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FOREWORD
Hawthorne's oeuvre is decisively modern.
future and speaks to us today.

It arrives out of the

It is audacious. 1

In so far as it speaks

against the unquestioned perceptual and metaphysical bias of the age, a
bias immediately contingent upon the scientific-technological world-view
which had exhaustively informed the most basic posture of Western
civilization since the Renaissance, Hawthorne's work affectively articulates a counter-environment or "world" in opposition to the tradition
from whence it obtains.

Over and against the predominantly transparent

"rationalism" of his day, and its divergent conspicuousness in both
idealism and transcendentalism, Hawthorne's fiction discloses a
revolutionary moment in its discovery of the world, a moment liberated
from the scientific-technological objectification of Being in order to
become apparent.

Thus articulated, the world no longer constitutes the

transparent reflection of a consciousness whose "content" is already
determined ahead of itself, but rather becomes an indivisible part of the
opaque and situated unitary structure, being-in-the-world.

At the same

time, Hawthorne's work performs an ontological reduction of Being, disclosing the bankruptcy of an intelligence which ignores its own affective
basis or "ground" in pre-reflective understanding.

In its most radical

lcf. David Michael Levin, "The Novelhood of the Novel: The Limits
of Representation and the Modernist Discovery of Presence," Chicago
Review, 48 (Spring 1977) : 87--"The modernist novel is a scandal. Not
even the boldest .of the old masters, excepting, perhaps Laurence Sterne
(consider Tristram Shandy) and Nathaniel Hawthorne (consider 'Rappaccini's
Daughter,' 'Dr. Heidegger's Experiment' and 'My Kinsman, Major Molineaux'
[sic]), would have dared the audacities of our modernist writers."
vi

manifestation, this reduction of Being in Hawthorne's oeuvre takes the
form, "head" versus "heart."

But how, specifically, does this articu-

lation come about, and to what does it point?
Although it seems that Hawthorne never developed a systematic
philosophy, his own comments in the notebooks, as well as the fiction
itself, reveal a persistent concern with the complex tradition out of
which the oeuvre arises.

Like the present, Hawthorne's age was beseiged

by rapid technological advances whereby it became increasingly more
difficult to situate one's "self" in the world.

Eminently, as a man of

his time, Hawthorne felt the necessity to transact the perceptual and
ontological issues raised by the cultural milieu in which he lived.
Thus, Hawthorne's fiction displays, throughout, a marked fascination with
two predominant media which attained to their fullest development at this
time:

daguerreotype and diorama.

In the following work I am suggesting

that Hawthorne discovered in the daguerreotype and diorama two
descriptive models which would acconunodate the reciprocal postures "head"
and "heart. 11

Similarly, both models reflect a set of perceptual and

ontological assumptions about the world which they portray.
time and space, for example, are fixed and frozen.

"Daguerrean"

Here the percipient

is without, looking upon a static moment and "perspective" space.

He

sets himself apart from and against the world in order to objectify its
11

content;" and to this extent, the world becomes a comprehensive picture

or view.
attitude.

Hawthorne's villains, without exception, assume such an
In effect, Hawthorne's scientists, reformers, and

."intellectuals" in general seek not so much to dis-cover the world, but
rather to verify their own presuppositions.
vii

11

Dioramic 11 time and space,

on the other hand, are fluid, transpositional, metamorphic.

Here the

percipient is within or "situated," looking upon an unframed perception
where both "subject" and "object" equiprimordially constitute the
phenomenal structure, being-in-the-world.

Thus, the dioramic point of

view is always ambiguously incomplete, and constitutes an authentically
open bearing toward the existent as a whole.

Metaphysically speaking,

Hawthorne's oeuvre implicitly translates both the daguerrean attitude of
the "head" and the dioramic attitude of the "heart" into the realm of
"subjectivity" as analogous models of logic.

In Heideggerian terms, that

mode of consciousness proper to the daguerrean model corresponds to the
logic of calculating reason:
That mode of

consciousne~s

the world's inner space:

Descartes' consciousness of the ego cogito.

proper to the dioramic model corresponds to
Pascal's logic of the heart.

In Hawthorne's

work, an ontological conversion of consciousness ensues whenever the
daguerrean manipulation and objectification of Being is turned toward the
dioramic interior of the heart's inner space:
Roderick Elliston.

such is the case with

For only when the "scientific" or self-assertive

attitude (Hawthorne's "unpardonable sin") is turned toward the heart's
interior does man appropriate the existent as a whole.

The converted

consciousness engages in "saying" without the self-imposing willing of
desire--without calculating reason and its objectification of Being.
is to say Being; it is to be; it is to care.
conversion with language:

It

Thus, man accomplishes this

witness Dimmesdale' s final "revelation."

In

speaking the truth of his heart, Dimmesdale returns to the fullness of
Being, the very fullness of the existent itself wherein Being .is always
situated--that is, Being-there (Da-sein).
viii

Conversely, the self-imposing

attitude characteristic of Hawthorne's villains never turns this
conversion; it violates the human heart; it turns away from the heart; it
makes of the heart an object; such is the case with Ethan Brand.

To

repose in this attitude is to stand apart from Being, to stand outside
Being:

witness Chillingworth, Hollingsworth, and Westervelt.
Furthermore, located within the tradition from whence this

dichotomy between head and heart originates, its ground is discernible in
nothing less than the subject-object dichotomy itself, a dichotomy which
had informed the most elemental presuppositions concerning the nature of
"reality" throughout the history of Western civilization as a whole.
Thus, the subject-object dichotomy, and its "artistic" delineation in
Hawthorne as head versus heart, points to an historical context which
Hawthorne's oeuvre disrupts.

Because Hawthorne's work implicitly sets

out to destruct or de-construct the referential surface of the metaphysical world-picture which had so unequivocally articulated the subjectobject dichotomy ever since the Renaissance, I have felt it necessary to
explore the background of that tradition in some detail.

Thus, the

first two chapters of the present work investigate the uniquely Western
and essentially philosophical tradition which Hawthorne's oeuvre
affectively destroys.

Similarly, the two complimentary chapters which

conclude the present work specifically address the Hawthorne canon in
terms of the aforementioned context.

In other words, the dissertation

generally takes the form of a structural "gestalt," wherein Chapters I
and II constitute the "ground" or background, while Chapters III and IV
constitute the "figure" itself, that is, Hawthorne's oeuvre.

Hence,

although Hawthorne rhetorically abhorred the lifeless abstractions of
ix

philosophy as such, it is my sincere hope that the following discussion
will disclose Hawthorne's work in a way which will make it appear to us
again, for Hawthorne's work is out of the future and speaks to us today.
Finally, in so far as the present work essentially constitutes a
phenomenological approach to Hawthorne's oeuvre, it assumes on the part
of the reader at least a passing familiarity with certain contemporary
thinkers--specifically, the basic writings of Martin Heidegger and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

The obvious limitations of time and space

prohibit a more detailed philosophical explication of the terms herein
employed other than what is explicitly set forth in the first two
chapters.

Unavoidably, that explication will be inordinate for some,

and insufficient for others.

Throughout, however, I ask the reader to

bear in mind that whenever the terms "subject" and "object" are utilized,
they refer to the single, unitary structure "being-in-the-world," which
is never divisible ontologically and which signifies the primordial
structure from whence the possibility of the subject-object dichotomy
misunderstandingly originates in the first place.

Otherwise, it is hoped

the following schema will clarify some of the basic distinctipps
taken for granted in the present work. 2

alte~4Y

Whenever an inquiry i$

"ontological," its object is Being (Sein); its terms are designated as
"existentials;" the status of occurrence is designated as "factical;" and
the type of self-awareness which accompanies the inquiry is "existential."
Reciprocally, whenever an inquiry is "antic," its object is some Entity
(Das Sciende); its terms are designated as "categories;" the status of
2cf. Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time,"
(New York: Harper and Row, A Harper Torchbook, 1970), pp. 19-24.
X

occurrence is designated as "factual;" and the type of self-awareness
which accompanies the inquiry is "existentiell."

In so far as the present

investigation seeks to phenomenologically disclose the ontological ground
of Hawthorne's oeuvre, it is always directed toward the "existential"
self-awareness which the world of Hawthorne's work figures forth, the
very self-awareness toward which the villains that populate Hawthorne's
fictional world have already closed themselves off.

To the extent that

Hawthorne's villains treat Dasein as merely another object in objective
space, they characteristically articulate the type of "ontical attitude"
which Hawthorne's work brings to account.

It is precisely this

ontological bearing that grounds the world of Hawthorne's work and, at
the same time, speaks to us today in its own significant voice, a voice
which is both silent and alien because it is too near.

The authentically

reticent discourse of Hawthorne's oeuvre echoes the void between Being
and nothingness, and re-soundingly calls us to care.

xi

CHAPTER I
DAGUERREOTYPE AND WORLD-VIEW:

THE FRAME

The eighteenth century explicitly articulated an attitude constitutive of the most elementary vector of Western civilization since the
Renaissance.

Cartesian metaphysics had already solidified this position

when it defined the existent as objectivity of representation, and truth
as certainty of representation;! as such, the existent is only in so far
as it is set before us as an object, as something calculable.

By

defining the existent as that which is re-presented "objectively," man
simultaneously sets himself up as the real and uniquely meaningful
subject independent of a world in which he finds himself situated.

He

subsequently appropriates the meaning of the existent merely as a superfluous footnote to himself.

He becomes, in fact, the center of the

world, the center of the existent as a whole, the "measure" of all things.
This process whereby man "sets up," "sets before," and "sets apart" at the
same time discloses the most basic exercise of modern history:

"the more

completely and thoroughly the conquered world stands at our disposal,··. the
more objective the object seems to be, the more subjectively--that is,
the more prominently--does the subjectum rise up, and the more inevitably
do contemplation and explanation of the world and doctrine about the
world turn into a doctrine of man, into anthropology."2

Only when man

!Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World View," trans.
Marjorie Grene, Boundary 2 4 (Winter 1976) : 349.
2Ibid., pp. 352-53.
1

2

sets himself apart from the existent do the resultant subjective and
objective postures mutually condition one another so that "reality"
becomes a problem.

Hence, in an attempt to solve this pseudo-problem,

the dichotomy between subject and object, man, metaphysically cut off and
isolated from the world qua world, consequently adopts an attitude or
view towards the world whereby it exists only to the extent that it is
determinate.

Moreover, this prospect of the world, as an object of

transcendental inquiry about which absolute knowledge is possible,
represents an attitude peculiarly and voluntarily maintained by man
himself.

This anthropological analysis of the world, which attained

exclusive prominence at the end of the eighteenth century, persists
today more vigorously than ever before and is essentially characterized,
thus, by having a "world-view" (Weltanschauung).
As the subject of a world-view--that is, as that existent who has
an entirely determinate frame of reference and to whom no "objective"
domain is inaccessible--man thereby constitutes the "norm" of truth, the
absolute standard by which something is said to be certain or not.

Man

simultaneously gets himself "into the picture" as that cogitatio whose
positing consciousness can re-present the whole picture to itself, a
-third person process determining every modality of the res extensa.3

By

being in the frame of his own view, as another object in an object-world,
man acquires a specific view of the world which in its most radical
significance means simply a completed view of man.

This implies that

he is able to deal with the existent; he is equipped to negotiate it
and, similarly, to determine it.
3Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans.
Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 80.

3

But in so far as man thus puts himself into the picture, he
puts himself into the setting, that is, into the open horizon of
the universally and openly represented. Therefore man posits
himself as the setting, in which the existent must from now on
represent itself, present itself, that is, be a view or picture.
Man becomes the representative of the existent in the sense of the
objective.
What is decisive is that man himself takes this viewpoint as
produced by himself, maintains it voluntarily as that taken by
himself, and as the basis of a possible development of humanity.
Now, for the first time, there is such a thing as a viewpoint of
man. Man takes on himself the manner in which he is to stand to
the existent as the objective. That type of being-a-man begins
which uses the sphere of human powers as the place for measuring
and accomplishing the mastery of the existent as a whole. The
age which is determined by this event is not only for retrospective reflection a new one as against the preceding one, but it
asserts itself specifically as the new one. To be new is peculiar
to the world which has become a view.4
Thus, by placing itself in the forefront of the frame as subjectum,
second-order consciousness paradoxically encloses a world delinquently
withheld from ambiguity, a world whose total space encompasses not only
the view, but the viewer as well in so far as he transparently transfers
himself back upon the very frame of reference itself.

But to the extent

that man maintains this over-view, he simultaneously over-looks the more
primordial phenomenon of experience and focuses exclusively on the world
as an "object" of experience.

Indeed, "the existent holds as existent

only in so far as and to the extent that it is drawn into and back to
this life, that it is lived through or experienced and becomes experience." 5

Because he thus entertains a view of life, man brings his own

life into the picture as the norm, a posture universally susceptible to
truth; he subsequently posits objectivity or "correctness" as the
standard of truth itself.

As a concept mutually agreed upon, the truth

of the world becomes a representable fact.
4Heidegger, "World View," pp. 351-52.

And as that existent which
5rbid.,_ p. 353.

4

goes about determining the content of this factuality, man "brings into
play the unlimited power of calculation, planning, and cultivation of
all things.

Science as research is art indispensable form of this

adjustment in the world, one of the paths on which the modern age races
to the fulfillment of its nature with a velocity unknown to the participants."6
Like Descartes' meditating Ego, the impartial spectator
(uninteressierter Zuschauer) of scientific observation

makes no attempt

to discover, or rediscover, an already given rationality, but establishes
itself by an act of initiative which has no guarantee in Being, "its
justification resting entirely on the effective power which it confers on
us by taking our own history upon ourselves."?

The scientific method

unquestioningly accepts perception as a kind of window which opens onto
things, an act directed towards a truth-in-itself "in which the reason
underlying all appearances is to be found."8

Tacitly implied in this

assumption is the belief that the perspective of individual consciousnesses can ultimately be co-ordinated, removing all contradiction in so
far as "what is now indeterminate for me could become determinate for a
more complete knowledge, which is as it were realized in advance in the
thing, or rather which is the thing itself."9

The scientific attitude

thus schizophrenically deserts its ontological ground and ceases to
recognize its "place" in its determinate view of the world.

Repressively

isolated not only from itself but also the world it seeks to frame,
scientific consciousness, like the world-view, thus levels down all
6Ibid.

7Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. xx.

Brbid., p. 54.

9rbid.

5

experience:

"in face of the constituting I, the empirical selves are

objects."10

Moreover, because it frames a view of the world solely

constituted by the res

exte~,

the history of science represents

nothing less than a history of the thing perceived.
The ideality of the object, the objectification of the living body,
the placing of spirit in an axiological dimension having no common
measure with nature, such is the transparent philosophy arrived at
by pushing further along the route of knowledge opened up by
perception. It could be held that perception is an incipient
science, science a methodical and complete perception, since
science was merely following uncritically the ideal of knowledge
set up by the perceived thing.ll
It is in this sense that Heidegger speaks of the "battle" of world-views
taking place today.

Because the basic process of modern times has come

to mean the conquest of the world as picture, the world view now means
the product of representational building:

"In it man fights for the

position in which he can be that existent which sets the standard for
all existence and forms the directive for it." 12

Furthermore, this

battle for supremacy rages "not between world views at random, but only
between those which have already taken extreme basic positions of man
with the last decisiveness."l3

Even today, this opposition is chiefly

characterized by the kind of attitude Kepler displayed toward Fludd when
he was attacked for his strict adherence to scientific measurement and
objectivity:

Kepler replied, "Caudam ego teneo sed manu, tu caput

amplectaris mente, modo ne somnians"--"You may embrace the head (of the
universe) but you do so only in your mind, nay, in your dreams; I have
10Ibid., p. 56.
llibid.
12Heidegger, "World View," p. 353.
I3Ibid.
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merely the tail, but that I hold in my hand."14

Unfortunately, neither

thinker sought the "whole" on the hither side of this ingeminated
distinction.
The traditional subject-object dichotomy continues to inform
various contemporary world-views, although in physics the discovery of
the quantum of action has initiated a general collapse of this
foundation.

The category "natural object" was, perhaps, the first to

disappear; for its part, the organism no longer presents physico-chemical
analysis "with the practical difficulties of a complex object, but with
the theoretical difficulty of a meaningful being." 15

As the Nobel

Prize-winning physicist, W. Pauli, has remarked:
Though we now have natural sciences, we no longer have a total
scientific picture of the world. Since the discovery of the
quantum of action, physics has gradually been forced to relinquish
its proud claim to be able to understand, in principle, the whole
world. This very circumstance, however, as a correction of
earlier one-sidedness, could contain the germ of progress toward
a unified conception of the entire cosmos of which the natural
sciences are only a part.16
Whatever may be eventually resolved from such a recognition, it
remains true, even today, that science for the most part tenaciously
adheres to its traditional view of the world, whereby the scient.ific
concept fixes phenomena objectively.

It orders the world by virtue of a·

rationalism which ignores the phenomenal experience of chaos, defining a
theoretical state of bodies not subject to the action of any force, and
14Apologia adversus demonstrationem analyticam Roberti de
Fluctibus, quoted in Erwin Panofsky, "Artist, Scientist, Genius: Notes
on the 'Renaissance-Dannnerung,'" in The Renaissance: Six Essays
(New York: Harper and Row, Inc., Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp. 181-82.
15Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 56.
16"The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of
Kepler," quoted in Panofsky, The Renaissance, p. 182.
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thus ipso facto defining force itself.
The notion of geometrical space, indifferent to its contents, that
of pure movement which does not by itself affect the properties of
the object, provided phenomena with a setting of inert existence
in which each event could be related to physical conditions
responsible for the changes occurring, and therefore contributed
to this freezing of being which appeared to be the task of
physics. In thus developing the concept of the thing, scientific
knowledge was not aware that it was working on a presupposition.l7
And though a few may recognize today that nature "is not in itself
geometrical, and it appears so only to a careful observer who contents
himself with macrocosmic data,"l8 the scientific pre-supposition
continues to structure the majority view which sees the world as the
completed picture of its own conceptual frame.

Yet, in order to explain

the upsurge of reason "in a world not of its making and to prepare the
substructure of living experience without which reason and liberty are
emptied of their content and wither away," we must see rationalism
itself"' in a historical perspective which it set itself on principle to
avoid."l9

I

The Middle Ages had conceived of a picture as "a material,
impenetrable surface on which figures and things are depicted.n20
. Similarly, what it had called perspectiva was merely optics, that is,
"an elaborate theory of vision which attempted to determine the
structure of the natural visual image by mathematical means but did not
attempt to teach the artist how to reproduce this image in a painting or
17Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 54.
18Ibid., p. 56.

19Ibid., pp. 56-57.

20Panofsky, The Renaissanc~, p. 124.

8

drawing." 21

It was not until about 1420 that Filippo Brunelleschi

defined the painting as "a plane cross section through the pencil of rays
connecting the eye of the painter (and the beholder) with the object or
.
obJects
seen, n22 so that by around 1435 Leone Battista Alberti was able

to formulate the picture as a "pariete di vetro" or "an imaginary windowpane through which we look out into a section of space." 23

Because the

Renaissance predicated its radically new approach to the visible world
upon this neoteric definition of artistic construction

~nd

represen-

tation,24 the world itself became uniformly spatial in so far as it could
be geometrically articulated.

Indeed, this revolutionary technique for

graphic representation created the very possibility of an objective
science; and it is fair to say that the subsequent development of all the
sciences during the Renaissance was directly contingent upon it:
perspective laid the foundation for advances in botany, palaeontology,
physics, zoology, and both projective and analytical geometry.25

But

above all, this new pictorial or "artificial" perspective enabled the
science of anatomy to explore the interior space of the human body with
an objective precision hitherto impossible.

Leonardo's Situs drawings,

for example, not only co-relate perspective images with vertical and
horizontal sections, but also demonstrate the internal organs in
transparency;26 and his "serial sections" represent "a concrete,
surgical application of a method of geometrical projection developed by

••
Piero della Francesa and later on adopted by Durer:
21rbid., pp. 131-32.
24rbid.

22rbid. , p. 133.

the plotting of a

23 rbid., p. 124.

25rbid., pp. 140 and 133, respectively.

26rbid., p. 148.

9

series of cross-sections through the human body preparatory to exact
.
.
n27
perspect1ve
construct1on.

I n t h is respect, Andreas Vesa 1 ius '

De humani corporis fabrica (1543) marks the inception of a new era in
anatomical investigation.28

Science had securely commenced its

transparent mission of seeing through the world.
At the same time that anatomy negotiated the transparency of the
individual object, the human body and its parts, another science was
breaking fresh ground on a reciprocal front.

In the very same year that

Vesalius published his Fabrica, Copernicus unequivocally formulated the
new astronomy; by placing the earth in its "proper" perspective, he
articulated the geometrically "correct" space of the world.

And like

anatomy, the external world demonstrated its own theory of proportions
which would henceforth locate the res extensa within a transparent view
uniformly ingressive to all by virtue of its mathematical constitution.
To the degree that the world had become geometrically spatial, man had
become an observer--the dis-interested spectator of his view.

Once the

Renaissance had introduced perspective into painting, the art work
. necessarily engaged man as a spectator tll.rough the instrwnentality of
its visual

~niform

space.

Having ceased to participate in the world,

man henceforth negotiates the existent. in terms of its geometric
continuity; for what, after all, constitutes scientific observation but
an attitude which varies the point of view while keeping the object
fixed?29

The object, as such, represents an invariable structure

27Ibid., PP· 153-55.
28George Sarton, "The Quest for Truth:
the Renaissance," in The Renaissance, p. 70.

Scientific Progress During

29Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. 90-92.
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existing in a theoretical space so that between the subjectum and the
existent as a whole there abides a spatial continuum which, focused in
the predetermined depth of an "objective" vanishing point, not only
requires 20/20 vision for its epistemological certainty, but also
constitutes a "psychological" inter-action.

Indeed, once the existent

becomes that upon which man "reflects" he has already separated himself
from the existent as a whole.

In this sense, the twentieth-century

rhetoric of alienation is by no means indigenous to the century itself;
its origin extends as far back as the Renaissance:
Lear, or for that matter--Oedipus.

witness Hamlet and

Because our thinking is so

irretrievably established in spatial perspective, we are always "subject"
to being out of place; that is, alienated.

Consequently, we even think

of time as a function of perspective space, for who would care to
qualify my previous statement that alienation extends as "far back" as
the Renaissance?

Pictorial perspective thus successfully transferred a

transparent consciousness onto the world itself in so far as man now
possessed the fiducial means of seeing through it.

Confidently poised

outside the world, the scientific vision macrographically guaranteed that
man could, once and for all, get a view of the world, a picture of the
whole thing.

Even today, such an eminent scientific figure as the late

George Sarton could say with a straight face:
Many people misunderstand science, and hence one can hardly
expect them to have a fair idea of its history. The history of
science might be defined as the history of the discovery of
objective truth, of the gradual conquest of matter by the human
mind; it describes the age-long and endless struggle for the
freedom of thought •
The history of science is one of the essential parts of the
spiritual history of mankind; the other main parts are the history
of art and the history of religion. It differs from these other
parts in that the development of knowledge is the only development
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which is truly cumulative and progressive. Hence, if we try to
explain the progress of mankind, the history of science should be
the very axis of our explanation.30
Copernicus would have agreed; and it remained for Kepler to establish

'

the new world picture, vis-a-vis advancing technological developments,
with finality.
By virtue of its naive anopia, however, science simultaneously
developed a tell-tale symptom characteristic of its historical
motivation up to, and including, the present.

At the very time when man

was beginning to "conquer" nature, Copernicus ironically shoved him out
of the center of the picture.

The repercussions from this infantile

trauma have haunted the scientific vision ever since; for a lurking
doubt astigmatically disrupts the superficial correctness of this view,
the doubt, be it ever so small, that the world might just be slightly
larger than itself.

Beneath its bravado-exterior there persistently

dwells a cancerous anxiety, an anarthric apprehension that someday the
world will fool it, just as it manipulatively "fools" with the world.
And as its April-fool mentality nonchalantly manipulates the world and
steals the object from a setting, it reciprocally fears that at any
moment its cleptobiotic joke may back-fire.

By framing its view, .

moreover, toward a transparent cross-section of theoretical space,
science paradoxically negates the very over-view it claims to
appropriate.

Since science can only manipulate its objects within the

conceptual frame of an ideal space, it de-limits its own capacity to see
in terms of the very frame it requires in order to freeze being.

Thus,

to the extent that it sees through the opacity of things by virtue of
30sarton, The Renaissance, p. 55.
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its frame, science, in effect, peeps at the world.

It peeps at the

world in order to catch it by surprise in the same way that it "listens"
to the world in order to "over-hear" the secrets of the universe, its
transparent design.

Wordsworth's indictment of "One that would peep and

botanize/Upon his mother's grave"31 perhaps expresses it best.

By

divorcing its objects, as well as itself, from the situation, from
incarnate being, science simultaneously severs the thing from matter
itself, and its "ideas" from the form of its own "body" (of knowledge).
This is why science is always in the act of cutting off its own head;
but in the process it goes blind, of course.

In order to avoid this

discomfort, it subsequently enlisted the aid of technology which
courteously obliged to become its handmaiden, though in outward posture
only.

For ever since, technology has led it by the hand.

Together,

these two make a charming but dangerous couple.
Science manipulates things and gives up living in them. It makes
its own limited models of things; operating upon these indices or
variables to effect whatever transformations are permitted by
their definition, it comes face to face with the real world only
at rare intervals. Science is and always has been that admirably
active, ingenious, and bold way of thinking whose fundamental bias
is to treat everything as though it were an object-in-general--as
though it meant nothing to us and yet was predestined for our own
use.32
In so far, then, as the new representational technique of perspective
delineated the space of an "objective" world and created the basis for an
"objective" science during the Renaissance, it subsequently fostered the
metaphysical world-picture whereby the subjectum negotiates the world
31Wordsworth: Poetical Works, ed. Thomas Hutchinson, rev. ed.
Ernest de Selincourt (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 380.
32Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 159.
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from an un-situated, theoretical point of view; that is, outside of it.
Once the world became transparent, it ceased to be that space where man
comes up "against" things, and became, instead, the luminous reflection
of consciousness.

Yet, the metaphysical picture itself required its own

articulation; and Descartes filled the bill.
Throughout the greater part of the sixteenth century, art and
science had evolved together, but by the end of that century the "divine
madness" of Neo-Platonism had inspired such art theorists as
Raffaele Borghini, Gregorio Comanini, and Federico Zuccari to openly
attack science, especially mathematics, as an enslavement of the
spirit.33

The fact that the world of science was "increasingly

dominated by telescopic and microscopic instrumentation served to
estrange it from the world of the artist;"34 and via the Neo-Platonic
gospel of supra-rationalism, art itself turned away from the imprisonment of all "rational" rules:

"It was realized that the numerous planes

which the Renaissance had projected onto one surface were, in fact,
distinct and had to be separated again--according to principles which
could become evident only once the projection had been performed."35
Descartes' metaphysics unequivocally framed the completed picture of
this separation between Nee-Platonic "subjectivity" and scientific
"objectivity;" vis-'a-visthe "cogito" and "res extensa," Descartes
fixed the world in its proper perspective; that is, he saw it as a view.
Taking his lead from mathematics, Descartes defined the existent in
terms of that continuous and uniform space constituted by a reflecting
33Panofsky, The Renaissanc~, p. 175.
34rbid., p. 178.

3Srbid., p. 175.
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subject; and from this geometrically transparent consciousness he
concluded to the existence of God and of the world itself.

To negotiate

the world in this fashion subsequently became "rational;" so that even
today we speak of having a "rational" perspective on the thing in the
sense that we see it "correctly," in its objectively proper place with
respect to a complete continuum or whole picture, detached from our own
"subjective" bias, that is, outside of our "self."

And once the world is

thought outside us, it has already become conceptual--an observation.
From its disinterested vantage point, rationalism refuted the situation
in favor of an all-encompassing view of the spectacle of the world; but
to the extent that it constitutes a view at all, it is all-encompassing
not in the sense that it sees "around" any thing, but rather in the sense
that it sees from a certain perspective--the rational or theoretically
ubiquitous point of view.

Rationalism represents the only perspective

from which one can correctly observe the truth, for it fixes the object
before it varies the point of view.

Grounded in the single horizon of

the object itself, rationalism holds the whole world before a gaze
simultaneously everywhere and nowhere.

Paradoxically, however, this

ubiquitous vision always remains invisibly de-limited by the limitations
of its frame; because it necessarily envisions its world outside itself,
it exclusively appropriates a single horizon, a vanishing point which
unambiguously adheres to its objects without exception. -Like the
Renaissance painting, it thereby sees through its invisible "windowpane"
onto the world.

It can only know the world, then, in so far as it sets

itself apart from it by virtue of a theoretical frame; whatever cannot
be framed cannot be known; that is, it does not really exist.

To the

degree that object and frame constitute center and margin, rationalism
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merely comes into the possession of an equally determinate peripheral
vision;36 but this is nothing more than the distinction between object and
subject expressly delineated via the perspective of the world-view itself.
In his effort to define certainty in terms of quantitative measurementor "correctness," Descartes thus ascribed the "reality" of the world
to "rational" space alone.

In effect, then, re-presentation (Vor-stellen)

bestows an intelligibility upon the epistemological distinction between
subject and object, and the pseudo-problem of "reality," by accommodating
both the external and internal world in such a way that they make "sense."
The Lear landscape in Shakespeare offers a close counterpart to the
Durer illustration showing a perspective drawing being made through
a transparent screen. The artist fixes himself in position,
allowing neither himself or his model to move. He then proceeds to
match dots on the picture plane with corresponding dots on the
visual image, a rather bizarre anticipation of the head clamps of
Daguerre. This is the kind of "single vision" that William Blake
later deprecated as "single vision and Newton's sleep." It
consists basically in a process of matching outer and inner
representation. That which was faithfully represented or repeated
has ever since been held to be the very criterion of rationality
and reality.37
Similarly, Descartes' severation between subject and object set in
motion a subsequent explanation of both "entities" along historical lines
which further isolated the one from the other,
We have become accustomed, through the influence of the Cartesian
tradition, to jettison the subject: the reflective attitude
simultaneously purifies the common notions of body and soul by
defining the body as the sum of its parts with no interior, and the
soul as a being wholly present to itself without distance. These
definitions make matters perfectly clear both within and outside
ourselves: we have the transparency of an object with no secret
recesses, the transparency of a subject which is nothing but what
it thinks it is. The object is an object through and through, and
36Marshall McLuhan and Harley Parker, Through the Vanishing
Point: Space in Poetry and Painting (New York: Harper and Row, Inc.,
1968), p. 20.
37rbid., p. 16.
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consciousness a consciousness through and through. There are two
senses, and two only, of the word 'exist': one exists as a thing
or else one exists as a consciousness.38
For Newton the existent became known as correct or true to the extent
that it was represented as a refractive condition of the eye; for Kant
the existent became known as correct or true in so far as it was
represented either as a determinate concept, that is, through the instrumentality of the

~

priori forms of the categories of the understanding,

or as an indeterminate concept of an "aesthetic" object.

Thus, both the

"scientific" and "intellectual" attitude came to be predicated on the
analogous operation of

re~presentation.

With respect to Newton's eye and

Kant's mind's eye, the subjectum knows, in fact "experiences," the
existent according to the perspective-view precisely because he is
already positioned outside the existent itself.
Writing to Francis Bacon in 1620, Sir Henry Wotton told of a visit
to Kepler, where he saw a "draft of a landscape on a piece of paper,
methought masterly done;"39 and to Wotton's surprise, Kepler remarked
that he had made the picture from,
a little black tent . • • exactly close and dark, save at one hole,
about an inch and a half in the diameter, to which he applies a
long perspective trunk, with a convex glass fitted to the said
hole, and the concave taken out at the other end • • • through
which the visible radiations of all the objects without are intromitted, falling upon a paper • . . and so he traceth them with his
pen in their natural appearance.40
Kepler's "little black tent" was, of course, a camera obscura; and it
became his visible model for the human eye.

Although Giambattista della

38Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 198.
39The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton, ed. Logan Pearsall
Smith, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1907), 2:205.
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;

40rbid., p. 206 .
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Porta had popularized it in the sixteenth century, the first published
account appeared in Vitruvius' Architecture (1521).

While others before

Kepler had remarked its analogies to the human eye,41 Kepler was the
first to fully demonstrate its resemblance to vision; and it remained
for Scheiner to prove the hypothesis at his exhibition in Rome, 1625,
where he "cut away the coats of the back parts of eyes of sheep and oxen,
and, holding objects before them, saw the images of the objects clearly
and distinctly inverted upon the naked retina."42

Descartes' geometrical

vision was thus substantiated by these "pictures" painted on the eye, or
so it seemed.

Many thinkers of the period entertained the notion that in

the structure of the eye could be found that intermediary term or missing
link between the cogito and res extensa.

Of course, this represented

nothing more than a sophisticated rendition of the Cartesian pineal
gland, for positing an intermediary in any single part of the body still
pre-supposes unsituated Being.

In his Essay Concerning Human Understand-

ing (1690), Locke's dark-room analogy of the camera obscura extends this
kind of thinking toward the epistemological problem, his famous "closetsimile" expresses it thus:
methinks, the Understanding is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut
from light, with only some little opening left, to let in external
visible Resemblances, or Ideas of things without; would the
Pictures coming into such a dark Room but stay there, and lie so
orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble
the Understanding of a Man, in reference to all Objects of sight,
and the Ideas of them.43
41Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Newton Demands the Muse (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 78.
42Ibid., p. 79.
43John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H.
Nidditch (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 163.
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As the link between subject and object, the camera obscura thoroughly
conditioned both philsophical and scientific attitudes during the
seventeenth century so that Plato's figure in the cave, vigilantly
observing the shadows on the wall, became the dominant symbol of the age.
Newton's Opticks (1704) solidified the theoretical implications of
the previous century, confirming scientific corroboration that the
pictures of external objects are, indeed, "propogated by Motion along the
Fibres of the Optick Nerves into the Brain," and constitute the very
"cause of vision."44

'·.

Light which comes from the several _Points of the Object is so
refracted by the transparent skins and humours of the Eye • • • as
to converge and meet again in so many Points in the bottom of the
Eye, and there to paint the Picture of the Object upon that
skin • • . with which the bottom of the Eye is covered. For
Anatomists, when they have taken off from the bottom of the Eye
that outward and most thick Coat called the Dura Mater, can then
see through the thinner Coats, the Pictures of Objects lively
painted thereon.45
Nevertheless, such questions as why we see in single vision, not double,
and why we see color, shape, and magnitude remained ambiguous; for
Newton's theory demonstrated how we "see," but failed to show us how we
"perceive."

This was a problem which had perplexed not only Newton, but

also Descartes, Kepler, and Locke as well.

Newton's answer was

characteristically naive, and no more addressed the fundamental issue
than Descartes' Dioptric.

We perceive, said Newton, via the "Sensorium:"

"Is not the Sensory of Animals that place to which the sensitive
Substance is present, and into which the sensible Species of Things are
carried through the Nerves and Brain, that there they may be perceived
44sir Isaac Newton, Opticks, based on 4th ed. London, 1730
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952), p. 15.
45rbid.

19
by their immediate presence to that Substance."46

Yet, try as he might,

Newton's "eye" could discern neither the situation of perception in the
subject, nor "Light and its Effects upon the Frame of Nature;" but then,
it did not have to:

there remained that incorporeal, omnipresent Being

"who in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory, sees the things themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them
wholly by their immediate presence to himself."47

It was not until the

nineteenth century, however, that God's "sensorium" became the explicit
vision of science:

witness Mary Shelley's Frankenstein.

At any rate,

the great Newton's authority now stood behind that view of the world
which envisioned roan as the dis-interested spectator of a vast and
comprehensive mathematical system or "picture," as Edwin Arthur Burtt
put it,
whose regular motions according to mechanical principles constituted the world of nature. The gloriously romantic universe of
Dante and Milton, that set no bounds to the imagination of man as
it played over space and time, had now been swept away • • • •
The world that people had thought themselves living in--a world
rich with colour and sound, redolent with fragrance, filled with
gladness, love and beauty, speaking everywhere of purposive
harmony and creative ideals--was crowded now into minute corners
in the brains of scattered organic beings. The really important
world outside was a world hard, cold, colourless, silent, and
dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable
motions in mechanical regularity.48
Or as Alfred North Whitehead similarly remarked, speaking of the
seventeenth-century scientific world-view, whatever theory you chose
"there is no light or colour as a fact in external nature.

There is

46rbid., p. 370.
47Ibid., pp. 405 and 370, respectively.
48Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical_ Science, rev. ed.
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1932), pp. 236-37.

20
merely motion of material:" thus, "Nature is a dull affair, soundless,
scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly,
meaninglessly."49

Such was the world of Descartes, Kepler, Locke, and

Newton.
At the other extreme, a certain mental disposition, ideologically
similar, had been simultaneously negotiating a theoretical world "out
there," but from the opposite point of view.

Rather than interrogate the

res extensa as such, this reciprocal attitude emphasized the problematic
character of the cogito itself; yet, the basic pre-supposition of a
theoretical space framed by the perspective view continued to inform the
subject-object disjunction.

In his Discourse on Metaphysics (1686),

Leibniz argued against the possibility of conceiving an irregular event
since the mind is always able to construct or formalize a "regular"
design for it:
let us suppose for example that some one jots down a quantity of
points upon a sheet of paper helter skelter, as do those who
exercise the ridiculous art of Geomancy; now I say that it is
possible to find a geometrical line whose concept shall be uniform
and constant, that is, in accordance with a central formula, and
which line at the same time'shall pass through all of those
points, and in the same order.in which the hand jotted them doWJ}.
Moreover, if a continuous line be traced, which is now straight,
now circular, and now of any other description, it is possible to
find a mental equivalent, a formula or an equation common to all
the points of this line by virtue of which formula the changes in
the direction of the line must occur. There is no instance of a
face whose contour does not form part of a geometric line and
which can not be traced entire by a certain mathematical motion. 50
Like Descartes, Leibni.z once again assigns a transparent consciousness
49Science and the Modern World (New York:
1925), pp. 76 and 77~espectively.

The Macmillan Co.,

50Gottfried Wilhelm Von Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics,'' in
The European Philosophers: from Descartes to Nietzsche, ed. Monroe C.
Beardsley (New York: Random House, The Modern Library, 1960), pp. 254-55.
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onto the world; by treating an event as though it were a geometrical
form, Leibniz, in effect, conceives of temporality in terms of a
perspective space whose uniform continuity accomodates the whole picture
at once.

Because the world is ultimately theoretical, we can always have

a whole view of it via a lineal series of equations.

In such a way, the

mind is able to frame a regular or perspectived view, whereby everything
assumes its proper place.

Thus, time takes its place along-side the

other objects in a world where everything is only in so far as it can be
re-presented to us; and since it is essentially spatial, time becomes
determined by the spatial perspective itself--that is, the succession of
individual, isolated moments which regularly recede along a continuous
line toward an objectively determinate "form."

Again, Leibniz's account

of the regularity contingent upon the fact of mathematical "motion"
reminds us of the Durer illustration, whose contour can be traced
entirely by virtue of its representational cor.rectness.
Hume fell into the same trap.

His distinction between Mentory and

Imagination is literally "drawn" in terms of their respective
representational ability to produce a lively "image" or picture (Hume
sometimes uses the word "idea" for what we commonly mean by "image") to
the mind's eye.
We find by experience, that when any impression has been present
with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and
this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new
appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity,
and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or
when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The
faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner,
is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. 'Tis evident
at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively
and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former
faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any
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which are employ'd by the latter.51
The diction itself reveals the metaphorical frame of mind in which Hume
conceives of these faculties; they are defined in terms of their respective ability to "paint" the object in more or less "distinct colours."
But there is more to it than this:

consistent with the painting metaphor,

'

Hume attributes to the imagination, vis-a-vis its ability to grasp the
object, a certain facility for positioning our "self."

This perspective

on our self, in relation to the imagination's perspective on its object,
is both contingent upon time and space.
its object to the present time and place.

The imagination always relates
The more remote the object in

time or space, the more difficult is the task for the imagination, and
the greater the pleasure we derive from its use.

And though Hume admits

"the consequences of a removal in space are much inferior to those of a
removal in time,"52 he nevertheless conceives of the function of imagination primarily in spatial terms, for the removal in time is thought of as
a distance between individual successive moments.

In effect, then, the

imagination positions man with respect to its object as a relation of
perspective, that is, outside the existent itself.
'Tis obvious, that the imagination can never totally forget the
points of space and time, in which we are existent; but receives
such frequent advertisements of them from the passions and senses,
that however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote
objects, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present.
'Tis also remarkable, that in the conception of those objects,
which we regard as real and existent, we take them in their proper
order and situation, and never leap from one object to another,
which is distant from it, without running over, at least in a cursory manner, all those objects, which are interpos'd betwixt them.
51"A Treatise of Human Nature," in David Hume: The Philosophical
Works, ed. Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, 4 vols. (Darmstadt,
Germany: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964), 1:317-18.
52rbid., 2:206.
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When we reflect, therefore, on any object distant from ourselves,
we are oblig'd not only to reach it at first by passing thro' all
the intermediate space betwixt ourselves and the object, but also
to renew our progress every moment; being every moment recall'd to
the consideration of ourselves and our present situation.53
The specific discussion of the effect of spatial distance further
indicates that for Hume the imagination re-presents its objects as a
function of perspective:
'tis evident that the mere view and contemplation of any greatness,
whether successive or extended, enlarges the soul, and gives it
sensible delight and pleasure. A wide plain, the ocean, eternity,
a succession of several ages; all these are entertaining objects,
and excel every thing, however beautiful, which accompanies not its
beauty with a suitable greatness. Now when any very distant
object is presented to the imagination, we naturally reflect on the
interpos'd distance, and by that means, conceiving something great
and magnificent, receive the usual satisfaction. But as the fancy
passes easily from one idea to another related to it, and
transports to the second all the passions excited by the first, the
admiration, which is directed to the distance, naturally diffuses
itself over the distant object.54

a

Because Hume, like all the others, pre-supposes that the world is
objectively spatial, he can never get around the subject-object dilemma;
the world is known only to the extent that we can re-present it as a
picture or view outside the "self" or cogito.
Even Kant's "copernican revolution" was not sufficiently liberated
from this kind of thinking to free the object from its theoretical
manipulation, for Kant equally frames the world by making it immanent in
the subject, as Husser! observed.

His distinction between the empirical

"reproductive" Imagination and the transcendental "productive"
Imagination remains tied to the object as that concerning which we form
or "frame" an image.

By extending Hume's theory of imagination from the

empirical realm to the transcendental, Kant defined the imagination as
53Ibid., pp. 205-06.

54Ibid., pp. 209-210.
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that faculty which not only makes "sense" of the object immediately in
our presence and enables us to re-present an image of the object to our
mind when the object itself is absent, but also determines the form of
our sensations

3!_

priori.

Imaginative activity is one of "apprehension,"

that is, it mediates between sensation and intellection.

It consequently

contributes to our awareness of the world via its representational power
in so far as it forms images.

Because of its aesthetic significance,

however, we sometimes tend to forget the proposed function of the Third
Critigue; yet, Kant's primary purpose in the Critique of Judgment (1790)
was to link up Understanding to Reason by way of Judgment, specifically
the "reflective judgment," which from a particular "given" appropriates a
universal.

In ordinary perception, the imagination informs our sense

data and presents it to the understanding as a concept; and this
conceptualization, as the form of an object, for example, provides the
very possibility of representation in so far as it is constituted by
"regularity."

As Kant saw it, "The regularity which leads to the

concept of an object is indeed the indispensable condition (conditio sine
qua non) for grasping the object in a single representation and
determining the manifold in its form."55

Thus, Kant's epistemological

revolution continues to negotiate the object in spatial terms, for we
come to know the object in so far as it always presents itself to us in
the same conceptual "position."

In seeking to find a universal pattern

or "form" from a particular "given," the aesthetic judgment, as a specific kind of reflective judgment, employs the transcendental concept of
the "purposiveness of nature."

This, of course, does not mean that

55critigue of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York:
Publishing Co., 1968), p. 79.
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nature itself has a purpose or end, but rather that we assume some kind
of universal pattern in things prior to our seeking such a pattern.
"The purposiveness of nature is therefore a particular concept,
which has its origin solely in the reflective judgment."56

~priori,

As such, it

is entirely subjective, and attributes nothing to the object whatsoever.
This transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither
a natural concept nor a concept of freedom, because it ascribes
nothing to the object (of nature), but only represents the peculiar
way in which we must proceed in reflection upon the objects in
nature in reference to a thoroughly connected experience, and is
consequently a subjective principle (maxim) of the judgment.57
When the aesthetic judgment perceives this form in an object, and does so
with a contiguous pleasure derived from the harmonious inter-relation
between the understanding and the imagination, the object is said to be
"beautiful."

The transcendental concept of the purposiveness of nature

leads us then, as a subjective principle, to perceive the "purpose" in
the object itself--its form as an end internal to that object, and not as
a concept for the understanding.

Yet, what is the specific relation

between imagination and the aesthetic judgment?

How does the role of

the imagination as a function of aesthetic judgment differ from its role
as that representational faculty which presents images of the objects of
sensation to the understanding under a determinate concept?
When the imagination frames an image for the understanding, in our
ordinary perception of the world, it brings that object before the
understanding precisely as a determinate concept; whereas, when the
imagination frames an image for the understanding, in our perception of
an object as "aesthetic," the understanding confirms its concept of the
object as indeterminate.
56rbid., p. 17.

In the aesthetic judgment, the imagination is
57rbid., p. 20.
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not contingent upon the laws of association; it is free to focus on the
visible form itself, independent of a concept.

Indeed, the imagination

is liberated of any prior concept whatsoever, and subsequently able to
create its own.

Thus, between the imagination and the understanding

there is a subjective agreement only, and not an "objective" agreement as
there would be with a determinate concept.

In its freedom, then, the

imagination is productive and spontaneous; and this is what constitutes
its role in the aesthetic judgment.

It is the cause of the pleasure

derived from an aesthetic judgment at all times, regardless of whether or
not that judgment is of the beautiful or the sublime.

"Now, if in the

judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom, it
is in the first place not regarded as reproductive, as it is subject to
the laws of association, but as productive and spontaneous (as the author
of arbitrary forms of possible intuition)."58

For Kant, then, the

imagination is always distinguished as that faculty which "frames"
images; and is

fur~her

distinguished in the aesthetic judgment as that

faculty which freely frames its images, "the author of arbitrary forms of
possible intuition," independent of the determinate concepts of understanding.

Furthermore, Kant explains the distinction between the

"beautiful" and the "sublime" specifically in terms of the imagination's
ability to frame the image.

The beautiful is constituted or determined

by that freely framed image of the imagination brought to bear upon the
understanding as an indeterminate concept, and yet harmonious with it;
whereas, the sublime is determined by an object presented to reason as an
indeterminate idea, and, as such, the imagination is incapable of
ssibid., p. 77.

~
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framing an image at all.

The object suggests an idea of which no image

can be formed; the image-making facility of imagination has before it the
form of some object beyond which no further images are able to be
produced; the object suggests certain indeterminate ideas for which no
visible form can be created.

In this respect, the sublime does not

properly belong to nature at all, but constitutes a "pure" state of mind:
the sublime in nature is improperly so called and that, properly
speaking, the word should only be applied to a state of mind, or
rather to its foundation in human nature. The apprehension of an
otherwise formless and unpurposive object gives merely the
occasion through which we become conscious of such a state; the
object is thus employed as subjectively purposive, but is not
judged as such in itself and on account of its form (it is, as it
were, a species~inalis accepta, non data).59
Generally speaking, then, the empirical imagination is determined by the
"form" of sensation; on the other hand, the transcendental imagination
creates or constructs its own forms, it determines the form of sense
~priori.

Yet, for Kant, the imagination always mediates between

sensation and intellection according to its "formal" power; and to the
extent that the imagination must always "frame" its images, it puts them
in "perspective" in so far as it sets them before us within a single,
uniform, and theoretical space.60
Consciousness thus duplicates an absolute thought of the world;61
by de-limiting its objects, the only obstacle it encounters is chaos,
which is clearly nothing at all.62

Because consciousness constitutes

59rbid., p. 121.
60For a much more detailed discussion of how Imagination "frames"
its objects, see Mary Warnock, Imagination (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1976), pp. 41-66, to whom I am greatly indebted for the
above interpretation of Kant.
61Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. xvii.

62Ibid., pp. 27-28.
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everything, eternally possessing the intelligible structure of all its
objects, it never changes its structure with respect to the various
objects it appropriates;63 it merely de-lineates an entire pre-existing
world--a single and constant exterior horizon.

As with the scientific

perception, idealism restricts the freedom of its vision through an
artificial scope which, like the microscope and telescope, explains the
world according to an analytic of "true" and "correct" data.

"The

precise and entirely determinate world is still posited in the first
place, no longer perhaps as the cause of our perceptions, but as their
immanent end.

If the world is to be possible, it must be implied in the

first adumbration of consciousness, as the transcendental deduction so
forcibly brings out."64

If science maintained absolute faith in the

"object," representing a total picture of the world in terms of its
temporal-spatial constitution, it simultaneously treated consciousness as
the absolute transparency of the world.

Idealism, on the other hand,

represents the co-relative view, whereby the "subjecJ:" constitutes the
absolute "idea" of a determinate world in so far as he comes into the
possession of a completed system of "true" thoughts, "capable of coordinating all phenomena, a flat projection which clarifies all perspectives, a pure object upon which all subjective views open."65

Because i~

is thus "familiar" with absolute being, consciousness snatches the oneupmanship from science in so far as it no longer needs to "observe" the
world at all; by challenging the "illusion" as the illusion of illusions,
consciousness proclaims that it can only see what is.66

It is in this

sense that Heidegger defines the world-view as a view of life, whereby
63Ibid., p. 28.

64tbid., p. 31.

65tbid.' p. 40.

. 66tbid.' p. 41.
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the existent holds as existent only to the extent that it is lived
through or experienced; for, once the structure of consciousness is
considered absolute, the view itself can never be distinct from an
"experience" of the world, although, paradoxically, the view is always of
a world "out there" which can only be lived conceptually.
Hence a philosophy with two guises, and observable in any doctrine
of the understanding: a leap is taken from a naturalistic view,
which expresses our de facto condition, to a transcendental sphere
in which all bondage is theoretically removed, and we never have to
wonder how the same subject comes to be a part of the world and at
the same time its principle because the thing constituted exists
only for the constituting agent. In fact, the image of a constituted world where, with my body, I should be only one object among
others, and the idea of an absolute constituting consciousness are
only apparently antithetical; they are a dual expression of a
universe perfectly explicit in itself.67
In principle, then, there is no essential difference between Newton's
"eye" and Kant's "mind's eye:"

in so far as the refractive condition of

the eye enables the object to form an image or picture on the retina, it
locates the object outside of us in a theoretical space; and in so far as
the "formal" facility of the imagination always mediates between
sensation and intellection, it too locates the object outside of us in
the conceptual space of the subjective analytic.

Kant's imagination

could no more accommodate the subject-object dichotomy than Newton's eye;
for once Descartes had severed subject from object, the world was "real"
only to the extent that it could be set before us.

And as the product of

that separation, epistemology subsequently became grounded in
"de-lineation"

vis~-vis

an abstract uni-form space.

To the degree that

man could frame an image of the world, that is, discern it as a view or
picture, he could know it.
67rbid.

And via this perspective on the world, the
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existent is thus determined by its re-presentation in the subject.
World view, properly understood, therefore means, not a view of the
world, but the world understood as a view. The existent as a whole
is now so understood that it is existent when and only when and in
the degree to which it is held at bay by the person who represents
and establishes it. Where a world view arises, an essential
decision takes place about the existent as a whole. The being of
the existent is sought and found in the representational character
of the existent.68

II
~or

the eighteenth century, the world tarried as one anxious

landscape, reticently waiting to be painted; indeed, the primary drift of
eighteenth-century thought was "dedicated to the proposition that the
outer world existed to end in a picture."69

Through such writers as

de Chambray, de Piles, and du Fresnoy, the first half of the eighteenth
century appropriated its basically Italianate aesthetic, specifically its
theory of painting which stressed "design" in the sense that
William Aglionby's Painting Illustrated in Three Diallogues (1686)
defined it:

"Design is the Expressing with a Pen, or Pencil, or other

Instrument, the Likeness of any Object by its out Lines, or Contours."70
In this context, du Fresnoy's De Arte Graphica (1668) had already taken
Michelangelo to task for presuming "Liberties against the Rules of
Perspective."71

And though Michelangelo's reputation steadily gained

favor in the second half of the eighteenth century so that
Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his Discourses on Art (1769-90), could say of
68Heidegger, "World View," p. 350.
69McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 121.
70quoted in Samuel Monk, The Sublime (Ann Arbor:
Michigan Press, 1960), p. 172.
71quoted in Monk, p. 173.
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him that he was the "Founder and Father of modern Art," carrying it to
the "highest point of possible perfection,"72 the posture of art
criticism pertinaciously upheld representation as the most elemental
criterion of truth.

Only now, in conjunction with a parallel development

in the concept of the "sublime,"73 the painter 'is apprised to represent
the "general" truth of nature rather than its specific detail:

"To dis-

tinguish between correctness of drawing, and that part which respects
the imagination, we may say the one approaches to the mechanical (which
in its way too may make just pretensions to genius) and the other to the
poetical."74

Reynolds' distinction not only points backward to Newton

(the "mechanical") and forward to Kant (the "poetical"), but also
accomodates the successive gamut of eighteenth-century aesthetics.

Yet,

beneath this apparent theoretical opposition a radical pre-supposition
informs the entire aesthetic continuum; whether the artist negotiates the
"truth" of nature in terms of its specific or general detail, the art
work always constitutes an imitation in so far as it is expected to
represent the world.
In Newton, painters and poets of the first half of the eighteenth
century discovered a world more objectively certain than that offered by
Descartes:
Descartes thus, great Nature's wandering guide,
Fallacious led philosophy aside,
'Till Newton rose, in orient beauty bright,
He rose, and brought the world's dark laws to light,
72sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art (New York:
1966), p. 239.

Collier Books,

73For an extensive treatment of the historical development of this
concept, see Monk, The Sublime.
74Reynolds, p. 239.
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Then subtile matter saw, and vanished at his sight.75
Newtonian light promised an absolute familiarity with the world in so far
as the perfect symmetry of geometrical vision could guarantee "this outward Frame of Things/ Is what it seems;"76 and i t accomplished this to
the extent that the optic nerve supplied the means of framing an image
which resembles the object.

In his Universal Beauty, Henry Brooke

expressed the infallibility of this divine organ:
So temper'd wondrous by mechanic scheme,
The Sovereign Geometrician knits the frame;
In mode of organizing texture wrought,
And quick with spirited quintessence fraught:
When objects on the exterior membrane press,
The alarm runs inmost through each dark recess,
Impulsive strikes the corresponding springs,
And moves th' accord of sympathetic strings.77
But if the geometry of vision, "Where truth's eternal measures mark the
bound/ Of circle, cube or sphere."78 guaranteed the world, it simultaneously introduced metaphysical speculation concerning its origin:
But can corporeal forms, with so much ease,
Meet in their flight a thousand images,
And yet no conflict, no collisive force,
Break their thin texture, and disturb their course?
What fix'd their parts, and made them so cohere,
That they the picture of the object wear?
What is the shape, that from a body flies?
What moves, what propogates, what multiplies
And paints one image in a thousand eyes?
When to the eye the crowding figures pass,
How in a point can all possess a place,
75Richard Oakley, "Will with a Wisp," in The Works of the English
Poets: From Chaucer to Cowper, ed. Samuel Johnson and Alexander
. Chalmers, 21 vols. (London: J. Johnson et. al., 1810), 16:258. Chalmers
mistakenly attributes this poem to Francis Fawkes.
76Richard Jago, Edge-Hill (London:

J. Dodsley, 1767), p. 83.

77works of the English Poets, 17:351.
78Mark Akenside, The Pleasures of Imagination (London:
R. Dodsley, 1744), p. 34.
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And lye distinguish'd in such narrow space?79
Here, as throughout his entire poem the Creation, Blackmore, like Brooke,
reasons for design in the universe as a final proof of the Great
Anatomist, generally opposing Epicureanism and the modern atomists of his
own century who argued for chance:

"Not thus he gave our optic's vital

glance,/ Amid omniscent art, to search for chance,/ Blind to the charms
of Nature's beauteous frame."80

Similarly, Edward Young's Night Thoughts

insisted on design, going so far as to attribute a certain "divinity" to
man's senses as well as his reason:
Our senses, as our reason, are divine.
But for the magic organ's powerful charm,
Earth were a rude, uncolour'd chaos, still.
Objects are but th' occasion; ours th' exploit;
Ours is the cloth, the pencil, and the paint,
Which nature's admirable picture drawsi
And beautifies creation's ample dome.8
Newton had earlier made the same concession with his analogy

bet~een

the

human and divine "sensorium;" and like Newton's optic world, the world of
Young's Night Thoughts is void of color--there is nothing but light.
"Into the camera obscura of perpetual night Young retired in order that
Reason, the godlike faculty of man, might see light pure, not
refracted, and inflected."82

di~colored,

It was, indeed, the kind of world which the

telescope had discovered on the moon.83
Although Newton's "eye" apparently bridged the gap between internal
and external worlds in so far as it "correctly" re-presented the object
79Richard Blackmore, Creation, in Works of the English Poets,
10:376.
80Brooke, Universal Beauty, in Works of the English Poets, 17:357.
81Works of the English Poets, 13:450.
82Nicolson, p. 150.

83Ibid.
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to us, it simultaneously failed to appropriate the "truth" of the world;
for the truth of an objective world necessarily exists beyond the naked
eye, just as the truths of science can never ultimately be "seen".

By

definition, the very concept of an objective world outside our "self"
reciprocally carries with it the implicit assumption that its truths are
"noumenal," that is, beyond phenomena.
p~ctorial

As with the conceptual space of

perspective, the world of Descartes, Locke, and Newton is pri-

mordially invisible; Kant merely articulated the other side of the coin.
Yet, science could not concede the impossibility of knowing the world
absolutely, and stubbornly maintained that its superficial investigation
of phenomena could and would lead it to a final noumenal vision.
eighteenth century, technological advances in

t~lescopic

For the

and microscopic

instrumentation encouraged this fiction not only among scientific
coteries but in the heart of the poets as well.

Fanatically different

from Arnold's narrator in "Dover Beach," Savage's "wanderer" turns his
thoughts to telescopic lenses and similar Newtonian paraphernalia as he
stands on the cliff over-looking the sea:
There lies obscur'd the ripening diamond's ray,
And thence red-branching coral's rent away.
In conic form there gelid crystal grows;
Thro' such the palace-lamp, gay lustre throws!
Lustre, which, through dim night, as various plays,
As play from yonder snows the changeful rays!
For nobler use the crystal's worth may rise,
If tubes perspective hem the spotless prize;
Thro' these the beams of the far-lengthen'd eye
Measure known stars, and new remoter spy.84
But though this artificial "far-lengthen'd eye" may

geom~trically

fix

the measurement of the universe, Savage's wanderer no more negotiates
84Richard Savage, The Wanderer, in Works of the English Poets,
11:302.
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the visible ambiguity of perception than does the reverse perspective of
microscopial analysis.

Like the transparent "cogito" of Cartesian meta-

physics, both telescope and microscope factitiously accommodated the
subjectum's bistouric desire to cleanly slice through a section of the

-

world "naturally" hidden to the naked eye.

If nature's secrets were to

be unveiled, technology would assuredly have to come up with the artificial means of attaining a super-vision virtually capable of seeing
through matter.

Science had a considerable wait, however, before tech-

nology manufactured the X-ray; in the meantime, the microscopial
discoveries of Leeuwenhoek, Swammerdam, and others encouraged metaphysical speculation about the world of the minute, and why God had
denied to man the kind of vision he had given to other animals.85

Though

philosophers, especially Locke and Berkeley, had oxytocically delivered
this question to theoretical supposition, Pope answered it handily and
succinctly in a single sentence in his Essay on Man:

"Why has not Man a

microscopic eye?/ For this plain reason, Man is not a Fly."86
Perhaps more than any other poet of his time, Pope opposed the
growing tendency of the age to confer god-head upon the scientific
mission; in The Dunciad he unequivocally indicted the arrogant posture of
those who would make man the measure of all things, although his ultimate
argument rested on theological ground.
"O! would the Sons of Men once think their Eyes
85Nicolson, p. 102.
86The Poems of Alexander Pope, Twi.ckenham Edition, gen.ed.
John But~11 vols-.-(London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1961-69), 3-i:38-39.
For a penetrating analysis of the controversy surrounding Pope's manipulation of ideas in the Essay on Man, see Douglas White, Pope and the
Context of Controversy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
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And Reason giv'n them but to study Flies!
See Nature in some partial narrow shape,
And let the Author of the Whole escape:
Learn but to trifle; or, who most observe,
To wonder at the Maker, not to serve."
"Be that my task • . •
Let others creep by timid steps', and slow,
On plain Experience lay foundations low,
By common sense to common knowledge bred,
And last, to Nature's Cause thro' Nature led.
All-seeing in thy mists, we want no guide,
Mother of Arrogance, and Source of Pride!
We nobly take the high Priori Road,
And reason downward, till we doubt of God:
Make Nature still incroach upon his plan;
And shove him off as far as e'er we can:
Thrust some Mechanic Cause into his place;
Or bind in Matter, or diffuse in Space.
Or, at one bound o'er-leaping all his laws,
Make God Man's Image, Man the final Cause •
Of course, Swift's Tale

of~

87

Tub had previously enunciated the

Scriblerian protest, but nowhere do we find a more devastating reply to
the philosophic and scientific world-view than in the final section of
The Dunciad, where universal darkness descends upon the pseudo-illumination proffered by the prevalent theoretical abstractions of philosophy,
physics, metaphysics, and mathematics:
See skulking Truth to her old Cavern fled,
Mountains of Casuistry heap'd o'er her head!
Philosophy, that lean'd on Heav'n before,
Shrinks to her second cause, and is no more.
Physic of Metaphysic begs defence,
And Metaphysic calls for aid on Sense!
See Mystery to Mathematics fly!
In vain! they gaze, turn giddy, rave, and die.88
Even Voltaire hastened to turn aside the scientific usurpation by
declaring that the geometry of Newtonian philosophy was not a proper
subject for poetry; but he weakened the force of his own rhetoric by
writing verse on Newtonian principles himself.89
87rbid., 5:385-88.

88rbid., 5:407-09.

Pope too, despite his
89Nicolson, p. 15.
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frequent sorties against the securely entrenched certitude of scientific
objectivity, fell prey to the intellectual climate responsible for the
very attitudes he found so threatening; and the centrally implicit image
behind the Essay on Man appropriates an equally total picture of the
world, for the traditional idea of a great chain of being negotiates an
abstract and theoretical space, no less "objective" than the linear
perspective of a Renaissance drawing.
If the first half of the eighteenth century stressed what Reynolds
termed the "mechanical" aspect of representation, the second half of
that century experienced a gradual shift toward the "poetical," although
the imbrication of reality continued to evade its theoreticians.

And if

the poets began to analyze the construction of reality in terms of
certain faculties in man, the respective capabilities of these faculties
simultaneously contracted the consonant view of scientific "objectification."

Akenside's Pleasures of Imagination reflected the philosophic

trend toward "subjectivity" which would culminate in Kant's Third
Critique, although this subjectivity is no more situated than the
Cartesian "cogito."

"Mind," remarks Akenside in his poem, "Mind alone,

bears witness, earth and heav'n!/ The living fountains in itself
contains/ Of beauteous and sublime."90

But if the mind contains the

beauty and sublimity of the world "out there," how much more carefully
man is cautioned to proceed in his survey of the world; Richard Jago's
Edge-Hill warned of the dangers implicit in the imagination,
recommending to the reader the visual certainty of Newtonian
objectivity:
90p. 36.
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Shall we, 'cause Reason strives in vain to tell
How Matter acts on incorporeal Mind,
Or how (when Sleep has lock'd up ev'ry Sense,
Or Fevers rage) Imagination paints
Unreal Scenes, reject what sober Sense
And calmest Thought attest? Shall we confound
States wholly diff'rent? Sleep with wakeful Life?
Disease with Health? This were to quit the Day,
And seek our Path at Midnight. To renounce
Man's surest Evidence, and idolize
Imagination. Quit we rather then
These Metaphysic Subtleties, and mark
The curious Structure of these visual Orbs,
The Windows of the Mind; substance how clear,
Aqueous, or chrystalline! through which the Soul,
As thro' a Glass, all outward Things surveys.91
Because Fancy and Imagination receive "The whole magnificence of heaven
and earth,/ And every beauty, delicate or bold,/ Obvious or more remote,
with livelier sense,/ Difussive painted on the rapid mind,"92 as
Thomson's Seasons suggests, they may simultaneously distort the clear and
perfectly transparent vision of Reason.

To this effect, Akenside

distinctly draws an analogy along the contemporary lines of Newtonian
optics; because Fancy delineates a "form" which does not correspond to
the actual object, it represents a false picture of the world, and thus
constitutes an endogenous danger to man's ethical life:
Another tribe succeeds; deluded long
By fancy's dazzling optics, these behold
The images of some peculiar things
With brighter hues resplendent, and portray'd
With features nobler far than e'er adorn'd
Their genuine objects.93
91pp. 84-85.
92James Thomson, "Summer," The Seasons, in The Complete Poetical
Works of James Thomson, ed. J. Logie Robertson (London: Oxford
University Press, 1908), p. 118.
93Pleasures of Imagination, p. 98. An annotation to these lines
in the first edition reads: "Ridicule from a notion of excellence in
particular objects disproportion'd to their intrinsic value, and
inconsistent with the order of nature."
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But, "where the pow'rs/ Of fancy neither lessen nor enlarge/ The images
of things, but paint in all/ Their genuine hues, the features which they
wore/ In nature; there opinion will be true,/ And action right."94
Akenside introduces, here, an aesthetic supposition which became
increasingly popular throughout the latter part of the eighteenth
century, that the truth of nature resides in its general forms, and not
its specific detail--thus the falsity of "images of some peculiar
things."

Johnson's Rasselas aesthetically terminated this attitude, what

Reynolds termed the "poetical" in painting:

"The business of a

poet • . • is to examine not the individual, but the species; to remark
general properties and large appearances.

He does not number the

streaks of the tulip, or describe the different shades in the verdure of
the forest; he is to exhibit in his portraits of nature such prominent
and striking features as recall the original to every mind."95

That

Johnson defines the task of the poet in terms of visual representation
is, of course, no accident, for Newtonian theory persistently intormed
aesthetic pre-suppositions concerning imitation throughout the entire
century even if that aesthetic shifted its vision toward the mental
constitution of the world.

The eighteenth century adopted the doctrine.

of "Ut pictura poesis" flat across the board, whereby not only poetry,
but all art aspired to the condition of painting; Uvedale Price went so
far as to impute this condition to music.

In this sense, the existent is

only to the extent that it is "picturesque," that is, fit to be painted;
indeed, this way of looking at the world corresponds to that attitude
94Ibid., pp. 90-91.
95samuel Johnson, Rasselas (Great Neek:
Series, Inc., 1962), p. 49.
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determined by having a view to such an hyperbolic degree that the
existent as a whole becomes one vast prospect, suitable for framing.
Nevertheless, Johnson's aesthetic reflects the increasingly sophisticated distinction between the "picturesque," the "beautiful," and the
"sublime;" and like Kant's Third Critique, it historically represents an
indefatigable attempt to unify the various aesthetic theories of the
eighteenth century into a single coherent system or "picture."
Yet, throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, and
despite the popular trend toward "subjectivity," poets continued to
dispute the respective merits of Fancy and Imagination regarding their
ability to appropriate the "truth" of nature.

Akenside, for example,

airs the cob-webs from Memnon's Harp in order to sing the one-to-one
correspondence between Nature and Mind which exists when Imagination is
properly "tuned."

As Titan's rays evoke the harmonious response of the

harp,
ev'n so did nature's hand
To certain species of external things,
Attune the finer organs of the mind:
So the glad impulse of congenial pow'rs,
Or of sweet sound, or fair-proportion'd form,
The grace of motion, or the bloom of light,
Thrills thro' imagination's tender frame,
From nerve to nerve: all naked and alive
They catch the spreading rays: till now the soul
At length discloses every tuneful spring,
To that harmonious movement from without,
Responsive.96
Like the eye, imagination frames its images within the proportioned
space of a perspective which catches the "spreading raysn of its view
from "nerve to nerve."

Indeed, the implicit distinction between subject

and object in the eighteenth-century view provoked the isoclinal framing
96Pleasures of Imagination, pp. 15-16.
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of life to such an extent that the body itself was naturally thought of
as a frame.

Just as the mental image thrills through "imagination's

tender frame," so does emotion insinuate the frame of the body.
Thomson's Seasons expressed the effect imagination produces on the body
in terms of the usual clichl:

"Deep-roused, I feel/ A sacred terror, a

severe delight,/ Creep through my mortal frame."97

Thus, the general

framing of life indigenous to having a world-view continued to sustain
the Cartesian severance despite the popular turn toward certain
faculties of the mind; and though Fancy and Imagination entertain the
danger of distorting the truth inherent in the objective forms of nature,
they simultaneously disclose its unequivocal correspondence with the mind
when functioning properly.

Yet, the augmented intussusception of mind in

aesthetic theory signaled a growing rift between science and poetry, and
ophthalmoscopically prefigured the uniquely subjective vision of the
Romantic movement.

At the beginning of the century, Addison had already

declared that the poet was at liberty to transcend the laws of optical
representation since language often "gives us more lively ideas than the
sight of things themselves," and can subsequently improve nature:
Words, when well chosen, have so great a force in them, that a
description often gives us more lively ideas than the sight of
things themselves. The reader finds a scene drawn in stronger
colours, and painted more to the life in his imagination by the
help of words, than by an actual survey of the scene which they
describe. In this case the poet seems to get the better of
nature; he takes, indeed, the landscape after her, but gives it
more vigorous touches, heightens its beauty, and so enlivens the
whole piece that the images which flow from the objects themselves
appear weak and faint in comparison of those that come from the
expressions. The reason probably may be, because in the survey of
any object we have only so much of it painted on the imagination
as comes in at the eye; but in its description the poet gives us
as free a view of it as he pleases, and discovers to us several
97"Summer," Complete Poetical Works, p. 73.
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parts that either we did not attend to, or that lay out of our
sight when we first beheld it. As we look on any object our idea
of it is, perhaps, made up of two or three simple ideas; but when
the poet represents it, he may either give us a more complex idea
of it, or only raise in us such ideas as are most apt to affect
the imagination.98
Although Addison seems to endorse the poet's freedom vis~-vis an
aesthetic expressiveness, the heart of his argument reads like a preface
to Hume; and the painting metaphor itself reveals a typical Newtonian
preoccupation with the representation of an optically framed view,
perspectively located outside the "self."

Thus, Addison's theory of

imagination no more questions the picture-world of eighteenth-century
aesthetics than its other theoreticians; in fact, it was Addison who not
only acutely realized the significance of Locke and Newton, but also
popularized their theories for the masses.

If imagination fascinated

Addison, it was only because it alone colored a world objectively dull,
sterile, and colorless in itself.

Cartesian metaphysics defined a world

where color was merely accidental, and Newtonian physics manipulated a
world similarly bleak where color is nowhere to be found in external
nature itself.

Addison merely painted the picture for all to see:

Things would make but a poor appearance to the eye, if we saw them
only in their proper figures and motions. And what reason can we
assign for their exciting in us many of those ideas which are
different from anything that exists in the objects themselves (for
such are light and colours), were it not to add supernumerary
ornaments to the universe, and make it more agreeable to the
imagination? We are everywhere entertained with pleasing shows
and apparitions, we discover imaginary glories in the heavens, and
in the earth, and see some of this visionary beauty poured out
upon the whole creation; but what a rough unsightly sketch of
Nature should we be entertained with, did all her colouring disappear, and the several distinctions of light and shade vanish?99
98No. 416, The Spectator, ed. George A. Aitken, 8 vols. (London:
John C. Nimmo, 1898), 6:100-01.
99rbid., No. 413, 6:83-84.

43
~·

~··

t

Pope, too, had remarked the subjective quality of perception,
especially how Fancy "colors" our vision; his Moral Essays juxtapose the
clear and pure light of Reason with the "color" refracted by passion:

f

I

. the diff'rence is as great between
The optics seeing, as the objects seen.
All Manners take a tincture from our own,
Or come discolour'd thro' our Passions shown.
Or Fancy's beam enlarges, multiplies,
Contracts, inverts, and gives ten thousand dyes.lOO
But Pope gave credit where Newtonian optics denied it; for in our
perception of the world, he declared that "Darkness strikes the sense no
less than Light."101

His "Epitaph, Intended for Sir Isaac Newton,"

"Nature, and Nature's Laws lay hid in Night./ God said, 'Let Newton be!'
and All was Light,"102 not only locates Newton within the AugustanCartesian-Galilean tradition of the "natural light" of reason, but
ironically contrasts with the final lines of The Dunciad, where that
tradition avariciously self-destructs:
Lo! Thy dread Empire, CHAOS! is restor'd;
Light dies before thy uncreating word:
Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fall;
And universal Darkness buries All.l03
But if the eighteenth-century "school of night" found solace in this
subfuscous interior, it simultaneously appropriated the achromatic
shades of Newtonianism from whence the anti-logos might descend.

Indeed,

Young's Night Thoughts adopts a similar posture, and yet reads like a
single and continuous annotation of the Opticks:
Let Indians, and the gay, like Indians, fond
Of feather'd fopperies, the Sun adore:
Darkness has more divinity for me;
It strikes -thought inward; it drives back the soul
100"Epistle I," The Poems of Alexander Pope, 3-ii:17.
IOlrbid., 3-ii:23.
i
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102Ibid., 6:317.

I03rbid., 5:409.
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To settle on herself, our point supreme!
There lies our theatre! there sits our judge.
Darkness the curtain drops o'er life's dull scene;
'Tis the kind hand of Providence stretch'd out
'Twixt man and vanity; 'tis reason's reign,
And virtue's too • . • . 104
For most of the poets, however, darkness was not singularly individual,
but rather an association, as Burke expressed it, "of a more general
nature, an association which takes in all mankind;"105 it was this
general fear of darkness which prompted, for the most part, the
"rational" mind of the Age of Enlightenment to seek the secure light of
Reason.

Walter Harte's "Essay on Reason" relates a somewhat modified

version of the Lockean account of the development of this faculty:
How stretch'd like Kneller's canvas first it lies,
'Ere the soft tints awake, or outlines rise;
How till the finishing of thrice sev'n years,
The master figure Reason scarce appears . • • •
Sensation first, the ground-work of the whole,
Deals ray by ray each image to the soul;
Perception true to every nerve, receives
The various impulse, now exults, now grieves.
Thought works and ends, and dares afresh begin.
Experience slowly moving next appears,
Wise but by habit, judging but from years;
Till Knowledge comes, a wise and gen'rous heir,
And opes the reservoir, averse to spare;
And Reason rises, the Newtonian Sun,
Moves all, guides all, and all sustains in one.106
And yet, beneath this certitude, there persistently remained the lurking
fear that the light of reason was ultimately grounded in darkness itself;
in his "Essay on the Weakness of Human Knowledge," Henry Jones, who
changed his rhetorical posture to suit the popular attitudes of the age
104works of the English Poets, 13:439.
105Edmund Burke, ! Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, facsimile reproduction, 2nd ed.,
1759 (Menston, England: The Scholar Press Ltd., 1970), pp. 273-74.
106works of the English Poets, 16:354.
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like a weather-vane, mimicked Pope in his attack on science and
philosophy:
Our prying Eyes would pierce all Nature's store,
Unlock her Secrets, turn her Treasures o'er;
Yet far within she shows the searching Ray;
Her mighty Master keeps the Mystick Key;
A nearer View's deny'd to mortal Sight;
Newton's transcendent Day must bound in Night.107
But Jones, like all the rest, whether looking at the world in terms of
its "subjective" or "objective" constitution, assumes that Newtonian
achromaticism correctly describes being-in-the-world, or more precisely
the existent as such.
white.

The world of science is invariably black and

Blake knew it only too well:

"Art is the Tree of Life," he

proclaimed, "Science is the Tree of Death."l08
"Blake delighted in nothing more than in his ability to forge
verbal thunderbolts to hurl against Bacon, Locke, and Newton."109

In

his "Island in the Moon," he states the case in Hamletesque satire:
To be, or not to be
Of great capacity,
Like Sir Isaac Newton,
Or Locke, or Doctor South,
Or Sherlock upon death?
I'd rather be Sutton.llO
Blake's disgust with the tradition of Locke and Newton represents a
radical break with the eighteenth-century aesthetic, a break which
"adumbrated a complete revolutionary philosophy, including a psychology,
a moral and social doctrine, and a metaphysic.

In his transvaluation of

107quoted in Nicolson, pp. 137-38.
108"The Laocoon," in Blake: Complete Writings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 777.
109Nicolson, p. 168.
110Blake:

Complete Writings, p. 57.
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values Blake in some respects anticipated Nietzche."lll

Had the

nineteenth century understood the existential significance of Blake's
vision, it might have avoided the cultural transmission of a devastating
world-picture which continues to dominate the scientific and
technological visual field of our own age.

He not only lived during the

most violent age in English history, but witnessed the birth of the
world as we know it today; 11 2 the imagery of the prophetic books reflect
this process in so far as it increasingly darkens as we read on toward
the true horror of a vision more vivid than the naked eye can
glimpse.ll3
I stood among my valleys of the south
And saw a flame of fire, even as a Wheel
Of fire surrounding all the heavens: it went
From west to east, against the current of
Creation, and devour'd all things in its loud
Fury & thundering course round heaven & earth.114
Blake inveighed against the scientific and technological objectification
of the world, and its attendant divination of the five senses, which had,
by his time, already initiated the destruction of the earth:

"Man's

perceptions are not bounded by organs of perception; he perceives more
than sense (tho' ever so acute) can discover."115 .With respect to the
technological manipulation of man, "Blake saw the machine growlarger
111Louis I. Bredvold, The Literature of the Restoration and the
Eighteenth Century, 1660-1798, vol. III, in A History of English
Literature (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 191.
112Jacob Bronowski, William Blake and the Age of Revolution
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 173-74.
113Ibid., p. 176.
114"Jerusalem," Blake:

Complete Writings, p. 717.

115"There is No Natural Religion," second series, Blake:
Writings, p. 97.
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than man, to make him stunted, ignorant, and beastly; 1'116 yet, no one
seemed to want to hear the voice of the bard,
Who Present, Past, & Future sees;
Whose ears have heard
The Holy Word
That walk'd among the ancient trees,
Calling the lapsed Soul,
And weeping in the evening dew;
That might controll
The starry pole.
And fallen, fallen light renew!
'O Earth, 0 Earth, return!•117
Against the representational theory of "aesthesia," and sensation in
general, Blake's fairy in "Europe" proclaimed the opacity of a world
wherein beauty was specifically embodied in the singularity of each
situation, rather than constituted by either the subjectum or an aQstract
correspondence to the "truth" of nature--"So sang a Fairy, mocking, as he
sat on a streak'd Tulip."l18

When asked, "what is the material world,

and is it dead,"
He, laughing, answer'd: "I will write a book on leaves of flowers,
If you will feed me on love-thoughts & give me now and then
A cup of sparkling poetic fancies; so, when I am tipsie,
I'll sing to you to this soft lute, and shew you all alive
The world, when every particle of dust breathes forth its joy."ll9
In Reynolds' Discourses, moreover, Blake discovered the aesthetic
synthesis, via Burke, analogous to the scientific and metaphysical
thought he so detested in Bacon, Locke, and Newton.

His "Annotations to

Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses" summarizes the connectedness of the
eighteenth-century world-view in general, and discloses the termination
116Bronowski, p. 176.
117"Songs of Experience," Blake:
118Blake:

Complete Writings, p. 210.

Complet~ Writings, p. 237.

119rbid.
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of that picture in so far as it accommodates a framed prospect of the
whole "world."
Burke's Treatise on the Sublime & Beautiful is founded on the
Opinions of Newton & Locke; on this Treatise Reynolds has grounded
many of his assertions in all his Discourses. I read Burke's
Treatise when very Young; at the same time I read Locke on Human
Understanding & Bacon's Advancement of Learning; on Every one of
these Books I wrote my Opinions, & on looking them over find that
my Notes on Reynolds in this Book are exactly Similar.120
Blake alone perceived the peculiar frame of mind which informed
eighteenth-century aesthetic, philosophic, and scientific theory, as well
as its universal indebtedness to Newton; and if initial over-emphasis on
the "res extensa" of Newtonian objectivity prompted Kant to revive the
Cartesian "cogito" at the end of the century, Blake knew only too well
the single visage which prowled beneath this Janus-faced exterior.

With

his prism Newton had
first separated light into colors in his darkened room; then he had
fused the particolored divergent thought of the age into a single
beam of pure light, the light of Reason, "the Newtonian Sun."
Pope wrote the perfect epitaph for that Newton: "God said, 'Let
Newton be!' and all was Light!" Blake's epitaph was equally
succinct: "The Song of Los is ended. Urizen wept."121
Blake was no more eccentric than John Bull himself; indeed, his thought
"rested squarely on the world in which he lived.n122

Whenever the defin-

itive gesture of a single life is grounded in the situation, that life is
inevitably public; we find it eccentric only when we miss the context:
If we give our fancy to the privacy of a man who gave his mind to
living in public, we shall needs find him eccentric; but the
eccentricity is ours. The context of Blake's writings is the
context of a man who gave his mind to speaking to a public world;
and the man was of a piece. The public did not listen. But it
stood about the speaker.123
120rbid., pp. 476-77.

121Nicolson, p. 174.

122Bronowski, p. 177.

123Ibid.
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Blake knew:

"A Last Judgment is Necessary because Fools flourish."124

Eighteenth-century thought remained thoroughly conditioned to the
theories of Locke and Newton, and the uncritical acceptance of Cartesian

-

dualism; and as for its poets,
The world "out there," the mind "in here," remained to many of them
separate and distinct; try as they would, they could not bridge the
gap. Even "Imagination," of which they made so much, was unable to
go far, "cabin'd, cribb'd, confined, bound in" to one part of man's
"soul"; passive rather than active, its place was predetermined,
its functions limited. To the school of common sense, the way out
of the dilemma seemed simple: let man leave his mental dark-room
on the blank walls of which nature was shown only by reflection;
let him go forth into the world outside and face reality for
himself. 125
Romanticism embraced the opposite extreme.

Conditioned as it was by

German idealism, especially the post-Kantianism of Schelling, the subjectobject dichotomy continued to inhere in any investigation of "reality;"
the question of an external world merely became predicated on the
subjectum and his natural tendency "to bury the 'external world' in
nullity 'epistemologically' before going on to prove it."126

Romanticism

merely transfers the transparency of an isolated "cogito" onto the
external world itself, and henceforth negotiates the "truth" of that
world in terms of a symbolic "insight" which sees "through it," just as
its own reflection illuminates the ultimate reality of "mind."

"After

the primordial phenomenon of Being-in-the-world has been shattered, the
isolated subject is all that remains, and this becomes the basis on which

i.·
J
;?."

124"A Vision of the Last Judgment," Blake:
p. 612.

Complete Writings,

125Nicolson, p. 164.
126Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 250.
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it gets joined together with a 'world' ." 12 7

Yet, to the extent that this

"symbolic" insight is still envisioned in terms of an absolute "form,"
and that the inward glance toward a particular state of consciousness is
still constituted by a theoretical and unsituated frame, the romantics
unconsciously propounded the same kind of visual, spatial continuity of a
perspective drawing even though that "form" now becomes "mind" or "self"
as the mirror of nature.

Although romantic poets rhetorically rejected

"rationalism" in favor of "feeling," they continued to employ its
perceptual bias in so far as they appropriated perspective in order to
isolate single emotional states. 12 8

Newton is somehow still in the

picture, and we can detect the influence of his Opticks on nineteenthcentury painting as well.

"His revelation of the natural power of the

eye to refract the visual world encouraged artists to select outer landscapes that isolated a particular mood or feeling from the emotional
spectrum • .

The external world was studied for its powers to select

and to refract particular qualities of experience."129

In this regard it

was especially the habit of American painters to delight in picturing the
"mood" of a landscape,
particularly when its moods were expressed in atmospheric effects
of light, twilight, or morning haze. • • • Whatever the mood,
however, these painters sought to engage the eye of the viewer
deeply enough to lead his vision beyond the basic subject matter.
They hoped keen observation of the mists over the hills would lead
the viewer beyond the physical limits of the hills.130
But it was chiefly the romantic poets who thoroughly exploited the
127Ibid.
128McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 21.

129Ibid., p. 22.

130Richard Rudisill, Mirror Image: The Influence of the
Daguerreotype on American Society (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1971), p. 16.
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symbolic function of nature; Coleridge's expropriation of German
idealism, following his flirtation with empiricism, convinced him of the
transparency of the world, whereby a close observation of nature leads
one to the vision of its general forms, its "significance."

And we

arrive at this symbolic insight directly in proportion to the transparency of our "gaze"--"as I have stood,/ Silent with swimming sense; yea,
gazing round/ On the wide landscape, gaze till all doth seem/ Less gross
than bodily."l31

Nature somehow points to a "reality" beyond itself;

and though we can perceive this significance in a nebulous fashion, we
can never explicitly express it.

Similarly, Wordsworth disclosed the

superordinate desire to see beyond the thing itself, to see with a
"spiritual eye" the truth of ordinary objects of perception.
By penetrating the specific form or "shell" of the object, we formulate the general truth of nature; we see into the life of things.

This

post-Kantian attitude by which the eye informs its object finds its
clearest expression, perhaps, in "Tintern Abbey."
These beauteous forms,
Through a long absence, have not been to me
As is a landscape to a blind man's eye:
But oft, in lonely rooms, and 'mid the din
Of towns and cities, I have owed to them,
In hours of weariness, sensations sweet,
Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart;
And passing even into my purer mind,
With tranquil restoration . • • •
Nor less, I trust,
To them I may have owed another gift,
Of Aspect more sublime . • .
that serene and blessed mood,
In which the affections gently lead us on,-Until, the breath of this corporeal frame
13l"This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison," in Selected Poetry and Prose
ed. Donald A. Stauffer (New York: Random House, Inc.,
The Modern Library, 1951), p. 61.
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And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things.132
Obviously, the framing of life persists; only in so far as these
"beauteous forms" affect a mental eye do they lead us to the transparency
of the world.

Matter remains superfluous, just as the frame of the

corporeal body hinders our perception of the world rather than grounding
it; in order to see the world as it "really" is we must appropriate its
mental transparency.

The world is only to the extent that it is in

thought; and in this sense, the romantic attitude adheres to the
Cartesian projection whereby any resemblance between nature and mind
belongs to thought alone.

Like a Cartesian, the romantic poet does not

see "himself" in the mirror;
he sees a dummy, an "outside," which, he has every reason to
believe, other people see in the very same way but which, no more
for himself than for others, is not a body in the flesh. His
"image" in the mirror is an effect of the mechanics of things. If
he recognizes himself in it, if he thinks i t "looks like him," it
is his thought that weaves this connection. The mirror image is
nothing that belongs to him.133
So much for the insufficiency of "this corporeal frame" which must be
shed if man is to perceive the truth of the world; thus, Wordsworth
could say of the poetic mission, in the concluding lines of
that it must nucleonically reveal
• • • how the mind of man becomes
A thousand times more beautiful than the earth
On which he dwells, above this frame of things
(Which, 'mid all revolution in the hopes
And fears of men, doth still remain unchanged)
132wordsworth:

Poetical Works, p. 164.

133Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, p. 170.
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In beauty exalted, as it is itself
Of quality and fabric more divine.134
Yet, this "eye" which sees into the life of things is clearly not the
"eye" of Kant, which can never ascertain the noumenal thing-in-itself.
For Wordsworth, however, the possibility of knowing the noumenal world

--

stipples the life-long task of the poet, whose mind, more than any other,
possesses the power for seeing through the opaque materiality of things.
And what is this power or faculty of X-ray vision?

It is, again, the

Imagination.
For the romantics, imagination implied a mental facility considerably different from the context in which Kant had defined it; but we can
follow the development of this new meaning in so far as it primordially
derived from the Kantian distinction between the beautiful and the sublime.

For Kant, the beautiful constituted that framed image presented to

the understanding as an indeterminate concept; as such, the form of the
object is represented to us in such a way that the imagination and the
understanding mutually derive a specific pleasure from their harmonious
inter-action.

The sublime, on the other hand, was constituted by an

object which the imagination presents to reason as an indeterminate
idea, so that the object can not be represented as an image at all; the
imagination is incapable of forming one, for an "idea" is the very
opposite of an "image."

Yet, we continue to obtain a certain pleasure

from the anti-purposiveness of the object; the very formlessness of the
image of the idea presented by the object provides a certain satisfaction.
Though it is beyond representation, the mind somehow apprehends something
in the object beyond its appearance.
134wordsworth:

Precisely because we can in some

Poetical Works, p. 588.
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way apprehend an object other than under the restricted categories of
understanding, as an idea of reason, we thus approach, in our perception
of the sublime, the very limit of thought--knowledge of the thing-initself.

In other words, by our recognition of the sublime we vaguely

experience an idea of reason, although that experience is fated to
remain indistinct and indeterminate.

Moreover, in the sense which Kant

defines it, the object itself can never be sublime; rather it is the
mind which is sublime in recognizing it.

And yet, to the extent that we

may call an object sublime, we simultaneously attribute a subsequent
quality to the object which "exists" beyond the object, and to which the
object itself points.
"symbolic."

Nature thus becomes significant, that is,

The imagination, then, can present us with an idea, though

never directly; and that idea, which is "aesthetic" and not an idea of
reason, is presented as such in its symbolic form.

Apparently Kant was

pushed to this position in light of his admittedly limited classification
of those things which can be "actually" beautiful in terms of pure form.
Because of this, the Third Critique seems to weaken the First wherein
Kant explicitly denied the possibility of ever attaining to an idea of
reason in any way since an idea, by definition, represented that limit of
~·

thought beyond which we can never go.

Knowledge of an "ultimate"

reality, the thing-in-itself, endured forever inaccessible.

Strictly

speaking, however, a Kantian "idea" is neither in the mind nor in
nature, but rather that which mediates subject and object.

Yet, the

post-Kantian German idealists, especially Schelling, predicated the
"idea" in nature itself so that all of nature became energized b.y a
"Rational Idea;" Nature was Mind.

For Schelling, Imagination became

that faculty which virtually creates the world.

As an idea, nature is
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merely the unconscious expression of spirit; the "objective" world, as
idea, like the eighteenth-century landscape, patiently awaits interpretation in so far as it is symbolic, that is, the concrete form of an
infinite idea.

Obviously Schelling turned to Kant for his interpre-

tation of symbol (Sinnbild)--that which embodies a universal (idea) in a
particular (image); but he went further, by making the Kantian impossibility of knowing the idea a practical possibility.

Imagination

perceives the essence of a thing, an infinite idea, in the concrete
articulation of the form as an "object;" in this regard, imagination
appropriates symbols as an expression of the ultimate reality, the idea
itself.

Even for Schelling, imagination functions as a representational

power; it delineates the ideas as a form, the form of a form as it were.
And to the extent that imagination is formational; it "pictures" the
existent in terms of a spatial perspective whereby man

~ow

has a view of

the world in so far as it constitutes an "idea."
Coleridge adopted this position, and was largely responsible for
its introduction to England.

Because nature is mind, the imagination

came to be that faculty which frames ideas rather than images; and it
does so in such a way that the idea becomes significant with respect to
its symbolic expression.

"An IDEA, in the highest sense of that word,

cannot be conveyed but by a symbol; and, except in geometry, all symbols
of necessity involve an apparent contradiction." 135

Coleridge probably

adopted the notion that the symbol contains a contradiction directly
from Schelling; but even as that faculty which both perceives and
creates the world, the imagination remains an abstract and format.ive
135Biographia Literaria, in Selected Poetrx and Prose, p. 185.
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power.

It re-presents; it shapes; it reconciles; it combines.

Coleridge

called this power "esemplastic," although its essentially spatial connotations apply more properly to a mental activity "in here" rather than
the way in which it takes up an object world "out there."
The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime
Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite
mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The
secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, coexisting with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the
primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree,
and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses,
dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is
rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to
idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all
objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.l36
Again we find a similarity to Newton's "sensorium;" because perception is
judged to be primarily spiritual and mental, it naturally follows that
the object itself lacks a life or a world of its own, that it is
essentially "fixed and dead."

Thus, the infinite repetition of imagina-

tive activity always looks back toward a theoretical and ideal correspondence in order to formally unify its vision.

Grounded in the

infinite and eternal, it necessarily "struggles to idealize" because it
sets itself apart from the world it negotiates in order to perceive the
whole picture.
~

The "in order to" of its activity already dictates an

priori absolute standard divorced from what the activity itself dis-

closes and to which the activity must always address itself; and if the
priority of its content is ever to be fully delineated, imagination must
ultimately disregard the manner of its own expression in order to
describe an ideal world, a non-personal space, where everything
transparently "makes sense" according to its proper place.
I36rbid., p. 263.
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The. poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of
man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each
other, according to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses
a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses,
each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which we
have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination. This
power, first put in action by the will and understanding, and
retained under their irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed,
controul (laxis effertur habenis) reveals itself in the balance or
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities . • • and while
it blends and harmonizes the natural and the artificial, still
subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter; and our
admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry.l37
Despite its "transcendental" qualities, Coleridge's definition of imagination retains something indigenous to the Newtonian spirit; the notion
that one idea attracts another pervades his thinking here, and we are led
to suspect that perhaps Coleridge could never entirely relinquish the
influence of Hartley and empiricism in general.

Nonetheless, for

Coleridge the imagination concretizes the ideas of reason by combining
its "objects" in such a way that it presents us with a symbol of that
which lies beyond the immediate forms of nature.

But in so far as its

symbols re-present "another" reality, imagination sets the existent
before a theoretical gaze which not only subordinates "the manner to the
matter," but also delegates the correspondence between external and
internal worlds to the lineal perspective of a single rational Idea.
Because the world is thus constituted by such a comprehensively
transparent picture, knowledge of the world is tantamount to knowledge of
the "self."

Little wonder, then, that Wordsworth could only "reassure"

himself of the materiality of nature by touching it.

For how else can

the blind see?
For the romantics, following the direction of post-Kantian
137Ibid., p. 269.
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idealism, it was natural that the focus of imagination turned inward.
But in effect, romanticism killed the very kind of Being it sought to
emulate; by viewing the object as something "fixed and dead," romanticism
could only come up to it by looking back in the same way that we treat a
friend who has died as merely a "memory."
beginning of a subject.

The death of an object is the

This change-over in Being, whereby the entity is

able to be encountered only in the mind, signals the birth of an entirely
new way of "living" the world, a way that both avoids the present, via a
subliminal sentimentality, and the future, via its implicit failure to
negotiate a genuine choice--it is "to remember."

Romanticism visually

delineated an inward gaze toward basic states of consciousness, a
particular feeling or emotion, by employing the prevalent perceptual bias
ever since the Renaissance.

In looking back toward an historical

subjectivity, romantic poetry frames a whole life in terms of isolated
and sequential emotional states, little pictures placed in a theoretical
perspective.

It thus represents an ideal view, as much removed from the

world as it is from its "self," for "The order of the sequence in which
Experiences run their course does not give us the phenomenal structure of
existing."l38

The creative function of imagination remained identical,

in principle, to that representational organ which forms an image,
whether or not that power historically derived from Newton's refractive
condition of the eye or Kant's image-framing faculty of the mind.
truth of the existent is determined to the extent that it is either
reproduced or constructed as an "objective" form occupying an ideal
space. ·Romanticism temporarily "covered up" the subject-object
138Heidegger, ~eing and Time, p. 337.

The

dichotomy in so far as it appropriated a psychological perspective in
assessing its relation to nature; yet this repressive activity disclosed
an even deeper duality.

By thinking it could "create" nature, as a prod-

uct of mind, romanticism merely externalized the interiority of its
poets.

This self-deceptive attempt on the part of the poets to manipu-

late their own psychological abberations historically articulated the
hyperbolic posture of scientific objectivity--but at the opposite
extreme.

In fact, it was inevitable:

There is a type of mind, and not necessarily of an inferior order,
which finds it impossible to accept the sum of parts as a substitute for the whole, the quantitative as a substitute for the qualitative, a series of equations as a substitute for significance; and
there is no denying that the reduction of nature to a system of
numerical relations, so uncompromisingly demanded and put into
practice by Galileo, was bound to leave a kind of psychological
vacuum.l39
In so far as it reflects the mind, romanticism ironically represents the
ultimate "rational" posture--psychoanalytical self-analysis; carried to
its logical extreme, it has become, in our own time, inextricably bound
up with conducting the business of life in the most practical, inexpensive, and least time-consuming fashion possible, that is, "You, too, can
analyze yourself in one simple lesson."

Indeed, today's advertizing has

us so "psyched" that we uncritically accept the "mind-over-matter" sales
pitch in order to avoid the "situation" at all costs.

"Everydayness takes

Dasein as something ready-to-hand to be concerned with--that is, something
that gets managed and reckoned up.
not it covers its costs."l40

'Life' is a 'business', whether or

Today we more or less accomodate this im-

plicit consequence of romanticism as something included in the rent, like
139Panofsky, The Renaissance, p. 181.
140Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 336.
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the water bill; but for the nineteenth century the cost of romanticism was
dear.

The failure of the "objective" or "scientific" analysis of private

interior states to find a "law" or general maxim was finally evidenced in
the necessity of Freud.

The romantics had isolated single emotional

states without interrogating their relationship to a whole world.

And

without a world, man is unavoidably doomed to "insanity."
Between Romanticism and Transcendentalism lies the straight and
narrow path.

We might add, that path is extremely short; so short, in

fact, that if one closes his eyes he is there, for Emerson's transparent
eyeball is irreparably blind as well.

Like romanticism, transcendentalism

is largely the product of post-Kantian idealism.

Just as romanticism

could talk about the truth of nature as a reflection or image of the
"self" or mind, so too could transcendentalism speak of a spiritual "insight" based on close observation of nature.

For Emerson, each moment is

uniquely transcendent in the perception of the object; and if we see it
"correctly" we are led to the truth of nature itself.

Yet Emerson was no

more systematic in his thinking than Coleridge; and though it seems that
he sincerely envisioned himself as a counter-gradient to the perceptual
bias of his age, his thinking remained inextricably tied to the age's
most fundamental prejudice.

In his essay "Nature," Emerson invariably

relies on the traditional epistemological metaphor of picture-thinking;
his diction is saturated with the word "picture."

Describing the corre-

spondence between "visible things and human thoughts," Emerson remarks,
"Every natural fact is a symbol of some spiritual fact.

Every appearance

in nature corresponds to some state of the mind, and that state of the
mind can only be described by presenting that natural appearance as its
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picture."141

And elsewhere he says, "To the attentive eye, each moment

of the year has its own beauty, and in the same field, it beholds, every
hour, a picture which was never seen before, and which shall never be
seen again."142

That Emerson uses the word "picture" to such an excess

suggests that he recognizes the moment of vision as a fixed organized
image, anticipating the daguerreotype by three years.143

l

In order to see

nature correctly, "I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see

(

all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me. 11 144

In

seeing all, the perceiver becomes a transparent eyeball by escaping the
frame of his body as well as the situation of perception itself; such a
disembodied being must surely be "nothing," as Emerson would have it.

Of

course, this does not frighten Emerson any more than Homais in Flaubert's
Madame Bovary; as he remarks to Madame Lefrancois:
frighten a philosopher."145

"Nothingness does not

Even so, before this transparent eyeball

becomes a nothingness in order to discern the reciprocal transparency of
nature and of the universe itself, it must condescendingly address the
"forms" of nature.

As an object of the intellect, "The beauty of nature

re-forms itself in the mind, and not for barren contemplation, but for
new creation."146
Such is the constitution of all things, or such the plastic power
141Nature, "Language," in The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo
Emerson, ed. Edward Waldo Emerson, Centenary Edition, 12 vols. (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1903-21), 1:29 and 26, respectively.
142rbid., "Beauty," p. 18.
143Rudisill, p. 17.

144Nature, "Nature," p. 10.

145Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, trans. Paul de Man (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., A Norton Critical Edition, 1965), p. 242.
146Nature, "Beauty," p. 23.
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of the human eye, that the primary forms, as the sky, the
mountain, the tree, the animal, give us a delight in and for themselves; a pleasure arising from outline, color, motio~and grouping. This seems partly owing to the eye itself. The eye is the
best of artists. By the mutual action of its structure and of the
laws of light, perspective is produced, which integrates every
mass of objects, of what character soever, into a well colored and
shaded globe, so that where the particular objects are mean and
unaffecting, the landscape which they compose is round and
symmetrical.l47
Nature is thus "the integrity of impression made by manifold natural
objects.

There is a property in the horizon which no man has but

he whose eye can integrate all the parts."l48

Again, that specific

property of the eye which is able to unify the manifold, to integrate
the objects of nature into a uniformly continuous space, is characterized
by perspective.

Emerson envisions the existent as a picture.

Spatial perspective so permeates Emerson's thinking that he
defines Memory in similar terms:

"Visible distance behind and before us,

is respectively our image of memory and hope."l49
Hume.

We are reminded of

But Emerson rhetorically espouses an all-inclusive posture to the

extent that he facilely accomodates all other systems in so far as they
contain a partial truth, a kind of mental "aspect" of nature.

Because

idealism glibly negotiates all angles simultaneously, sees through the
angular distinctness of matter in terms of a perspective somehow beyond
perspective like Leibniz's perspectiveless posture, Emerson judiciously
concedes all points of view:

"The dawn is my Assyria; the sunset and

moonrise my Paphos, and unimaginable realms of faerie; broad noon shall
be my England of the senses and the understanding; the night shall be my
Germany of mystic philosophy and dreams."l50
147rbid., "Beauty," p. 15.
149Ibid., "Language," p. 26.

Although he appears to

148rbid., "Nature," p. 8.
150rbid., "Beauty," p. 17.
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oblige both empiricism and idealism in this remark, Emerson, like
Coleridge, believed that truth reposed ultimately in the mind.

The

imagination mediates between reason and sensation in order to arrive at
the transparency of the world:

"The Imagination may be defined to be

the use which the Reason makes of the material world."lSl

In a passage

somewhat reminiscent of Kant's definition of the sublime, Emerson
describes this process; it is interesting, here, that he speaks of the
"eye" of reason, although it seems that a pure "vision" of reason is
beyond form--a transparency which approximates Kant's formlessness of
the sublime:
When the eye of Reason opens, to outline and surface are at once
added grace and expression. These proceed from imagination and
affection, and abate somewhat of the angular distinctness of
objects. If the Reason be stimulated to more earnest vision,
outlines and surfaces become transparent, and are no longer seen;
causes and spirits are seen through them,l52
In fact, Emerson specifically mentions the sublime several times in the
essay; yet, regardless of whether or not he has Kant's concept of the
sublime distinctly in mind here, it is obvious that Emerson's thinking is
dominated by the desire to see through to the noumenal world.

We can

only arrive at the ultimately unframed vision of reason by cutting down
the angular distinctness of matter in so far as it shapes and forms the
;.

object; but in order to do this, the imagination must somehow alter our
point of view.

By changing the point of view we get a new perspective on

things; this, of course, means that we must catch nature in the act,
amidst its fleeting variety of shapes and forms:
Nature is made to conspire with spirit to emancipate us. Certain
mechanical changes, a small alteration in our local position,
apprises us of a dualism. We are strangely affected by seeing the
151Ibid., "Idealism," p. 52.

152Ibid., "Idealism," pp. 49-50.
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shore from a moving ship, from a balloon, or through the tints of
an unusual sky. The least change in our point of view gives the
whole world a pictorial air. A man who seldom rides, needs only
to get into a coach and traverse his own town, to turn the street
into a puppet-show. The men, the women,--talking, running,
bartering, fighting,--the earnest mechanic, the lounger, the
begger, the boys, the dogs, are unrealized at once, or, at least,
wholly detached from all relation to the observer, and seen as
transparent, not substantial beings. What new thoughts are
suggested by seeing a face of country quite familiar, in the rapid
movement of the railroad car! Nay, the most wonted objects, (make
a very slight change in the point of vision,) please us most. In
a camera obscura, the butcher's cart, and the figure of one of our
own family amuse us. So a portrait of a well-known face gratifies
us. Turn the eyes upside down, by looking at the landscape
through your legs, and how agreeable is the picture, though you
have seen it any time these twenty years!153

-

For Emerson, changing the point of view "unrealizes" the world, it
idealizes in so far as the vision is "wholly detached from all relation
to the observer;" like the unsituated attitude of scientific "observation," Emerson's observer ideally perceives the object from everywhere at
once.

In theory, only when the imagination presents the object from

every point of view is reason then disposed to see the transparency of
nature.

But does this, in fact, mean that the vanishing point ceases to

inhere in the object?
throne?

Does man finally abdicate his spectatorial

Does Emerson disown the theoretically ubiquitous perspective?

Not at all.

Man still determines the existent in so far as his vision

constitutes a perspective; but instead of being in the form of the
object, as such, the vanishing point now nebulously inheres in the formlessness of the "truth" of nature as a whole.

"Every universal truth

which we express in words, implies or supposes every other truth.
verum vera consonat.

Omne

It is like a great circle on a sphere, comprising

all possible circles; which, however, may be drawn and comprise it in
153Ibid., "Idealism," pp. 50-51.
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like manner.

Every such truth is the absolute Ens seen from one side.

But it has innumerable sides."l54

In order to see the truth, then, man

must be outside the existent, for it is only from the ubiquitous point
of view that man can perceive an entirely determinate picture of the

-

whole truth of being:

"A Fact is the end or last issue of spirit.

The

visible creation is the terminus or the circumference of the invisible
world." 155
Like the scientific consciousness, Emerson's reason would define
its scope in terms of the infinite; because it fails to recognize the
very situatedness of being, it dis-locates itself from the world it seeks
to see and, henceforth, ascribes to mind what was once the task of the
body.

But truth remains objective in the sense that it is "there" for

all to see, it is the object of the mind; and man can know the truth
only in so far as he sets it before himself.

But to the extent that

truth is mind, and not determined as an internal or external form, what
man sets before himself is, in fact, himself.

Only because mind

terminates the mirror of truth can nature, in turn, become a "discipline"--again, mind over matter.
,,

gloss on Addison:

At times, Emerson's essay reads like a

when man's thoughts are the equal of nature so that

he can get the better of her, beat her at her own game, "the frame will
suit the picture.

A virtuous man is in unison with her works, and makes

the central figure of the visible sphere."l56

Nature thus frames man,

who in turn frames the truth of the world which is nothing more than the
~

disembodied image of himself.

Interestingly, this self-portrait is

I'

~

154Ibid., "Discipline," p. 44.
155Ibid., "Language," pp. 34-35.

156rbid., "Beauty," p. 22.
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never seen in profile, but always in full "view."

In general, idealism

does not do away with the distinction between subject and object, but
rather makes the subject the object of his own observation.

Like the

seventeenth-century portrait, which gazes in_full view upon the
observer, idealism establishes a psychological vanishing point in the
viewer.l57

"Idealism acquaints us with the total disparity between the

evidence of our own being and the evidence of the world's being.
one is perfect; the other, incapable of any assurance."158

The

Yet, the

viewer is still divorced from the view precisely because it is a view,
even if only a mirror-view or self-view; and as a view at all, the
"visual" vanishing point remains outside the subject.
We are taught by great actions that the universe is the property
of every individual in it. Every rational creature has all nature
for his dowry and estate. It is his, if he will. He may divest
himself of it; he may creep into a corner, and abdicate his
kingdom, as most men do, but he is entitled to the world by his
constitution. In proportion to the energy of his thought and
will, he takes up the world into himself.159
Reason thus determines the world, constitutes the world, indeed creates
the world; through it we learn that "man has access to the entiremind
of the Creator, is himself the creator in the finite.

This view.•

carries upon its face the highest certificate of truth, because it
animates me to create my own world through the purification of my
soul."160

Indeed, the world belongs to those who think it best, and

life becomes the thinking of a history, or better, the history of a
thought, for only the rational perspective is correct:
157McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 13.
159rbid., "Beauty," p. 20.
160Ibid., "Spirit," p. 65.

"In inquiries

158Nature, "Spirit," p. 62.
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respecting the laws of the world and the frame of things, the highest
reason is always the truest."161

The manifold in unity, "il piu nell'

uno," subsequently exists as something tacked on to reason whereby
nature merely becomes "an appendix to the soul."l62

This attitude

represents a logical extension of Cartesian metaphysics, wherein the
existent as a whole is set before us in so far as it loses its opaqueness and becomes visibly transparent; in such a way man gets a view on
it, a picture of the whole thing.

He subsequently concentrates all his

efforts into the solution of this picture-puzzle; he interrogates the
world by demanding that it show itself.

Discontent with the "appearance"

of a world, man demands that things reveal themselves for what they
"really" are beneath the surface of their form.

Because he adds an

"aspect" to the thing which he cannot "see," an invisible quale over and
above the quantum, he spends the remainder of a life searching for a
transparency in the thing which was never there to begin, never attested
by the thing, but somehow posited as necessarily-there by himself.
Man's quaquaversal vision seeks transparency as something payable on
demand.

George Santayana expressed the absurdity of such an attitude,

and of idealism in general, in his satirical little poem which appeared
in the Journal of Philosophy, 1952, but written around 1926:
"I thought, before I learned to think,
That bread was food and water drink,
But now I know that drink and food
Are simple phases of the good.
My need of nourishment makes meat
Out of such things as I can eat;
Only that drink is drink in act
Which irrigates my thirsty tract;
And because I am slaked and fed
Water is water and bread bread.
161Ibid., "Prospects," p. 66.

162Ibid., "Idealism," p. 56.
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Pips, bones, and grist]~ and the rest,
Express my failure to digest.
My mind, with all in thought comprised,
Is just digestion realized;
The whole world else, beyond all question,
Is my projected indigestion.
How came it that so bright a youth
Ever could doubt this limpid truth?
Because, concerning food and drink,
I thought before I learned to think."l63
In effect, Emerson no more wished to transact the truth of vision
than did Descartes; rather than investigate the phenomenon, Emerson would
chase the specters of Reasons, which negotiates form-less, object-less
perceptions "on the edge of a world that doesn't equivocate!"l64

Like

Descartes' Dioptric, Emerson's "Nature" represents "the breviary of a
thought that wants no longer to abide in the visible and so decides to
construct the visible according to a model-in-thought."165

By handling

the existent in this way, man secures a position free from doubt,
Descartes' very starting point.

By calculation and manipulation man

imposes his will on nature as the very representation of its "truth", and
thus determines the existent in so far as it becomes his servant.
The exercise of the Will, or the lesson of power, is taught in
every event. From the child's successive possession of his
several senses up to the hour when he saith, "Thy will be done!" he
is learning the secret that he can reduce under his will not only
particular events but great classes, nay, the whole series of
events, and so conform all facts to his character. Nature is
thoroughly mediate. It is made to serve. It receives the
dominion of man as meekly as the ass on which the Saviour rode. It
offers all its kingdoms to man as the raw material which he may
mould into what is useful. Man is never weary of working it
up.
One after another his victorious thought comes up with
and reduces all things, until the world becomes at last only a
163quoted in Dialogue on George Santay~na, ed. Corliss Lamont
. (New York: Horizon Press, 1959), pp. 105-06.
164Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, p. 169.
165Ibid.
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realized will,--the double of the man.l66
Such a willful im-position is irreparably doomed to failure; because he
is naturally "out of position," man can only continue to make those
costly errors which will finally cost him the ball game.

As soon as he

becomes the frame of reference by which the existent as a whole is
judged, man de-limits his vision to that high-lighted area and its peripheral frame through which he stares at the reflection of himself.

By

seeing the world as that which stares back at him, the reflection of
himself, he logically concludes that the existent as a whole does so
also; but the syllogism is based on a false premise, and the results are
devastating.

"The greatest delight which the fields and woods minister

is the suggestion of an occult relation between man and the vegetable.
am not alone and unacknowledged.

I

They nod to me, and I to them • • • •

Nature always wears the colors of the spirit."167
nizes man's presence; it reassures him he is there.

The universe recogMan needs this kind

of formal acknowledgment once he locates himself outside the existent as
an observer.
III

"It is no exaggeration to say that in the history of modern science
the advent of perspective marked the beginning of a first period; the
invention of the telescope and the microscope that of a second; and the
discovery of photography that of a third."l68

r
f.

And it is no accident that

the history of these three inventions constitutes the history of the
166Nature, "Discipline," pp. 39-40.
167Ibid., "Nature," pp. 10-11.
168Panofsky, The Renaissance, p. 147.
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solidification of the world-view.

Today, that world-view bespeaks the

'

enormous value attached to "specialization" vis-a-vis research, a procedure thoroughly different from seventeenth-century "experimentation."
Yet, both experimentation and research presume that their projected area
is able to become "objective" only in so far as they already possess a
view of the world "ahead" of their activity.
Every science is, as research, founded on the projection of a
limited object area and is therefore necessarily specialized
science. But, in the development of the projection, every specialized science must, through its procedure, separate itself into
definite fields of investigation. But this separation or specialization is by no means only the unavoidable concomitant of the
increasing vastness of the results of research. It is not a
necessary evil, but the necessary essence of science as research.
Specialization is not the consequence, but the cause of the
progress of all research.169
Characterized by its "busy-ness," modern science is able to incorporate
the projection of its object area in the existent; but this is nothing
less than to grant the procedure itself definitive precedence over Being,
which research objectifies.170

"On the basis of this business

character, the sciences provide themselves with the appropriate coherence
and unity," which in turn forms men of an entirely different stamp:
scholar disappears.
research projects.

He is replaced by the research man who is engaged in
This, rather than the pursuit of scholarship, gives

his work its keen atmosphere.
library at home.

"The

The research man no longer needs a

Besides he is always moving about.

at meetings and gets information at congresses."171

He does business
The total picture

of the sciences today is grounded in this kind of motility; with respect
to the objectification of Being, modern science has erected a "system"
169Heidegger, "World View," pp. 346-47.
170rbid., I=· 347.

171Ibid., pp. 347-48.
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which offers the "greatest possible ability to switch its research--freedom of research, yet regulated mobility of transference and integration
of activities with respect to whatever tasks happen to be of paramount
importance."l72

In this way, research "holds the existent to account on

the question of how and how far it can be put at the disposal of available 'representation.'

Research has the existent at its disposal if it

can either calculate it in advance, in its future course, or calculate
it afterwards as past."173

Of course, this aspect of research, the

transformation of truth into certainty of representation, had originated
with Descartes, and had thoroughly serrated the perceptual field by the
seventeenth century with the propagation of the "new science."174
takes a uniquely different course in our own century.

But it

It is in the most

varied guises that science, 2;! research, specifically appears as "the
gigantic;" and it is in this connection that the gigantic announces the
infinitesimal.175

At the same time that technology produces such things

as the skyscraper and the atomic bomb, it lays the ground for the
emergence of that which makes such quantitatively gigantic phenomena
possible:

"Think of the numbers of atomic physics.

The gigantic presses

forward in a form which appears precisely to make .it vanish."176

Yet,

beneath the superficially quantitative exterior of the gigantic there
lurks, in our own time, a shadow darker than night; for the gigantic
naturally tends to hide that through which the quantitative is trans172rbid., p. 348.

173rbid., p. 349.

174cf. Patrick Cruttwell, The Shakespearian Moment. London:
Chatto and Windus, 1954, and Hallett Smith, Elizabethan Poetry.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
175Heidegger, "World View," p. 354.

176lbid.
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formed into a peculiar

~uality,

and subsequently becomes a distinctive

type of greatness.l77
Every historical period differs from others not only in its greatness; it has also in each case its own concept of greatness. But
as soon as the gigantic in planning and calculation and organization and affirmation shifts from the quantitative to a peculiar
quality, the gigantic and that which can apparently be completely
and continually calculated becomes, precisely because of this, the
incalculable. This remains the invisible shadow which is cast
over all things everywhere when man has become subjectum and the
world a view.l78
Today, this menacing specter appears not only against the backdrop of an
immanent nuclear catastrophe, but also hovers over the more threatening
consequences of contemporary genetic research.

When the International

Council of Scientific Unions feels it necessary to form a watch-dog
committee in order to regulate and monitor, as well as promote, recombinant DNA research, the incalculable has unmistakably become, indeed, a
distinctive type of greatness, that peculiar quality about which
Heidegger speaks.

Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe this new

Committee on Genetic Experimentation will be able to do any more than
what certain individual governments are already trying to do alone.
Yet, on other fronts, contemporary scientific objectification
touches our daily lives more poignantly; the electronic revolution in
mass media such as the telephone and television evidences an apparently
decreasing ability to situate ourselves, whereby modern technology
pushes forward toward the "annihiliation" of time and space.

We experi-

ence it in terms of transportation as well; witness the ever-decreasing
time (and space) interval between any two points on the globe.

Air

flight, for example, makes its own unique demands on the passenger,
177Ibid.

178rbid.
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demands which must be addressed both physically and psychologically in
order to remain somehow "oriented" toward a whole world:
Air flight involves an extension of the whole body. Once in the
air a plane makes its own times and spaces, or perhaps one should
say that it exists mainly in the dimension of time rather than
space once it is off the ground. The passengers develop a
"destination syndrome," as it were, as their contribution to the
unique space created in the act of flight.l79
The new technological acceleration which we experience today in terms of
fragmentation and isolation, however, is unique to the age only in so far
as we approach the zero-limit of this interval as a lived experience.
The nineteenth century was a time of enormous technological innovation as
well.

Such inventions as the steamboat, the railroad, and the telegraph

appreciably diminished the time-space factor.

Among the numerous techno-

logical innovations of the age, Emerson lists five miracles which
appeared in his own lifetime:

the steamboat, the railroad, the telegraph,

the application of the spectroscope to astronomy, and the photograph; a
little ditty from Elton's Songs and Melodies for the Multitude humorously
expresses what must have been a common sentiment of the time:
Oh, the world ain't now as it used to was,
The past is like a dream, sirs.
Every thing's on the railroad plan,
Though they don't all go by steam, sirs.
Expresses now are all the rage,
By steamboat and balloon, sirs,
In a year or two we'll get the news
Directly from the moon, sirs.
The electric telegraphs are now
Both time and distance mocking,
But then, the news which they convey
Is really very shocking.
Short hand is now quite out of use,
For when the ministers preach, sirs,
179McLuhan, Vanishing ~oint, p. 217.
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Or politicians rise to spout,
They "Daguerreotype" the speech, sirs.l80
To the extent that the above attitude addresses a new technological
attitude, it also tells us specifically how that age was on the way
towards a world-view, and how the inventions of the age supported the
stipulation that man, as
existent as a whole.

~ubjecturn,

envisioned himself as the norm of the

Among Emerson's five technological miracles, can we

find one which stands out above the rest and articulates the public,
technological bias more than any other?
More than any other invention of the age, the daguerreotype became
the metaphor for technology in the public consciousness:
Along with the railroad and the electric telegraph, it had taken
hold of popular imagination as an example of technology. Distinct
from the railroad and the telegraph, the daguerreotype had
implications of symbolic insight which made it an ideal agency for
such use. It seemed to epitomize new means of reaching truth in a
form acceptable to everyone.l81
In general, the daguerrean view supported the publicly biased attachment
to technology and its concomitant perceptual prejudice in so far as it
helped "locate" mari in the universe; it encouraged the fictive time and
space which accompanies having a world-view.

As that which is "real"

only to the extent that it is set before us, the world became ultimately
accessible when man could at last frame an image of it seemingly
irrespective of his own position in that world, an image which appeared
to co-incide with the object perfectly.

Once man had captured the

existent scientifically, and done so in a purely "objective" fashion
divorced from the partial subjectivity inherent in microscopic and tele180"Rhymes and Chimes," quoted in Rudisill, pp. 74-75.
181Rudisill, p. 73.
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scopic instrumentation, the existent was assumed to be "there" before him
once and for all; that is, in the sense we have previously defined as
"rational."

In 1849 Samuel Dwight Humphrey sent one of his plates of a

multiple exposure of the moon to Jared Sparks, then president of Harvard
University, who replied:

"We here perceive the apparent motion of the

Moon, or rather the actual motion of the Earth on its axis, distinctly
measured for half a minute's time, within the space of one-tenth of an
inch."l82

Once time and space have been set before us as an entirely

measurable function, as that kind of thing on which we can formulate a
perspective, both time and space are demonstrated to be calculable and
manipulable; they are, in fact, proven to be exclusively objective, and
to be so "really."

The daguerreotype's ability to record a direct image

of man's location with respect to the moon and stars asserted man's
presence in the universe, and pushed him further into the forefront of
that frame of reference by which the existent as a whole would henceforth
be envisioned, manipulated, and constituted.

The daguerreotype made

explicit the central thought of the age; once man no longer considered
himself as situated in the world, as that existent which looks upon the
world in order to dis-cover it, but rather as the central figure of the
world by which truth is solely determined and appropriated in so ·far as
it coincides with his representation of it, he ceased to "see" the world
at all.

Now it is the world which perceives man as he goes about the

business of manipulating and calculating it.
~t

If man continues to "see"

all, it is to perceive that which is looking at him.

As with

Emerson's "Nature," everything bears witness to man's own actions, and
182quoted in Rudisill, p. 85.
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history becomes the record of man's presence in the universe •

•

Edward Hitchcock expressed the sentiment unreservedly:
Men fancy that a wave of oblivion passes over the greater part of
their actions. But physical science shows us that those actions
have been transfused into the very texture of the universe, so
that no waters can wash them out, and no erosions, comminution, or
metamorphoses, can obliterate them. . • • Our words, our actions,
and even our thoughts, make an indelible impression on the

~v;t:Se.183

Hitchcock further envisions the universe as one "vast picture gallery,"
and defines the universe, in essence, as pothing less than a huge
daguerreotype of history which "encloses the pictures of the past, like
an indestructible and incorruptible record, containing the purest and the
clearest truth."184

Considering the implications that all nature is

pervaded by this photographic influence, he proceeds:

"We do not know

but it may imprint upon the world around us our features, as they are
modified by various passions, and thus fill nature with daguerreotype
impressions of all our actions that are performed in daylight."185
Analogous to the perspective articulated in Whitman's interior picture
gallery,186 Hitchcock perceives history in essentially photographic
terms; for all future generations the "truth" of history will be
directly accessible.

History, and truth in

g~neral,

subsequently become

that which can be visually perceived and accurately recorded as a
representation.

Only the represented "fact" is true, and it is true to

the extent that its objectivity coincides with the rational.
183The Religion of Geology and its Related Sciences (Boston:
Phillips, Sampson, and Co., 1851), p. 410.
184rbid., pp. 410 and 418, respectively.
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186cf. Walt Whitman, Pictures:
The June House, 1927.

185Ibid., p. 426.
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We have seen this collusion before in Emerson's "Nature," whereby
nature coquettishly acknowledges man's presence in the universe.

Man

solicits this complicity whereby the universe reassures him he is
"there;" he needs this kind of formal acknowledgment in so far as he
locates himself outside the existent as an observer.

Emerson's "Nature"

had originally appeared in 1836, three years before the invention of the
daguerreotype, and disclosed to what extent the stage had been set for
its latest technological performance.

Hitchcock's definition of the

universe as a vast picture gallery, and history as the all-inclusive
daguerreotype, merely constitute the daguerrean articulation, or
"exposure" if you will, of Emerson's description of idealism, which
"beholds the whole circle of persons and things, of actions and events,
of country and religion, not as painfully accumulated, atom after atom,
act after act, in an aged creeping Past, but as one vast picture which
God paints on the instant eternity for the contemplation of the soul."l87
The daguerreotype terminated the emphasis which the age placed on visual
representation, and its correlative ability to arrive at the "truth" of
nature and reality in general.

Consciousness thus comes to be con~ti~
;

titued by its visual "data," a collection of mental contents
a coincidence between subject and object; and rationality, in

repr~sent~g-.
tu~,

is

shown to be grounded in the immediacy of fact, the unequivocal relation
between sensation and impression--indeed, "a fortunate accident bringing
together dispersed sensations."l88

The ontological implications of

idealism are thus seen to be grounded in the very same epistemological
187Nature, "Idealism," p. 60.
188Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 60.
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assumptions as rationalism.

Idealism generally seeks to discover a

"community in being" rather than a "community in meaning," as Cassirer
denies to analytical reflection itself; yet, even an abstracted
"community in meaning" destroys the significance of phenomena, for it

-

places consciousness outside being.189

Like the rational perspective,

symbolic insight is fated to remain irreparably divorced from the
phenomenon itself.

Thus, the daguerreotype superficially articulated

both the realistic and transcendental posture; for over and above its
ability to accurately record the object as it "appears," the daguerreotype simultaneously accommodated the symbolic demand that we see "in"
the object something "beyond" the object iself--that is, that we see
"more."

This seeing "more," however, contingently subsists in the

accuracy by which we initially perceive the object as "objective;" we can
appropriate the spiritual insight only in so far as it is grounded in
accurate representation, that is, only to the extent that "what" we see
before us (the visual data or content of consciousness) is "formal."
Axiomatically, the daguerreotype was quick to seize the "content"
of painting as most properly germane to its own purpose and potential;
within a single year after its invention such a distinguished figure as
Samuel Morse had already forseen the daguerreotype's enormous possibility
as a determining factor in the art world.
National Academy of Design, Morse declared:

In 1840, as president of the
"The daguerreotype is

undoubtedly destined to produce a great revolution in art, and we, as
artists, should be aware of it and rightly understand its influence.
This influence, both on ourselves and the public generally, will, I
189cf. Ibid., pp. 124-25.
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think, be in the highest degree favorable to the character of art."190
The thinking of Thomas Cole, at this time, reflects the "realistic"
aspect of the American visual sense, and in it we may discern that aspect
of representation which Reynolds termed "mechanical" as opposed to the
"poetical."

In his paintings, Cole seeks to present the object as a

form of the "natural eye," rather than the "mind's eye;" in a letter to
William Dunlap he remarks, "Although, in many respects, I was delighted
with the English school of painting, yet, on the whole, I was
disappointed:

my natural eye was disgusted with its gaud and

ostentation."191

He continues:

Turner is the prince of the evil spirits. With imagination and a
deep knowledge of the machinery of his art, he has produced some
surprising specimens of effect. His earlier pictures are really
beautiful and true, though rather misty; but in his late works you
see the most splendid combinations of color and chiaroscuro-gorgeous but altogether false--there is a visionary, unsubstantial
look about them that, for some subjects, is admirably appropriate;
but in pictures, representing scenes in this world, rocks should
not look like sugar candy, nor the ground like jelly.192
Yet, consummate painter that he was, Cole was cautious not to carry this
position to the extreme; in a letter of 1844 he wrote that a painting
"ought not to be a dead imitation of things without the power to impress
a sentiment, or enforce a truth."193

Indeed, his "L'Allegro" and "Il

~·-.

190quoted in M. A. Root, The Camera and the Pencil (Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1864), p. 391.
191william Dunlap, ! History of the Rise and Progress of the Arts
of Design in the United States, rev. ed., ed. Frank W. Bayley and
Charles E. Goodspeed, 3 vols. (Boston: C. E. Goodspeed and Co., 1918),
3:152.
192Ibid., p. 153.
193quoted in American Narrative Painting, Catalog notes by Nancy
Wall Moure, Essay by Donelson F. Hoopes (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County
Museum of Art, in association with Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. 54.
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Penseroso" display a marked fascination with light although it could be
argued that the themes dictate such an emphasis, while his "The Voyage of
Life:

Manhood" bears, in many respects, a genuine resemblance to Turner

himself.

Nonetheless, Cole's general attitude reveals how easily the

daguerreotype was able to appropriate the realistic function of painting,
a function not only sanctioned by many painters themselves, but also
shared by a large portion of the general public.
Working men and artisans over the country formed a keenly
critical audience able to spot an inaccuracy or a distortion of
what they knew from experience; in this kind of image recording
even more than with landscapes, Americans believed that a picture
was "good" if it was "true." Perhaps more than any other form of
visual record, the genre paintings illustrated a climate of
interest that was favorable for the introduction of photography.
Like the panoramas, these pictures prefigured a need for the
recording accuracy of the daguerreotype.194
In Paris, however, when Daguerre produced his first "sun-paintings,"
audience response was somewhat qualified; Daguerre's early pictures
reflected a magical aura specifically in terms of their acutely
represented detail.

Yet, the initial rejoinder to the daguerreotype

evinced the feeling that something was "missing."195

The accuracy of

194Rudisill, p. 12.
195A passage from the Leipziger Anzeiger amusingly reflects an
extreme reaction to the daguerreotype, as quoted in Rudisill, p. 50. The
great generosity of the French government in pres~nting the process of
the daguerreotype as a free gift to the world made the daguerreotype
internationally known almost over night. Having failed to make a
daguerreotype itself, the Anzeiger denounced Daguerre in .the following
terms:
"Wanting to hold fast to transitory mirror-pictures is not only an
impossibility, as has been shown by basic German research, but even the
wish to do so is blasphemy. Man is created in the image of God, and
God's image cannot be captured by any man-made machine. • • • God has,
to be sure, tolerantly forborne the mirror in His creation as a vain toy
of the Devil. Most likely, however, He is regretting this tolerance,
especially because many women are using mirrors to look at themselves in
all of their vanity and pride. But no mirror, neither of glass nor of
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these pictures intensified their magical mood,
by their eerie representation of Paris as a city complete to every
brick yet totally devoid of life. Since even the most carefully
detailed paintings of the age--such as those of David or Ingres-were still oriented to a central concern with humanity, people were
used to thinking of pictures as centering on man. Since it was
also the period of Romantic painting, pictures were expected to
idealize the world by addition or suppression or interpretation.
Now, suddenly, people in one of the most art-conscious cities of the
world were confronted with pictures that were uncompromisingly
acute in itemizing the details of the world but which simultaneously
removed all trace of human life. The absence of color in such
otherwise perfect representations further stressed this effect, as
did the curious negative-positive character of the image on a
perfect mirror surface that turned realistic scenes into ghostly
negative images with the slightest change of viewing angle.l96
Unsurprisingly, then, feeling somehow left out of the frame, it was in
order to compensate for this apparent void in the photographic "stilllife" that man as subjectum re-positioned himself into the forefront once
again by defining the daguerrean process as an art.
daguerreotypist becomes an "artist."

Henceforth, the

This was especially necessary for an

audience which could only think in terms of a visual conditioning
centered around man, particularly so in painting itself; by comparison,
the daguerreotype must have seemed peculiarly, if not frighteningly,
devoid of the human '~touch."

Ironically, the painters were among the

quicksilver, has yet received permission from God to hold fast the image
of the human face. • • • Now: Should this same God, who for thousands
of years has never allowed that mirror-pictures of men should be fadeless, should this same God suddenly become untrue to His eternal principles and allow that a Frenchman from Paris should set loose such a
devilish invention into the World!!?? We must make clear, after all, how
unChristian and Hellishly vain mankind would become if everyone could
have his own mirror-picture made for filthy money and reproduced by the
dozen. There would be such a mass epidemic of vanity that mankind would
become godlessly superficial and godlessly vain. And·if this "Man-sewer"
Daguerre in Paris maintains a hundred times that his human mirrorpictures can be held fast on silver plates, this must a hundred times be
called an infamous lie, and it is not worthwhile that German masters of
optics concern themselves with this impertinent claim."
196Rudisill, p. 39.
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first to recognize the daguerreotype's artistic significance:

Delacroix,

for example, made elaborate use of the photographic medium for his own
drawings; and Paul Delaroche, in a remark singularly pertinent to the
over-worked comparison to Rembrandt's etchings, said of the daguerre-

-

otype, "Color is translated with so much truth that its absence is
forgotten."l97

Whatever mysterious meaning Delaroche may have intended,

comparison with Rembrandt immediately became a general touchstone "for
discussing the monochromatic continuous-tone subtleties of light and dark
which had never been seen before, and the medium's acuteness of rendering
of atmospheric conditions was a constant marvel."l98

Already, in 1839,

the year of its birth, N. P. Willis, the "sunshine and summer" columnist
as S. G. Goodrich called him in contra-distinction to the "chill, dark,
and wintry" Hawthorne,199 said of the daguerreotype:
All nature shall paint herself--fields, rivers, trees, houses,
plains, mountains, cities, shall all paint themselves at a bidding,
and at a few moment's notice. Towns will no longer have any
representative but themselves. Invention says it. It has found
out the one thing new under the sun; that, by virtue of the sun's
patent, all nature, animate and inanimate, shall be henceforth
its own painter, engraver, printer, and publisher.200
From such a passage as the above, one can justifiably understand how
Willis would be counted among Hawthorne's bunch of "scribbling women;"
nevertheless, Willis negotiates, here, the terms in which the daguerreotype generally came to be discussed.

Rather than deny the daguerreo-

197quoted in Rudisill, p. 41.
198Rudisill, p. 38.
199Recollections of ~ Lifetime, quoted in Hawthorn~: The Critical
Heritage, ed. J. Donald Crowley (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc.,
1970), p. 6.
200quoted in Rudisill, p. 43.
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typist his "art," Willis' conunent merely exhibits the difference between
the European and American attitude toward painting at the time.

Unlike

the European reaction which focused on the creatively individual artist,
the American attitude tended to emphasize the objects of nature as the
"formal" constitutents of art.

In this respect, American painting

principally attended to nature rather than the artist himself.

Behind

the thoeretical divergence, however, one constant persistently emerged:
the daguerreotype always tells the "truth" about nature, it cannot lie.
In 1840, expressing a desire for this kind of absolute certainty, one of
the great "rationalists" of the nineteenth century, Edgar Allan Poe,
unequivocally stated the daguerreotype's superiority in this respect:
In truth the daguerreotype plate is infinitely more accurate than
any painting by human hands. If we examine a work of ordinary
art, by means of a powerful microscope, all traces of resemblance
to nature will disappear--but the closest scrutiny of the photographic drawing discloses only a more absolute truth, more perfect
identity of aspect with the thing represented.201
Poe's "more perfect identity of aspect with the thing represented" might
be said to describe the nineteenth-century scientific-technological
f

attitude in general; but as we have seen, that perceptual bias was
primordially grounded in the world-view itself, and more specifically,
"rational" perspective.

And whether or not that view focused outward

upon the object or inward toward the subject, as an object of concern, it
invariably employed representation as its criterion for "truth."

The

framed "prospectus" constructs a visually uniform space so that the view
itself necessarily yields a formal resemblance between object and image.
By taking over the "realistic 11 function of painting, the daguerreotype
201quoted in Van Deren Coke, "Camera and Canvas," Art in America
49 (No. 3., 1961) : 68.
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conferred a finality upon the existent in the sense that our certainty of
the world was no longer confined, or forced to con-form, to a physical or
mental "organ."

Man's picture of the world was no longer contingent upon

the subjectivity inherent in microscopic or telescopic instrumentation,
much less the extreme inaccuracies inherent in a painting or a drawing;
the mirror-image correctly reflected the existent in its absolute truth.
"A painting may omit a blemish, or adapt a feature to the artist's fancy,
but a reflected image must be faithful to its prototype."202
Yet, this same kind of thinking simultaneously promoted the
daguerreotype to a medium capable of symbolic insight precisely because
of its essential ability to apprehend the object in the truth of its
"form."

In so far as the nineteenth-century perceptual bias demanded an

absolute resemblance between external and internal worlds, phenomena
merely represented the disclosure of an already pre-existent "reason;"
formal identity thereby solved the problem of maximum coherence, the very
condition for the possibility of the world.203

Whether or not this

conformity represented the external world of Newtonian physics or the
internal world of Kantian metaphysics, "form" itself invariably
constituted the a priori model upon which the phenomena of structure are
constructed.

Rather than disclosing the very identity between external

and internal world which it rhetorically sought, the world-view, because
it assumes the ontological priority of space rather than time, "realizes"
the world according to its norm to the extent that it projects the
internal in the external, or vice versa.

Both empiricism and idealism,

202J. M. Whittemore, prospectus for The Daguerreotype:
of Foreign Literature and Science, quoted in Rudisill, p. 73.
203Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. 60-61.
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no matter what guise they may assume, are compelled to do this in order
to get the whole "thing" before its gaze, just as a child, placing the
final piece of a puzzle into place, comes up with the whole picture.
With transcendentalism, too, consciousness exists solely for the forms,
and stands outside Being in order to see it in a single glance; the
transcendental ego equally belongs to others as well as myself.

In this

sense, knowing other people can never be a problem, for in determining
the general conditions which make a world possible we have already
discovered the "other" as well.

Only as pure consciousnesses can we have

the world and its completed "history" transparently before us.204
Contemporary advertizing attests that this "view" largely persists to the
present, and its inordinate success in creating a group consciousness
tells us to what extent we think the world rather than live it.

Similarly,

the daguerreotype's symbolic function derived from its potential to
define and perpetrate a national image which at once became "historical"
and "true," a symbolic "reality."

The possibility of publicly recording,

for all times and places, an event or personality instigated a national
or group consciousness:

'..

When bodies of people taking part in noteworthy events were so
deliberately involved with pictorial situations, a form of group
consciousness of communication with later generations was
activated. • • • The commonality of public experience in the
picture-making situation from one part of the United States to
another tended to universalize the responses of the people into
national behavior and attitudes held in general.205
Public response to the daguerreotype consequently revealed a sense of
historic iconology:

"Merely by its presence, such a body of pictures

204For a more detailed explanation of the above, see Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology, pp. 60-63.
205Rudisill, p. 224.
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conditioned the process of visual perception along particular lines of
development so that people came to conceive of certain kinds of visual
images as being true, or permanent, or typical."206

Functioning on this

level, the daguerreotype became more meaningful in terms of its image
rather than its "subject matter," so that "the value attached to the
subject of a picture was often transferred to the picture itself in a way
that allowed the picture not only to reflect attitudes or feelings but to
affect them in terms of what people saw and how they saw it."207

In the

same way, we have seen that American landscape painters often sought to
portray the "mood" of the landscape, desiring to lead the eye of the
viewer beyond the physical limitation of the subject matter itself.
It was particularly in their attempt to represent light through an
"atmosphere" that landscape painters imitated this "mood;" the
eighteenth-century poet, Samuel Boyse, in his "Triumphs of Nature,"
expressed it thus:
As darts the Sun oblique his varied rays,
When through the fleecy cloud his lustre plays,
Here deepens to a gloom the varied green,
There beams a light--and shifts the shadowy scene:
But when the obvious vapour melts away,
The boundless prospect brightens into day.208
Similarly, nothing contributed more to the symbolic function of the
daguerreotype than its relation to light.

In "Nature," Emerson had

remarked on the efficacy of light in perception:

"And as the eye is the

best composer, so light is the first of painters.

There is no object so

foul that intense light will not make beautiful.

And the stimulus it

affords to the sense, and a sort of infinitude which it hath, like space
206Ibid., p. 225.

207rbid., p. 32.

208works of the English Poets, 14:536.
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and time, make all matter gay."209

With the daguerreotype, however,

nature could immediately paint herself; as the direct and absolute image
of light, these "sun-paintings" represented a "shadow" cast across the
instant of eternity.

-

The daguerreotype was thus unique in so far as it

scientifically exemplified the Newtonian "divinity" of light.

Much was

made of the truth of this direct image of light, and the daguerreotype
machine itself became a kind of mystical medium capable of asserting its
own agency in the production of this truth.

Speaking of his daguerreo-

type machine, James F. Ryder expressed the sentiment ingenuously:

"The

box was the body, the lens was the soul, and an 'all-seeing eye,' and the
gift of carrying the image to the plate."210
function has endured to the present.

Indeed, this symbolic

Edward Weston's photographic

aesthetic merely reformulates the posture of Emerson's transcendental
vision, whereby direct experience can lead to spiritual insight, and

f

!

extends that kind of thinking into the twentieth century.

Weston's

repeated goal as a photographer, "To see the Thing Itself,"211 insists
that the "thing itself" possess a significance beyond its explicit
representation; and yet, the insight remains contingent upon accurate
representation.

"This then:

to photograph a rock, have it look like a

rock, but be more than a rock.--Significant presentation--not interpretation."212

We are reminded of Cole's remark on Turner, and his own

209Nature, "Beauty," p. 15.
210voigtlander and ! (Cleveland:
Publishing Co., 1902), p. 16.

Cleveland Printing and

211quoted in Edward Weston: Photographer, ed. Nancy Newhall
(Rochester: Aperture, Inc., 1964), p. 39.
212Ibid.
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belief that imitation should enforce some truth.

And in a recent

commentary on Edward Weston, Willard Van Dyke reinforces this kind of
confused thinking about perception as a cogent value for the present age.
Concerning the presentation of Weston's subject, Van Dyke says, it "is
deceptively simple; it challenges the viewer to make his own interpretation.

In his pictures the object is all there, complete within the

confines of the frame; it is clearly what it is .

Yet it is more.

Whatever it may be, it also partakes of all other things because Weston
saw its universal qualities." 213

Again, as the translator and divine

agent of light, the photograph appropriates the general truth of a thing.
But surely, to perceive the "universal qualities" of a thing is to
abstract it, to form-alize it.
the thing itself.

At any rate, it is clearly not to see

In fact, it is nothing more than Emerson's transparent

eyeball which, in its ability to capture the general effect as well as
the specific detail, sees through the transparency of the world itself to
its symbolic meaning.

Weston defined his photographic aesthetic

precisely in these terms:
The photographer's power lies in his ability to re-create his
subject in terms of its basic reality, and present this re-creation
in such a form that the spectator feels that he is seeing not just
a symbol for the object, but the thing itself revealed for the
first time. Guided by the photographer's selective understanding,
the penetrating power of the camera-eye can be used to produce a
heightened sense of reality--a kind of super realism that reveals
the vital essence of things.214
Thus, the photographer, due to his superior "selective understanding" of
the existent and in conspiracy with the "penetrating power of the
213quoted in "Photo Exhibition a Testimony to Weston's Skills,"
The Denver Post, 1 February 1976, "Roundup Section," p. 22.
214"What is Photographic Beauty?" quoted in Rudisill, p. 141.
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camera-eye," unabashedly guarantees the truth of his presentation.

In

effect, then, the photograph no longer even represents the object, but
becomes the representation of how well the photographer understands the
object before he objectifies it.

This kind of patting oneself on the

back does nothing more than typify a modified version of Edward Hitchcock's initial response to the medium:
to man's presence in the universe.

henceforth, all nature attests

Weston's attitude further "develops"

that diorthotic objectification of the world, whereby the thing exists
only in so far as it is set before us, or "brought to light."

Yet, this

is anything but the Heideggerian "clearing" of aletheia, for there is no
room here for the "shadow" of concealment in truth.

Its own historian,

light reveals the world as some sort of mysterious agent in subtle and
unexpressed complicity with man.

Once man has placed himself "in the

picture," he tenaciously holds onto this view whereby he constitutes the
world as subjectum.

The more man pursues the calculation, manipulation,

and objectification of the existent, the more prominently he places
himself in the forefront of the frame.

Indeed, "That the world becomes

a view is one and the same process with that by which man, within the
existent, becomes a subjectum."215
With the very inception of the daguerreotype, then, it was inevitable that man should become the subject for his own picture.

The

daguerrean portrait, by "objectively" placing man in the picture,
literally terminated the anthropological tangent of nineteenth-century
hero worship.

Emerson's early thinking in the lectures on Biography

(1835) reiterated Carlyle's On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the ijeroic in
215Heidegger, "World View," p. 352.
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History, and the nineteenth-century approach to history in general.

And

his Representative Men (1850), though somewhat tempered by a growing
emphasis on dialectic so that society as well as the individual is given
a positive role in the historical synthesis, denotes a contiguous
attitude in so far as man abides as "representative."216
-._.

Man represents

the determination of historical events; he represents the age.

And in

the sense that he represents it at all, he does so in terms of a fixed
and static vision of a moment in time.

Even if that moment now resides

in either the dialectical thesis or antithesis, which taken as a
relation is always "moving on" toward a new synthesis, the vision itself
remains permanently fixed in its truth.

In other words, the "face" of

man represents the existent as a whole in no less a dogmatic sense than
Swedenborg's theory of correspondences.

And though it seems fair to say

with Charles Feidelson that Swedenborg "was Emerson's favorite whipping
boy"217 regarding the stasis'of Swedenborg's doctrine of symbolism,
Emerson's view in Representative Men is equally as retrospective or
static in so far as we can discover the dynamics of an age by looking
back at an individual as representative at all--and framing that
perspective, moreover, as one which will be correct and true for all
future generations who subsequently look back.

In such a way the "mean-

ing" of history never belongs to the present, much less the future, but
remains the counterfeit property of the past.

The interpretation of

history is in no way "subject" to change because the subject has become
216For a detailed analysis of the role of dialectic in Emerson's
historical thinking, see Gustaaf Van Cromphout, "Emerson and the
Dialectics of History," PMLA 91 (January: 1976) : 54-64.
217cf. Charles Feidelson, Jr., Symbolism and American Literature
(Chicago: University of Ch~cago Press, Phoenix Books, 1959), p. 318.

91

an object for study, a "discipline."

Whenever we look back, the subject

is always "there," staring back at us from the exact same posture.
Anchored in the past, these fixed lines of force secure man's position in
the present--forever.

-

In order to avoid this kind of historical

attitude, we must keep in mind that these stereotypes in no way constitute a "destiny,"
and just as clothing, jewellery and love transfigure the biological
needs from which they arise, in the same way within the cultural
world the historical ~ priori is constant only for a given phase
and provided that the balance of forces allows the same forms to
remain. So history is neither a perpetual novelty, nor a
perpetual repetition, but the unique movement which creates stable
forms and breaks them up.218
Of course, by its very nature the portrait is retrospective; as a view
into the past, the portrait frames or isolates a moment which represents
the "subject" of history as a timeless object, an object

~

of time.

It was only with the daguerreotype, however, that "everyman" could
become a hero; though, to be sure, this is no return to medieval nonperspectivism.

Rather, the daguerreotype offered the opportunity for

every man to have an "objectified" perspective on his private life, able
to be exhibited at will to anyone else, thereby substantiating the Glaim
that every life participates in the existent "significantly."
In very little time, then, the portrait became the bread and butter
of the daguerreotypist's trade, and portrait galleries sprung up in every

ff

major city.

While the European tradition of daguerreotype portraiture

emphasized aesthetic composition, the general or "formal" view, the
American portrait stressed a central figure.

The typical method

presented the subject in direct light against a dark background.
218Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 88.

This,
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in effect, toned down the purely "realistic" or compositional aspect of
the portrait while simultaneously playing up the "symbolic."

Thus,

European daguerreotypes, in general, seem "more timeless and selfcontained than is the immediate moment hacked out of the passing scene
often shown in American pictures.

This sort of jagged directness tends

to emphasize the 'truth and reality' of the American picture in a way
suggesting that the picture is less a distinct entity than a view into
the world beyond it in an almost Emersonian sense."219

Once again,

daguerrean portraiture, by presenting the high-lighted subject set off
against a dark background, reminds us of Rembrandt's own technique which,
as we have seen, sustained innumerable comparisons with the daguerreotype
throughout its

develop~nt.

Similarly, at the photographic exhibit for

the London World's Fair, the jury reported:
America stands alone for stern development of character, her
works, with few exceptions, reject all accessories, present a
faithful transcript of the subject and yield to none in excellence
of execution • • • • The portraits stand forward in bold relief
upon a plain background. The artist, having placed implicit
reliance upon his knowledge of photographic science, has neglected
to avail himself of the resources of art • • • • 220
Rather than paint-in a scene or background ("the resources of art"),
American daguerreotypists preferred the more direct contrast between
light and dark as a significant commentary on the subject.
his own technique, Gabriel Harrison explained:

Concerning

"In daguerreotyping, as

well as in painting, the artist should endeavor to secure three distinct
and marked peculiarities that can hardly fail of making his production a
superior work of art.

These three points are the high lights, the middle

219Rudisill, p. 161.
220quoted in James D. Horan, Mathew Brady:
Camera (New York: Bonanza Books, 1955), p. 18.
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tints, and the shadow."221

He further remarked that when tonal

gradations define the effect in this way, the daguerreotypist will insure
himself of a picture "whose deep and Rembrandt-like shadow constrasts
finely with the clear distinct tone of the high light, while the middle
tints exhibit an elasticity of appearance so pure and lifelike, that the
flesh seems imbued with motion, and the dull, frosty, death-like
representation, that is so detestable in a work of art is studiously
avoided."222

Thus, like the philosophical posture of idealism, the

daguerrean portrait pictorially gets man "in the picture" objectively in
so far as it treats the body as part of a single, continuous objectspace.

Thus isolated from him-"self," the subject is henceforth able to

perceive the truth of his subjectivity apart from its fictive opacity in
the world.

By placing his subjectivity in "front of" himself, out there,

the subject simultaneously becomes the spectator of his own view; like
the world, he becomes transparent.
22l"Lights and Shadows of Daguerrean Life," Photographic and Fine
Art Journal 7 (January 1854) : 8.
222Ibid. Harrison deliberately emphasized this potentially
"dramatic" aspect of the daguerreotype as a literary technique in his own
writings. In fact, like science, the literary world at large was quick
to adopt the daguerreotype to its own purposes. Nearly ten years prior
to Hawthorne's use of the daguerreotype as one of his organizing
metaphors in The House of the Seven Gables, as Rudisill remarks (pp. 22122), Francis Osgood had employed the daguerreotype as a kind of framing
device for a series of character sketches in her short story,
"Daguerreotype Pictures." And in 1847, a new literary magazine, The
Daguerreotype, was established in order to create "verbal pictures," a
new visual approach to literature which indicates to what extent the
literary world was willing to appropriate the new technology to its own
domain. Henceforth, the daguerreotype appeared in numerous short
stories and novels either as some kind of plot device or metaphor for
moral commentary. Such works as Fred Hunter's The Daguerreotype: or
Love at First Sight, Dion Boucicault's The Octoroon, Augustine Duganne's
The Daguerreotype Miniature or Life in the Empire City, and many others
made extensive use of the daguerreotype as a literary technique,
especially as a framing device for characterization or "portraiture."
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In conclusion, then, because it uniformly frames the space of its
image, the world-view positions the object in such a way that its form is
always determined by the whatness of its "vision."

But what we see is

nothing more than the "content" isolated and set apart from its structure
so that the vision never constitutes the phenomenon itself.
.--

This

priority of content can only be brought to account once we interrogate
the possible relation of "meaning" to the visiop..

Although the structure

of a phenomenon changes or alters its content, this can never be "true"
of a world which is convinced of the unchangeability of its objects and
their consequent absolute determinability in the mind as "concept."

My

idea of a geometrical space, for example, can never co-incide with the
meaning of the space of my body as incarnate being-in-the-world.

This

space discloses a vanishing point in my "self" as a perceiver, and not
in the object as a spectacle.

Since I am always in the world as the

articulation of a posture, perspective can never represent the space of
that world, but only an ideal world whose space conforms to geometrical
concepts incapable of framing anything other than a fixed and predetermined significance.

The daguerreotype, moreover, not only objecti-

fied the thing, but the subjectum as well; the daguerrean portrait
transformed people into things in so far as it extended and multiplied
the human image to the proportions of mass-produced merchandise. 223
Nevertheless, whatever "object" it captures, the photograph, like the
world-view, sets its image before us as

~

view; the spectator simulta-

neously sets himself apart from the view in so far as it represents a
1
~

privileged consciousness anterior to perception itself.

To the extent

223Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man
(New York: The New American Library, A Signet Book, 1964), p. 170.
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that the photograph objectified the world, it further evidenced the
"correctness" of Cartesian metaphysics whereby the subjectum knows the
object as extended and separate from him in a continuous and uniform
space according to an

~

priori rationality or fixed perspective.

Scientifically, of course, the photograph culminated the age of
mechanical industrialism.

"It was this all-important quality of

uniformity and repeatability that had made the Gutenberg break between
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Photography was almost as decisive

in making the break between mere mechanical industrialism and the graphic
age of electronic man."224

Strictly speaking, however,. it was not until

the "motion" picture that the electronic age could be said to have begun;
yet, these photographic "dots" for the eye graphically terminated the
thinking of an age, just as their corresponding "dots" for the ear
implied the beginning of a new age:

"Within a year of Daguerre's

discovery, Samuel F. B. Morse was taking photographs of his wife and
daughter in New York City.

Dots for the eye (photograph) and dots for

the ear (telegraph) thus met on top of a skyscraper."225

Perspective

had created the very possibility of an "objective" science; Leonardo's
Situs drawings and the subsequent science of anatomy were predicated on
this new pictorial technique which could now describe the interior of the
body as well as the external world itself.

Telescope and microscope had

further magnified the scientific objectification of the world.

But with

the photograph, the scientific mission had entered a new era which would
extend the ubiquitous deceit of the camera-eye far into the twentieth
224Ibid., p. 171.
225rbid.
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century itself.

In so far as the photograph was able to capture the

interior gestures of both matter and mind, it constituted the foundation
not only for sub-atomic physics, but for the new worlds of endocrinology
and psychopathology as well.226

226Ibid., p. 181.

r
CHAPTER II
EXPRESSIVE SPACE AND BEING SITUATED:

THE FIELD

Because perspective pays absolute homage to the object through the
vanishing point, securing its place in a fixed uniform space in which the

l

I

perceiver is situated objectively as well, it delineates an object-world
already there, a world in which the perceiver passively identifies the
truth of its content.

Since it is an object itself, the world makes

itself known to the extent that it is determinate and measurable, a space
wherein every thing has its proper place via a calculus of objects--a
calculus, moreover, which encourages the "delta" as the means of transcending the purely geometrical in order to ground the world in an
abstract infinity.

As that ultimate object, entirely calculable, the

world is to the extent that it is incremental, objectively representable.
In short, the world becomes the "notion" that I have of it, an idea.
Only in this way can we ever have it in our view . . Because perspective
articulated the very frame for an objective scientific method, it
simultaneously delimited the world of that frame, its content, as a
view, and henceforth appropriated the world-view as its product.

In

order to insure its future, however, a world-view is necessarily
compelled to repress the more primordial aspect of its epistemology, as a
product of scientific and technological thinking wherein consciousness
posits a priority of content in the sense that its view is significant
only in so far as it is framed.

For if it were to reflect on how it is

that it "knows" its content, it would be forced to re-think the entire
97
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of its methodology, an aspect which at any rate it considers

superfluous.

For a world-view always orients itself toward a theoretical

space in which it is unnecessary that it be perceived in order to be,
since the ready-made world, as object, presents itself as the setting or
frame for every possible event wherein perception is merely one of those
events.!

As long as "vision" merely negotiates the objective space of

the thing perceived, either constituted or constituent, this kind of
seeing stubbornly transforms its own activity into a perspicuous
exchange between an epistemological subject and object.

Because the

perceptual "something" is never "in the middle of something else"2 it can
never form part of a field, but rather gives me information or in-forms
me of the content of its frame--a magic show which truly represents a
performance "out of this world."

It is in this sense that its perspec-

tive is always "framed."
Indeed the natural world presents itself as existing in itself over
and above its existence for me; the act of transcendence whereby
the subject is thrown open to the world runs away with itself and
we find ourselves in the presence of a nature which has no need to
be perceived in order to exist.3
Since, then, the object exists before we perceive it, there is no
necessity that we take hold of it or "take it up" in order to know it.
Because the object exists in a pre-determined conceptual space, all that
remains is to reveal its geographical or geometrical location with
respect to other objects, irrespective of the objectless subjectivity of
our own body which makes the birth of Being possible.

Thus, the "truth"

of the world-view inheres in the assumption that our body is simply
lMerleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 207.
2rbid., p. 4.

3Ibid., p. 154.
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another object in the world, a commodity with the ability to pay for
itself.

By framing its perspective, the world-view delineates an

unequivocal correspondence between subject and object without any intermediary term.

It judges the truth of its vision by an abstract impression:

between perceiver and perceived there resides an absolute nothingness, as
though the "something" perceived, its "whatness," constitutes a flat
content which through the mystical agency of a fixed line of force
projects the near-infinite number of points on its surface back onto a
vision which receives them as impressions in the form of local stimuli
and, in a durationless moment, reduplicates them--Presto!--into the
completed form of a picture.

Since perceiver and perceived exist as one

object to another, this deliberate posture nullifies the object-horizon
structure in the sense that the peripheral vision of its focus is as
equally determinate as the central vision itself.
Like pictorial perspective, the scientific-technological worldview objectifies by making every object within the gaze of its frame
centrally focused without any peripheral indeterminateness; it represents
a gaze which has simultaneously come to rest on every thing,

ther~by

appropriating an absolute focal figure accompanied by a subsequent loss
or negation of any background whatsoever--a flat projection without
"depth."

Within this gaze, objects rescind their ability to establish a

horizon for other objects.

What this amounts to, then, is not a gaze at

all, but a framed representation, the mental picture of a whole world, a
world constituted solely by objects as though the object were for-itself.
In effect, this kind of perspective paradoxically represents an unlimited
point of view, one which sees from every angle simultaneously because it
ignores the subject of its perception by vanishing in the single horizon

;;: .
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of the object.

Objectivity or representation is intransigently forgetful

of the non-objective space necessary for there to be a representation or
object-space at all; it disregards the bodily space of the perceiver; in
short, it ignores Being.4

Because it presents a world of thoroughly

focused objects through the fixed lines of force constituting, via the
vanishing point, a continuous uniform space, it traces the outline of its
gaze by a geometry in which the subject of the gaze plays no role other
than already being there as another object in an objective space already
made, a theoretical world of ready-made objects.

In this kind of

representation, an object is that which is seen from everrwhere at once;
the object itself can be none of the individual points of view from
which my body is able to perceive it at any given moment, but rather
constitutes the flat projection of all possible perspectives, Leibniz's
perspectiveless posture, the object seen from nowhere, or rather the
object seen from everywhere.

"The completed object is translucent, being

shot through from all sides by an infinite number of present scrutinies
which intersect in its depth leaving nothing hidden."5

Because the

sufficient content, articulates a world of focal figures without a
background or field, the world itself subsequently forfeits its opacity.
It can thus no longer display itself, for there no longer exists the
possibility of "relief."

Where nothing is hidden, nothing can be seen.

4cf. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans.
Ralph Manheim. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1961.
5Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 69.
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We are left with the Cartesian-Newtonian world, an invisible universe, an
abstraction.

By going beyond the experience of perception,

I regard my body, which is my point of view upon the world, as one
of the objects of that world. My recent awareness of my gaze as a
means of knowledge I now repress, and treat my eyes as bits of
matter. They then take their place in the same objective space in
which I am trying to situate the external object and I believe that
I am producing the perceived perspective by the projection of the
objects on my retina.6
By positing an absolute object I negate my "own" experience and, like
Melville's Ahab, monomaniacally attach myself to the idea which presumes
itself "true," as does an absolute object, for all times, places, and
Dasein.

By expressing a universal validating power which forever closes

off my ante-predicative knowledge of the world, I simultaneously "come up
to" the world and every thing in it only in so far as it represents or
refers me to an idea.

As Descartes expressed it, perception is "solely

an inspection by the mind;" and further on in the "Second Meditation" he
continues, "I comprehend, solely by the faculty of judgment which resides
in my mind, that which I believed I saw with my eyes."7
Yet, phenomenally speaking, we do not come up to the thing in
perception, but rather we live it by taking "hold of it," by making it
our own.

Hence, the non-objective situated space of my body makes it

possible to define perception and Being analogously; for each, in its
own way, constitutes the "disclosure of appropriation,"8 or as Hofstadter
6Ibid., pp. 70-71.
7Ren/ Descartes, "Discourse on Method" and "Meditations," trans.
Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1960),
pp. 88-89.
8Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," Poetry,
Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row,
Harper Colophon Books, 1975), p. 86.
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interprets Heidegger's "das Ereignis," enownment.9
Perception, for instance, is an enownment between man, Being, and
time, in which the world opens up for man in his seeing, hearing,
touching, smelling, tasting. In perception, what is other to the
individual human being appears as enowned in its otherness. The
house we see over there is seen as the dwelling place, whose
entrance beckons or repels, which harbors within it the family, the
hidden place of love and hate, conflict and healing. Saying, in
uttering "house," has allowed this structure of enownment to appear
and has opened up the possibility of ourselves grasping it and even
entering into it to partake of the mode of life-presencing and
-absencing which it makes accessible.10
By embracing the world with our body, then, we make it our own, whereas
the scientific world of objects situated in a geometrically abstract
space can never interosculate the perceptual field, remaining fated to a
desiccative world in which every thing has its uniquely proper "place" as
the necessary condition for its being.

And though the enunciation of

this ready-made world represents the fixed end of a process which is only
possible because in the world, as it is experienced or lived-through, my
body is able to move around things, this motility is decisively overlooked in favor of a pseudo object-horizon structure which slyly evades
its interior dialectic, peremptorily identifying the priority of its
content without a single interpellant gesture, never interrogating how
it came to be or why it is at all.

Thus, objective or scientific

thought cunningly exerts an omnipotence which purports, with a money-back
guarantee, to "save" us from the opaque and angular shadow-world of our
own experience.
expensive.

The bargain, however, is only apparent, and ultimately

True to its promise, this edulcorated object-world, shot

through and through with the transparency of finest plate glass
9Albert Hofstadter, "Enownment," Boundary 2 4 (Winter 1976)
10rbid., p. 374.

369.
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unceasingly bringing its content "to light," elucidates a completed
picture of the world, but one which is fixed, static, forever consigned
to a frozen image as though caught in a winter ice-storm; for "the
absolute positing of a single object is the death of consciousness, since
it congeals the whole of existence."ll
Fortunately my body always presents itself to me from the same
"angle" and thus precludes the possibility of ever being an object solely
in-itself, for an object is precisely that thing on which I can have a
multiple perspective and, in fact, move away from me until it disappears
from view.

I can move an object "in" and "out" of view at will, but I

can never be absent from my own body, and it is this which secures its
permanence from my point of view; it must always be with me, as my basic
habit, since it can never be "in front" of me.l2

And as the tertium quid

in the figure-background configuration, constituting a "double horizon of
external and bodily space"l3 in so far as the perceptual "something" is
always in the middle of something else as part of a field, it constantly
evades the treatment to which science would "subject" it as an object of
study.

It refuses to become a "discipline;" indeed, it refuses to take

an un-situated "place" in universal Being.

When something touches my

body, for example, it does not present itself to me "as a geometrical
outline in which each stimulus occupies an explicit position."l4

So

too with the visual experience; the phenomenal forces in my perceptual
field, and not the "objective" forces, elicit my response or movement
toward a potential world, so that it is "never our objective body that
11Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 71.
13Ibid., p. 101.

14rbid., p. 108.

12Ibid., pp. 90-91.

-
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we move, but our phenomenal body."lS

This phenomenal space surrounding

my body constitutes a perceptual field which makes it possible, in the
first place, for there to be a world of objects.

The fixed, uniform,

homogeneous space I disclose in a perspective receives its meaning from
the non-objective field of bodily space in which I am situated.

It is

the situation which brings a spatial organization into being and allows
consciousness to "derealize" itself and subsequently "throw itself'' into
the object as an intention.16

In so far as consciousness is always a

consciousness of something,17 as Husserl has defined it, its articulation
and interpretation can never be expressed through inductive or causal
thinking, as the relation of function to variable, but only as the interpenetration of intentional vectors.

"Beneath intelligence as beneath

perception, we discover a more fundamental function, 'a vector mobile.•n18
Of course, that which lies at the very center of this intentional
reticulation is existence itself.

Perceptual intentionality19 discloses

a non-positing, non-representational consciousness which negates the
absolute."truth" of representation (Vor-stellung) claimed by the positing
consciousness, for "space may be given to me in an intention to take hold
without being given in an intention to know."20

The cerebellar patient,

for example, can grasp a part of his body, but not be able to point to
it.

The phenomenal space of my body thus discloses a different kind of

consciousness, consciousness of a world where the "object" does not
15Ibid., p. 106.

16Ibid., p. 121.

17cf. Remy C. Kwant, The Phenomenological Philosophy of MerleauPonty (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1963), pp. 153-68.
18Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 135.
l9cf. Ibid., p. 121.

20Ibid. , p. 104.
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represent extension itself, but presents itself as an "extension" of my
own body, just as the blind man's walking stick becomes a "bodily
auxiliary, an extensi~n of the bodily synthesis."21

In this "interior"

space (in the sense of a non-objective space which negates the subjectobject dichotomy) the object is not a flat projection or total system of
simultaneous perspectives from "everywhere;" it is not an idea or
representation; it is not a sign, but an "aspect" or extension of my own
body co-inhabiting the intentional co-ordinates of a non-geometrical
space, that "intentional arc"22 of expressive space habitually projected
around me.

In the same way, the structure of consciousness in general

displays a prehensility for apprehending an intelligible interior of
meaning, just as the mass of ferromagnetic material inside a wire coil
increases its external magnetic field.
every constitution has the schema:
sion."23

As Husserl expressed it:

"Not

content of apprehension--apprehen-

In the visual field, then, objects do not impress themselves

upon me as local stimuli, now being explicitly "here," now "there," but
,,,,

primordially occupy a phenomenal space in which I intend to move; and
there could be no "objective" space at all without this intentional
spatialization via my body--this "vector mobile" moving, as Hochheimer
expresses it in Analyse eines Seelenblinden von der Sprache, "in all
directions like a searchlight, one through which we can direct ourselves
towards anything, in or outside ourselves, and display a form of
21Ibid., p. 152.
22Ibid., p. 136.
23Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Conscioused. Martin Heidegger, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 25.

~.
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behavior in relation to that object."24
The analogy of the searchlight, however, as Merleau-Ponty remarks,
is inadequate "since it presupposes given objects on to which the beam
plays, whereas the nuclear function to which we refer, before bringing
objects to our sight or knowledge, makes them exist in a more intimate
sense, for us."25

This intimate sense reflects my personal motor habit

as an extension of my own existence, and bespeaks the way in which my
perceptual habit brings me into the possession of a world.26

Indeed,

the style of my gaze, the execution of perception, becomes a behavioral
gesture which creates the possibility for the meaning of my world, a
meaning which I always grasp via my body and its motility although
perception itself can never imbue my life with fresh significance since
it is always in the mode of the impersonal "One."27

Thus the "gaze,"

like the blind man's walking stick, provides us with a natural
instrument which "gets more or less from things according to the way in
which it questions them, ranges over or dwells on them.

To learn to see

colours is to acquire a certain style of seeing, a new use of one's own
body; it is to enrich and recast the body image."28

Science, however,

ignores the object's carnality, intentionality, and the function of
body-motility in perception, for it intrudes itself upon a transparently
completed form of existence; as with childhood, science ignores those
things which do not comfortably fit into its world.

Like illness itself,

then, science represents a pathological disturbance which employs an
24quoted in Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. 135-36.
25Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 136.
27Ibid., p. 240.

28rbid., p. 153.

26Ibid., p. 153.

107
inflexible systematic set of procedures in order to compensate for
certain deficiencies, a "repression" which continues to support its
world despite the frequent creaking of its incomplete foundation.

In

effect, science
reduces the object to a collection of successive 'characteristics,'
perception to an abstract account, recognition to a rational
synthesis or a plausible conjecture, and strips the object of its
carnal presence and facticity. Whereas in the normal person every
event related to movement or sense of touch causes consciousness
to put up a host of intentions which run from the body as the
centre of potential action either towards the body itself or
towards the object.29
This is to espouse a synergism in which the whole is, indeed, greater
than the sum of its parts.

My body is not merely an aggregation of

parts which extemporize themselves by a harmonious juxtaposition in
space; rather, my body articulates a dynamic fluxion which continually
"digests" the world, transforming it to energy and waste with every
"bite."

I nevertheless remain in undivided possession of it through a

body image in which all the parts are included.30

The possibility of a

style, then, is the possibility of a non-objective body image, a
completed "awareness" of posture not as the autonomous form of knowledge
but as a kind of consciousness which trans-forms its "content" into the
form of itself thereby giving structure and meaning to my "environment"
and the objects which I "take up" in that environment.

This intentional

space provides the background against which my personal gesture or style
stands out, and virtually signifies that my body, as a "subject," dwells
face to face against the world.31

Here my personal bearing toward the

world comes to light--a non-discursive significance which, like an art
29Ibid., p. 109.
31Ibid., p. 101.

30Ibid. , p. 98.
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work, discloses its meaning through an expressive time and space created
by the "£orm."32

By "expressing" the world, my body takes "hold of it;"

I come into the possession of a world by projecting a distinctly
individual motility.

And as the projection of a movement against the

background of an integral structure of potential intentionality, this
-._

new configuration or field reveals that my body touches the world.
live being through my fingertips.33

I

Thus, the spatiality of my body is

clearly brought into being via its motility; it inhabits or dwells in a
configuration constituted by both an "objective" and a "bodily" space.
In this sense, perception itself is not even a deliberate act, but the
background against which all my acts stand out; for the "content" of
perception is always "inserted into a certain form of behaviour.n34

In

this way, the world becomes an "expression" of my personal way of Being,
the form of behavior; and world-structure becomes an expressive space.
I

Now an expressive space is precisely that kind of space which
comes and goes.

So long as we consider the space of the thing perceived,

a framed space in so far as it constitutes an objectively total area
which always gets fixed, we shall never expose the spatial relationship
between the embodied subject and a world.

Things can only begin to

exist for us because we desire them; the affective life of the body
32cf. Susanne K. Langer. Feeling and Form. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1953, and Erich Heller. The Disinherited Mind.
Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., Meridian Books, 1959.
33william V. Spanos, "Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic
Circle: Towards a Postmodern Theory of Interpretation as Dis-closure,"
Boundary 2 4 (Winter 1976) : 479.
34Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. xi and 208-09, respectively.
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projects its own intentionality, one which consolidates a peculiar form
of consciousness and expresses a typical structure incorporating other
"forms" of behavior which reciprocally express it as well.

As a

constituent of this integrated network, the affective life underscores
our distinctive way of taking up the world.

We invite the world to us

as we would a lover, gesticulating the appropriate postures in accordance with how we would have it.

If we wish to surprise it, we encounter

it with a feigned lack of awareness as the courtier who, knowing his
mistress is scheduled to walk across a certain path in the woods,
nonchalantly situates himself against a tree which she will pass,
perhaps crossing his legs and leaning into the tree at an angle which
will flatter him the most.

He fastens his gaze away from the direction

by which she will come so that in taking her by surprise she is forced
to "discover" him.

Although at first glance this attitude seemingly

represents a "predetermined" pose, the fact of our body repudiates an
entirely "postureless" attitude, for we are always situated expressively
whether we wish it or not.

Every event in life is thus internally

determined by our "demeanor," the style by which we ucourt" the wo:r;"ld as
a projection of our own affective intentionality.

As Merleau-Ponty

points out, this is what Freud implied when he spoke of symptoms as
always being "overdetermined."

Because the body constantly transforms

its "interiority" into de facto situations, it insures the world of an
essential metamorphosis, one which substantiates the Ovidian universe
and simultaneously confirms the meaning of existence.

Similarly, it

might be said that any myth, because it opens onto possible objectifications, grounds the de facto articulation of an "objective" world
predicated on causality--not because it anticipates science, but because
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its "noemata" can be set in a phenomenology which describes its function
as a certain kind of consciousness which opens onto other possible
consciousnesses.

For example, the second law of thermodynamics

singularly appropriates in scientific terms what the body had always

-

"known" in phenomenal terms and existentially expresse'd as the "phoenix. 11
Like the bird which rises from its own ashes, the second law of thermodynamics merely describes a set of phenomena which accounts for the
birth of a sun provisional to the paradoxical process of burning itself
out, whereby hydrogen is converted to helium and then to oxygen and
carbon, and so forth.

Science, however, tells us nothing of this world

as an event wherein the incorporeal content belies a more primordial
"form," that most general space expressing a structure of Being endowed
with emblematic and physiognomic characteristics, the metamorphic nature
of perception itself; science merely defalcates its "discoveries" from a
world absolutely there, a world, moreover, which ironically beckons to
be raped because of its beautiful "mind," and not its "body."

This kind

of embezzlement mirrors the promethean endeavor of science to lay bare a
universe stripped of its matter, a de-natured view of an anatomy denuded
to a set of purely objective phenomena via an induction which can never
arrive at necessity from the order of contingent facts.

Today's

"science fiction" sharply defines this attitude, although such writers
as Poe and, more recently, H. P. Lovecraft had already established the
ground for such a vision in an abstract "gothic."

"The true 'hero' of a

marvel tale," remarks Lovecraft, "is not any human being but simply a
set of phenomena.

Over and above everything else should tower the

stark, outrageous monstrousness of one chosen departure from
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nature." 35

By denying the world an expressive space, science fixes its

gaze upon a theoretical area entirely framed and demarcated, a space
implacably there irrespective of an embodied perceiver, which appropriates a set of phenomena in terms of an idea whose truth is determined by
the logical progression of a set of equations, and not the intentionality
of an affective life.
Such a vision precludes the possibility of removing one's self at
will, for the bodiless perceiver is condemned to the absolute truth of
its vision as an abstract function of the equation itself.

As a testi-

mony to "objectivity" the perceiver relinquishes his will, becoming the
slave to a world of self-sufficient "things" forever imprisoned in a
space that lacks motility since it is always determined by an abstract
system of co-ordinates which positions its objects with absolute
finality.

The bodiless observer can never go any "where" in this

theoretical frame since no-"thing" can take up space.

By forfeiting its

sexuality this neutered entity can never come and go as it pleases, and
subsequently forfeits the possibility of an "intercourse" with the world.
A genuine subject, on the other hand, continually enjoys a freedom which
not only transposes him upon the world effecting a "d,placement" toward
various situations, but also allows him to withdraw from it in so far as
he always has a body.

Through this constant metamorphosis the body

guarantees an inherited immunity to scientific thinghood, that fatal
35Marginalia, quoted in Roger Shattuck, The Banquet Years: The
Origins of the Avant Garde in France, 1885 to World War .!• rev. ed.
(New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1968), p. 41. Cf. also,
H. P. Lovecraft, Supernatural Horror in Literature (New York: Dover .
Publications, Inc., 1973), p. 87: "Serious weird stores are . • • made
realistically intense by close consistency and perfect fidelity to
Nature except in the one supernatural direction which the author allows
himself."
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disease by which an entity remains forever susceptible to itself and the
world.

Indeed, my body constitutes the possibility of discarding

every-thing, including, if I so desire, my very existence.

In this

process, however, my body is never self-sufficient, but always alongside
a void, between the poles of transformation, "a prey to an active
...,.

nothingness."36

It is through the body that existence begins to appear,

as a message in invisible ink begins to make itself present before our
very eyes; and in this sense Binswanger defines the body as the hidden
form of being ourself. 37

In the sexuality of my body, then, existence

announces its ambiguous character, an ambiguity which inter-penetrates it
to such an extent that we can never determine "where" sexuality leaves
off and existence begins, for existence is the act of taking up a sexual
situation;38

"The importance we attach to the body and the contradic-

tions of love are, therefore, related to a more general drama which
arises from the metaphysical structure of my body, which is both an
object for others and a subject for myself."39

This kind of transcen-

dence, whereby the world becomes meaningful to the extent that I take up
a position, not only testifies that science can never get the "whole
picture," but also indicates that we have at last escaped the anthropologism of the traditional subject-object dichotomy.

Though ontic

relations within the world may initially obscure the "posture" or
situation as an originating form of knowledge, I nevertheless discover
36Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 165.
37uber Psychotherapie, quoted in Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology,
p. 166.
38Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 169.
39Ibid., p. 167.
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through my body the primordial way in which I come into the possession of
a world.

So too with language:

"it is the subject's taking up of a

position in the world of his meanings."40

Thus, man's genius for

ambiguity, as Merleau-Ponty refers to it, is disclosed through the
experience of his own body, which refuses to be known in any way other
than living it.41

To the extent that I possess experience at all, that

experience inevitably bespeaks my body as the way I am:
at the same time my body is as it were a 'natural' subject, a provisional sketch of my total being. Thus experience of one's own
body runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches
subject and object from each other, and which gives us only the
thought about the body, or the body as an idea, and not the
experience of the body or the body in reality.42
By re-discovering the experience of my body and its basic structure, I
re-discover, at the same time, the structure of the world, a structure,
moreover, which like my body assumes a non-specific gravity, a density
which continually evades the scientific transparency of objectification
and, indeed, the world-view itself.
Just as the synthesis of my body guarantees the object prior to
constructing an idea of it, so too does it guarantee the world.

"The

thing, and the world, are given to me along with the parts of my body,
not by any 'natural geometry', but in a living connection comparable, or
rather identical, with that existing between the parts of my body
itself."43

For example, the "orientation" of my body image constitutes

the possibility of a co-related orientation in my visual field.

Since my

body is not determined by a transparent geometry but by an express.ive
40Ibid., p. 193.
41Ibid.

Cf. also pp. 189 and 295-96, respectively.

42Ibid., pp. 198-99.

43Ibid., p. 205.
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unity which I discover by taking it up, this structure pertains to the
world as well.

By reason of my "position," I thus gain access to a

visual field, a system of entities with which my gaze can get in touch.
Reciprocally, my gaze acquires a certain style, a technique for "laying

-

its hand" upon this field, proportionate to the experience accrued from
using it.

Similarly, all the senses display the unity of a perceptual

field which inosculates a common world, as when a piece of music
expresses an audible "space" which belongs to the eye as well as the ear,
a depth inherent in the volume of a tone which seems to occupy all the
room between us and its source, as William James has remarked.44

The eye

here becomes an "auxiliary organ in order to concentrate attention upon
the kinetic character of~music."45

Stravinsky goes so far as to express

a disapproval of those who shut their eyes while

listenin~

to music:

I have always abominated listening to music with closed eyes, without the eye taking an active part. Seeing the gestures and_motions
of the different parts of the body that produce music is necessary
and essential to grasping it in all its fullness. Those who claim
to enjoy music fully only if their eyes are closed do not hear it
better than if their eyes were open, but the absence of visual
distractions allows them to abandon themselves, under the lulling
influence of sounds, to vague reveries--and it is these which they
love, far more than music itself.46
Though such an eminent musician as Pablo Casals played and listened to
music with his eyes shut, as Zuckerkandl points out, Stravinsky's remark
aptly enunciates that primordially general space whence all perception
transpires--the space, as Heidegger defines it, where things encounter us.
44"The Perception of Space," quoted in Victor Zuckerkandl, Sound
and Symbol: Music and the External World, trans. Willard R. Trask
(New York: Pantheon Books, Bollingen Series XLIV, 1956), p. 275.
45zuckerkandl, p. 340.
46stravinsky, An Autobiography, quoted in Zuckerkandl, p. 340.

115

Indeed, perceptual experience is ambiguous to such an extent that
11

an audible rhythm causes cinematograph pictures to run together and

produces a perception of

movemen~

whereas, without auditory support, the

same succession of images would be too slow to give rise to stroboscopic
movement. 11 47 In so far as the form of an object inter-penetrates all the
senses so that it is never a geometrical shape which we perceive, the
form itself articulates a whole world.

Because perception displays a

world common to all the senses, poets have recognized the synaesthetic
experience long before science committed it to second-order reflection.
Thus, Dante's Hell typifies "A place made dumb of every glimmer of
light."48

The sense configuration of the world adheres within the inten-

tiona! unity of my body, just as the unity of the single object g.rasped
by my visual field adheres within the intentional unity of my "gaze,"
which replaces diplopia or the double image that scientific colligation
would describe as superimposition.
For my gaze to alight on near objects and to focus my eyes on them,
it must experience double vision as an unbalance or as an imperfect
vision, and tend towards the single object as towards the release
of tension and the completion of vision. 'It is necessary to
"look" in order to see.' The unity of the object in binocular
vision is not, therefore, the result of some third person process
which eventually produces a single image through the fusion of two
monocular images. When we go from diplopia to normal vision, the
single object replaces the two images, one is clearly not superimposed on the other: it is not of the same order as they, but is
incomparably more substantial. The two images of diplopia are not
amalgamated into one single one in binocular vision; the unity of
the object is intentional. But--and this is the point we are
trying to make--it is not therefore a notional unity. We pass from
double vision to the single object, not through an inspection of
the mind, but when the two eyes cease to function each on its own
47Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 228.
48The Divine Come4Y, 3 Vols., trans. Dorothy L. Sayers, vol. I:
Hell (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1949), p. 98.
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account and are used as a single organ by one single gaze.49
The intentional synthesis of the phenomenal body projects around itself a
certain setting "in so far as its 'parts' are dynamically acquainted with
each other, and its receptors are so arranged as to make possible,
through their synergy, the perception of the object."50

In this way,

then, normal vision negotiates both the double image and the single
object in so far as we use it; we cannot explain it as the focus of an
anatomical visual apparatus, but only as an intentional function.
Furthermore, learning to look, that is, seeing in general, is an acquired
habit so that I always get from my gaze what I "put into it."

For

example, the visual sensation of the infant or the blind person, whose
sight has been restored, saliently attests that seeing in perspective is
ancillary to the development of a vision, but not its initial condition.
Initially, the person whose sight has been restored makes no styptic
contraction from the world by positing an "out there," but freely bleeds
upon it, as it were, as though he were in direct touch with it.

It is

only later, through practice, that he locates places through a visual
distance which foments the pandemic demarcation of "within" and "without."
Thus, "the senses interact in perception as the two eyes collaborate in vision."51

The pre-conscious unity of the body image sustains

the perceptual synthesis just as the intentional unity of my gaze
sustains the object; for the body is a synergic system which constitutes
the general situation of being, that is, being-in-the-world.

Perception

is thus a "form" of behavior only to the extent that my body "occupies"
49Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 232.
51Ibid., p. 234.

sorbid., PP· 232-33.
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a phenomenal space, for all the forms belong to the phenomenal world.52
Because the world is formal only in so far as it is phenomenal, movement
forms the basis for the synergic unity of the senses in perception as a
"project" or potential movement, and not as a transference in objective
space.53

My body, then, is the very possibility of the world, a formal

network of intentions co-inhabiting a phenomenal space; as such, my body
expresses the world, conferring significance upon it by the fact of my
situation.

Now in so far as my body "occupies" space at all, as being-

in-the-world, it always does so in terms of its "situation" and not its
"location."54

This is what is meant when we speak of the body as the

"subject" of perception.

Perception "occupies" me just as my body

"occupies" space, by merging into it intentionally.

For this reason I

neither think the object nor myself thinking it any more than my body
thinks its space; rather than being spread out before himself as a
consciousness, the perceiver merges into the object thereby leaving his
own subjectivity opaque and historical.55

If it were otherwise, there

could be no discrepancy between consciousness and the world, for intentionality would then "carry us to the heart of the object, and. simultaneously the percept would lose the thickness conferred by the present." 5 6
Because perception constitutes an "enownment," an appropriation, the
object invites my body to take it up in a certain way, to which my body
52Ibid., p. 232, footnote 2.

53Ibid., p. 234.

54obviously, "location" is not meant in the sense which Heidegger
speaks of it in "Building Dwelling Thinking," Poetry, Language, Thought,
p. 154.
55Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 238.
56 Ibid.
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responds by assuming an attitude which, in turn, makes the object determin ate.
The sensible configuration of an object or a gesture, which the
criticism of the constancy hypothesis brings before our eyes, is
not grasped in some inexpressible coincidence, it 'is understood'
through a sort of act of appropriation which we all experience when
we say that we have 'found' the rabbit in the foliage of a puzzle,
or that we have 'caught' a slight gesture. Once the prejudice of
sensation has been banished, a face, a signature, a form of
behaviour cease to be mere 'visual data' whose psychological meaning is to be sought in our inner experience, and the mental life
of others becomes an immediate object, a whole charged with
immanent meaning.57
The perceptual situation, then, neither posits the subject nor the object,
but discloses that my body is both a subject for me and an object for
others; it constitutes the lived experience of both a unified subject and
the intersensory unity of the thing.58 But how is this unification
ultimately possible?
If temporality is the ground of Being, as Heidegger's Being and
Time demonstrates, it must simultaneously be the ground of perception.
The perceptual synthesis is temporal:

"Subjectivity, at the level of

perception, is nothing but temporality."59

Temporality thus enables me

to re-assign the object of my perception to the world, for I can,
by slipping into the future, throw into the immediate past the
world's first attack upon my senses, and direct myself towards the
determinate object as towards a near future. The act of looking is
indivisibly prospective, since the object is the final stage of my
process of focusing, and retrospective, since it will present
itself as preceding its own appearance, as the 'stimulus,' the
motive or the prime mover of every process since its beginning.
The spatial synthesis and the synthesis of the object are base~ on
this unfolding of time. In every focusing movement my body unites
present, past and future, it secretes time, or rather it becomes
that location in nature where, for the first time, events, instead
of pushing each other into the realm of being, project round the
present a double horizon of past and future and acquire a
57rbid., pp. 57-58.

58Ibid., p. 239.

59rbid.
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historical orientation.60
The perceptual "moment" is therefore essentially characterized by its
"present;" for it is in the present that the act of focusing, for
example, projects a past and future which constitute a history.

And in

this sense, my body takes possession of time in so far as it "looks" at
the world.

But because perception, by definition, is actual only so long

as it is perceiving, because seeing is actual only so long as it is looking, every act of seeing must continually be renewed.

"The object

remains clearly before me provided that I run my eyes over it, freeranging scope being an essential property of the gaze." 61

The synthesis

"Can be recaptured only in a fresh act which is itself temporal." 62
Thus, the perceptual claim to objectivity must perpetually be re-made.
This failure of perceptual consciousness clearly reveals, then, how it is
that my body can be both the subject of perception and yet an object for
others, for it discloses that the subject of perception can never be an
absolute subjectivity, but remains destined "to become an object for an
ulterior I.

Perception is always in the mode of the impersonal 'One. t.n6J

Its being in the present, its characteristic ekstasis, is precisely what
makes the perceptual act itself impersonal.
It is not a personal act enabling me to give a fresh significance
to my life. The person who, in sensory exploration, gives a past
to the present and directs it towards a future, is not myself as
an autonomous subject, but myself in so far as I have a body anQ am
able to 'look.' Rather than being a genuine history, perception
ratifies and renews in us a 'prehistory.•64
Every perception thus "produces a new present which retains the past.
The duality of naturata and naturans is therefore converted into a
60Ibid., PP· 239-40.
62Ibid.

63Ibid.

61Ibid., p. 240.
64Ibid.

~.
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dialectic of constituted and constituting time."65
Still this does not get us to the most primordial horizon of Being,
that which makes being-situated possible.

Although we have described the

temporal ekstasis of the perceptual situation itself, we have yet to
define that ekstasis which makes perception possible in the first place.
The possibility of perception belongs to the futural ekstasis, just as
the possibility of the general situation being-in-the-world belongs to
it, for the ultimate ground of perception is the ultimate ground of beingsituated.

Although the perceptual "moment" is essentially characterized

by the present, it is existentially grounded in the future, the temporal
horizon of possibility itself.

Like authentic Being, authentic

perception is projective in its resoluteness.

To the extent that

perception makes the object determinate by throwing its indeterminate
sensations into the past, it does so only in so far as it ceaselessly
directs itself toward the object as a projected identity and thereby
throws itself into the future; and to that extent, perception constitutes
a primordial mode of concernful being-alongside the ready-to-hand, as
well as solicitous being-with-others.

Authentic perception frees me for

the world by the directedness of its project, and .thus liberates my body
for the potentiality-for-being appropriate to its own situation with
respect to the disclosure of being.

And like Being, authentic perception

maintains itself in truth and un-truth simultaneously; it can never withdraw from the actuality of its present for it would then cease to be, yet
its possibility confers a style upon its own situation so that it is
always situated within a temporal configuration constitutive of the
65rbid.
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particular kind of space it presently negotiates vis-a-vis the resoluteness of its intention.

In other words, perception is factually

determined by the actuality of its present, though factically de-limited
by the possibility of its future.

Authentic perception has already put

itself into the situation, for resoluteness "is authentically nothing
else than Being-in-the-world."66

Anticipatory resoluteness "brings the

Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-tohand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others."67
In the visual field, for example, objects disclose themselves by
virtue of other objects which constitute their horizon.

I can only "see"

an object because other objects remain concealed, although they are still
in the "field;" conspicuously, this is different from the perception in a
perspective which adheres in terms of a single horizon constituted by an
abstract vanishing "point."

After all, perception discloses truth to the

extent that it seeks to meet the world on its own terms; it directs
itself to that end in order to bring forth the truth of the world by
making room for the "clearing" where objects simultaneously conceal and
de-conceal themselves.
in "relief."

It is in this clearing that aletheia is figured

The inauthentic perception, on the other hand, rather than

bring forth this clearing (Gestalt), seeks to close it off within the
boundary or outline of an all-inclusive frame (Ge-Stell) so that it might
secure the object in its place.

It commandeers the absolute via the

process of representation (Vor-stellen), and it is in this sense that
inauthentic perception establishes the nature of modern technology, which
assumes "the unconditional character of mere willing in the sense of
66Heidegger, Being_ and Time, p. 344.

67rbid.
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purposeful self-assertion in everything."68
intention:
ness.

Of course, this is its

it intransigently disallows the other to appear in its other-

By refusing to meet the object on its own terms, as a mode which

makes the presencing and absencing of life possible, the technological
posture simultaneously denies the world the possibility of appearing in
its self-deconcealing.
the world.

In short, it spurns the phenomenal possibility of

By closing itself off from the phenomenon, it ironically

denegates itself the truth, the very thing it claims to possess
absolutely by virtue of the frame.

This is comprehensible only in light

of the fact that the technological attitude parasitizes on self-deception.
As a self-deception, the inauthentic perception represents, in fact, a
pseudo-posture, for it "pretends" not to be situated at all; modern
technology fixes the world by its view and subsequently sets itself apart
from the world so that it stands outside it.

The technological pseudo-

posture is forced to sever itself from the world because it willfully
intends to control it.

Accordingly, its intention obdurately ignores

the resolute call to Being and posits, in its place, the transparently
un-situated correctness of an idea.
By assuming an absolutely constituent consciousness, modern
technology consigns its objects to a vavasory model-in-thought, subject
to nothing but its own seigneuric indubitability, so that in effect it
never has to perceive them at all.

By abnegating the situation, that is,

being-in-the-world, technology submits itself to a slavery historically
unheralded, one which far exceeds that of the situation it seeks to
escape.

By virtue of its constitution, this hyperopic vision falls prey

68Heidegger, "What are :Poets For?" Poetry, Language, Thought,
p. 116.
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to the

foreshorten~d

figures it attempts to emulate; these ''figures"

which lure the ideal eye to an ultimate horizon-less invisibility where
they disappear altogether, subsumed by the harmless obscurity called
"infinity," merely pre-occupy the boredom of its vacuous vision which
levels down everything, every ordo, "to the uniformity of production."69
Because the technological vision would avoid that which lies closest to
it, because it will not see what is nearest its own "eyeball," it is
constantly frustrated by the ambiguous figure in the foreground which it
cannot avoid and which gradually encroaches upon its "territory."

It

lives in perpetual fear of the day this figure will zoom-in upon its
vision until it usurps the entire space of its frame, condemning the
infinite light of its vision to eternal darkness.

And what, more

precisely, is this dark figure which technology would eternally negate?
It is its very ground--finitude; it is, in short, death.

"The self-

assertion of technological objectification is the constant negation of
death.

By this negation death itself becomes something negative; it

becomes the altogether inconstant and null."70

The inauthentic techno~

logical perception thus negates itself in so far as it remains entirely
contingent upon the content of its frame, a content which defines its own
existence as eternally present-at-hand.

In this respect, technology

remains open to an invariably impossible future, wherein a single
"present," eternally the same, continually dis-places the futural vector
inherent in the act of individually renewing each successive perception.
It thus corresponds, in many ways, to the psychoanalytical phenomenon of
"repression."

The technological attitude can never abandon its mono-

69rbid., p. 117.

70rbid., p. 125.
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maniacal enterprise which indefinitely usurps its energy; it simultaneously pushes the traumatic experience of itself out of its frame so
that the structure remains intact.

By abstracting its existence to the

third person, singular, this attitude subsequently forgoes the project of
entertaining other "worlds" in the exclusive interest of one.

As a

phenomenon, however, this kind of repression nevertheless reveals that it
can never truly escape its situation, that is, its finitude, and we are
thereby led to the dynamics of its peculiar situation as autochthonous to
its pervasive self-deception--a posture which pretends not to be
situated.71

Authentic perception, on the other hand, brings itself into

the fullness of being by articulating its own situation as an appropriation, an enownment of the world, and thereby ratifies being-in-the-world
as the very condition of its own possibility.

I am able to appropriate a

past for the present and direct that present towards a future "in so far
as I have a body and am able to 'look."'72

In such a way, my subjectiv-

ity is grounded in the ultimate horizon of its finite temporality.
Rather than purifying consciousness of its opacity, the temporal subjectivity of perceptual consciousness brings us in touch with that
primordial experience of the world which, in turn, grounds the possibility of a critical attitude capable of questioning the "gaze" and
subsequently removing itself from the situation in order to penetrate it.
Thus, the subjectivity of authentic perception is grounded in time.

But

if, at the outset, my perceptual field stands out against the background
of a world in which neither subject nor object is posited,73 how can
71cf. Merleau-Ponty's description of repression regarding the
phenomenon of the "phantom limb," Phenomenology, pp. 82-83.
72Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenal~, p. 240.

73Ibid., p~ 241.
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there by an inter-subjectivity without objectification?

How can a

multiplicity of unique phenomenal "spaces" simultaneously share a common
world?
As a "form" of behavior, perception adheres to a world-structure
which reamins consistently "there" with respect to the intentional field,
but nevertheless refuses to concede the epistemological distinction
between the insidedness and outsidedness of its space.

Just as the

temporality of perception is neither absolutely constituted nor
constituting, its spatiality is neither absolutely spatialized nor
spatializing.

Empiricism, for example, concerns itself with a purely

physical space whereas idealism concerns itself with geometrical space.
In the first case, my body and things, their concrete relationships
expressed in such terms as top and bottom, right and left, near and
far, may appear to me as an irreducibly manifold variety, whereas
in the second case I discover a single and indivisible ability to
describe space. In the first case, I am concerned with physical
space, with its regions of varied quality; in the second with
geometrical space having interchangeable dimensions, homogeneous
and isotropic, and here I can at least think of a pure change of
place which would leave the moving body unchanged, and consequently
a pure position distinct from the situation of the object in its
concrete context.74
Physical space is thus characterized by its content, whereas geometrical
space is determined by some "pure unifying activity;"75 yet, our firsthand experience of the world teaches us that we must look "on the hither
side of the distinction between form and content."76

Cases of vision

without retinal inversion, in which the subject is made to wear glasses
which "correce' the retinal images, show us that our experience of "top"
and "bottom," "up" and "down," and so forth can be altered with respect
to its content as well as its form, since the altered visual appearances
74Ibid., p. 244.

75Ibid., p. 248.

76Ibid.
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"which, at the beginn:Lng, stood out against a background of previous
space, develop round themselves

. a horizon with a general orienta-

tion corresponding to their own."77

Direction in space, then, is neither

the reception of a "real" space, nor the relationship dependent upon a
certain number of fixed points arbitrarily chosen.

Experience shows us

"that the same contents can be successively oriented in one direction or
another, and that objective relationships as registered on the retina
through the position of the physical image do not govern our experience
of 'up' and 'down,'" and so forth.78

But how, then, do we come into the

possession of a world oriented in space?
As Merleau-Ponty suggests, perception recognizes "a certain spatial
level."79

What makes orientation in space possible in the first place is

not my body as an object in an objective space, but rather my body as "a
system of possible actions, a virtual body with its phenomenal 'place'
defined by its task and situation.
thing to be done."80

My body is wherever there is some-

I consequently acquire an orientation towards the

world when my virtual body co-incides with my objective body, although it
is the virtual body which ultimately makes it possible for me to change
levels, and thereby accommodate a variety of different "spaces."

I am

able to understand space only to the extent that I can live it through my
body:

my body co-exists with the world, and it is this situation which

"magnetizes experience and induces a direction in it."81

ln so far as it

is perceived, the world is always grasped in terms of an orientation in
77Ibid., p. 245.

78Ibid,, p. 247.

79Ibid., p. 248.

80Ibid., p. 250.

81Ibid., p. 252.
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space which is not contingent upon the object, but grounded in the
directionality of an intentional field which is able to "right" the
world for every new spectacle which makes its appearance; and to this
extent we can never disassociate "being" from the "situation," that is,
being-in-the-world.

My body, as a "system of anonymous 'functions' which

draw every particular focus into a general project,"82 insures me of its
inherence in the world.

This spatial level, constitutive of perception,

"endows every subsequent perception of space with its meaning, and it is
resumed at every instant."83
facticity.

Space is grounded, therefore, in our own

The world is primordially spatial as a structural phenomenon

wherein the subject is established in a setting inherent in the world.
Because the spatial perception itself is always "motivated," my body
similarly negotiates the situation vis-~-vis the general motion of the
world; and in so far as motion is always involved in a setting, the
world becomes that "space" where I am able to freely change my place of
residence in accordance with every new appearance of it.

In this sense,

then, my perception of the world is determined by the way in which I am
able to negotiate it, and to that extent perception constitutes a "form"
of behavior grounded in a phenomenal space which is neither spatialized
nor spatializing, neither objective nor subjective.
Oriented or phenomenal space, in turn, is precisely what opens us
onto a world of possible objectifications.

The various structures of

being-in-the-world guarantee a world common to all of them because they
are ultimately grounded in a "natural" world prior to any reflective
consciousness of it, wherein my gaze is able to lose itself entirely.
82rbid., p. 254.

83Ibid.
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In so far as space constitutes a lived experience, it is primordially
existential; and can only open onto an objective "outside" because it
simultaneously articulates a non-human space toward which my body
projects me.

Perception is not determined by analytical reflection, but

can dissolve into the sensible where its verification and fullness are
found.84
I never wholly live in varieties of human space, but am always
ultimately rooted in a natural and non-human space. As I walk
across the Place de la Concorde, and think of myself as totally
caught up· in the city of Paris, I can rest my eyes on one stone of
the Tuileries wall, the Square disappears and there is then nothing
but this stone entirely without history: I can, furthermore, allow
my gaze to be absorbed by this yellowish, gritty surface, and then
there is no longer even a stone there, but merely the play of light
upon an indefinite substance.85
Perception itself, then, discloses the co-incidence of subjectivity and
objectivity as it is constitutive of the world and our normal experience
of it.

In "abnormal" states of consciousness, such as myth, dream, and

insanity, we begin to lose touch with the world to the extent that its
non-human space diminishes to the purely human.

And yet the world still

reveals its common appearance in so far as these states demonstrate a
deviation from it.

The primordial space of the world thus frees me for

every possible setting because it binds me to the in-itself, whereas in
dream, myth, or hallucination this space recedes toward a purely human
structure.

"What protects the sane man against delirium or hallucina-

tion, is not his critical powers, but the structure of his space:
objects remain before him, keeping their distance and, as Malebranche
said speaking of Adam, touching him only with respect."86
This phenomenal or lived distance, through which I respectfully

~

l

84Ibid., p. 293.

85Ibid.

86Ibid., p. 291.
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keep in touch with the world, reveals its own kind of "perspective," a
depth by which I grasp the world in terms of its actual opacity and not
according to an ideal physical or geometrical space sustained by thinking
the relation of its parts to each other via the "pictorial" perspective
indicative of both empiricism and idealism.

The primordial depth we

experience in perception is not determined by the juxtaposition of its
parts, for it is prior to objective space; the depth we experience in
perception is a visible depth, and not the ideal depth which traditional
theories of perception would relegate to the invisible foreshortened form
of "breadth viewed in profile." 87

An invisible depth pre-supposes the

juxtaposition of simultaneous points in the direction of my gaze--a
breadth seen from the side by virtue of a uniform space in which the
subject abandons his individual point of view on the world in order to
think himself into an un-situated, ubiquitous vantage point.88

Invisible

depth, in fact, represents the way in which God would see the world.

But

this tells us nothing about the way we actually perceive it; although
this concept, in itself, attests the self-evidence of an inter-subjective
world.89

The leveled-down perspective of science derives from a

primordial depth which belongs to the perspective itself and not to
things; this primordial depth defines my relationship to the thing, and
not the relation among things irrespective of a perceiving subject.90
Without a subject, the object atrophies to a life-less ideality;
perception, like Being, is necessarily incarnate.

Richard Wilbur's "tall

camels of the spirit," which "shimmer on the brink," beautifully describe
the vacuous "rational" perspective which moves "with a stilted stride/ To
87Ibid., p. 255.

88rbid.

89rbid., p. 256.

90rbid.
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the land of sheer horizon, hunting Traherne's/ Sensible emptiness, there
where the brain's lantern-slide/ Revels in vast returns;" and we are
warned to
Wisely watch for the sight
Of the supernova burgeoning over the barn,
Lampshine blurred in the steam of beasts, the spirit's right
Oasis, light incarnate.91
Phenomenal depth expresses the apparent size of an object, whereas
"objective" depth defines the apparent size of an object as something
measurable, the function of an invisible interval which reveals the "real"
size with respect to other objects in space.

But this "real" size is

merely a mental size, a relation which does not take into account the
perceiver, but conceptually vanishes in the object autonomously.

The

phenomenon of depth, however, discloses a vanishing point naturally
established in the subject of the perception.

Phenomenal "distance" can

never be given to me as the height of a triangle together with its base
and base angles, as Malebranche would have it,92 for my body does not
occupy the same objective space of its perception.

If it did, I would be

already initiated into the world and would never need a perception.
course, this is the way science would have it.

Of

But perception "does not

bear upon a content of consciousness;" the mental image of the object is,
in fact, "neither larger nor smaller than the physical image of the same
object on my retina."93

Gestalt psychology has shown that the apparent

size of an object is not the representation of an invisible depth for
91"A World Without Objects is a Sensible Emptiness," in
Contemporary American Poetry, ed. Donald Hall (Baltimore: Penguin Books,
1962), p. 63.
92Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 257.
93Ibid., p. 260.
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"the apparent size of a retreating object does not vary proportionately
to the retinal image."94

Consequently, there is no mental image consti-

tutive of a determinate size relative to the physical image which
"stands like a screen between me and the thing."95
The phenomenon of apparent size and distance are "two phases of a
comprehensive organization of the field,"96 an act in which my gaze
alters the perceptual field by focusing on the object in-itself, and
thereby causes the apparent size of the object to appear.

By breaking up

the visual field, the perspective appears as a depth in intention; yet,
this depth of perspective does not "measure" the apparent size of the
object according to its distance, but rather grasps it prior to any
geometrical judgment.

The further away the object lies, the less

completely it "occupies" my visual field--realizing, of course, that the
visual field itself is not a measurable area, and has no definite
capacity.97

My gaze can take in more or less objects depending upon how

it negotiates the visual field, so that "near" and "far" define the
situation, how my gaze takes hold of the objects in its field.

In this

respect, it differs radically from the daguerrean-like frame (Wilbur's
"brain's lantern-slide") of the world-view which always contains the same
number of things because it posits or sets them in an objective space
incapable of changing its "content" precisely because of the frame.
Increasing distance, then, is not "an augmenting externality:

it

expresses merely that the thing is beginning to slip away from the grip
of our gaze and is less closely allied to it."98
94Ibid., p. 259.

95rbid., p. 260.

96Ibid., p. 259.

97rbid., p. 261.

Depth becomes a moment

98rbid.
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in appropriating the single object; by taking up a factual situation, the
unity of binocular vision transpires because the visual field itself is
moving towards the most perfect possible symmetry.99

By appropriating

the most determinate form, my gaze penetrates the object in such a way
that depth appears as the significance of a certain organization in my
visual field; "It is the dimension in which things or elements of things
envelop each other, whereas breadth and height are the dimensions in
which they are juxtaposed." 100

Thus, primordial depth does not assess a

distance between objects; it is liminal regarding its applicability to
things.
Just as top and bottom, right and left are not given to the subject
with the perceived contents, and are at each moment constituted
with a spatial level in relation to which things arrange themselves--in the same way depth and size come to things in virtue of
their being situated in relation to a level of distances and sizes,
which defines the far and the near, the great and the small, before
any object arises to provide us with a standard for comparison.lOl
Primordial depth articulates the phenomenal hold my body has on its
immediate surroundings, the style of my gaze, just as we can speak of a
"small" responsibility which nevertheless "fills 1,1p," so to speak, the
retinal structure of my intentional field--something which appears
immanently close because it must be done immediately.

Depth discloses,

therefore, the phenomenal relation between a subject and space, that
existential dimension of perspective anterior to the derivative perspective of physical and geometrical space, which conceptually designate "the
one single form of being in a situation."l02
Like the phenomenon of space in general, primordial depth is
99rbid. , p. 262.
IOlrbid., p. 266.

100Ibid., pp. 264-65.
I02rbid., p. 267.
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equally grounded in temporality.

Unlike the Kantian synthesis, which

presupposes the discrete terms of a multiple perspective subject to
analytical explication, the temporal dimension of depth constitutes a
quasi-synthesis; for my gaze to grasp an object at a distance, it
simultaneously grasps the object in time in so far as it "already holds"
or "still holds" the object.l03

Spatial co-existence is temporal, then,

because the perceived object and my perception of it are contemporary.
The 'order of co-existents' is inseparable from the 'order of
sequences', or rather time is not only the consciousness of a
sequence. Perception provides me with a 'field of presence' in
the broad sense, extending in two dimensions: the here-there
dimension and the past-present-future dimension. The second
elucidates the first. I 'hold', I 'have' the distant object without any explicit positing of the spatial perspective (apparent size
and shape) as I still 'have in hand' the immediate past without any
distortion and without any interposed 'recollection•.l04
We do not perceive distance as the content of an equidistant flat
projection of the object any more than we understand memory as the interposition of a content between a past and present.

Just as memory

signifies an immediate possession of the past, a way of "being there," so
too the perception of distance "can be understood only as a being in the
distance which links up with being where it appears."l05

Once we admit

time into the spatial setting, the phenomenon of movement shows up as an
entity in its own right.

"The thematization of movement ends with the

identical object in motion and with the relativity of movement, which
means that it destroys movement."l06

Granted, something must be in

motion in order for a change to come about; yet, if we concern ourselves
with "the particular manner of its 'passing,"' we discover a world made
103Ibid., p. 265.
f.

i

l

I06rbid., p. 275.

104rbid.

105rbid.

-
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up not only of things, but also "pure transitions. 11 107
time is made up of successive moments.108

Only objective

The unity of a lived time and

space are always present to the perceiving subject because they envelop
him within the unified scope of a behavioral configuration--his familiar
setting in the world.

Phenomenal time is not constituted by the

successive moments of an "objective" time; "the lived present holds a
past and a future within its thickness." 109

Similarly, the pure

transition of phenomenal time reveals the unique way in which motion
articulates the inextricable factuality of the situation.
The motion in my visual field constitutes "a modulation of an
already familiar setting;" at no time is it necessary that I be

~ware

of

any objective positions, for every object in motion is given to my visual
field--a visual organization which, by definition, does not maintain an
objectively stable point. 1 10

Unlike the frame, the edges of the visual

field do not constitute a real line:

"Our visual field is not neatly cut

out of our objective world, and is not a fragment with sharp edges like
the landscape framed by the window.

We see as far as our hold on things

extends, far beyond the zone of clear vision, and even behind us."lll
Thus, when an object changes place in my visual field, its motion
functions as a structural phenomenon; for the "very peculiar relationship
which constitutes movement does not exist between objects." 112

Depending

on that part of the field upon which my gaze focuses, the object is said
to be either in motion or at rest.
107rbid.

108Ibid.

Like Proust's steeple of Saint-Hilaire,

109rbid.

llOrbid., pp. 275 and 277, respectively.
lllrbid., p. 277.

112rbid.
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as we retreat from it in a carriage we can take it as a fixed point and
feel ourself in motion around it as the narrator does; or we can watch it
glide by in front of us as though our own position were fixed.
~

~-

t

f·

The cloud

floats over the steeple only if my focus is on the cloud; as soon as I
focus on the steeple it begins to move ,113

Motion is the way in which my

gaze establishes a relation in the visual field with respect to a figure
and its background; what makes part of the field the background, and
another part its figure, is the way I look at it, the peculiar focus of
my gaze.

This relation between the moving object and its background

"passes through my body" because my eye is never another object in the
object space; I do not infer the immobility of the steeple, but by
transferring my gaze from the steeple to the clouds, and so forth, its
immobility simultaneously appears:
other:

"the two phenomena envelop each

what we have is not two terms of an algebraic expression, but two

'moments' in an organization which embraces them both."114

Thus it is

the gaze which preeminently discloses the possibility of a pure trans!tion in the world, for in the body itself we discover that kind of motion
entirely independent of a moving object.

Like the orientation of top and

bottom, motion is also a phenomenon of levels:
~'·

The movement of my eye towards the thing upon which it is about to
focus is not the displacement of an object in relation to another
object, but progress towards reality. My eye is in motion or at
rest in relation to a thing which it is approaching or from which
it is receding. In so far as the body provides the perception of
movement with the ground or basis which it needs in order to become
established, it is as a power of perception, rooted in a certain
domain and geared to a world.115
So long as my visual field provides a setting where objects change place
irrespective of any geometry or calculation via a juxtaposition of parts,
113Ibid., p. 278.

114J:bid.

115Ibid., p. 279.
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the phenomenon of movement must be designated as structural; and since
this relation is not constituted by a movement between objects, it cannot
be relative.

"Once involved in a setting, we see motion appear before us

as an absolute." 116

As a structural function of my visual field, then,

motion discloses that the spectacle of the world is always appropriated
as a kinaesthetic situation, the double-horizoned relationship between an
object and my body.
II

When Gertrude Stein said of Picasso that with him "pictures
commenced to want to leave their frames,"ll7 she prefigured the most
elementary posture of twentieth-century art in general.

Although the

twentieth century divinizes the image of life framed by the world-view
because it re-makes technology into the new godhead, its artists have
relentlessly declared that God is, once and for all, dead.

Very simply,

this means that we can no longer unquestioningly accept the all-embracing
grace of the ubiquitous vision of science.

Rather than envision the

world as God.would see it, twentieth-century art liberates the world for
man; it situates him within the limited point of view, the freedom of his
own perspective, and rids him of the cystostic vision of a technology
which would control him with the same disrespect by which it controls its
entire object-world.

And this is what cubism explicitly proclaimed.

It

freed man for the thing, and the thing for itself, because it perceived
the primordial constitution of the world's "space"--what Gertrude Stein
called the "composition" of the world.

"Nothing changes from generation

Il6rbid., p. 280.
117Picasso (New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 12.
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to generation except the thing seen and that makes a composition."118
This new way of seeing the world obtained from a characteristically
different manner of looking at things:
First. The composition, because the way of living had
changed the composition of living had extended and each thing was
as important as any other thing. Secondly, the faith in what the
eyes were seeing, that is to say the belief in the reality of
science, commenced to diminish. To be sure science had discovered
many things, she would continue to discover things, but the
principle which was the basis of all this was completely understood,
the joy of discovery was almost over.
Thirdly, the framing of life, the need that a picture exist
in its frame, remain in its frame was over. A picture remaining in
its frame was a thing that always had existed and now pictures
commenced to want to leave their frames and this also created the
necessity for cubism.ll9
·
In cubism, then, twentieth-century art had found a beginning.

By making

a fresh start, by looking at things all over again, the artist simultaneously discovered the quasi-self-sufficiency of the thing as well as his
own situation in the world; and this reflected an understanding of the
primordial space of being-in-the-world.
Because cubism appreciated the spectacle of the world as a certain
kinaesthetic situation, it re-defined the significance of co-relative
perspective in perception.

In so far as it disclosed the opacity of the

world to the extent that I have a body and that "through that body I am
at grips with the world,"120 it renounced the transparently ubiquitous
point of view which always "sees" the thing from an ideal perspective, as
a mental construct or idea.

Cubism demanded, in fact, a new spatial

level in order to be perceived; it demanded a new attitude of the body.
ll8"Composition as Explanation," in Selected Writings of Gertrude
Stein, ed. Carl Van Vechten (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 513.
119stein, Picasso, p. 12.
120Merleau-Pon ty, Phenomenology, .P. 303.
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once that was achieved, the painting became "familiar" at last.

"It is

strange about everything, it is strange about pictures, a picture may
seem extraordinarily strange to you and after some time not only it does
not seem strange but it is impossible to find what there was in it that
was strange."l21

What cubism re-defined in the perspective was the

phenomenal space of the world, the non-geometrical space in which my
relation to the thing is constituted by being-situated.

Pictorial

perspective was entirely abolished in favor of that unique perspective by
which we take up the things in the world with our body; and that is why
it required a new structure of expression.

The ideal space of pictorial

perspective could only re-present the object as it "appeared" to the
mind, whereas the expressive space of cubism presented the object as it
affected the body, just as "An oblique position of the object in relation
to me is not measured by the angle which it forms with the plane of my
face, but felt as a lack of balance, as an unequal distribution of its
influences upon me."122

We primordially perceive the thing as a relation

of our own body, and not in terms of an ideal spatial re-presentation;
the mental representation constitutes a concept, it can never get us to
the thing as it exists in its own right.

Second-order consciousness thus

removes us from the world in so far as it discounts the ancipital
relation between the space of the thing and the space of my body.

For

this reason the discursive significance of pictorial perspective demands
a particular kind of logic in order to be "seen" at all, and many people
subsequently fail to recognize this kind of derivative visualization
12lstein, Picasso, p. 14.
122Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 302.
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although it would be foolish to say that they do not perceive the world.
For example, "Picasso at this period often used to say that Spaniards
cannot recognize people from their photographs.

So the photographers

made two photographs, a man with a beard and a man smooth shaven and when

-

the men left home to do their military service they sent one of these two
types of photographs to their family and the family always found it very
resembling."l23

In so far as the "realism" of the photograph is deriva-

tive, it tells us nothing of our primordial appropriation of a world.

If

art were to escape its utter subjection to the world-view, it had to rediscover that primary "reality," being-in-the-world.
Cubism pictorially articulated the primordial situatedness of Being,
prior to its intussusception by a malignant theoretical optics.

It

reversed the traditional perspective of Euclidean space, once again
making the spectator a participant, as Heidegger would express it, in the
"worldling of the world."

Like Hopkins' "inscape," this new kind of

perceptual space invites the perceiver in, it surrounds him; by vanishing
in the spectator, and not the object, it personalizes the world in so far
as it renounces the objectively neutral space of the Newtonian
landscape.124

Cubism thus internalized space at the terminus of the

visual gradient;125 it publicly declared that space was essentially a
personal affair.

But even before cubism, painting had definitively

disclaimed Euclidean space as

an~

priori.

Seurat, for example, had

already reversed the traditional perspective, creating a formal or
phenomenal space which replaced the hypotactic image of a geometrically
123Stein, Picasso, p. 14.
124McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 24.

125rbid., p. 28.
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neutral space with the paratactic discontinuity of an expressive space.
Prior to Ezra Pound's poetic "super-pository" technique and the modern
cinematic technique of super-imposition, pointilism created paratactic
space.126

As McLuhan remarks, by utilizing the Newtonian concept of the

fragmentation of light, Seurat "came to the technique of divisionism,
whereby each dot of paint becomes the equivalent of an actual light
source, a sun, as it were;" through the deformation of an objectively
continuous space, a space enclosed by the impersonal and linear flow of a
series of geometrical equations, Seurat opened the painting onto the
viewer's personal space and subsequently opened the art work onto the
world--he returned to "the paratactic Egyptian image."127

In this

respect, we are better able to understand Rousseau's remark to Picasso
who, incidently, owned five Rousseau canvases:

"We are the two great

painters of this era, you in Egyptian style, I in modern style."l28

In

so far as modern art breaks down the visual continuity of a homogeneous
space, it articulates the phenomenal space of perception.

By negotiating

a virtual space--a dream space, as it were--it even pre-figures the
electronic age:
We are inclined today to regard paintings as radiant forms of
energy much in the way that the Oriental world does. Perhaps the
most obvious example of how space has ceased to be neutral, in the
old visual and Newtonian sense, is to be found in the world of the
astronaut. The totally designed environment necessary to life in
the space capsule draws attention to the fact that the astronaut
makes the spaces that he needs and encounters. Beyond the
126cf. McLuhan, Vanishing Point, pp. 25-26, and Earl Miner, The
Japanese Tradition in British and American Literature. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1958.
127McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 24.
128quoted in Shattuck, p. 108.
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environment of this planet there is no space in our planetary or
"container" sense. The gravitational point once transcended, the
astronaut must have his own environment with him, as it were.
There is no upside down in Eskimo art or in a space capsule any
more than there is perspective or foreshortening (weight, or
gravitational force, came in with perspective). Strong indications
are given to the astronauts that objects, as well as people, create
their own spaces. Outer space is not a frame any more than it is
visualizable.129
In his painting Le reve, for example, Rousseau presents the natural
habitat as an artifact; 1 3° and his Le centenaire de l'independance
refutes the uniform space of pictorial perspective as does a tryptich,
forcing the eye to move over the scene discontinuously--indeed,
"electronically:"
Le centenaire de l'independance breaks down into three arbitrarily
combined scenes like a tryptich, and not even a homogeneous threedimensional space is constructed to hold them together. On the
right side in the immediate foreground stand three men and a
woman; in the center the smaller figures of the dancers move with a
lively disjointed rhythm under a spreading tree; on the left a
drummer plays in the far background and some children watch the
dancing. The three distinct groups are connected only by a line of
banners which stretches across the upper part of the canvas. The
eye moves over the scene not in a smooth line of flowing mass but
in three jumps.131
Rather than enclose the world, Rousseau's paintings, like Seurat's,
complete it by opening onto the perceiver; this is what Kandinsky meant
when he spoke of the "new realism" foreshadowed by Rousseau.l32

Unlike

photographic realism, "a highly sophisticated development of the sensibility absent from children's drawings and which did not devour the art
of the West until the sixteenth century," Rousseau's realism evokes "the
remembered or dream image set down directly in paint--an image seeking
not to outrage the purely optical arrangement of the world, but to
12~cLuhan,

Vanishing Point, p. 25.

131shattuck, p. 110.

130Ibid., p. 173.

132Ibid., p. 109.
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complete it."133
of a jungle (Le

When asked why he had placed the red sofa in the middle

~),

Rousseau casually replied:

surprised to find a sofa out in a virgin forest.
for the richness of the red.
rest is Yadwigha's dream." 134

"You shouldn't be
It means nothing except

You understand, the sofa is in a room; the
Rousseau's "naivete" re-creates the

primordial space of perception, and thus it was accurately said of him
that he was not of his own century.

In one of his final letters he

explained,
if I have kept my naivete, it is because M. Gerome, who was a
professor at the Beaux-Arts, as well as M. Clement, director of
Beaux-Arts at the Ecole de Lyon, always told me to keep it. You
will no longer find that amazing in the future. And I have been
told before that I was not of this century. I will not now be able
to change my manner which I have acquired by stubborn application,
believe me.l35
Rousseau's images transact the "interior" space of the world; as formal
or phenomenal spaces they are naive only to the extent that there is no
"room" for an impersonal object.

Rather than situate the object at a

"distance," forever fixed in a geometrical location, Rousseau's canvas
confers a certain "depth" upon the object as something "close" or "far"
by virtue of the composition itself (as Stein calls it), which pulls us
to it, envelops us, Rousseau accomplished this in terms of color.

The

surface tension of the foreground "favors the location of the
composition in the front plane,"136 and subsequently coerces the space of
the painting outward, beyond the edges of the canvas, beyond the frame;
this frontal pull denies us easy access to the illusion of a perspectivespace while it simultaneously engages our gaze as an extension of its own
133rbid.

134quoted in Shattuck, p. 111.

135rbid., pp. 111-12.

136Shattuck, pp. 104-05.
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insatiable field.

In Le reve, for example, "lush magnified leaves spring

up in the foreground, and meet, as if in the same plane, other plants
which are much farther away.

He incarnates his universe by

painting it exhaustively and palpably close."137

In other words, the

objects in the painting become an extension of our gaze, just as the
blind man's walking stick becomes an extension of his own body; Rousseau's
universe is incarnate because its space situates the body as the subject
of perception, and not as another object in objective space.

His space

is phenomenal in so far as its forms cannot be separated from its color:
it "expresses" the relation of distance, as well as value and mood.138
In this respect, his ubiquitous lighting remains powerless to effect the
color itself, and merely assists the composition in releasing its objects
"to the voraciousness of surface design."139

In so far as Rousseau's

space appropriates the primordial appearance of things, it invites our
gaze to take up its objects, to touch them, to explore their surfaces.;
and to this extent, his art graciously concedes the opacity of the world
by opening onto it.

It completes the world.

Thus, Rousseau could

incisively say of Cezanne's paintings, "I'd like to finish all these."140
By manipulating its foreground, then, as the embolic function of an
expressive depth, modern painting apprehended the object in its
phenomenal space, one which in-corporates the spectator, takes him in,
envelops him.

Because it does not set the perceiver apart, as "viewer,"

its expressive space emancipates it .from the frame.

Yet, in their

unanimous insubordination to the emmetropic delineation of reality,

,.

1

137Ibid., p. 105.

138Ibid., p. 103.

139Ibid., p. 106.

140quoted in Shattuck, p. 105. ·

144
modern painters were not alone; for other artists had equally tired of
this solitary confinement.

Just as in painting the composition

"commenced to leave its frame," so it was with the musical composition
as well; for with "atonality" or "antitonality," as Stravinsky preferred
to call it, the tonal function of chords escaped the frame of the
diatonic system.

In his Poetics of Music, Stravinsky declared, "From the

moment when chords no longer serve to fulfill merely the functions
assigned to them by the interplay of tones but, instead, throw off all
constraint to become new entities free of all ties--from that moment on
one may say that the process is completed:
out its life cycle."141

the diatonic system has lived

Although the development of the overtone had

evolved, by Debussy's time, from the unison, through consecutive fifths,
to the triad and the seventh, Debussy perceived "the complete harmony of
the ninth, eleventh, thirteenth, as the true expression of nature which
they are."142

Yet he employed the overtone as a true center in itself.

Classical tonality had implied a closed circle of modulations; when
Debussy discarded the significance of major and minor, he wished to
escape the centrality of the C major scale.

By transposing a variety of

scales other than the tonal, Debussy achieved, as he expressed it to
Guiraud:

"Incomplete chords, floating.

Il faut noyer le ton.

travel where he wishes and leave by any door.

One can

Greater nuances."143

141Igor Stravinsky, Poetics of Music in the Form of Six Lessons,
trans. Arthur Knodel and Ingolf Dahl (New York: Random House, Vintage
Books, 1947), p. 40.
1.42E. Robert Schmitz, The Piano Works of Claude Debussy (New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., 1950), p. 10.
143quoted in Maurice Emmanuel, "Notes on Debussy's Conversations
with Ernest Guiraud, 1890," in Claude Debussy: Prelude to "The Afternoon
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Satie's experimental harmony encouraged Debussy toward a kind of opacity
in his own harmonic structures in so far as he "omits the third in a
triad, or alternate thirds in chords of the ninth or thirteenth, leaving
superimposed fifths" whereby the subsequent modality remains undetermined for the moment, opening onto two simultaneous horizons.144

Because

the harmonic structures create this ambiguity, the chordal progressions
step into the foreground, as it were, to take their place alongside the
melody; and it is this transposition which, together, moves out of the
diatonic system onto simultaneous "vistas" to touch our ear.

But it was

only by bringing the chordal progression into the foreground that Debussy
was able to create this new kind of super-imposition in music.
example, in his Prelude to "The Afternoon

of~

For

Faun," which generally

progresses either by a fifth down or a fourth up, "The susceptibility of
the C# and the G and their connecting line of melody to being harmonized
with various chordal accompaniments • • . is the outstanding harmonic
feature."145

The total context of the piece thus derives from the

heightening of chordal significance; and it is precisely this which led
many listeners, including Saint-Saens, to conclude that the Prelude
lacked melody.

Because "the parts seem to overlap each other," no part

"spontaneously breaks lose to lodge in our memories as a tune."146

And

yet, this ambiguous relation in the composition between the melody and
of a Faun," An Authoritative Score, ed. William W. Austin (New York:
Norton~nd Co., Inc., Norton Critical Scores, 1970), p. 130.

W: W.

144schmitz, p. 30.
145william W. Austin, "Toward an Analytical Appreciation," Norton
Critical Scores, p. 82.
146rbid. , p. 71.
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the harmony, what Debussy called "melodic harmonies," constitutes the
basis on which Pierre Boulez designates the Prelude as the beginning of
modern music:

"just as modern poetry surely took root in certain of

Baudelaire's poems, so one is justified in saying that modern music was
awakened by L'Apres-midi d'un faune."147
Parallel to Debussy's own career moved that of his dearest friend,
Eric Satie; and together, like the chordal progressions they created,
these two men transposed the direction of twentieth-century music.

Taken

together, these two careers opened music onto the world, freed it from
its conceptual setting, just as the undetermined modality of their
harmonic structures opened onto simultaneous
imposition.

hor~zons

But with Satie, there were two "careers."

by means of superThe first, in

unison with Debussy's own career, executed the basic posture of the
fin-de-siecle in general--that period characterized by Satie's admonition
to Debussy to forsake the "sauerkraut" of Wagner's aesthetic.l48

Debussy

subsequently was to say of Wagner's Ring that it struck him as a sort of
"vast musical city directory."l49

Indeed, it seems appropriate here to

quote Stravinsky at length concerning the melodramatic--in fact,
vaudevillian--nature of Wagner's music, for no one has ever put it better:
Insubordination • • • does away with constraint in the everdisappointed hope of finding in freedom the principle of strength.
Instead, it finds in freedom only the arbitrariness of whim and the
disorders of fancy. Thus it loses every vestige of control, loses
its bearings and ends by demanding of music things outside its
scope and competence. Do we not, in truth, ask the impossible of
music when we expect it to express feelings, to translate dramatic
147"Modern Music Begins," Norton Critical Scores, p. 161.
148shattuck, p. 127.
149stravinsky, Poetics of Music, p. 80.
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situations, even to imitate nature? And, as if it were not enough
to condemn music to the job of being an illustrator, the century to
which we owe what it called "progress through enlightenment"
invented for good measure the monumental absurdity which consists
of bestowing on every accessory, as well as on every feeling and
every character of the lyrical drama, a sort of checkroom number
called a Leitmotiv . . . .
There are two kinds of Leitmotiv in Wagner: some symbolize
abstract ideas . . . the others make the pretense of representing
objects or concrete personages • . . .
It is strange that skeptics who readily demand new proofs for
everything and who usually take a sly delight in exposing whatever
is purely conventional in established forms never ask that any
proof be given of the necessity or even of the simple expediency of
any musical phrase that claims to identify itself with an idea, an
object, or a character. If I am told that the power of genius is
here great enough to justify this identification, then I shall ask
what is the use of those widely circulated little guides that are
the material embodiment of the musical city directory Debussy had
in mind, little guides that make the neophyte attending a
presentation of Gotterdammerung resemble one of those tourists you
see on top of the Empire State Building trying to orient himself by
spreading out a map of New York. And never let it be said that
these little memory-books are an insult to Wagner and betray his
thought: their wide circulation alone sufficiently proves that
they answer a real need.
Basically, what is most irritating about these artistic
rebels, of whom Wagner offers us the most complete type, is the
spirit of systematization which, under the guise of doing away with
conventions, establishes a new set, quite as arbitrary and much
more cumbersome than the old. So that it is less the arbitrariness
. • . that tries our patience than the system which this
arbitrariness sets up as a principle.150
So much for the pomp and "spectacle" of the Wagnerian horror show.
Satie's second career, following his break with Debussy and his decision
to return to school in order to study counterpoint under Albert Rousse1, 151
singularly appropriated that unique musical form which was to characterize
much of the first half of the twentieth century--jazz.

"If the Sarabandes

foretell the course of French music to 1914, The Gymnopedies and the
150Ibid., pp. 79-81.
151When Debussy advised Satie against it, saying "At our age you
don't shed your skin again," Satie very simply replied, "If I lose, too
bad. It would mean I had no guts in the first place;" quoted in
Shattuck, p. 133.
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Gnossiennes foretell the turn it was to take after the war."152

The

turmoil instigated by Parade (1917) established the tone for the post-war
years, "a turning to jazz and music hall and to all the paraphernalia of
modern life, not in the spirit of realism, but with a sense of exhilaration in the absurd." 15 3

The next year, 1918, jazz reached Paris when a

black band from the States played the Casino de Paris.154
Debussy had remarked to Guiraud, "Rhythms are stifling.
be contained within bars.
'composed' time.

In 1890,
Rhythms cannot

It is nonsense to speak of 'simple' and

There should be an interminable flow of them both with-

out seeking to bury the rhythmic patterns."155

Interestingly, all of

Satie's works during 1910 to 1915, with the exception of his songs,
appear in published form without either bar lines or key signatures.156
Besides escaping the diatonic frame, music was attempting to defy its
very confinement to measure.
In 1913, Stravinsky had already introduced the African rhythms of
jazz into his Sacre du printemps, and Satie had subsequently written into
Parade its first concert treatment in French music.157

The elliptical

nature of jazz, its oblique quality, defies the homogeneous space of the
traditional structures which demand to be filled in, so to speak, both
rhythmically and melodically in order to work.

Once this kind of theoret-

ical perspective was abandoned, modern music could transpose, like modern
painting, all its elements into the foreground itself, creating its own
152shattuck, p. 143.
153Ibid., pp. 154-55.

154Ibid., p. 155.

155Eimllanuel, "Notes on Debussy's Conversations," p. 130.
156shattuck, p. 151..

157rbid., p. 155.
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depth by means of an expressive structure rather than a discursive logic.
Speaking of the African influence on jazz, Ernest Borneman has said:

-

In language, the African tradition aims at circumlocution rather
than at exact definition. The direct statement is considered
crude and unimaginative; the veiling of all contents in everchanging paraphrases is considered the criterion of intelligence
and personality. In music, the same tendency towards obliquity
and ellipsis is noticeable: no note is attacked straight; the
voice or instrument always approaches it from above or below, plays
around the implied pitch without ever remaining on it for any
length of time, and departs from it without ever having committed
itself to a single meaning.l58
The same is true of meter.

Jazz distinctively brought the rhythmic

improvisation of the soloist into the foreground so that its simultaneous
inter-action with an isochronous meter articulated an open perceptual
field; the resultant super-imposition generated an emblematic kind of
"relief" which subsequently enveloped the listener within its own
distinctive space.

Thus, like the formal element of color in a Rousseau

canvas, the formal element of rhythm created the "spatial depth" of a
'

melody in so far as it stepped forward, so to speak, to take its place
alongside the other elements in its "field."
Stravinsky phrased it this way:

In his Poetics of Music,

"Who of us, on hearing jazz music, has

not felt an amusing sensation approaching giddiness when a dancer or a
solo musician, trying persistently to stress irregular accents, cannot
succeed in turning our ear away from the regular pulsation of the meter
drummed out by the percussion?"159

In fact, Brunella Rondi, in his

Prospetiva della musica moderna, argues that Debussy's greatest achievement was precisely in the area of rhythm, and he credits Debussy for
158"The Roots of Jazz," in Jazz, ed. Nat Hentoff and Albert J.
McCarthy (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1959), p. 17.
159Stravinsky, Poetics of Music, p. 30.
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having opened the way toward later developments in this respect.160
Whether or not we agree with him about Debussy, jazz undeniably enhanced
the aesthetic possibilities open to rhythm, and modern music in general;
by fetching the entire scope of musical elements available to it into the
foreground, jazz accomplished that super-imposition which somehow
characterized all of modern art and which Gauguin decreed essential--"For
there is no art if there is no transposition."161

And Satie, more than

Debussy, was never hesitant to take advantage of these possibilities,
instituting a major direction for post-war music.
Ravel's respect for Satie was enormous; his first published work, a
Menuet antique for piano (1895), clearly revealed the influence of the
older composer in its liberated use of sevenths and ninths irrespective
of their resolution.162

The year before, however, Debussy's Prelude had

appeared, and shortly thereafter it was Debussy who became his life-long
idol, although the Pavane pour une Infante defunte (1899) still showed
the succession of thirteenths and ninths characteristic of Satie's early
work, especially the Sarabandes.

The Pavane, in so far as it fore-

shadowed the technique and style of Ravel's future compositions, stands
singularly important in this respect; as Norman Demuth has said of it,
"It is remarkable for its original lay-out; the tune itself requires
considerable control of key, but when one thinks that he might have
accompanied it with simple arpeggios . . . we can see the working of an
160Austin, "Toward an Analytical Appreciation," p. 91.
161Paul Gauguin, "Impressionism and After," Norton Critical
Scores, p. 124.
162Norman Demuth, Ravel (New York:
p. 16.

Collier Books, 1962),
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original mind from the very start." 163

Notably, the second entry of the

tun, widely spaced in so far as it is doubled at the fifteenth as well as
the octave, portends a favorite device in his later works; its pianistic
significance thus guaranteed it a place in the history of modern music,
even though Roland-Manuel spoke disparagingly of it as a piece suitable
for young girls.164

After the war, however, Ravel became increasingly

more attracted to jazz and its origin, especially its rhythmic possibilities, an interest which culminated, more or less, in 1928 following a
tour of the States and Canada.

Upon his return he began working on an

orchestration which he was to call "a work for orchestra without music;"
the result was Bolero. 16 5

Regardless of whether we consider it "great"

music, Bolero discloses a similarly intense preoccupation with rhythm
that we find in Satie and Debussy, with one major exception:
entirely dominates the piece.

the rhythm

In its monotony, it bespeaks a kind of

absurdity reminiscent of the initial declaration of Dada in 1916--that
is, it takes us no-where.

Its repetitive function merely serves to

'
incite the mounting intensity of an angular rhythm which builds to nearly
hypnotic power until the startling change to E major thrusts us entirely
out of this rhythmic orbit for eight measures, only to envelop us once
again with the return to C for its coda.l66

The syncopation and dominant

rhythm continually expand outward, like the circular ripples from a
pebble thrown into a lake, creating a "surface" depth without any particular direction:

the orchestra plays "like a gigantic guitar, with the

percussion rattling out the pedal rhythm."167
163rbid., p. 67.

164rbid., pp. 66-67.

165rbid., p. 54.

166rbid., p. 141.

As Demuth describes its

167rbid.
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first concert performance in Paris, "Its insistence played upon the
senses to an inordinate degree.

People clutched each other and crumpled

their programmes into lumps of perspiring pulp."168

As for its title,

the piece is called a "bolero;" yet, its rhythm is umistakably the
rhythm of jazz.
The form of jazz typically expresses the new aesthetic of modern
music; its method of composition, like the composition of a modern painting, defies linear perspective--it defies the frame.

As Rene Guillere

expressed it in an article, "Il. n'y a plus de perspective:"
Its basic parts: syncopation and a dominance of rhythm • • . .
Rhythm is stated by angle--protruding edge, sharp profile. It has
a rigid structure--firmly constructed. It strives towards plasticity. Jazz seeks volume of sound, volume of phrase. Classical
music was based on planes (not on volumes)-,.-planes arranged in
layers, planes erected atop one another, planes horizontal and
vertical, creating an architecture of truly noble proportions:
palaces with terraces, colonnades, flights of monumental steps--all
receding into a deep perspective. In jazz all elements are brought
to the foreground. . • • Conventional perspective with its fixed
focus and its gradual vanishing point has abdicated.169
Modern painting, modern music--modern art in general--no longer acknowledges the construction of the world grounded in a geometrical concept;
its new "depth" of perspective reveals the object as it is grasped with
both eyes, gropingly, and not as it is seen by an ideal eye.

"We no

longer construct the visual world with an acute angle, converging on the
horizon.

We open up this angle, pulling representation against us, upon

us, toward us • • • •

We take part in this world." 1 70

Through this new

168Ibid., p. 140.
169quoted in Sergei M. Eisenstein, The Film Sense, trans. Jay Leyda
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., A Harvest Book, 1942),
p. 96.
170Eisenstein, The Fil~ Sense, p. 96.
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kind of depth, modern art brings us back into the world; we enter the
world, we touch it, we disclose it in so far as we become part of it once
again; in short, we become situated.

This new perception, like the

Chinese landscape-painting, avoids leading the perceiver into a single,
pre-determined perspective--instead, it stretches· out before him, inviting
the perceiver into its field as surely as it reciprocally moves toward him.
Eisenstein is incorrect when he describes this epoch as decadent because
it lacks a higher unity and thereby places an over-emphasis on individualism.

As he sees it, "It is only in periods of decadence in the arts that

this centripetal movement changes to a centrifugal movement, hurling apart
all unifying tendencies." 171

But Eisenstein misses the point:

all

perception begins with the individual, although it undeniably ends with
the world.

Modern art attempted to re-establish the beginning of a

world, how we know it in the first place, its perceptual constitution;
this movement is obviously centrifugal in so far as it refutes a theoretical world of any sort.

Perception is an originating "consciousness,"

and to that extent it can never give us an idea of a whole world already
there before us.

Yet, the depth of perspective in modern art centri-

petally leads us to a world whose typical structure symbiotically invades
the body as its setting.

We can never have a "view" of this world simply

because we can never leave it.
evidence."172

"It exists primarily in its self-

Because of his social responsibility to the "state,"

however, Eisenstein is forced to retain an antique historical perspective;
and to this extent he misses the point on purpose.
In literature, of course, the same structure had dominated the
171Ibid., p. 100.

172Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 325.
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milieu as well.

Here antique perspective took the form of detailed char-

acterization With strict adherence to a chronological plot, and framed by
the linear connectedness and ubiquitous knowledgeability of the "narration," or point of view.

The poem, the novel, the play--all represented

a concise view of the world.

As we have seen, the romantic poets, though

seeming to turn away from chronology in favor of the "new" logic, psycho!ogy, continued to negotiate the isolated emotional moment as a
recollection.

As a detached observer of himself, the romantic poet

thereby placed his own experience in an historically synchronic perspective.

In this movement "backwards," toward discursive explanation, the

poet appropriated his past as a dis-interested spectator in order to
achieve a certain degree of "objectivity;" but this is nothing more than a
reflection so that the emotional state may be re-presented in its
supposedly original form.

Because the recollection itself is never

original, but claims to duplicate something which came before it, it
impersonates a static moment in time, one which delineates an "idea" in so
far as it exemplifies a distanced knowledge about something.

Such a

perspective nullifies the situation, and seeks repose in its very lack of
intentionality--thus the romantic basis for creativity itself, emotion
recollected in tranquility.

The poem frames the emotion in terms of its

mental prospect or view, "that prospectiveness of mind, that surview,
which enables a man to foresee the whole of what he is to convey,
appertaining to any one point; and by this means to subordinate and
arrange the different parts according to their relative importance, as to
convey it at once, and as an organized whole."l73

And again according to

173Coleridge, ~iographia Literaria, in Selected Poetry and Prose,
p. 294.
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Coleridge, by situating himself outside the experience in order to look
back, the poet must avoid a "state of excitement," for "the property of
passion is not to create; but to set in increased activity." 1 74

The poem

thus represents the telescoped reflection of a single, isolated image:
"Nothing assuredly can differ either in origin or in mode more widely from
the apparent tautologies of intense and turbulent feeling, in which the
passion is greater and of longer endurance than to be exhausted or satisfied by a single representation of the image or incident exciting it."175
In this respect, Wordsworth's Prelude expresses the most sustained attempt
at such a linear perspective, vanishing on the horizon line of a
tranquilly recollected past, though he described it best at Tintern Abbey:
Five years have past; five summers, with the length
Of five long winters! and again I hear
These waters, rolling from their mountain-springs
With a soft inland murmer.--Once again
Do I behold these steep and lofty cliffs,
That on a wild secluded scene impress
Thoughts of more deep seclusion; and connect
The landscape with the quiet of the sky.
The day is come when I again repose
Here, under this dark sycamore, and view
These plots of cottage-ground • • . • 176
The recollected moment is artificial and inauthentic in so far as it
remains, as Kierkegaard said, "negatively directed backwards in opposition
to the movement of life;"177 once it is freed of this frame, recollection
can at last proceed forward to become an originating consciousness, as it
does in Proust.

Kierkegaard categorized this forward movement in

174Ibid., p. 293.

175Ibid., pp. 293-94.

176Poetical Works, pp. 163-64.
177soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, trans. Lee M. Capel
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, a Midland Book Edition, 1968),
p. 155.
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recollection as "repetition," and defined it as interested intentionality:
"Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite
directions; for what is recollection has been, is repeated backwards,
whereas repetition properly so called is recollected forwards."l78

The

"interestedness" involved in Kierkegaardian repetition fundamentally
approximates the Heideggerian "Sorge," Dasein as being-in-the-world.
Similarly, the recollected moment of romantic poetry negotiates the
disinterested metaphysical attitude, and consequently portrays "the perspective sub specie aeternitatis or, as Kierkegaard puts it, aeterno
by 'aesthetically' reconciling opposites in the inclusive whole of

~.

pos~i-

bility and neutralizing the existential imperative to 'choose' resolutely
in situation." 179

Primordially, both recollection and repetition are

grounded in "interest," the necessity of an existential significance; but,
as William V. Spanos further explains it in his essay, "Heidegger,
Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic Circle:

Towards a Postmodern Theory of

Interpretation as Dis-closure,"
in "recollecting backward"--in recalling in the sense of recollecting the unique temporal experience from the point of view of
an already fully established concept of Being as realm of ideal
Forms (as in Plato) or as ideal System (as in Hegel) that is prior
to the contingent experience, the recollection resolves the contradictions and annuls the very interest that originally generates the
metaphysical question of what it means to be.l80
By recollecting backwards, romantic poetry continued to deploy the anthropological frame as a means to de-limit its pseudo-subjectivity; for by
glancing over its shoulder, the art work merely receded toward a solitary
pre-directed depth whose mental "correctness" was determined by its ideal
178Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology, trans. Walter
Lowrie (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 33.
179spanos, p. 465.

180rbid., p. 464.
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and simultaneously identical perspective--the depth of infinity.

Grounded

in infinity, the representational power of the mind guarantees an
objectivity which transcends the situation, re-locating the emotion in a
body-less (subject-less) space, an objective space accessible to all by
virtue of identical frequencies, as it were, and a zero phase difference.
This synchronous point of view transcends the world like Wordsworth's
imagination, which soars beyond the summit of Mount Snowdon, dwelling
"above this frame of things."l81

To this extent, romantic poetry decreed

that "the history of a Poet's mind/ Is labour not unworthy of regard;"l82
but in so doing, it appropriated the very frame it rhetorically
renounced--objectification.
The chronological objectification of individual emotional states
set before the poet "an image to be looked at from a distance," just as
surely as the eighteenth century set before the poet a picture of the
world to be painted, or technology set before the scientist "an It to be
mastered."l83

Modern poetry, however, like painting and music, brought

its hitherto background elements into the foreground in order to engage
the reader's interest, constantly threatening and modifying his spatial
and temporal perceptions vis..\-vis the situation.

If Baudelaire

launched the new beginning from which poetry would likewise commence to
leave its frame, he did so in order to escape the world.

And the "new

order" of Mallarme' and Valtry, originating from Baudelaire himself, no
more confronts the world in terms of being-situated than does romanticism;
181Prelude, in Wordsworth:
182Ibid.
183spanos, p. 479.

Poetical Works, p. 588.

.
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it seeks. rather, to abandon it.184

158

,

Both Lautreamont and Rimbaud relied

heavily on a hallucinative literary technique, but it is paradoxically
here that we discern the beginning of the destruction of discursive logic
and its subsequent chronological perspective in order to meet the world
on its own terms, as something wonder-full to behold, and not in terms of
a stagnant concept, a controlled or disciplined view.
new personage emerges:

"With Rimbuad a

the 'child-man,' the grownup who has refrained

from putting off childish things.

Artists became increasingly willing to

accept the child's wonder and spontaneity and destructiveness as not
inferior to adulthood." 185

But it was not until Apollinaire that the

poem inclusively opened onto the world.

Apollinaire's poetry freed the

appearance of the thing for the world; appearance and reality became one
and the same.

What was true of Picasso was equally true of Apollinaire,

as Gertrude Stein pointed out:

"The beginning of this struggle to

express the things, only the really visible things, was discouraging,
even for his most intimate friends, even for Guillaume Apollinaire."186
Apollinaire's early literary endeavors already display this
tendency to return to the things themselves as they appear in perception,
and not as the invisible objects of a conceptualized lineality.

With the

publication of Alcools (1913) Apollinaire forsook all punctuation in
order to undermine discursive unity by means of discontinuous sentences;
and his "calligraphic" poems thoroughly dislodged the narrative from its
traditionally logical sequence and thereby achieved a final liberation
184rn so far as it "runs away" from the world, the poetry of
1
Baudelaire and Mallarme discloses the kind of repression already
discussed with respect to the scientific world-view itself.
185shattuck, p. 31.

186stein, Pica~, p. 15,
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from the frame.

Apollinaire stated his own theory in Soirles:

"Psycho-

logically it is of no importance that this visible image be composed of
fragments of spoken language, for the bond between these fragments is no
longer the logic of grammar but an ideographic logic culminating in an

.

order of spatial disposition totally opposed to discursive JUXtapos
tion."187

¥'-

1

This calligraphic structure involved the reader j ust as/cubism

involved the spectator as a participant in the art work; and it is no
co-incidence that Stein discussed a similar calligraphic character in
Picasso's painting at this time:
During this period the cubes were no longer important, the cubes
were lost. After all one must know more than one sees and one does
not see a cube in its entirety. In 1914 there were less cubes in
cubism, each time that Picasso commenced again he recommenced the
struggle to express in a picture the things seen without association but simply as things seen and it is only the things seen that
are knowledge for Picasso. • • • And so then always and always
Picasso commenced his attempt to express
• really everything
a human being can know at each moment of his existence and not an
assembling of all his experiences.
So in all this period of 1913 to 1917 one sees that he took great
pleasure in decorating his pictures, always with a rather calligraphic tendency than a sculptural one, and during the naturalist
period, which followed Parade and the voyage to Italy, the
consolation offered to the side of him that was Spanish was
calligraphy.
Calligraphy, as I understand it in him had perhaps its most intense
moment in the decor of Mercure.
A little before that he had
made a series of drawings, also purely calligraphic, the lines
were extraordinarily lines, they were also stars that were stars
which moved, they existed, they were really cubism, that is to say
a thing that existed in itself without the aid of association or
emotion.188
Yet, in back of all this there existed that predominant and interpenetrating vector which underscored Apollinaire's entire oeuvre, and
187quoted in Shattuck, p. 310.
188stein, Picasso, pp. 35, 37, and 37-38, respectively.

160
which he had already defined as the "gratuitous act" of his pornographic
novels:

the total freedom to express what one sees, the absolute freedom

of the individual in the face of society--Heidegger's authentic "care" in
the face of the "they-self."
Like cubism, Apollinaire's poetry freed the art work from its ideal
perspective by bracketing "the arrogant anthropomorphic frame of reference
of the metaphysical imagination, the Wille zum Willen, and its synchronic
perspective in favor of a 'situated' or historical imagination and its
diachronic standpoint, the standpoint of the ek-static Das.ein. " 189

In his

struggle with time, Apollinaire recollects the past forward in so far as a
unique past acquires its

inter~st

and significance as situated "being" in

the present; at the same time, this repeition is guided beyond the
present to the extent that its remembering constitutes a dis-covering of
the world.
time.

"Nothing causes more melancholy in me than the passing of

It is in such formal disagreement with my feelings, with my sense

of identity, that it is the very source of my poetry."190

Apollinaire's

authentically "subjective" (care-ful) mode grounds the reader in its
becoming, in the openly anxious moment of its own freedom, by turning
itself inside out, so to speak, so that its movement simultaneously
negotiates both destruction and ekstasis.

"It is as if his I were the

exterior world from which, once he had radiated himself into it, he
could look back wistfully and indulgently upon his old self as a pathetic
object."191

This ambiguous reversal of consciousness devours the reader

189spanos, p. 479.
190Lettres ~ sa marraine, quoted in Shattuck, p. 312, footnote.
191Shattuck, p. 316.
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even as its posture digests the world:
universe."192

"But I know the savor of the

Apollinaire's iconoclastic technique breaks down the

barrier between subject and object, leaving the reader unaccommodated;
discontinuity dialogically engages the reader with the text and thus
ruptures the referential surface of the metaphysical world-picture, that
framed space of the world which Wallace Stevens described as not even our
"own" much less our "self."193

Apollinaire perhaps expressed it best in

"Cort~ge," where the "location" of his own being and, more inclusively,
the world, refuses to be pinned down to a single vanishing point:
One day
One day as I invited my soul
I said to myself William it's time to come
So I at last may find out who I am
All those who arrived and were not myself
Brought one by one the fragments of myself • • • • 194
Like Satie's compositions which frequently revolve around a single
interval, Apollinaire's poetry achieves an hermeneutic circularity which
eludes linear development; indeed, he wrote his first calligraphic poems
literally in circles, "the circles of expanding and contracting
attention."l95

If the center no longer holds, as Yeats expressed it, it

is because the self has at last "othered" the world, made it its

~;

without the mediation of representational consciousness, the world becomes
"the horizon of all horizons, the style of all possible styles, which
192"vende'miaire," Alcools, trans. Anne Hyde Greet (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1965), p. 209.
193spanos, pp. 474-75.
194Alcools, pp. 67 and 71, respectively. Cf. Daniel Oster,
Guillaume Apollinaire (Paris: Seghers, 1975), pp. 72-85.
195shattuck, p. 38, footnote.
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gaurantees for my experience a given, not a willed, unity underlying all
the disruptions of my personal and historical life." 1 96

Once we recognize

the world as the primordial situation of Being, the distinction between
subject and object disappears toward the invisible sphere to which it

-

belongs.

Apollinaire's poetry thus articulates the "pure art" of which

Baudelaire spoke in L'art philosophique but left as an explicandum for the
future:

"Qu'est-ce que l'art pur suivant la conception moderne?

C'est

crfer une magie suggestive contenant ~ la fois l'objet et le sujet, le
monde exte'rieur

'a

!'artiste et !'artiste lui-m~me." 1 97

Apollinaire's

poetry unequivocally cancelled out the endurance ratio of the technological posture whose tensile strength could no longer sustain the stress of
living the world; the fatuous attempt to control the world in the languid
interest of a mentally detached view of life had failed.

Ironically, the

twentieth century has ignored this bankruptcy, resuscitating the technological value to its logically larcenous proportion; in so doing, it has
of course simultaneously forfeited what is
world.

rt":

But Apollinaire knew:

e~istentially

its own--the

"Our. civilization is more refined than the

things which it employs/ There's more to it than the easy life."l98
By recollecting forward, poetry had accomplished the destruction of
19&.Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 330.
197oeuvres Compl~tes
de Charles Baudelaire, 7 vols. (Paris: Calmann
Levy, Bibliotheque Contemporaine, 1889-1904), 3:127--"What is the modern
conception of p~re art? It is to create a suggestive magic which contains
both object and subject, the external world of the artist and the artist
himself" (translation mine).

,

--

198(Translation mine}: "Notre civilisation a plus de finesse que le
choses qu'ils emploient/ Elle est au-del~ de la vie confortable,"
L' Italie, '~ Obus Couleur ~ Lune, in Oeuvres Poltiques D'Apollinaire, ed.
Marcel Adema and Michel Decaudin, pref. Andr~ Billy (Paris:. Gallimard,
Biblioth~que de la Pleiade, 1965), p. 275.
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the narrative and chronological frame; in bringing its own temporality
into the foreground, the poem effected the transformation of consciousness toward its primordial constitution in the "subject" and thereby
authentically appropriated the world as its indivisible situation.

-

This

new awareness, as an originating consciousness, enveloped the reader in a
world whose very constitution he helped to create, just as perceptual
"consciousness" discloses the world through its participation in it.

But

with this re-creation of the past in the present, and toward a future,
the modern poem was not alone.

"What we have not had to decipher, to

elucidate by our own efforts, what was clear before we looked at it, is
not ours." 199

Thus speaks the narrator of Proust's revolutionarily

brilliant oeuvre.

Here, the re-awakened memory continually establishes

itself in the foreground of the narration; not fettered to the lineality
of a single chronological vanishing point, its temporality is free to
"jump around" as the eye jumps over Rousseau's Le centenaire de
l'independance.

The ekstasis of this movement authentically enables the

"subject" to dis-cover the world in so far as temporality expresses it;
it becomes the very expression of Being.

The "reality" of the work

resides in the determination of this depth, a depth created by the world
of the work itself, and not a mentally perspectived representation of it.
"A writer reasons, that is to say he goes astray, only when he has not
the strength to force himself to make an impression pass through all the
successive states which will culminate in its fixation, its expression.
The reality that he has to express resides . • • not in the superficial
199Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, 7 vols. trans.
Scott Moncrief£ and Andreas Mayor (New York: Random House, Vintage
Books, 1970), 7:140.
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appearance of his subject but at a depth at which that appearance matters
little." 200

Because Remembrance of Things Past situates the memory in

its affective context, it opens onto the world as a means of revealing
its essential ambiguity:

--

in fashioning a work of art we are by no means free • . . • it is
pre-existent to us and therefore we are obliged, since it is both
necessary and hidden, to do what we should have to do if it were a
law of nature, that is to say to discover it. But this
discovery . • • is it not, I thought, really the discovery of what,
though it ought to be more precious to us than anything in the
world, yet remains ordinarily forever unkown to us, the discovery
of our true life, of reality as we have felt it to be, which
differs so greatly from what we think it is that when a chance
happening brings us an authentic memory of it we are filled with an
immense happiness? In this conclusion I was confirmed by the
thought of the falseness of so-called realist art, which would not
be so untruthful if we had not in life acquired the habit of giving
to what we feel a form of expression which differs so much from,
and which we nevertheless after a little time take to be, reality
itself.201
Proust's authentic moment, as recollection forward, discloses being-inthe-world as "care," for it accommodates our basic susceptibility to the
"they-self" while it simultaneously refuses to bend toward the solace
proffered by the "they."

In a sense, this movement constitutes Dasein's

being toward its ownmost potentiality, a "letting-itself-come-towardsitself" in so far as it takes over its own guilt.202

Rather than back

away in the face of the "having been," Proust's narrator resolutely takes
over his own thrown-ness; this moment of vision, "as an authentic Present
or waiting-towards • . • permits us to encounter for the first time what
can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand."203
This is clearly not the "Having forgotten" (Vergessenheit) of
200Ibid., p. 141.

201Ibid., p. 140.

202Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 372-73.
203rbid., p. 388.
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having been, whereby I am "proximally and for the most part as-havingbeen;" 2 04 otherwise, Proust's narrator could never "re-capture" the past
creatively.

It is not the "remembering" of a forgetting that "ret.ains"--

the kind of recollection backward of the romantic poets; Proust's moment
of vision carries the past with it in anticipatory understanding--in
openness and uncertainty.

"The idea of death took up permanent residence

within me in the way that love sometimes does . . • • and even if no
object occupied my attention and I remained in a state of complete repose,
the idea of death still kept me company as faithfully as the idea of my
self." 205

In creatively coming to terms with the authentic nature of

this temporal ekstasis, Proust's narrator discloses a final anticipatory
resoluteness:

"In the past the fear of being no longer myself was some,..

thing that had terrified me

But by dint of repetition this fear

had gradually been transformed into a calm confidence."206

By the

essentially dialogical process of the creative act, the narrator succeeds
in rectifying that "oblique interior discourse which deviates gradually
more and more widely from the first and central impression," bringing it
back into line with the "authentic words which the impression ought to
have generated;" like the love which he is finally able to reconcile with
his own death, the oeuvre itself ultimately accomplishes this "laborious
undertaking which our idleness would prefer to shirk."207
Here all our feigned indifferences, all our indignation at the lies
of whomever it is we love • • • in a word all that we have not
ceased, whenever we are unhappy or betrayed, not only to say to the
loved one but, while we are waiting for a meeting with her, to
repeat endlessly to ourselves, sometimes aloud in the silence of
204Ibid., p. 389.

205Proust, p. 267.

206Ibid., p. 263.

207rbid., p. 148.
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our room, which we disturb with remarks like: "No, really, this
sor.t of behavior is intolerable," and: "I have consented to see
you once more, for the last time, and I don't deny that it hurts
me," all this can only be brought back into confonnity with the
felt truth from which it has so widely diverged by the abolition of
all that we have set most store by, all that in our solitude, in
our feverish projects of letters and schemes, has been the
substance of our passionate dialogue with ourselves.208
By re-capturing the past, the memory does not "scan" it as a distant view
on which it finally gets a perspective, but rather grasps an affective
depth--its expression in the total temporal ekstasis of past-presentfuture.

Proust's art work thus avoids the misleading re-presentation,

so often done by painters when they paint a sail or the peak of a
mountain in such a way that, according to the laws of perspective,
the intensity of the colors and the illusion of our first glance,
they appear to us either very near or very far away, through an
error which logical thinking subsequently corrects by, sometimes,
a very large displacement. Other errors, though of a more serious
kind, I might continue to commit, placing features, for instance,
as we all do, upon the face of a woman seen in the street, when
instead of a nose, cheeks and chin there ought to be merely an empty
space with nothing more upon it than a flickering reflection of our
desires. But at least, after seeing what I had seen • • • and even
if I did not attempt . • • to represent some of my characters as existing not outside but within ourselves • • . and to vary also the
light of the moral sky which illumines them in accordance with the
variations in pressure in our sensibility (for an object which
was so small beneath the clear sky of our certainty can be suddenly
magnified many times over on the appearance of a tiny cloud of danger)--if, in my attempt to transcribe a universe which had to be
totally redrawn, I could not convey these changes and many others,
the needfulness of which, if one is to depict reality, has been
made manifest in the course of my narrative, at least I should not
fail to portray man, in this universe, as endowed with the length
not of his body but of his years . • • ,209
By recollecting forward, then, Proust brought the temporality of the
novel into the foreground so that the events of its plot dis-continuously
reveal themselves through super-imposition, and not the perspective of
linear chronology; he simultaneously freed the narration from its frame.
In doing so, Proust actualized the vector of the modern novel initiated
208Ibid.

209rbid., p. 270.
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by Flaubert and Dostoevsky, establishing the ground for what is loosely
called "stream of consciousness" and the twentieth-century masterpieces
of Gide, Joyce, and Faulkner.
In drama, meanwhile, the immediacy of consciousness evolved toward
a depth of its own.

In his Death of Tragedy, Steiner dates the beginning

of modern theatre from Ibsen's Pillars of Society (1877); 210 but the
social orientation of Ibsen·' s early work seems hardly adequate to
sufficiently rank it as modern.

In fact, it is not until 1884, with

Ibsen's Wild Duck, that the dramatic form absconds from its traditional
frame, as Steiner himself remarks:

"The limitations Qf the well-made

play and its deliberate flatness of perspective began crowding in on
Ibsen.

While retaining the prose form and outward conventions of realism,

he went back to the lyric voice and allegoric means of his early
experimental plays, Brand and Peer Gynt.

With the toy forest and

imaginary hunt of old Ekdal in The Wild Duck, drama returns to a use of
effective myth and symbolic action which had disappeared from the theatre
since the late plays of Shakespeare."211

Ibsen's use of symbolic action

brings the traditional idea of a "plot" or series_of incidents into the
forefront of the dramatic frame so that personal gesture supersedes the
external "event," taking its place alongside the other elements of the
play; this stylized vision of life equally confers an emblematic significance upon all the elements in so far as the drama now expresses the
virtual shape of an "ethical interior."

The very objects of the setting

express an inner shape, an inward motion--the new steeple in The
210George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New York:
1961)' p. 290.
211Ibid., pp. 291-92.
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Hill and Wang,
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Builder, the vine leaves in Hedda Gabler, Gabler's pistols, the wild duck,
the flagpole in The Lady from the Sea, the tarantella dance in A Doll's
Hous~, and so forth.212

Ibsen's dramas presuppose the withdrawal of God from human affairs,
and that withdrawal has left the door open to cold gusts blowing in
from a malevolent though inanimate creation. But the most
dangerous assaults upon reason and life come not from without, as
they do in Greek and Elizabethan tragedy. They arise in the
unstable soul. Ibsen proceeds from the modern awareness that there
is rivalry and unbalance in the individual psyche. The ghosts that
haunt his characters are • . • cancers growing in the soul. In
Ibsen's vocabulary~ the most deadly of these cancers is
"idealism" • . • • L 13
In his later plays especially, the three-walled stage, with its
perspective view into a slice of life, retracts toward an affective depth
whose setting leads into an unchartered world, a world whose sign-posts
we must discover all over again.

By transposing the public form of drama

into the highly subjective "key" of private expression, Ibsen re-defined
the dramatic perspective itself.

Strindberg achieved a similar kind of

depth, but failed in the long run to effect the dramatically coherent
structure we consistently find in Ibsen.

What made the difference?

Ibsen re-defined the very "focus" of the dramatic vision, a perspective which, since the Renaissance, had focused on external incidents or
"plot."

Taking its lead from Aristotle, who had defined the tragic

vision as the imitation of an action, Renaissance dramatic construction
subsequently employed chronology as the dramatic equivalent of pictorial
perspective--the re-presentation of an event.

In his Poetics, Aristotle

had specifically insisted on this:
The most important of the constitutive elements is the Plot, that
is, the organization of the incidents of the story; for Tragedy in
212Ibid., pp. 294-95.

213Ibid., p. 293.
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its essence is an imitation, not of men as such, but of action and
life, of happiness and misery. And happiness and misery are not
states of being, but forms of activity; the end for which we live
is some form of activity, not the realization of a moral
quality. . . . In a play, consequently, the agents do not perform
for the sake of representing their individual dispositions; rather,
the display of moral character is included as subsidiary to the
things that are done. So that the incidents of the action, and the
structural ordering of these incidents, constitute the end and
purpose of the tragedy.214
This is consistent with the significance Aristotle gives to "beginning,"
"middle," and "end" so that the spectator, via the ubiquity of his perspective, is able to witness· the completely unified action within a
single glance, as it were.

With Ibsen, however, "plot" becomes the

incrusted "epilogue" to a previous action; he begins where earlier
tragedies had ended:

"Suppose Shakespeare had written a play showing

Macbeth and Lady Macbeth living out their black lives in exile after they
had been defeated by their avenging enemies.

We might then have the

angle of vision that we find in John Gabriel Borkman."215

As the

peripherally indeterminate ingress to a private interior, Ibsen's drama
super-imposed the logic of interior time over an ·implied chronological
moment, initiating the destruction of the plot as an imitation of an
action or "life."

It wasn't until Chekhov that the destruction was

complete.
Chekhov's plays not only abrogate the traditional perspective of
the five-act division, but also meiotically terminate the anorectic
teleology of beginning-middle-end.

Chekhov fetches chronology into the

foreground to such an extent that it touches our nose; a blurred tempo214Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, trans. Lane Cooper (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 24.
215steiner, pp. 296-97.
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rality nebulously juts through the entire visual field of the play, so to
speak.

Time anxiously nudges us as we wait for something to happen, but

it never does.

In Chekhov absolutely nothing ever "happens."

It is all

talk; even suicide simply represents another rhetorical posture, for like
the characters themselves, it accomplishes nothing.

The structure of

Chekhov's drama constitutes a magnetic field of psychological motion
where "every word and gesture provokes a complex disturbance and regrouping of psychological forces. . . .
score set for speaking voice."216
~

A Chekhovian dialogue is a musical
Like Satie's music, which often

develops a single musical idea from different directions simultaneously
rather than "at length," Chekhovian drama evolves by standing still.
endures.

It

Whatever motion we may feel, it is the motion of a still

center; and that center is everywhere at once.

Like a carriage wheel,

which appears to be going backward once it reaches a certain forward
velocity, Chekhov's movement revolves in both directions at the same time.
His interrogation of psychological time suggests a mutual motion and
repose, just as with Satie's ostinato bass there is the suggestion of
"permanent movement and permanent rest."217
Satie might equally be said of Chekhov:

What Roger Shattuck says of

"He varies only the bare contour,

the notes in the melody but not its general shape, the chords in the
•
b ut not 1ts
·
d om1nant
·
accompan1ment
moo d • n218

The enigmatic quality of

Chekhovian dialogue derives from this super-imposition of simultaneous
levels of consciousness which, in turn, creates its own distinctive significance--absurdity.

Chekhov' s plays take up where Socrates left off .in

the Symposium, demonstrating that the spirit of tragedy is ultimately that
216Ibid., p. 300.

217shattuck, p. 141.

218rbid.
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of comedy as well.

In this respect, we can better understand Chekhov's

remark that he never wrote a tragedy; he intuitively recogQized life's
ultimate absurdity.

And what difference is there in the end, whether the

listener or the talker falls asleep?

Socrates' final comme~t in the

Symposium is most ironically appropriate--silence.

With his usual

incisiveness, Kierkegaard remarks:
What Socrates valued so highly, namely, to stand still and come to
himself, i.e. silence, this is what his whole life is in relation
to world history. He has left nothing from which a later age can
judge him. • . • He belonged to that species of human beings with
whom one is not content to remain with the external as such. The
external always suggested an 'other', an opposite. He was not like
a philosopher lecturing upon his views, wherein the very lecture
itself constitutes the presence of the Idea; on the contrary, what
Socrates said meant something 'other'. The outer and the inner did
not form a harmonious unity, for the outer was in opposition to the
inner, and only through this refracted angle is he to be
apprehended.219
Chekhov's plays articulated the silence of Socratic irony.
If Chekhov pre-figured Ionesco, Genet, Beckett, and the "Theatre of
the Absurd" in general, Alfred Jarry virtually launched it on the way.
In its trans-valuation of the rational "attitude," the Ubu trilogy
resembles "the incoherence--and significance of that other great
monstrosity:

Picasso's Guernica."220

If the perfect script were ever

written for W. C. Fields, this is it; Ibsen's Peer Gynt constitutes a
close second.

In act one, scene one of Ubu Enchained, Pa Ubu, having

"lorded" it over others as "king," initiates the general situation of the
play:
PA UBU • • • • Now that we are in the land where liberty is equal to
fraternity, and fraternity more or less means the equality of
legality, and since I am incapable of behaving like everyone else
and since being the same as everyone else is all the same to me
seeing that I shall certainly end up by killing everyone else, I
219The Concept of Irony, pp. 49-50.

220shattuck, p. 228.
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might as well become a slave, Ma Ubu!
MA UBU.

A slave!

But you're too fat, Pa Ubu!

PA UBU. All the better for doing a fat lot of work. You, madam our
female, go and set out our slave apron, and our unmentionable
slave brush, and our slave hook, and our slave's shoe-polishing
kit. But as for yourself, stay just as you are, so that everyone
can see plainly that you are wearing your beautiful costume of
slave cook.221
In a single definitive gesture, Jarry levels the reflective consciousness
which, in itself, attempts to level down all modalities of existence to a
single consciousness.

In fact, Ubu Enchained, begins with silence, as the

stage directions indicate, when Pa Ubu "comes forward and says nothing."222
Ma Ubu responds:

"What!

forgotten the Word?"223

You say nothing, Pa Ubu!

Surely you haven't

The "word" of course is Merdre--"Pschittl"--which

brought the house down on 10 December 1896, when Ubu Rex opened at the

ThJ~tre Nouveau in the Rue Blanche.

Not since 1830, when Victor Hugo

packed the house for the premiere of his own Hernani, had there been anything like it.

Pa Ubu's inability to pronounce the word at the beginning

of Ubu Enchained merely underscores the absurdity of it all.

Like

Rousseau's canvases and Satie's music, Jarry's child-like posture recreates
the structure of a pre-reflective consciousness where the apparent and the
real remain entirely ambiguous; slavery and freedom are synonymous within
the context of the play because Jarry never questions their relation
initially.

Jarry's vision is absurd precisely because he takes nothing--

or better, everything--for granted; his work addresses an interrogation
221Alfred Jarry, The Ubu Plays, ed. Simon Watson Taylor (New York:
Grove Press, Inc., 1968), p. 110.
222rbid., p. 109.
223rbid.
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which is never even formulated.224

By suspending all affirmation, he

stands, as Husserl would express it, in wonder before the world.225
Jarry turned the world inside-out in so far as he lived his art; in
his personal life he recreated the very figures which populate the pages
of his oeuvre.

As he says of Sengle, the protagonist of Days and Nights

(1897)'
he made no distinction whatsoever between his thoughts and his
actions or between his dream and his waking; and perfecting the
Liebnizian definition, that perception is a true hallucination, he
saw no reason why one should not say: hallucination is a false
perception, or more exactly: a weak one, or better yet: predicted
(remembered sometimes, which is the same thing). And, above all,
he considered that there existed nothing except hallucinations, or
perceptions, and that there were neither nights nor days (despite
the title of this book, which is why we chose it), and that life
goes on without interruption; • • • and the first proof of life is
the beating of the heart.226
Here, as in his "pataphysics," the distinction between dream and waking
does not represent a shift to consciousness but singularly indicates a
continuity.

Taken as a whole, this continuum constitutes consciousness

itself so that we can never dismiss the dream on phenomenological grounds.
The form of a dream appropriates a certain kind of consciousness by its
very nature; otherwise, it could never be disclosed, for example, in the
art work.

This is what Rollo May implies when he exhorts the psycho-

analyst to approach the patient's dream as a series of spatial forms.227
Concerning the structure of the dream, R. G. Collingwood made this
distinction:
224cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 295.

225rbid.

226selected Works of Alfred Jarry, ed. Roger Shattuck and Simon
Watson Taylor (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1965), p. 145-46.
227Rollo May, The Courage to Create (New York:
p. 154.

Bantam Books, 1976),
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It is essentially a structure which is, in the terminology of the
psycho-analyst himself, unconscious. ,, The dreamer himself is unaware
of it until, in collaboration with his psycho-analyst, he brings it
to light. The mythological way of stating this fact is to say that
the structure was 'in the unconscious'. This is frankly
nonsense . . . because the structure is not in the unconscious but
precisely in the dream, for it is the structure of the dream; and
the dream is conscious enough. . • . the revelation made by psychoanalysis is not the bringing into consciousness of what was
unconscious, but the bringing into explicitness of what was implicit,
the noticing of something already actually experienced in a light in
which it had not been noticed before . . • . the new light in
question is nothing but the hitherto overlooked structure of the
experience in question . . . 228
In so far as the dream embodies an implicit "logical" structure, it constitutes a continuous or, better, contiguous "form" of consciousness.
Jarry's works invert the logic of traditional consciousness, trans-forming
it into the structure of the dream.

Thus, Ubu asserts his freedom by

ironically, and paradoxically, becoming a slave.

This is the "magnificent

gesture" which Jarry transformed, by way of a pun, into the "manifest
imposture;" and it uniquely abridges the essence of his entire oeuvre.
Merleau-Ponty has said it another way:

"I face truth not with its

negation, but with a state of non-truth or ambiguity, the actual opacity
of my existence."229

Jarry set about "to upset the balance of waking

(rational) logic and developed the elements of 'Pataphysics,' a kind of
reasonable unreason;" the action of Ubu Rex, for example, takes place in
Poland, "( • • • a country long condemned to the nonexistence of
partition) an Eternity of Nowhere, and that contradiction is the mode of
its logic."230

By virtue of the universal imposture, the typical becomes

228speculum Mentis or The Map of Knowledge (London:
University Press, 1924), pp. 93-94.
22~erleau-Ponty, PhenomenoloEY• p. 295.

230shattuck, pp. 202 and 206, respectively.
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exceptional, and the exceptional, typical; this was the avowed purpose of
his "pataphysics," the science of the realm beyond metaphysics:
Pataphysics will examine the laws governing exceptions, and will
explain the universe supplementary to this one; or, less ambitiously, will describe a universe which can be--and perhaps should
be--envisaged in the place of the traditional one, since the laws
that are supposed to have been discovered in the traditional
universe are also correlations of exceptions, albiet more frequent
ones, but in any case accidental data which, reduced to the status
of unexceptional exceptions, possess no longer even the virtue of
originality. 2 31
Like Picasso, who later collected Jarry's manuscripts, Jarry's art sets
out to describe a universe which one can see; in this transformed space,
the art work takes its place alongside the expressive space of the world.
Because the art work has been freed of its frame, Andrl Breton could say
that with Jarry, the separation between art and life has been annihilated
once and for all.232

How poignantly Jarry disclosed the nature of his

,

own works when he analyzed the characters in a novel by Henri de Regnier,
who through inverse mimicry "congeal their surroundings into their own
image and erect palaces of space around themselves;" and he continues,
"if every hero brings his own scenery with him, and if we never see the
Prince of Praizig without his military greatcoat, Madame de Vitry without
her rouge • • . • nor Madame Brignan without her dyed hair, then this
proves, and no more evidence is needed, that the author has turned his
creatures inside out and exposed their soul:
tic."233

the soul is a nervous

Liberated for its own unique space, the art work could at last

231Exploits and Opinions of Doctor Faustroll, Pataphysician, in
Selected Works of Alfred Jarry, pp. 192-93; cf. also, Shattuck,
pp. 241-42.
232Andr/ Breton, Les Pas Perdus (Paris:

Gallimard, 1924), pp. 47-65.

233"concerning Inverse Mimicry in the Characters of Henri de
RJgnier," Selected Works of Alfred Jarry, pp. 91 and 92-93, respectively.
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proceed to create its own world as well.

In Ubu, Jarry initiated the

prototype which he would incorporate into his later works; he created, in
fact, the anti-Frankenstein monster, "a one-man demolition squad twenty
years before Dada." 234

Even more startling, as the science of laws

governing exceptions, his pataphysics prefigured Heisenberg's principle
of indeterminacy.

No wonder that Cyril Connolly dubbed Pa Ubu the "Santa

Claus of the Atomic Age," and that Apollinaire could say of Jarry himself
that he was "the last sublime debauchee of the Renaissance."235
By abandoning the lineality of a continuous and uniform perspective-space, the avant-garde exploded that most elemental perceptual bias
which had plagued Western civilization for more than four centuries.

In

returning to the "composition" of the work, as Gertrude Stein expressed
it, modern art abrogated the subject-object dichotomy constituted and
sustained by the principles of resemblance, imitation, and re-presentation.

More or less taking its lead from music, which came to epitomize

an absolutely self-sufficient art, modern painting and literature incorporated the "spectator" into its own structure; this new "expressive"
form appropriated a unique space in which the subject is expected to discover his own orientation all over again.
we become incarnate.

We become a part of the field;

By virtue of a trans-position, either juxtaposition

or super-imposition, modern art escaped the "transition," a discursive
element which inevitably represents a second-order "reflection" in
itself.

Apollinaire called this transition-less quality of modern art

"surprise."

Surprise engages us in mutual creation with the artist

234shattuck, p. 226.
235quoted in Shattuck, pp. 224 and 251, respectively.
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himself, as well as the art work, in so far as we disclose the significance of the work.

"In the old tradition the spectator knows in essence

what must happen, and while the action unfolds we experience not surprise
but verification of certain general truths.
the start.

The peripety is fated from

Thus, any important event occurs, in effect, twice--and this

analysis can be applied to Greek tragedy, to the early French novel, and
to baroque architecture."236
intimate:

By its nature an expressive form is

rather than hold him at "bay," it invites the spectator into

its own space.

We no longer "observe" the art work from a pre-determined

distance, as a "view," but touch it by entering onto its space.

To the

extent that modern art brings all its "elements" equally into the foreground so that something is "in·front" or "in back" of something else
only in so far as the "gaze" of the perceiver distinguishes it as such,
the art work enters onto the world as an incomplete gestalt which demands
to be completed in order to be experienced at all.

Art, as e.e. cummings

said of life, is no longer "a verb of two voices"--active and passive.237
By manipulating or "handling" the appearance of the thing, modern art
appropriates the perceptual freedom of the composition itself, the right
to its own world irrespective of a preconceived externality.

'!'his is the

kind of visual freedom Gertrude Stein had in mind when she said that with
Picasso's cubism the painting connnenced to leave its frame.
Of all the cubists, perhaps Juan Gris expressed the new aesthetic
and its subsequent methodology best:

"Now painting is foreseeing--fore-

seeing what will happen to the general effect of a picture by the intro236shattuck, pp. 339-40.
237Jacket copy of the play Him, New York:
quoted in Shattuck, p. 343.

Boni and Liveright, 1927,
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duction of some particular form of some particular colour, and foreseeing
what sort of reality will be suggested to the spectator.

It is, then, by

being my own spectator that I extract the subject from my picture."238
In 1890, Maurice Denis had already redefined the composition of the painting, and it was his re-formulation of this issue which instituted modern
criticism in general, he declared:

"Se rappeler qu'un tableau--avant

d'~tre un cheval de bataille, une femme nue, ou une quelconque anecdote--est essentiellement une surface plane recouverte de couleurs en un
certain ordre assemblels." 239

Rousseau seemed acutely aware of this

distinction, employing color as the most significantly "formal" element
in all his compositions.

By 1912, Robert Delaunay had made enormous

progress in this respect, directing his experiments with pure color toward
an entirely non-figurative style while, at the same time, Kandinsky and
Mondrian were performing similar experiments in Germany and Holland
respectively.240

Out of this specific effort there evolved the general

term "simultanism."

In the paintings of Delaunay's Les fen~res series,

for example, "we are simultaneously indoors and out of doors, inside an
object and on all sides of it."241

But what makes this articul~tion of

simultaneous points of view any different from the flat projection we
238"Notes on My Painting," in Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler, Juan Gris:
His Life and Work, rev. ed., trans: Douglas Cooper (New York:--aarry N.
Abrams, Inc., 1968), p. 194. Cf. "Reply to the Questionnaire: 'Chez les
cubistes'," 1925, ibid., p. 202: " • . • for the only relationship that
existed was that between the intellect of the painter and the objects and
practically never was there any relationship between the objects
themselves."
239Thlories: 1890-1910, 4th ed. (Paris: L. Rouart and J. Watelin,
1920), p. 1: "Recall that a painting--before being a horse in battle, a
naked woman, or any kind of anecdote--is essentially a plane surface
covered with colors and arranged in a certain order" (translation mine).
240shattuck, pp. 279-80.

241Ibid., p. 349.
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encounter in the ubiquitousness of the world-view?
visual field remains entirely indeterminate.

Precisely this--the

Like the newspaper cut-outs

in a cubist collage, the "objects" of a simultanist painting constitute a
possible horizon for other objects in the field.

Rather than vanish in

the determinate point of a single horizon, each object engages my
attention in so far as it opens onto an indeterminate periphery.

I

complete the "gestalt" a different way each time my gaze "takes it up"
which, in turn, determines how my body orients itself to the unique space
of the painting's world.

I can only make the world of the painting the

familiar setting of my own life to the extent that I intend to take it up
completely.

In this respect, the art work enters onto my own world; it

compels me to become familiar with it in so far as it dialogically
engages my attention, and I negotiate its unfamiliar space in order to
arrive at the most determinate "form" possible.

Only beyond the "edges"

of the painting, however, is this completion actualized, just as my
visual gaze appropriates the objects "in back of me" as part of its
field.

Because the formal possibilities subsequently remain open by

virtue of this double horizon, I encounter nothing less than the
existential ek-stasis itself--that is, temporality.

Situated in the

diachronic standpoint, the art work engages my interest in so

f~r

as it

stands out from the temporal horizon as a whole, past-present-future.
Thus, for example, the so-called "simultaneous" points of view in
simultanism constitute, in effect, neither a simultaneity in space nor
in time.

Shattuck locates the essence of not only simultanism but of

modern art in general in an eternal and continuous present, and calls it
"tbe art of stillness;" as he remarks, "Stillness represented its unity,
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its continuous present, its sole permanence."242

For Shattuck, modern

art represents, then, a synchronic standpoint, the "place" where everything happens at once.

This, however, merely re-locates its perspective

within the larger frame of the world-view itself, whereas, in fact, this
art appropriates an essential quality just the opposite of stillness, and
that is motion.
The lack of connectives in modern art pre-figures the electronic
cultural milieu in which we live today.

Like the mechanism in Jarry's

"How to Construct a Time Machine" (1899), it even anticipates the theory
of relativity:
If we could remain immobile in absolute Space while Time elapses,
if we could lock ourselves inside a Machine ~hat isolates us from
Time • • • all future and past instants could be explored successively, just as the stationary spectator of a panorama has the
illusion of a swift voyage through a series of landscapes.243
Yet, in so far as it is phenomenal, the motion of modern art is not
relative.

The absence of transition in modern art, whether it be a

musical score, a painting or a literary piece, produces that kinaesthetic
sensation whereby we experience a certain "speed" or motion in the form,
though never to the point where formal elements concur simultaneously.
This motion, however, possesses no "properties" in itself, but only a
certain style.

"The moving object, as object of an indefinite series of

explicit and concordant perceptions, has properties, the mobile entity
has only a style."244

Movement does not necessarily pre-suppose a moving

object; "it is sufficient that it should include 'something that moves',
or at the most 'something coloured' or 'luminous' without any actual
242Ibid.

243Selected Works of Alfred Jarry, p. 115.

244Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. 273-74.
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colour or light.

The logician excludes this middle term:

the radii of

the circle must be either equal or unequal, motion must either have or
not have a moving body." 2 45

We are concerned here with the non-thematic

significance of movement, for the thematization of movement "ends with
the identical object in motion and with the relativity of movement, which
means that it destroys movement."246

Phenomenally speaking, a "world" is

constituted not only by things but by change as well, whereas the "world"
constituted by the world-view recognizes only the thing itself in transit.
Thus, its most peculiar characteristic--having to account for "where"
everything "is at" thematically.

Spatial and temporal lineality thus

enable the percipient to always define his experience of the world by
virtue of an unequivocal predicate--that is, its "theme."

If it cannot

be expressed in a single definitive sentence, it simply isn't there.
Similarly, transition in the art work helps to define the relation of all
its parts in so far as the art work as a whole occupies a certain space;
even to say that the art work is greater than the sum of its parts still
implies a mathematical function which ultimately gets us nowhere,

In

traditional drama, or literature in general for example, the "event"
merely constitutes another "thing" in the manipulation or construction of
plot.

Modern art, on the other hand, recognizes the pure transition it:-

self, the manner of a thing's passing.

"The something in transit which

we have recognized as necessary to the constitution of a change is,to be
defined only in terms of the particular manner of its 'passing'." 247

In

other words, the modern art work defines itself primarily in terms of its
"behavior" and not its "properties."
245Ibid., p. 274.

Because it is essentially

246rbid., p. 275.

247Ibid.
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transitio.n-less, modern art appropriates the "pure transition" in itself--that is, motion.

The motion of modern art begins to appear as the

"modulation of an already familiar setting" in my perceptual field,248
only in so far as I acquaint myself with it entering onto its space.

To

the extent that my perceptual "gaze" supplies the appropriate figure and
background to the field, and to that extent alone, does the motion of the
work become structural, though never "relative," for the "very peculiar
relationship which constitutes movement does not exist between
objects." 24 9

In my perception of the modern art work, then, whether it

be music, painting or poetry, the pre-objective ekstatic temporality of a
lived present holds me within the thickness and opacity of past and
future as well; unlike objective time determined by successive moments, I
experience the phenomenon of motion "without being in any way aware of
objective positions."250

Shattuck's thinking is faulty in this respect

precisely because he conceives of the perceiver as another object in
objective space; he thus implicitly accepts the assumption that motion
can, and does, occur between two objects.

This is why he discovers, at

the heart of modern art, an absolute stillness:
difficulty taking into account

ot~er

motions.

"An object in motion has
Only by achieving rest,

arrest, can we perceive what is happening outside ourselves."251

This

is, of course, a logical conclusion only if we conceive of the perceptual
act transpiring without a field.

The necessity of a double horizon

constituted by both physical and bodily space leads us to a far different
248Ibid.

249Ibid., p. 277.

250Ibid., p. 275.
25lshattuck, p. 350.
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conclusion indeed, whereby motion, as we have seen, becomes an
absolute. 252
In its demand to be completed, modern art asserts an ontological
priority in time, and appropriates this significance in so far as the
motion becomes identical with its completed appropriation.

Its trans-

position, which Gaugin decreed essential to all modern art, thus
constitutes what today, in effect, we call "montage."

Here, as we saw

during the Renaissance, it was art which once again preceded technology
and its most significant product since the daguerreotype--the "motion"
picture.

Cinematic montage primordially articulates the "pure

transition," the manner of a thing's passing.

Indeed, contrary to

George Sarton's insidiously arrogant remark noted in the previous chapter,
that "if we try to explain the progress of mankind, the history of
science should be the very axis of our explanation,"253 the progress of
mankind is primordially and for the most part grounded in its art.

As

Sir Herbert Read has said, art precedes other forms; on the basis of its
activity, "a 'symbolic discourse' becomes possible, and religion, philosophy and science follow as consequent modes of thought."254

Rollo May

amplifies Sir Herbert's statement as follows:
This is not to say that reason is the more civilized form and art
the more primitive one, in a pejorative sense--an egregious error
unfortunately often found in our rationalistic Western culture.
This is, rather, to say that the creative encounter in the art form
is "total"--it expresses a wholeness of experience; and science and
philosophy abstract partial aspects for their subsequent
study.255
252Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 280.
253sarton, The Renaissance, p. 55.
254quoted in May, p. 99.

255May, pp. 99-100.
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At any rate, the motion in modern art pre-figured cinematic montage and
its purely transitional nature--temporal juxtaposition.
Roger Shattuck is true to the mark:

And here,

"Having no subordinate conjunctions

and no punctuation except the retarded timing of the fade and the mix,
film is organically juxtaposition." 2 56

No one has examined the history

and nature of the film more perceptively, perhaps, than Sergie Eisenstein.
In his Film Sense, he says of juxtaposition:
The basic fact was true, and remains true to this day, that the
juxtaposition of two separate shots by splicing them together
resembles not so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot--as
it does a creation. It resembles a creation--rather than a sum of
its parts--from the circumstance that in every such juxtaposition
the result is qualitative!~ distinguishable from each component
element viewed separately. 57
In other words, this new entity, as a product of juxtaposition, transcends
any and all re-presentation whatsoever--by virtue of its very motion it
escapes the limitations of its frame.

As an example, Eisenstein cites

Ambrose Bierce's "The Inconsolable Widow" where a woman in widow's
attire stands weeping upon a grave.
"Console yourself, madame," said a Sympathetic Stranger.
"Heaven's mercies are infinite. There is another man somewhere,
besides your husband, with whom you can still be happy."
"There was," she sobbed--"there was, but this is his grave."258
Eisenstein then explains:

"The woman • • • is a representation, the

mourning robe she is wearing is a representation--that is, both are
objectively representable.

But

·~widow,'

arising from a juxtaposition

of the two representations, is objectively unrepresentable."259
256shattuck, p. 334, footnote.
257Eisenstein, The. Film Sense, pp. 7-8.
258quoted in Eisenstein, The Film Sens~, p. 5.
259Eisenstein, The Film Sellse, p. 8.

Thus,

185
the unity of a film derives from its ability to transcend not only the
content enclosed by the single frames, but also the juxtaposition of
these separate contents with each other.260

"Hence the image of a

scene, a sequence, of a whole creation, exists not as something fixed and
ready-made.

It has to arise, to unfold before the senses of the

spectator."261

What unfolds before us is nothing less than the spatial

"world" of the film, its composition.

Ultimately grounded in the

temporality of its vision, the "motion" picture, like all of modern art,
invites us into its space in so far as we take it up intimately, with the
personal style of our "gaze."

Phenomenally situated within the pre-

objectivity of perception, the film demands a new spatial level in order
to be "seen" at all.

As Gertrude Stein said of art, defining it as the

"composition" of the world--"Nothing changes from generation to
generation except the thing seen and that makes a composition."262
Modern art not only opened onto the revolutionary form of the film
and its subsequent technological development, but once again laid the
ground for all of the seminal advances in the science and technology of
the twentieth century.

It created, in fact, the very possibility of a

"post-modern" physics some fifty years ahead of its time.

In so far as

contemporary physics is beginning to admit that it can no longer
entertain a total picture of the universe, it is ultimately fated to
relinquish its world-view; and with it must go, once and for all, the
pseudo-salvation of the ubiquitous vision of science in general.
simply a matter of time.
260Ibid., p. 9.

It is

Meanwhile, the central question which plagues
261Ibid., p. 18.

262"composition as Explanation," in Selected Writings, p. 513.
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the contemporary physicist echoes the significant question which haunted
the avant-garde some fifty years before:

is the physical space of the

universe essentially symmetrical as Galileo and Newton would have it, or
is it primordially the expression of an incomprehensible pattern or
"form."

Post-modern physics discloses a world not only at odds with

reason, but with our imagination as well.

As Huston Smith remarks in

his essay, "The Revolution in Western Thought,"
the problems which the new physics poses for man's sense of order
cannot be resolved by refinements in scale. Instead they appear to
point to a radical disjunction between the way things behave and
every possible way in which we might try to visualize them. How,
for example, are we to picture an electron traveling two or more
different routes through space concurrently or passing from orbit
to orbit without traversing the space between them all? What kind
of model can we construct of a space that is finite yet unbounded,
or of light which is both wave and particle?263
In so far as we cannot form a picture of it, this "new" world refuses to
be visualized at all--at least in the traditional perspective; it is
entirely beyond reason; it is truly, in Kant's sense of the term,
"sublime."

Yet what, after all, is the space of the electron, wherein it

concurrently travels through two or more different routes without
traversing the space between them at all, if not the pre-objective,
"behavioral," situated space of being-in-the-world?
than the expressive space of modern art.

It is nothing less

Thus, post-modern physics finds

itself describing the universe in such purely metaphorical terms as
"light years," "bent space," "absolute negative temperatures," and
"audible radio stars."264

P. W. Bridgman of Harvard has put it this way:

The structure of nature may eventually be such that our processes
263nialogue on Science, ed. William R. Cozart (Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1967), p. 26.
264shattuck, p. 349.
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of thought do not correspond to it sufficiently to permit us to
think about it at all. . . . The world fades out and eludes
us. . . . We are confronted with something truly ineffable. We
have reached the limit of the vision of the great pioneers of
science, the vision, namely, that we live in a sympathetic world
in that it is comprehensible by our minds.265
The post-modern physicist is subsequently encouraged to talk about a

-

theory in terms of its "elegance," rather than its "truth."

And in so

doing, he has at last returned to a world of beauty, the very world of
art from whence he originally emerged during the Renaissance.
Rationality or utility is no longer of paramount importance, but rather
subsumed, as Rollo May remarks, "as part of the character of being
beautiful.

The harmony of an internal form, the inner consistency of a

theory, the character of beauty that touches one's sensibilities--these
are significant factors determining why a given idea emerges • • • • insights emerge not chiefly because they are 'rationally true' or even
helpful, but because they have a certain form, the form that is beautiful
because it completes an incomplete Gestalt."266

As it did when Einstein

introduced his theory of relativity and Heisenberg his principle of
indeterminacy, the world henceforth runs the risk of continually being
upset--indeed, re-appropriates the very principle of chaos as part of its
ground.267

The perceptually biased "defense mechanisms" of optical

perspective are, at last, de trop.

Apollinaire knew it some fifty years

before, as did the avant-garde in general; and he articulated what has
become the basic posture of the twentieth century in his brilliant poem
265quoted in Smith, "The Revolution in Western Thought," in
Dialogue on Science, p. 26.
266May, pp. 73-74.
267cf. May, p. 78.
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"Zone," as we now begin to disclose the affective distances of
inter-planetary space:
God who dies Friday and rises Sunday
Christ who flies higher than the aviators
And holds the world's record
Christ pupil of the eye
Twentieth pupil of the centuries he knows his business
And changed to a bird this century ascends like Jesus •

268Alcools, p. 5.
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CHAPTER III

HAWTHORNE'S DIORAMIC GAZE:

PERCEPTION

For the nineteenth century, the daguerreotype appreciably offset
the temporal and spatial displacement caused by the latest technology;
for it securely located man within the perspective co-ordinates of his
world-view.

Yet, violent technical innovation engenders alienation and

the pain of isolation in any age.l

Hawthorne's fiction definitively

expresses the alienation and pain of isolation which his own age experienced.

It does so only because Hawthorne himself was eminently aware of

the condition of his environment:

"The artist has the power to discern

the current environment created by the latest technology.

Ordinary human

instinct causes people to recoil from these new environments and to rely
on the rear-view mirror as a kind of repeat or ricorso of the preceding
environment."2

Hawthorne's fiction condemns th~ unconscious bias of

perception in his own culture, and thus opens the possibility of new
perceptions with respect to the counter-environments of the fiction
itself.

As McLuhan puts it:

The function of the artist in correcting the unconscious bias of
perception in any given culture can be betrayed if he merely
repeats the bias of the culture instead of readjusting it. In
fact, it can be said that any culture which feeds merely on its
direct antecedents is dying. In this sense the role of art is to
create the means of perception by creating counterenvironments that
open the door of perception to people otherwise numbed in a
nonperceivable situation.3
lMcLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 235.
2Ibid., p. xxiii.

3Ibid., p. 241.
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Although it is difficult to assess the degree to which Hawthorne was consciously aware of himself as the creator of counter-environments--a means
of perceiving the actual environment over and against the pseudo-environments created by technology and their resultant fictions of space and
time--Hawthorne's fiction clearly speaks against the age; and it does so
with remarkable consistency.

But what is this speaking against?

What is

it that Hawthorne so violently detested and which, in short, becomes the
brunt of his attack?

Perhaps what he most generally disliked about his

age was its attitude toward the visual sense, an attitude which overwhelmingly reflected the major concern of his day as it appeared

'

vis-a-vis technology--specifically, the "daguerrean" or world-view.
Hawthorne's use of mirrors, for example, counterbalances the transilluminated image of the daguerrean plate; rather than perfectly reflect the
world, his mirrors obliquely demonstrate its perceptual opacity prior to
second-order consciousness; that is, prior to reflection itself.

The

mirror translates, the reflexivity of the sensible, that in which my
externality completes itself:

o~

"More completely than lights, shadows, and

reflections, the mirror image anticipates, within things, the labor of
vision."4

The mirror reciprocates what.!. see, by disclosing what ~binss

see of me; the body-image transcends itself to become a spectacle in its
own right.

Like any spectacle, moreover, the mirror plays its own

game~,

optical tricks by which the metamorphic nature of vision illusively.
appears in order to enclose itself.

In fact, from an "objective" point

of view, the mirror image must be re-reflected, that is, translated
mentally, before it accurately represents its derivative spatial
4Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, p. 168.
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reflection.

The image in the mirror is transitory, its transpositional

ambiguity escapes us even as we look.

Thus, "Monsieur du Miroir"

ironically illustrates the futility of any attempt to capture "the
picture or visible type of what I muse upon, that my mind may not wander
so vaguely as heretofore, chasing its own shadow through a chaos, and
catching only the monsters that abide there."S

Like many painters, who

use the mirror to paint themselves in the act of painting, Hawthorne
frequently employs his "mirrors" in order to write himself into the
writing.

Indeed, on an aesthetic level, the mirror "mirrors" his own

maieutic method.

Hawthorne's socratic narrator not only questions his

subject-matter and audience, but repeatedly interrogates himself.

In so

doing, he places a counterfeit image before himself, an opaque alternative
which recreates the perceptually and ontologically ambiguous dialectic of
"within" and "without."

This primordial ambiguity sets the tone through-

out much of Hawthorne's oeuvre, for the self-interrogative narrator is
often the source of his irony as well.

Like Matisse, Hawthorne enjoyed

drawing himself into the very structure of the work:
Monsieur du Miroir!

"Farewell,

Of you, perhaps, as of many men, it may be doubted

whether you are the wiser, though your whole business if REFLECTION."6
Inescapably, Hawthorne's fiction is predominantly visual, but to
5"Monsieur du Mirroir," in The Centenary Edition of the Works of
Nathaniel Hawthorne, ed. William Charvat, Roy Harvey Pearce, and Claude
M. Simpson, XVIII vols. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962present), X, pp. 169-70. Subsequent references to Hawthorne's works,
unless otherwise noted, will be exclusively to this edition, hereafter
referred to by volume and page number only. Volumes I through XI have
appeared to date, with volume XII projected for early December. I have
had no opportunity to research Hawthorne's "missing notebook," most
recently discovered in Boulder, Colorado, covering the years 1835-1841.
6Ibid., p. 171. Cf. also, "Fancy's Show Box," IX, p. 221, where
Mr. Smith gazes at his own reflection in the madeira glass.
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the extent that it is visual at all it is always counter-visual; its
perception is antithetical to the public bias.

Throughout his life,

Hawthorne remained half-convinced that the reflection was indeed the
reality.7

As Normand remarks:

Even though his intent in escaping from the maze of customs he had
been brought up in was not to seek out new ways of being and thinking, but simply to see what there is hidden beneath appearances, he
was none the less a traitor to society, for he was refusing to play
the game. He had therefore forfeited all his rights, his identity,
indeed all reality, and even in his own eyes.8
Thus, Hawthorne acquired what Malcolm Cowley calls his "compulsive
habit;" for he adorned "his imagined rooms and landscapes with mirrors of
every description--not only looking-glasses but burnished shields and
breastplates, copper pots, fountains, lakes, pools, anything that could
reflect the human form."9

Yet, in so far as the "reality'' to which

Hawthorne's eyes fell forfeit remained solely constituted by the technological frame of his age, he "lost" nothing more than the static, preconceptualized determinateness of its perspective view.

Grounded in

finite temporality, Hawthorne's gaze never gives us the whole picture any
more than the mind is able to grasp the meaning and value of Being within
a single and systematic mental equivalent:

"Perhaps there are higher

intelligences that look upon all the manifestations of the human mind-metaphysics, ethics, histories, politics, poems, stories &c &c--with the
same interest as we do on flowers, or any other humble production of
7The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 360.
8Jean Normand, Nathaniel Hawthorne: An Approach to an Analysis of
Artistic Creation, trans. Derek Coltman (Cleveland: The Press of Case
Western Reserve University, 1970), p. 41.
9"Hawthorne in the Looking-Glass," Sewanee Review 56 (OctoberDecember 1948) : 545.
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nature."10

Thus, it is not so much that Hawthorne sought what was hidden

beneath appearances, as that he consistently made attempts in both the
notebooks and the fiction itself "to re-educate his eyes, to rediscover
direct perception." 11

In fact, after 1837 Hawthorne's notebooks reveal a

marked shift in his own perceptual habits, a shift toward minute observation of the appearance of things.

"His eye became a faceted mirror

reflecting a reality fragmented into elements of microscopic size."12
Nevertheless, it remains phenomenally true that the hidden necessarily
constitutes an essential "aspect" of any "appearance."
recognized this phenomenon.

Hawthorne always

In the American Notebooks, for example, he

says of Una's beauty, "Her beauty is the most flitting, transitory, most
uncertain and unaccountable affair, that ever had a real existence;
• if you glance sideways at her, you perhaps think it is illuminating
her face, but, turning full round to enjoy it, it is gone again."13
Hawthorne's emphasis on fee.ling, sensibility, and interiority reflects
his reaction to the prevalent "rationalism" of his day, and appropriates,.
in its place, the changing appearance of each object with respect to the
temporality of perception itself.

His fiction proclaims a new moment in

its discovery of the world, a moment freed for itself in order to become
apparent; that is, personal and opaque.

By appearing for the first time,.

as an originating consciousness, it repeatedly warns us never to approach
the world it discloses with a pre-conception, but rather encourages "the
discipline of looking always at what is to be seen."l4
10The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 256.
11Normand, p. 115.

12Ibid., p. 121.

13vrri, p. 413.

14Henry David Thoreau, .¥alden; or, Life in the Woods (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), p. 162.
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I doubt if anybody ever does really see a mountain, who goes for
the set and sole purpose of seeing it. Nature will not let herself
be seen in such cases. You must patiently bide her time; and by
and by, at some unforeseen moment, she will quietly and suddenly
unveil herself and for a brief space allow you to look right into
the heart of her mystery. But if you call out to her preemptorily,
'Nature! unveil yourself this very moment!' she only draws her veil
the closer; and you may look with all your eyes, and imagine that
you see all that she can show, and yet see nothing.15
Because it compels us to reorient ourselves to a world previously envisioned as "familiar," Hawthorne's gaze simultaneously reveals the
primordial opacity of Being in general--"the things that constantly
surround us, we end up by not seeing them anymore."16

The changing

technological milieu forcibly brought this point home to Hawthorne, for
in the mechanistic utilitarianism of contemporary science he apprehended
the very ground of the transparently fixed idea which dominated his own
century as it had shaped the distinctive contour of Western civilization
since the Renaissance.
Prior to Bergson's Creative Evolution (1907), very few writers had
reacted more critically to the nineteenth-century scientific view than
Hawthorne.

An unsigned review of 1860, in The Times, expressed a typical

utilitarian response to Hawthorne's fiction in general:
There is a peculiar type of the American mind which is strongly in
revolt against American utilities, and which is predisposed by the
very monotony of its surroundings to hues of contrast and attitudes
of antagonism. . . . It is emphatically the desire of idealists
like . • • Mr. Hawthorne to escape from the 'iron rule' of their
country and the 'social despotism' of their generation. They
disdain to be parts of a complicated scheme of progress, which can
only result in their arrival at a colder and drearier region than
that they were born in, and they refuse to add to 'an accumulated
15Hawthorne, The English Notebooks, quoted in Critical Heritage,
p. 508.
16Nathalie Sarraute, Do You Hear Them?, trans. Maria Jolas
(New York: George Braziller, 1973), p. 144.
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pile of usefulness, of which the only use will be, to burden their
posterity with even heavier thoughts and more inordinate labour
than their own. '17
Rather than paint the time in which he lived, Hawthorne chose to attack
its fundamental beliefs.

In science he recognized the mechanical

illustration of ready-made truths about the meaning of life in which only
a mind imbued with the most rigid principles can take delight.l8

And

like his scientists, Hawthorne's intellectuals and reformers similarly
display the same conceptually sterile fixation so characteristic of the
age.

Thus, all three groups seek not so much to discover but to verify.

Accomplished "anatomists" that they are, Hawthorne's villains attempt to
penetrate the ambiguity of appearance, to see through the illusive
opacity of both body and mind in order to substantiate their own trans;
parent views.

Aylmer, Rappaccini, Chillingworth, Westervelt,

Hollingsworth, Holgrave--all represent men with minds conditioned by
inflexible concepts, the single ubiquitous perspective of a rational and
fixed idea.

Obsessed by the absolute invariability of its belief, this

mentality is forced to use any means to prove its truth; for without
proof its whole intellectual super-structure will collapse:
Aylmer.

witness

The scientific frame of reference provided Hawthorne with

images which enabled him to interiorize the world afresh in order to
communicate with it,19 to rediscover its primordial texture and
consistency rather than describe its popularly accepted fixation in
physical, chemical, and biological laws, as it was by such naturalists
as Zola in France, and Dreiser and Crane in the States.
17quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 329.
18Normand, p. 245.

19rbid., p. 173.
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Because Hawthorne's concerns were wholly other than those expressed
by the popular literature of his day, in conflict with public
sensitivity, he was condemned to failure from the start.

As one critic

put it:
Mr. Hawthorne, we are afraid, is one of those writers who aim at an
intellectual audience, and address themselves mainly to such. We
are greatly of opinion that this is a mistake and a delusion, and
that nothing good comes of it. The novelist's true audience is the
common people--the people of ordinary comprehension and everyday
sympathies, whatever their rank may be.20
In the critical vocabulary of the time, Hawthorne's fiction apportioned
too much "shadow" and insufficient "sunshine."

In an age when the

general truths of the world were supposed to inhere in the unambiguous
divinity of light, the daguerrean view came to represent the scientific
certitude of reason itself.

In typically ironic fashion, Hawthorne

discussed this aesthetic obstacle in his preface to The Marble Faun:
"No author, without a trial, can conceive of the difficulty of writing a.
Romance about a country where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no
mystery, no picturesque and gloomy wrong, nor anything but a common-place
prosperity, in broad and simple daylight." 21

Poe's disapprobation of

Hawthorne's propensity toward the dark and hidden articulated the

co~on

sentiment of that age, and its naive faith in the ultimate guarantee of
rationality:

"Let him mend his pen, get a bottle of visible ink."22

Like Baudelaire, Hawthorne was necessarily compelled to l.imit his
audience to a few select readers who would understand him.

One such

20An unsigned essay, "Modern Novelists--Great and Small,"
Blackwood's Magazine, 1855, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 313.
21 IV, p. 3.
22"Tale Writing--Nathaniel Hawthorne," Godey's Lady's Book, 1847,
quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 150.
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reader was John Lothrop Motley, who had written to Hawthorne in praise of
The Marble Faun:

"I like those shadowy, weird, fantastic, Hawthornesque

shapes flitting through the book.

I like the misty way in which the

story is indicated rather than revealed; the outlines are quite definite
enough from the beginning to the end to those who have imagination enough
to follow you." 2 3

On 1 April 1860, Hawthorne replied:

You are certainly that Gentle Reader for whom all my books were
exclusively written. . . . It is most satisfactory to be hit upon
the raw, to be shot straight through the heart. It is not the
quantity of your praise that I care so much about (though I gather
it all up most carefully, lavish as you are of it), but the kind,
for you take the book precisely as I meant it • • . • You work out
my imperfect efforts, and half make the book with your warm
imagination; and see what I myself saw, but could only hint at.
Well, the romance is a success, even if it never finds another
reader.24
Unfortunately for Hawthorne, the cheery optimism indigenous to the
scientific "sunshine" of the age had autonomously transferred itself onto
the thematic and tonal import of the literature in general, where it came
to represent an essentially feminine talent as opposed to the masculine
strength of scientific inquiry.

While Hawthorne observed this

impoverished spectacle, he was simultaneously "consumed with fury at
having to watch a damned mob of scribbling women reaping a harvest of
easy popularity at his expense, while the most enlightened critics of the
age were for their part awaiting the appearance of the male genius,
America's poetic Jupiter." 25

He had, of course, arrived.

The general

public, however, lacked the sophisticated sensitivity Hawthorne would
have liked it to have; unfortunately, "it was not even responsible for
the quality of its emotions--emotions that those with the necessary
23quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 327.
24Ibid.

25Normand, p. 173.

198
astuteness make it their business to provoke. . . .

His inward themes

could reach the ear of a lazy public only with great difficulty."26

As

one critic so aptly described the technological prejudice for transparency, and Hawthorne's subsequent lack of recognition by the general
public:

"Taste and culture, in fact, the outgrowths of educated thought,

are drawbacks to popularity, so far forth at least as they tend to add
angles reflective and refractive to the media through which people see
works of art.

The law is, the more transparent the medium, the more

instinctive the recognition."27

Richard Holt Hutton equally recognized

the obliquity of Hawthorne's perceptual gaze in his essay "Nathaniel
Hawthorne," and specifically applied it to the thematic treatment of the
tales:

"For the secret of his power lies in the great art with which he

reduplicates and reflects and re-reflects the main idea of the tale from
the countless faces of his imagination, until the reader's mind is
absolutely saturated and haunted by it."28
Because Hawthorne's fiction interiorized the certainty which its
public ascribed to the external world, interrogating the basic prejudices
of a superficially self-sufficient and indigently smug facade,

~t

required a commonly accepted ground from whence it could thereafter
proceed to undermine that very foundation.

If anything, what has

traditionally been called Hawthorne's allegorical method constitutes.
nothing more than a front or "masque" to catch the public off-guard, a
ceremonial way of getting the reader into the more significant fictional
26Ibid., p. 172.
27An unsigned review, Southern Review, 1870, quoted in Critical
Heritage, pp. 465-66.
28National Review, 1860, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 372.
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vision, a convenient method of fixing things in a superficial form both
accessible and acceptable to his general public.29

Reduced to a single

"optical" appearance, it is the nature of allegory to imprison its
content within the unequivocal confines of an insubstantial abstraction.
Hawthorne's external objects, on the other hand, consistently defy their
abstracted allegorical frame; the letter, the house, the statue, the
serpent, the ribbon, the maypole, the veil, the lime-kiln--these objects
significantly function as something more than mere moral or visual
divertissement.

They signify, in fact, the interior appropriation of a

world, partial elements of a spatial configuration, the personal
completion of a structural "gestalt" within a subject.

For Hawthorne,

an object is "objective" only to the extent that it perceptually informs
the partial aspect of a "field."

By definition, a field of vision is

never in the object; as such, it is fated to remain ultimately ambiguous
in so far as we can never "trace it out" in its entirety.

The different

parts of the whole possess a significance beyond the particular qualities
of its individually determinate "figures."

As Merleau-Ponty remarks,

"Already a 'figure' on a 'background' contains, as we have seen, much
more than the qualities presented at a given time.

It has an 'outline',

which does not 'belong' to the background and which 'stands out' from it;
it is 'stable' and offers a 'compact' area of colour, the background on
the other hand having no bounds, being of indefinite colouring and
'running on' under the figure~"30

So it is with Hawthorne's greatest

symbol, the scarlet letter.
29cf. Normand, p. 244.
30Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 13.
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In the most basic sense of the term, all of Hawthorne's symbols
are, in fact, emblems.

They exist within a spatial configuration, and

appear as "figures" against an ambiguously indeterminate "background."
The woodcut emblems of the New England Primer had indelibly engraved
themselves upon Hawthorne's consciousness.

What constitutes

hi~

emblematic technique, then, is not so much an allegorical content
supplemental to the visual image, as it is the apprehension of a figure
on a background.

Hawthorne's fiction abrades the traditional descriptive

distance; we find ourselves in a revolutionarily unique landscape where
the immediate encroaches so entirely upon our perceptual attention that
we can scarcely obtain a perspective at all.31

Though few critics

recognized the significance of Hawthorne's emblematic gaze and its
incomplete external contours, an anonymous commentator remarked in an
unsigned review, 1863, that the English sketches delineate "outlines not
drawn from notes or from reminiscences painfully recalled, but phototyped
from the very retina of the inward eye, and filled in with the very hues
and shadings supplied at the moment by the author's taste, wit, sympathy,
or disgust."32

Although the influence of Newtonianism and the daguerrean.

prejudice is apparent in the critical terminology, at least the critic
seemed aware of the perceptual demands which Hawthorne exacted of himself
as well as his reader.

Charles Webber had expressed a similar observa-

tion in the American Whig Review, 1846:
One of his finest traits is a sort of magical subtlety of vision,
which though it sees the true form of things through all the misty
obscurations of humbug and cant, yet possesses the rare power of
31cf. Henry Tuckerman, "Nathaniel Hawthorne," Southern Literary
Messenger, 1851, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 215.
32North American Review, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 391.
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compelling others to see their naked shapes through a medium of its
own. • . • It is a favorite expression with regard to Hawthorne,
that he 'Idealizes' everything. Now what does this Idealization
mean? Is it that he improves upon Nature? Pshaw! this is a
Literary cant which it is full time should be exploded! • • • Now,
Hawthorne does not endeavor to improve upon the Actual, but with a
wise emulation attempts--first to reach it, and then to modify it
suitably with the purpose he has to accomplish. Of course he is
led by his fine taste to desire to see it himself, and make you see
it in precisely that light in which it shows best--in which its
highest beauty is revealed.33
And he adds, "We can't get away from the physical, and just as our
material vision informs the inner life will that inner life know
Wisdom."34

In the American Notebooks, Hawthorne himself had remarked:

"An innate perception and reflection of truth gives the only sort of
originality that does not finally grow intolerable."35

For Hawthorne,

then, perception becomes an originating consciousness, the interior
reflection of a structural "gestalt."
Unlike Emerson, for whom symbolism represented "the looking-glass
raised to its highest power,"36 Hawthorne's symbolism re-creates a
personal and emblematic point of view, a unique moment in the perception
of a thing, and not its derivative conceptual resemblance to something
else.

In effect, then, Hawthorne's fiction abrogates the subject-object

dichotomy:

"there is no longer any question of subjective expression or

objective description."37

Consequently, this new.perceptual moment is

metamorphic, grounded as it is in time:

"Were we to sit here all day, a

week, a month, and doubtless a lifetime, objects would thus still be
33"Hawthome," quoted in Critical Heritage, pp. 130-31.
34Ibid., p. 131.

35vni, p. 358.

36Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Edward Waldo Emerson and
Waldo Emerson Forbes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912) VIII, p. 99.
37Feidelson, p. 52.
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presenting themselves as new, though there would seem to be no reason why
we should not have detected them all at the first moment."38

Perhaps

this moment is best expressed in Hawthorne's description of Pearl, the
very embodiment of the object upon which all eyes in the novel gaze in
order to dis-cover the "shape" of its meaning:
made amenable to rules.

"The child could not be

In giving her existence, a great law had been

broken; and the result was a being, whose elements were perhaps beautiful
and brilliant, but all in disorder; or with an order peculiar to themselves, amidst which the point of variety and arrangement was difficult
or impossible to be discovered."39

The peculiar order of Pearl's

"arrangement" derives from the metamorphic nature of the perceptual act;
imbued with the changing variety of an indeterminate background or
"field," Pearl signifies the temporal aspect of the letter itself:

"This

outward mutability indicated, and did not more than fairly express, the
various properties of her inner life.
depth, too, as well as variety.n40

Her nature appeared to possess

As an emblem in her own right, her

"figure" subsequently stands out against "an absolute circle of
radiance around her, on the darksome cottage-floor ••

Pearl's aspect

was imbued with a spell of infinite variety; in this one child there were
many children, comprehending the full scope between the wild-flower
prettiness of a peasant-baby, and the pomp, in little, of an infant
princess."41

She is of course the rose itself, and figures as the wild-

flower emerging from the prison-house gloom of Puritanism.
38The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 247.
39The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 91.
40Ibid., p. 90.

41Ibid.

Unlike the

r
203
scientifically transparent objectification of the world, Pearl's significance obtains from the structural "gestalt" of the perceiver, just as the
ambiguous embellishment of the letter against its own darksome background
is variously interpreted by those who see it to stand for anything from
"Adultery" to "Angel" to "Abel. " 42

Indeed, Hawthorne's oeuvre addresses

the opacity of perception on nearly every page, and in this respect he
stands uniquely by himself in the history of American letters.

If we

interpret it correctly, the scarlet "A" signifies nothing less than
Hawthorne's "Art."

And though he is continually singled out by critics

as having no precedent, it is equally true that he has no antecedents; he
stands alone in American literature as Bach does in the history of music.
It is as though his unfinished manuscripts dare anyone else to complete
them.
I

The daguerrean artist assumes the fixed transparency of a world
uniformly illuminated by light in its primordial constitution.

Whatever

shadow the daguerreotype secures merely represents an artistic "effect"
in the reproduction of an absolutely accessible truth.

In this respect,

art simply impersonated the technological vision itself, a viewpoint
appropriate to the time, "that individual differences in artistic
renderings indicate flaws in perception, at least for the recording
arts."43

Even the sophisticated aesthetic of a daguerreotypist such as

Albert Southworth betrays this desire to fix the object in its transparently inflexible truth, though it appears deceptively attractive at
42rbid., pp. 158 and 160, respectively.
43Rudisill, p. 85.
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first sight.

In the attempt to capture the essence of his "subject," the

daguerreotypist, as Southworth remarks, "feels its expression, he sympathizes with its character, he is impressed with its language; his heart,
mind, and soul are stirred in its contemplation.

It is the life, the

feeling, the mind, the soul of the subject itself."44

Ultimately,

however, the daguerreotypist can procure the desired representation only
in so far as his sympathetic facility enables him to see through the
appearance into the heart of its transparent reality, its contemplatively
universal significance--its "soul."

Holgrave epitomizes the primary

manifestation of this attitude; he dares the existent to stand still and
show itself worthy of representing not only the truth of itself, but the
truth of life in general.

As the translator and divine agent of light,

the daguerreotypist cannot error to the extent that he appropriates this
in-sight or view "through" the world, Holgrave's willingness to challenge
the existent 4erives from this belief, and the attendant belief in the
absolute disclosability of nature.

His naive trust in the ability of

light to elucidate the truth of the world sustains his equally concomitant
confidence in its transparency.

"Most of my likenesses do look unamiable;

but the very sufficient reason, I fancy, is, because the originals are so.
There is a wonderful insight in heaven's broad and simple sunshine.
While we give it credit only for depicting the merest surface, it
actually brings out the secret character with a truth that no painter
would ever venture upon, even could he detect it."45

Holgrave's

44Albert S. Southworth, "An Address to the National Photographic
Association of the United States," The Philadelphia Photographer 8
(October 1871) : 322.
45The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 91.
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daguerreotype of Judge Pyncheon, for example, despite numerous efforts to
make it more agreeable, persistently reveals the judge as a morally
despicable person.

Indeed, his desire to fix the truth of nature in

general, to catch it in the act, to permanently hold or capture the
existent amidst its fleeting variety of form and shape, reminds us of
Emerson.

Like Emerson, Holgrave challenges nature to "hold still," to

prove itself.

In this respect, his powers alarm Phoebe:

"He made her

uneasy, and seemed to unsettle everything around her, by his lack of

-----

reverence for what was fixed; unless, at a moment's warning, it could
establish its right to hold its ground."46

Thus, despite Holgrave's

apparent "lack of reverence for what was fixed," we are inveterately
deceived if we misconstrue him to figure as the representation of
modernism and change in the novel.

For though he seemingly argues

against the kind of permanence suggested by the house itself, he no
sooner prepares to leave it than he expresses the desire to preserve the
exterior while altering the interior to suit the individual's taste:
But I wonder that the late Judge • • • should not have felt the
propriety of embodying so excellent a piece of domestic architecture in stone, rather than in wood. Then, every generation of the
family might have altered the interior, to suit its own taste and
convenience; while the exterior, through the lapse of years, might
have been adding venerableness to its original beauty, and thus
giving that impression of permanence, which I consider essential to
the happiness of any one moment.47
Hawthorne was especially intrigued by scientific advances in media,
and it was only natural that the daguerreotype fascinated him.

Through-

out his life, his work was continually discussed in reference to
daguerrean technique.

Already in 1842, Gaylor Clark had compared his

46Ibid., p. 177.
47Ibid., pp. 314-15.
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mind to "the plates of a daguerreotype;"48 and in 1850, George Ripley
said of The Scarlet Letter, "The introduction, presenting a record of
savory reminiscences of the Salem Custom House, a frank display of autobiographical confessions, and a piquant daguerreotype of his ancient
colleagues in office, while surveyor of that port, is written with
Mr. Hawthorne's unrivalled force of graphic delineation."49
E. A. Duyckinch, in a review of 1852, remarked on The Snow Image:

"It is

no Chesterfieldian vacuum of politeness, but a world of realities, a
camera obscura of the outer world delicately and accurately painted on
the heart."SO

And in 1864, the year of Hawthorne's death, George

William Curtis said of him that he "treated his companions as he treated
himself and all the personages in history or experience with which he
dealt, merely as phenomena to be analyzed and described, with no more
private malice or personal emotion than the sun, which would have photographed them, warts and all." 51

Curtis, like most of the critics,

saliently misses the point; for in drawing an analogy between Hawthorne's
fiction and the daguerreotype, he misperceived the essential quality of
Hawthorne's descriptive technique.

Even today, contemporary criticism

continues to analyze him with respect to the aesthetic catchword of his
own age, "chiaroscuro."

In his book, The Power of Blackness, Harry Levin

discusses Hawthorne in terms of "that obsessive dark room which is always
behind the focus of his vision;" and elsewhere he says of the interplay
48Knickerbocker, quoted in Normand, p. 382, note 13.
49New York Tribune Supplement, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 159.
50Literary World, quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 238.
51North American Review, quoted in Critical

Hertage,
\

p. 417.
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between light and dark in Hawthorne--"la feuille blanche, le roman
noir"--that in the twelve years of solitude at Salem, "His mind itself
became a camera obscura, a dark room which sensitively registered the
infiltration of light from outside."5 2

True enough, Hawthorne often

emphasized the inter-action of high-light, middle tint, and shadow, as
Gabriel Harrison had defined the daguerrean method; but what the critics
have predominantly failed to see is how the effect of Hawthorne's lighting obscures a more profound perceptual principle.

His description of

the drowned girl in the American Notebooks, for example, later used in
The Blithedale Romance to depict the death of Zenobia, reveals an
exceptionally stark realism, dramatically high-lighted by lantern as in
a Goya painting:
When close to the bank, some of the men stepped into the
water and drew out the body; and then, by their lanterns, I could
see how rigid it was. • • . They took her out of the water, and
deposited her under an oak-tree; and by the time we had got ashore,
they were examining her by the light of two or three lanterns.
I never saw nor imagined a spectacle of such perfect horror.
The rigidity, above spoken of, was dreadful to behold. Her arms
had stiffened in the act of struggling; and were bent before her,
with the hands clenched. She was the very image of a death-agony;
and when the men tried to compose her figure, her arms would still
return to that same position. • • • The lower part of the body
had stiffened into a more quiet attitude; the legs were slightly
bent, and the feet close together. But that rigidity!--it is
impossible to express the effect of it; it seemed as if she would
keep the same posture in the grave, and that her skeleton would
keep it too, and that when she rose at the day of Judgment, it
would be in the same attitude.53
Hawthorne's wife equally misperceived his descriptive dynamics, mistaking
the above passage for photographic realism.

Editing her husband's note-

books for publication, Sophia wrote to James T. Fields in 1867,
52New York:
respectively.

Alfred A. Knopf, 1958, pp. 63, 28, and 36,

53vrrr, pp. 263-64.

208
inquiring whether they should publish "this wonderful photograph of the
terrible night."54

And when i t first appeared, i t thoroughly shocked the

reviewer, Thomas Higginson, who considered it "almost too frightful to
put into words,--certainly to put into types; 11 he continued, had there
been introduced "a series of photographs from the Paris morgue, the
result would not have been more terrible. 11 55
However, beneath the daguerrean appearance of the drowned girl's
description, there lurks the hidden drama of an expressiveness
inaccessible to the photographic medium itself.

For the effect of the

lighting is primordially disclosed as a function of its

11

discovery, 11 the

very motion inherent in the perceptual act of a subject, and not as the
elucidation of an invariable object.

The photograph objectively fixes

its content by virtue of a single and constant source of light.
Hawthorne's description, on the other hand, subjectively unfolds in time
in so far as its variable lighting reflects an affective "distance"
between the scene and the spectator.

We perceive the changing aspects of

the drowned girl at various distances which more or less express the
significant

11

figures" Hawthorne would have us perceive or, better,

"complete 11 against the indeterminate periphery of the bla(,!kness
surrounding the

11

field."

"Near" and "far" are not determ:lned by the

single continuity of a perspective, but rather appear as a function of an
ambiguous interior expressiveness contingent upon how significantly each
detail appropriates the whole effect, an effect which Hawthorne rhetorically claims "it is impossible to express, 11 but nonetheless gets
54rbid., p. 685.
55"Nathaniel Hawthorne and His Wife, 11 Atlantic Monthly 55
(February 1885) : 264.
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expressed most affectively.

Thus, the drowned girl's clenched hands,

which perspectively figure to be smaller than the arms, appear, in fact,
much larger; they loom beyond their graphic relation to the arms and come
to designate, in themselves, the general rigidity of the entire image.
Here, Hawthorne's metonymic gaze, the attention to synecdochic detail,
reveals his general proclivity toward contiguous relationships, relations
which "logically" digress from a continuously uniform setting in space
and time.

Like the cubists, Hawthorne's descriptive gaze transforms the

object into a set of synecdochic oscillations whose visual orientation
strives toward maximum determinateness.
perceiver "completes" it himself.

It obtains only in so far as the

This technique is clearly cinematic,

and pre-figures the changing angle, variable perspective, and repertoire
of variously focused "shots" indicative of the highly-sophisticated
"motion" picture of the twentieth century.

The close-up or "tight shot"

of the drowned girl's hands momentarily fills the visual field no less
effectively than the revolutionary metonymic "set-ups" in the productions
of D. W. Griffith.56

Hawthorne's changing light manifests this

perceptual "distance" as an expressive function of the gaze itself.

Our

proximity to any given figure in the field is solely predicated upon the
descriptive intention to "take it up."

Because description discloses the

affective aspect of an object, its perceptual enownment primordially
reflects an intentional "motion" in the subject, and not the representationa! determination of an object as such.

Again, Richard Holt Hutton

incisively recognized the "gestalt" structure of Hawthorne's gaze:
56cf. Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language: Metaphor and
Metonymy," in European Literary Theory anc!_ Practice: From Existential
Phenomenology to Structuralism, ed. Vernon W. Gras (New York: Dell
Publishing Co., Inc., Delta Book, 1973), pp. 124-25.
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"every touch and line in his imagined picture is calculated to impress
some leading thought on the reader."57

Thus, in Hawthorne, distance

invariably constitutes the expressive completion of a figure against a
background, and not the static and fixed pictorialism of photographic
perspective.

Hawthorne's variable lighting alters the discovery of its

objects according to the changing situatedness of the perceiver.
Conversely, what Hawthorne most admired in the Rembrandt-like
achromaticism of the daguerreotype was its expressive ability to suggest
a hidden psychological drama or intuition.

The portrait genre particu-

larly accommodated this interest in dramatic expressiveness:

"What he

looked for in a portrait was expression, pathos, the hidden drama of a
Beatrice Cenci; what interested him in a still life was the materiality
of the objects."58

The portrait of Beatrice in The Marble Faun abides

unique in this respect:
It is a peculiarity of this picture, that its profoundest
expression eludes a straightforward glance, and can only be caught
by side glimpses, or when the eye falls casually upon it; even as
if the painted face had a life and consciousness of its own, and,
resolving not to betray its secret of grief and guilt, permitted
the true tokens to come forth only when it imagined itself unseen.
No other such magical effect has ever been wrought by penci1.59
Of portraits in general, Hawthorne commented:

"The pursuit has

always interested my imagination more than any other; and I remember,
before having my first portrait taken, there was a great bewitchery in
the idea, as if it were a magic process."60

In order to capture this

moment, however, the portrait painter was forced to wrestle with time,
57"Nathaniel Hawthorne," Nat~onal Review, 1860, quoted in
Critical Heritage, p. 370.
58Normand, p. 94.

59Iv, 204-05.

60The American Notebooks, VIII, pp. 492-93.
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"casting quick, keen glances at me, and then making hasty touches on the
picture, as if to secure with his brush what he had caught with his
eye."61

Elsewhere, the narrator of "The Prophetic Pictures" observes:

Nothing, in the whole circle of human vanities, takes stronger
hold of the imagination, than this affair of having a portrait
painted. Yet why should it be so? The looking-glass, the polished
globes of the andirons, the mirror-like water, and all other
reflecting surfaces, continually present us with portraits, or
rather ghosts of ourselves, which we glance at, and straightway
forget them. But we forget them, only because they vanish. It is
the idea of duration--of earthly immortality--that gives such a
mysterious interest to our own portraits.62
Yet, less than two months after The Scarlet Letter first appeared in
print, Hawthorne had remarked in a notebook entry of 5 May 1850:

"In

fact, there is no such thing as a true portrait; they are all
delusions •

A bust has more reality."63

Ten years later not only

the bust, but the entire body as well, would come to life in Donatello.
Despite frequent critical attacks on Hawthorne's ability to appreciate
sculpture, evidence suggests quite the opposite, and points to the
unique quality of Hawthorne's descriptive gaze.

A notebook entry for

10 August 1842 already reveals his visual inclination toward the tactile
and tangible qualities of sculpture, anticipating the marvelously ironic
work of Hans Arp in our own century.
Summer squashes are a very pleasant vegetable to be acquainted
with;--they grow in the forms of urns and vases, some shallow,
others of considerable depth, and all with a beautifully scalloped
edge. Almost any squash in our garden might be copied by a
sculpture, and would look beautifully in marble, or in china-ware;
and if I could afford it, I would have exact imitations of the
real vegetable as portions of my dining-service.64
And again, "when a great squash or melon is produced, it is a large and
61Ibid., p. 498.

62 IX , p • 1 73 .

63The America~! Notebooks, VIII, p. 491.

64Ibid., p. 329.
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tangible existence, which the imagination can seize hold of and rejoice
in."65

Because the eye delights in the tangible, that around which it

can "play" in order to investigate the hidden qualities of an object,
its intentional function suggests an opaque subjectivity in so far as it
completes the object itself.

For Hawthorne, the portrait was "false" to

the extent that it presumed to complete an expressiveness entirely disproportionate to any predetermined objectification, for the significance
or implicitness of expression necessarily inheres in the subject of
perception, and not the object.

Thus, Hawthorne's own technique so

often reveals a natural affinity for the "sketch," which, like sculpture
itself, invites completion by virtue of its opaque suggestiveness.
Perceptually speaking, Hawthorne's gaze always seeks to complete the
suggestive contours of the sketch or "trace:"

"There was formerly, I

believe, a complete arch of marble, forming a natural bridge over the
top of the cave; but this is no longer so;" "We climbed to the top of
the arch, in which the traces of water having eddied are very
perceptible;" "Sometimes the image of a tree might be almost traced;
then nothing but this sweep of broken rainbow;" "The foundation of a
spacious porch may be traced on either side of the central portion;
some of the stones still remain; but even where they are gone, the lille
of the porch is still traceable by the greener verdure."66

Neither the

portrait not the daguerreotype in general provided Hawthorne with the
kind of situated or three-dimensional "gestalt" he demanded of
description for, in themselves, both are fated to remain transparently
65rbid., p. 330.
66rbid., pp. 100, 133, 158, and 160, respectively.
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fixed and dead. 67

Like the portraits which continually haunt the

painter's imagination in "The Prophetic Pictures," Hawthorne's
description completes the expressiveness of an object, its subjectivity,
the interiority of the world:

"Whether I look at the windows or the

door, there it is framed within them, painted strongly, and glowing in
the richest tints--the faces of the portraits--the figures and action
of the sketch!"68
The "frame," which figures so prominently in Hawthorne, accordingly
provides an emblematic background against which the possibility of an
expressive delineation first appears; like the portrait painter of "The
Prophetic Pictures," it was seldom Hawthorne's impulse "to copy natural
scenery, except as a frame work for the delineations of the human form
and face, instinct with thought, passion, or suffering."69

Hawthorne's

perceptual figures uniquely stand out against an emblematic context which
varies their meaning by virtue of a situated gaze, and not the ubiquitous
transparency of scientific "vision;" rather than delimit its content, the
frame enables Hawthorne to define perception contextually.

His frames

never constitute the traditionally isolated and uniform view by whtch
the object had previously been envisioned for centuries; for when
Hawthorne specifically uses the word "frame," it nearly always means the
background by which a foreground figure affectively comes to be set off,
and not the optical representation of a perspective section of space.

In

67For further references to portraits, pictures, engravings,
etchings, and the like, cf. the following pages in The American Notebooks,
VIII: 53, 65, 130, 149, 212, 214-15, 218, 226, 227, 231, 233-34, 235,
242, 254, 255, 259, 260-61, 263, 293, 321, 331, 366, 383, 385-86, 394,
396, 399, 400, 401, 403, 407-08, 416, 417, 418-19, 444, 490, 491, 492,
495, and 498-99.
68Ix, p. 180.

69Ihid., p. 178.
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itself, the Hawthornian frame most clearly approches what, today,
Gestalt theory calls a field of vision.

For proof of Hawthorne's

perceptual intention despite this apparent contradiction in terminology,
one need only consult the American Notebooks, that indispensible record
of his observatory techniques:

"this gentle picture strangely set off

by the wild mountain frame around it;" "On the slope of Bald Mountain,
a clearing, set in the frame of the forest on all sides;" "Towards the
dimness of evening, a half-length figure appearing at a window:--the
blackness of the back ground and the light upon the

fa~e

cause it to

appear like a Rembrandt picture;" "Monument Mountain stands out in great
prominence, with its dark forest-covered sides, and here and there a
large white patch, indicating tillage or pasture land;--but making a
generally dark contrast with the white expanse of the frozen and snowcovered lake at its base, and the more undulating white of the
surrounding country;" "I saw the face and bust of a beautiful woman
gazing at me from a cloud. •
steps, and then vanished.

The vision lasted while I took a few

I never before saw nearly so distant a

cloud-picture--or rather sculpture; for it came out in alto relievo on •·
the body of the cloud;" "an open eye in earth's cot,Jntenance;" "There are
broad and peaceful meadows, which, I think, are among the most satisfying .
objects in natural scenery; the heart reposes on them, with a feeling
that few things else can give, because almost all other objects are
abrupt and clearly defined; but a meadow stretches out like a small
infinity, yet with a secure homeliness, which we do not find either in an
expanse of water or of air;" "I return with them (flowers) to my wife, of
whom what is lovliest among them are to me the imperfect emblems;" "it
seems as if the picture of our inward bliss should be set in a beautiful
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frame of outward nature;" "The fireplace had a white marble frame about
it, richly sculptured with figures and reliefs."70

Concerning a

"gestalt," the Letter is by far Hawthorne's most appropriate emblem for
man's very Being; like Heidegger's later works, it locates the primordial
ground of existence in language itself.

By 1839, Hawthorne had already

insinuated such ontological implications in a journal entry explicitly
concerned with perception:

"Letters in the shape of figures of men, &c.

At a distance, the words composed by the letters are alone distinguishable.

Close at hand, the figures alone are seen, and not distinguished

as letters.

Thus things may have a positive, a relative, and a

composite meaning, according to the point of view."71

Generally speaking,

then, Hawthorne's use of the frame purveys a supralogical background or
field in order to embody his symbols, and yet by virtue of its subjective constitution, the field extends beyond the edges of whatever
particular device Hawthorne chooses as the frame itself.

His emblematic

field allows the image to be reflected and re-reflected off of its
surrounding surfaces, just as the entire surrounding scene bounces off
the many-faceted sides of Endicott's armour,72 or the scarlet letter, in
the transformed shape of Pearl, is reflected off the polished, convex
mirror of the breastplate in "exaggerated and gigantic proportions, so as
to be greatly the most prominent feature of her appearance.
she seemed absolutely hidden behind it." 73

In truth,

Hawthorne's gaze lures the

70viii, pp. 132, 138, 259, 305, 311, 320, 321-22, 333, 366, and
490, respectively.
71Ibid., p. 183.
72"Endicott and the Red Cross," IX, p. 434.
73The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 106.
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object out of its perspective depth and toward the "surface," where it
leaves the artificial confines of its optical frame to become part of the
world; with Hawthorne's emblematic symbols, image and object are always
one and the same.

Thus, as Holgrave unveils the recess in the wall,

disclosing the ancient deed, the debilitated portrait, "frame and all,
tumbled suddenly from its position, and lay face downward on the
floor."74
With the scarlet letter, the blackness of its emblematic frame
indeterminately extends beyond the precisely embroidered figure of the
"A" which measures, as we are told in the "Custom-House," exactly three
and one-quarter inches on each side.

The Letter formally proffer,s a

reliable ingress to Hawthorne's perceptual labyrinth, and why it differs
so radically from the daguerrean view; for in embroidery, Hawthorne
discerned a felicitous tactile analogy for the gaze itself.

Unlike

pictorial perspective, where a visual content resides somewhere "in back
of" the pictorial surface toward an invisibly inaccessible "location,"
its vanishing point, the visual content of an embroidery extends outward,
"in front of" its optical surface toward a tangibly tactile space.
embroidered emblem virtually protrudes to "touch" our eye.

The

It thus

reciprocates the sculptural quality of Hawthorne's gaze, and approximates
the general situatedness of perception as such.

Hawthorne intuitively

understood the "situation" as the reciprocal basis of perception as well
as Being.

Like the painting which Ishmael encounters at the Spouter Inn,

whose ambiguous "something" in the middle evades definitive articulation,
the perceptual "shape" of the "A" is likewise variously interpreted
74The House of the Seven Gables, II, pp. 315-16.
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according to the situation of the individual perceiver, and therefore
destined to remain ultimately opaque; we can never get an absolute
perspective on it.

Similarly with life, the brilliantly embroidered

Letter equally applies to the meaning of Being:

"A life, generally of a

grave hue, may be said to be embroidered with occasional sports and
fantasies." 75

And herein emerges a veritable key to the nature of

Hawthorne's lighting as such, and his descriptive affinity for the
"powers of blackness" which Melville attributed to him,76 rather than the
light and sunshine of his own age.

As Henry James expressed it,

Hawthorne's fiction exposes his cat-like facility for seeing in the dark
which Emerson, "as a sort of spiritual sun-worshipper, could have
attached but a moderate value to."77

Taking his lead from Bacon, with

whose writing he was well acquainted, Hawthorne solidified his basic
emblematic habit.

In "Of Adversity," Bacon had written:

"We see in

needleworks and embroideries, it is more pleasing to have a lively work
upon a sad and solemn ground, than to have a dark and melancholy work
upon a lightsome ground:

judge therefore of the pleasure of the heart by

the pleasure of the eye."78

Melville was one of those rare critics who

immediately understood Hawthorne's counter-visual response to the
daguerrean prejudice of his age, and its concomitant emphasis on the
transparently absolute efficacy of light, in favor of this darkness
75rhe American Notebooks, VIII, p. 235.
76"Hawthorne and His Mosses," Literary World, 1850, quoted in
Critical Heritage, p. 116.
77Hawthorne (Ithaca:
Paperbacks, 1966), p. 79.

Cornell University Press, Cornell

78complete Essays of Francis Bacon, intra. Philip H. Bailey
(New York: Belmont Books, 1962), p. 24.
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which gives "more effect to the ever-moving dawn, that for ever advances
through it, and circumnavigates his world."79

Indeed, Melville seems to

have been the only one to perceive the "gestalt" significance of "this
black conceit" which pervades Hawthorne through and through:

-

You may be bewitched by his sunlight . . . but there is the blackness of darkness beyond; and even his bright gildings but fringe
and play upon the edges of thunder-clouds. In one word, the world
is mistaken in this Nathaniel Hawthorne. He himself must often
have smiled at its absurd misconception of him. •
this blackness it is that furnishes the infinite obscure of his background.80
Thus, unlike the daguerrean representation which seeks to bring
into sharp focus the entire content of its frame, Hawthorne's emblematic field, grounded in darkness itself, merely suggests the incomplete

:,

outlines of its figures as they are intermittently elucidated by the
perceptual intention to take them up.

In the same way, Goodman Parkerts

lantern gleams along the street, "bringing to view indistinct shapes of
things, and the fragments of a world, like order glimmering
chaos, or memory roaming over the past."81

~hrough

Whatever objects this gaze

personalizes or enowns ambiguously appear set off against an indeterminate surrounding.

For every object the gaze investigates, it

simultaneously forfeits its hold upon the other objects in its field;
they, in turn, slip away or fade back toward the obscure periphery from
whence they originally came, "in harmony with the low relief and dimness
of outline of the objects that surrounded them."82

The rose momentarily

79"Hawthorne and His Mosses," quoted in Critical Heritage, p. 115.
80Ibid., p. 116.
8l"The Wives of the Dead," XI, p. 196.
82James, p. 99.
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appears in relief against the gloom of the prison;83

the blurred meteor

temporarily disrupts the vacant regions of the night sky;84

the lime-

kiln juts out from the surrounding darkness to swallow us;85 the stark
fir-tree punctuates the desolate landscape, covered with its solitary
growth of living branches from the middle up;86 the Great Stone Face
emerges against the perpendicular side of a mountain;87 the lightsome
couple spontaneously issues forth from the band of gothic monsters, this
crew of Comus, to relieve the darksome face of the English priest, shaded
by the maypole; 88 the Letter itself writhes and twists its contorted
shape upon the sable field which provides an ambiguous backdrop for the
ocular metamorphoses of this illuminated manuscript.89

Hawthorne's

descriptive gaze approaches the object gropingly; it must feel around it
as a blind man runs his bands over the features of another's face--thus,
its peculiar sculptural or tactile quality.

It brings the object out

from its surroundings toward an affective depth peculiarly constituted by
the perceiving subject.

For Hawthorne, Being is incarnate throughout,

the image made flesh between the double horizon of physical and bodily
space, the cold marble resuscitated in the warmth of the Faun.
Hawthorne's gaze initiates the discovery of a situated, material world,
83rhe Scarlet Letter, I, p. 48.
84 Ibid., p. 154.
85"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 89.
86"The Gentle Boy," IX, p. 70.
87"The Great Stone Face," XI, p. 27.
88"The May-Pole of Merry Mount," IX, pp. 56-57.
89rhe Scarlet Letter, I, p. 106.
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the outsidedness of the "self" where objects encroach upon one's vision,
touching the fingertips of the "I."

The world seen from within magnifies

the body to infinity, reversing the traditional perspective on an
object; the vanishing point hurtles toward me, as I simultaneously
explode the boundaries of its frame.

To emphasize rationality is to

ignore the world's body; 90 thus Hawthorne shunned the ubiquitous view of
his age which pretended to ignore the interior, ambiguous carnality of
Being.

On the pillory, the minister's vigil, temporarily illumined by

the radiance of the meteor, dramatically pierces the all-encompassing
blackness of the night which endosmotically threatens to devour it once
again at any moment.

This extraordinary light constitutes nothing less

than the unique and personally individualized gaze, the original
discovery of a world in which its previously familiar objects appear
anew for the first time.
So powerful was its radiance, that it thoroughly illuminated the
dense medium of cloud betwixt the sky and earth. The great vault
brightened, like the dome of an immense lamp. It showed the
familiar scene of the street, with the distinctness of mid-day,
but also with the awfulness that is always imparted to familiar
objects by an unaccustomed light • • . . all were vieible, but with
a singularity of aspect that seemed to give another moral
interpretation to the things of this world than they had ever
borne before.91
.
Unlike the enfiladed continuity of an objectively detached perspective,9 2
90william Van O'Conner, "The World as B<:>dy," Sewanee Review 56
(July-September 1948) : 441.
91The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 154.
92cf. the following passages in The American Notebooks, VIII: "At a
distance, mountain summits look close together, and almost forming one
mountain, though in reality, a village lies in the depth between them"
(p. 101); "It is amusing to see all the distributed property, the
aristocracy and commonality, the various and conflicting interests of
the town, the loves and hates, compressed into a space which the eye
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Hawthorne sketches his most affectively dramatic scenes palpably close
precisely because they are perceptually inquisitive, demanding a new
level of visual awareness in order to be disclosed at all.

"It is a

singular thing, that at the distance, say, of five feet, the work of the
greatest dunce looks just as well as that of the greatest genius,--that
little space being all the distance between genius and stupidity."93

A

perceptual osmosis transpires between subject and object, an osmosis
which obliterates the objectification of the world-view.

Like the modern

art work, Hawthorne brings the object out of its predetermined location
and to the surface, just as the mountain prefigures Earnest's face upon
its side.

Thus, man "rediscovers himself through topography."94

In this

sense, Hawthorne never "paints" or pictures his most perceptually intense
scenes, but rather disrupts them from the inside out; his gaze engages the
object in so far as it seduces the object outward and away from the
familiar security of its perspective depth.

Hence, he could immediately

preface his description of the minister's vigil as "one of those ugly
nights, which we have faintly hinted at, but forborne to picture forth~n95
Hawthorne's diction (to picture forth) reveals to what extent he

.treate~

takes in as completely as the arrangement of a tea-table"(p. 102); the
"prospect from the top of Wachusett is the finest that I have seen--the
elevation being not so great as to snatch the beholder from all sympathy
with the earth. The roads that wind along at the fobt of the mountains
are discernable; and the villages, lying separate and unconscious of, one
another, each with their little knot of peculiar interests, but all
gathered into one category by the observer above them"(p. 260); "the
beholder takes in at a glance the estates on which different families
have long been situated . • . acting out the business of their life,
which looks not so important when we can get up so high as to comprehend
several men's portions in it at one glance"(p. 274).
9Jrbid. ' p. 16.

94Levin, p. 50.

95The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 146.
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description as a projective activity--the perceptual intentionality of a
subject, not unlike that activity of the minister himself who thereafter
started from his chair, and "stole softly down the staircase, undid the
door, and issued forth."96

Hawthorne's descriptive gaze negotiates the

factuality of the object as it strikes the eye, its original effect upon
the senses prior to rational interpretation; the facts speak for themselves.97

As Melville incisively remarked:

"We think that into no

recorded mind has the intense feeling of the visable [sic] truth ever
entered more deeply than into this man's.

By visable truth, we mean the

apprehension of the absolute condition of present things as they strike
the eye of the man who fears them not, though they do their worst to
him."98

And so with the meteoric lighting which temporarily illuminates

the scaffold during the minister's vigil; it sets off each of its
objects with a "singularity of aspect;" like the pre-rational gaze of
perception, it discloses the perceptual reciprocity between subject and
object in a world common to both--a world, moreover, which makes the
birth of Being possible in the first place:

"They stood in the noon of

that strange and solemn splendor, as if it were

~he

light that is to

reveal all secrets, and the day-break that shall unite all who belong to
one another."99
Lighting had always beguiled Hawthorne, and the American Notebooks
repeatedly reveal this preoccupation:

"It is wonderful what a difference

sunshine makes; it is like varnish, bringing out the hidden veins in a
96rbid.

97cf. "Earth's Holocaust," X, pp. 381-404.

98Melville, The Letters of Herma~ Melville, quoted in Critical
Heritage, p. 190.
99The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 154.
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piece of rich wood. . . .

The sunshine gradually spreads over the whole

landscape; and the whole sombre mass is changed to a variegated
picture."lOO

And elsewhere he says, "The sun shone strongly in among

these trees, and quite kindled them; so that the path seemed brighter for
their shade, than if it had been quite exposed to the sun."101

Such

passages, however, can be misleading; for unlike the daguerreotypist,
Hawthorne's interest in light primarily derives from its ability to cast
a shadow, to elucidate some new perceptual "aspect" of an obscurely
darkened world, or to transform, rather than accurately record the thing
itself or "bring it to light."

Thus, rather than light his objects by

the constancy of the sun, Hawthorne illumines his scenes by the ambiguous
flicker of the lantern, the torch, the fire, the moon •. Such partial and
intimate lighting subtly discloses its objects, previously envisioned as
familiar, in strange and new disguises.
Moonlight, in a familiar room, falling so white upon the carpet,
and showing all its figures so distinctly,--making every object so
minutely visible, yet so unlike a morning or noontide
visibility,--is a medium the most suitable for a romance-writer to
get acquainted with his illusive guests • • • • whatever, in a word,
has been used or played with, during the day, is now invested with
a quality of strangeness and remoteness, though still almost as
vividly present as by daylight.l02
Like Verlaine, Hawthorne's description appropriates the principle, "Pas
la couleur, rien que la nuance."l03

Margaret overlooks the street scene

from her window, where a lantern momentarily reddens the foreground
surrounded by the deluge of darkness which envelops every other object;l04
Robin finds his kinsman
lOOvrrr, p. 218.

amidst the labyrinthian procession illuminated
10lrbid., p. 219.

102The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 35-36.
104"The Wives of the Dead," XI, p. 195.

103Levin, p. 39.
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by the dense multitude of torches which temporarily disrupts the chilly
detachment of the moonbeams;105 Goodman Brown discovers his fellow townsmen assembled at the black mass in the forest around the grotesque blaze
of the fire, just as the ambiguous moonlight originally allowed him
access to that clearing;l06 Ethan Brand stands virtually hypnotized
before the dazzle of the lime-kiln to which he surrenders through
identification; 107 the indistinct moonlight dimly reveals the body of
Dorcas' son lying dead upon the bones of her father.108

Unlike the sun-

drenched world of scientific objectification, Hawthorne depicts an
ambiguous world of shadow.

Like the child, science would paint a world

transparently clear, as Hawthorne observed of his daughter Una, who
"wants there to be all sunshine and no shadow, like a Chinese picture." 109
Hawthorne, on the other hand, was steadfastly aware that the truth of
consciousness inheres in man's primordial interrogation of the world,
replete with doubt and contradiction.

Thus, the dark shadow of

ambiguity falls across every page of his work:

"Hawthorne could not

prevent himself from seeing darkness even at high noon." 110

Whereas his

age demanded that the new American psyche be white, just as its literature be pure, Hawthorne fearlessly discerned beneath its facade the
monadic truth of black:

"That blue-eyed darling Nathaniel knew

105"My Kinsman, Major Molineux," XI, p. 229.
106"Young Goodman Brown," X, pp. 84-85.
107"Ethan Brand," XI, pp. 99-100.
108"Roger Malvin's Burial," X, p. 360.
109The American Notebooks, VIII, pp. 418-19.
11~ormand, p. 163.
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disagreeable things in his inner soul.
disguise." 111

He was careful to send them out in

Hawthorne's descriptive gaze perceived the void which man

inhabits between affective poles of transformation, the "black,
impenetrable nothingness" which awaits all who would wander from the
security of their familiar surroundings into the "obscurity that hems them
in." 112

Similarly, we often find in Hawthorne's descriptive sketches the

unique and variously achromatic shades of black-on-black, as in the
opening scene of The Scarlet Letter, where "the wooden jail was already
marked with weather-stains and other indications of age, which gave a yet
darker aspect to its beetle-browed and gloomy front." 113

Indeed, some-

times the dark ambiguity of one shadow merely comes to be replaced by
that of another which juts its indistinctive gloom through the surrounding
field, piercing the ambiguous light of the camera-eye more profoundly
than light penetrates the retina of one emerging from the dark.

Thus,

the prison-house opaquely intersects the clearing "long after the fall of
the gigantic pines and oaks that originally overshadowed it.n114
Even Hawthorne's portraits elude their daguerrean likenesses which
would freeze them in their Being, to become "a ground of perceptual metamorphosis under cover of dim shadows."llS

"In most of the pictures, the

whole mind and character were brought out on the countenance, and concentrated into a single look, so that, to speak paradoxically, the originals
hardly resembled themselves so strikingly as the portraits did."ll6
llln. H. Lawrence, Studies in Classic American Literature
(New York: The Viking Press, Compass Books, 1964), p. 83.
112"Night Sketches," IX, pp. 427 and 429, respectively.
113r, p. 47.

114rbid., p. 48.

115Normand, p. 304.

116"The Prophetic Pictures," IX, p. 170.
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in relief by varying degrees of darkness, the faces emerge to touch us
with their glance, just as the pale but unfaded Madonna, "who had perhaps
been worshipped in Rome now regarded the lovers with such a mild and holy
look that they longed to worship too." 117

Simultaneously these faces

recede into the surrounding darkness, like the two old bearded saints who
had nearly vanished "into the darkening canvass." 11 8

The portrait

completes the spectator's gaze while the spectator's gaze, in turn,
completes the portrait:

"They hung side by side, separated by a narrow

panel, appearing to eye each other constantly, yet always returning the
gaze of the spectator." 119

In fact, Hawthorne's portraits paradoxically

light the rooms which they inhabit like the pictures of Walter and Elinor
which, "concealed for months, gleamed forth again in undiminished splendor,
appearing to throw a sombre light across the room, rather than to be
disclosed by a borrowed radiance." 120

Like the incomplete silhouette of

Hepzibah, framed by "the dusky, time-darkened passage" into which she
steps, "a tall figure, clad in black silk," 121 the portraits of Walter and
Elinor are variously completed in accordance with the individual gaze
which perceives them.
Such persons might gaze carelessly at first, but, becoming
interested, would return day after day, and study these painted
faces like the pages of a mystic volume. • • • they sometimes
disputed as to the expression which the painter had intended to
throw upon the features; all agreeing that there was a look of
earnest import, though no two explained it alike.122
By virtue of his indirect lighting, then, Hawthorne's gaze suggests the
117Ibid.

118Ibid.

119rbid., p. 176.

120rbid., p. 181.

121The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 32. See also, p. 129:
"Hepzibah spread out her gaunt figure across the door, and seemed really
to increase in bulk."
122"The Prophetic Pictures," IX, pp. 176-77.
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incomplete contours of a world primordially constituted by the perceiving
subject.

It explodes the predetermined objectification of a reality trans-

parently and uniformly illuminated by the scientific vision, which would
impose its own inflexibly rigid structure in order to manipulatively
dominate the delimited content of its fixed and sterile view.

The world of

Hawthorne's fiction passionately defrays the inordinate cost of an
objectively neutered universe and its bankrupt vision, in favor of a polar
and metamorphic reality situated in the personal glance of a perceiver.
Amidst this sexually ambiguous world, Hawthorne's gaze enowns the
interiority of its objects as they in turn reconstruct the subjective
consciousness perceiving them.

Like the echoes in "The Hollow of the

Three Hills," Hawthorne's objects rebound from various external surfaces
to strike our eyes only in so far as they are deflected, reflected, and
re-reflected in the gaze which temporarily beholds them. 123

Perceptually

grounded in the mutability of time, the object refuses the absolute
determination assigned to it by the formal and spatial priority of the
world-view.

Hawthorne's ambiguous lighting enables the object to escape

the scientific schematization to which the daguerrean view would subject
it:

the Letter ricochets off the armor in fragmented form in order to be

completed a different way in the "shape" of Pearl, who in turn perceives
a similar image in the head-piece,
smiling at her mother, with the elfish intelligence that was so

123rx, p. 201: "Their voices are encompassed and re-echoed by the
walls of a chamber, the windows of which were rattling in the breeze; the
regular vibration of a clock, the crackling of a fire, and the tinkling
of the embers as they fell among the ashes, rendered the scene almost as
vivid as i f painted to the eye"(italics mine). Cf. Leland Schubert, Hawthorne the Artist (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963), p. 24, for
an interesting structural comparison between "The Hollow of the Three
Hills" and Grant Wood's painting American Gothic.
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familiar an expression on her small physiognomy. That look of
naughty merriment was likewise reflected in the mirror, with so
much breadth and intensity of effect, that it made Hester Prynne
feel as if it could not be the image of her own child, but of an
imp who was seeking to mould itself into Pearl's shape.124
The inter-play of light and shade, of reflected and refracted light
against an obscure backdrop of black, allowed Hawthorne to populate his
universe with objects enowned or interiorized by the opacity of human
consciousness itself.

These ambiguously changing figures defy the

reflection which would petrify them as they appear in the poo1, 125 the
fountain, 12 6 the we11, 127 and then just as suddenly disintegrate back to
the mutably indeterminate form from whence they originally came.

"It is

hard to follow one great vision in this world of darkness and of many
changing shadows.

Among those shadows men get lost."128

Among the shadowy folds of darkness which encompass it, the House
of the Seven Gables acquires its "concentration of intimacy;"129 via the
forces which beseige it, the House becomes human.

It even reciprocates

Hepzibah's desire to decorate her hat with ribbons by growing flowers on
its roof, and imitates her frown with its "meditative look,'' its "impending brow," its "thoughtful gloom," its "rusty" and "battered visage."130
124The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 106
125"The Hollow of the Three Hills," IX, p. 203.
126"The Vision of the Fountain," IX, p. 214.
127The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 88.
128John G. Neihardt, Black Elk Speaks (Lincoln:
Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 254.

University of

129cf. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas
(Boston: Beacon Press, Beacon Paperbacks, 1969), p. 36.
130The House of the Seven Gables, II, pp. 27, 28, 12, 56, and 81,
respectively.

,.

'

229
In the same way, regarding the interior life of the House, the dim looking-glass that used to hang in one of the rooms "was fabled to contain
within its depths all the shapes that had ever been reflected there."l31
Yet, Hawthorne no more needs this apparently lost device than the
inhabitants of the house, for his own descriptive gaze invests the
objects within the house, as it does all the significant objects of his
oeuvre, from the very walls to the portraits which adorn them, with the
"human" or expressive space by which they come to life.

Hawthorne's

radical perception indirectly illuminates the objects of its gaze from
within; it permits, in fact, the objects to enlighten us, just as
Beatrice's face "positively illuminated the more shadowy intervals of the
garden path." 13 2

Moreover, once the object is brought to prominence in

this way, the human world ceases to be a metaphor, "and becomes once
more what it really is, the seat and as it were the homeland of our
thoughts.

The perceiving subject ceases to be an 'acosmic 1 thinking

subject, and action, feeling, and will remain to be explored as

origin~l

ways of positing an object, since 'an object looks attractive or
repulsive before it looks black or blue, circular or square•.rrl33

Thus,

each object brings its own unique degree of lighting with it and
appropriately discloses its truth in so far as a subject gropingly enowns
it in perception, just as the Great Carbuncle refuses to unveil its light
to anyone who would seek it "objectively," that is, as a detached
observer in search of absolute truth, and instantaneously mutates to
131rbid., p. 20.
132"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 102.
133Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 24.
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"opaque stone, with particles of mica glittering on its surface."l34
Hawthorne's Faustian gaze dared to see reality differently than his age
would have him view it; rather than intellectually codify the images of
experience, he ventured into its primordial chaos in order to resurrect
the very body of the world itself, a body whose physical and opaque
carnality had long since been discarded by the disembodied image of
daguerrean perspective, the flat projection of the scientific and
technological world-view.
II

Whatever constancy accrues to the objects within the world

o~

Hawthorne's work does so because the objects themselves appear against a
double horizon wherein the embodied perceiver articulates the general
setting of that world.

Thus, the perception of a world simply

constitutes the dilation of a subject's presence within the structures of
an indeterminate field, whereby the body "takes up room" among the
objects which surround it without ever becoming an object in itself.

The

physical presence of a perceiver thus "makes room" for the world by
virtue of a space which is neither entirely subjective nor objective, and
which accommodates its objects only to the extent that they reciprocally
call each other into Being.

The meteor punctuates the surrounding dark-

ness just as surely as the darkness "creates" the meteor; the lime-kiln
reveals the night just as the night illuminates it; the people on "the
other side" of the veil appropriate its meaning as equiprimordially as
the veil discloses them.

Each makes the other possible in the first

place, and contemporaneously exist only because they "touch" the
134"The Great Carbuncle," IX, p. 165.
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affective surface of an incarnate gaze.

In this sense, every object

becomes a metaphor; must be, in fact, a metaphor before it can become an
object as such, for an object is factual only by virtue of a situated
subject who perceives it as part of an affective setting in the first
place.

Although, at the outset, the Letter measures precisely three and

one-quarter inches on each side, its significant factuality remains
dormant without a factical subjectivity which calls it into Being.

Thus,

Hawthorne's initial description of the letter engages its immediate
qualities, those aspects which pre-reflectively arrest the gaze, and not
its geometrical properties.
But the point which drew all eyes, and, as it were, transfigured
the wearer,--so that both men and women, who had been familiarly
acquainted with Hester Prynne, were now impressed as if they beheld
her for the first time,--was that SCARLET LETTER, so fantastically
embroidered and illuminated upon her bosom. It had the effect of
a spell, taking her out of the ordinary relations with humanity,
and inclosing her in a sphere by herself.135
Similarly, the Letter has yet to become a unified sensory experience
because it remains to be lived by the reader-perceiver throughout the
course of the novel.
thing.

Each perceiver must discover his own way into the

Hawthorne implicitly understood this fact, and recreated the

perceiver's ingress into the thing itself as it primordially transpires
in perception.
paramount.

Thus, the phenomenon of lighting (Lichtfuhrung) looms

Rather than confer a notional meaning on the object,

Hawthorne's inosculation of light and shade implicitly organizes a
structural field in which the object is only in so far as my perception
disrupts into it; my experience of the world can only transcend itself in
the objects of that world because it is born amidst the incarnate setting
135The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 53-54.
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of the situation.

Indeed, the conspicuous absence of color in Hawthorne's

oeuvre invites further investigation.
In perception, the reflection of light functions incidentally; its
presence confers life upon the objects it illumines, whereas its absence
deprives them of all "expression."

Similarly, lighting "is not presented

to our perception as an objective, but as an auxiliary or mediating
element.

It is not seen itself, but causes us to see the rest." 136

Because lighting constitutes an aspect of the field, lingering in the
background without drawing specific attention to itself, it encourages or
guides the gaze toward maximum determinateness, and hence reveals the prereflective way in which the gaze takes up its objects in perception.

The

ubiquity of the daguerrean view posits the framed prospectus of a world
uniformly illuminated from without along each of its indivisible
"points."

Technology merely substantiated this fiction.

"In our

civilization, which has the same light everywhere, and puts electricity
in its cellars, we no longer go to the cellar carrying a candle.

But the

unconscious cannot be civilized.

It takes a candle when it goes to the

cellar."l37

the gaze engages its objects gropingly

So with perception:

within the intentionality of a subject.

Like the incomplete light of the

candle which shows up certain objects at the expense of others, the gaze
enowns a thing by virtue of the thing's contemporaneous relation to a
phenomenal body somehow already alongside the objective body as such,
whereby a nebulous and inconspicuous lighting initially allows the gaze
to take it up at the expense of other objects in the field.
136Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 309.
137Bachelard, Poetics of Space, p. 19.

Now an
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object primordially announces itself to us in terms of its immediate
"expression," its contours as they strike a kinaesthetic displacement of
the phenomenal body.

Perception itself goes straight to the thing, "and

by-passes the colour, just as it is able to fasten upon the expression of
a gaze without noting the colour of the eyes." 138

Conversely, color may

appear to us in modes other than the fixed quality of a reflective
attitude.

Thus, the dark-green moss which covers the burial-stone of

Parson Hooper appears to the receptive eye as black,l39 as does the ·
verdure of the forest in "Young Goodman Brown." 140

Reciprocally, to

certain eyes the Letter may appear "freshly green, instead of scarlet!"l4l
Indeed, the blackness which persists beneath the scarlet of the Letter is
less a sensible quality than a lugubrious power which affectively emerges
from the object, constantly insinuating its presence even when "sensibly"
absent from sight.

Moreover, whether it is seen in the direct light of

the sun or the reflected and refracted light of the polished armor, the
Letter affectively retains its constancy in modes other than the "sensory"
itself.

It is visible primarily in the sense that moral blackness is

visible. 142
In this respect, Hawthorne's descriptive gaze anticipates the
elemental function of lighting anterior to the distinction between colors
as such.

His lighting directs the gaze so that we discover the objects

it discloses, and complete them, in accordance with the foreshadowed
138Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 305.
139"The Minister's Black Veil," IX, p. 53.
140x, p. 83.

141The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 178.

142cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenome~ology, p. 305.
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spectacle previously given, just as Sir William Howe discerns his own
image beneath the cloaked figure which unexpectedly issues from the
•
shadow and then recedes before the spectators are able to catch a glimpse
of it.l43

Set in relief by the folds of darkness which surround them,

Hawthorne's figures surface to the gaze by virtue of the suggestive
lighting which nudges them forth, redistributing whatever color
"qualities" they possess back to the neutrality at "neutral territory"
from whence they are initially mediated according to the variable level
of lighting itself.
A child's shoe; the doll, seated in her little wicker carriage; the
hobby-horse;--whatever, in a word, has been used or played with,
during the day, is now invested with a quality of strangeness and
remoteness, though still almost as vividly present as by daylight.
Thus, therefore, the floor of our familiar room has become a
neutral territory, somewhere between the real world and fairy-land,
where the Actual and the Imaginary may meet, and each imbue itself
with the nature of the other.l44
Similarly, the red of the roses is lost to the "dark and glossy curls" of
the two youths encompassed within the ring of monsters at the maypoLe;l45
the motley colors of the clearing are neutralized by the Puritans,
invisibly watching the spectacle, who compare these revelers to the darksome evil that populates the "black wilderness;" 146 the richly-colored
garments of the figures, which emerge atop the staircase of the ProvinceHouse during the masked ball, gradually fade to dusk so that the shapes
"appeared rather like shadows than persons of fleshly substance;"l47 the
143"Howe's Masquerade," IX, p. 253.
144rhe Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 35-36.
145"The May-Pole of Merry Mount," IX, p. 56.
146rbid.
147"Howe's Masquerade," IX, p. 251.
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passionately gorgeous aspects of the plants in the garden reflect the
artificiality of man's depraved fancy, "glowing with only an evil mockery of
beauty."l48

Thus, Hawthorne's black and white vision significantly out-

weighs his color-daubing, but only because his descriptive gaze inclines
toward the primary constitution of the perceptual act prior to its
thematization.

Like Rousseau, he utilizes bold and simple colors, yet

engagingly set off against a tenebrous background which averts attention
from itself because it creates the primordial space of perception:

"in

the momentary gloom, the fire seemed to be glimmering amidst the vagueness of unenclosed space."l49

Already alongside an objective "eye," the

phenomenal space of an expressive bodily "eye" opens onto the object
itself, and makes it visible, in so far as it seizes the interplay of
light and shade without recognizing the light and shade as such.

Light-

ing always lingers hidden in the background as a structural phenomenon
whenever it makes an object visible, for in order to see the object "it
is necessary not to see the play of shadows and l:i,ght around it."l50

The

shadows of the tree boughs which flicker over the dead figure of Judge
Pyncheon amidst the gloomy room further articulate the slumping object
while they simultaneously interrogate the birth of the perceiving
subject.

Conversely, these shadow-branches which reach out to touch us

by reason of their unique space appear doubly there as they synchronously
suggest an actual counter-part, beyond the window frame, presented in
profile against the object they

e~body.

The lighting thus directs our

148"Rappaccini' s Daughter," X, p. 110.
149"The Artist of the Beautiful," X, p. 448.
15D.Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, p. 167.
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gaze toward the lifeless shape in the chair as "one" who has already been
there, and leads us to the object to the extent that we submit or entrust
ourselves to it.

Expressively situated, we perceive the spectacle in

conformity with the light which surrounds the body and permits the object
to confront us.

The lighting itself is neutral; only later, once the

object has become determinate, do colors as such appear.
By reason of Hawthorne's indirect lighting, then, which gravitates
toward the absence of color, objects apportion color among themselves in
so far as they resist this new ambience.

The quality of color in an

object becomes determinate only after its renitency to some variable
level of lighting.

Initially, Hawthorne's lighting is always on the side

of the subject, and not the object.

Prior to the distinction between

color, the effect of lighting is precisely what gets us into the perceptual situation in the first place.

For example, when a painter wishes to

portray some striking object, "he does so less by applying a bright
colour to that object than by a suitable distribution of light and shade
on surrounding ones."151

Hawthorne's description of the dead Judge

poignantly exemplifies this perceptual phenomenon:
Meanwhile the twilight is glooming upward out of the corners of the
room. The shadows of the tall furniture grow deeper, and at first
become more definite; then, spreading wider, they lose their
distinctness of outline in the dark, gray tide of oblivion, as it
were, that creeps slowly over the various objects, and the one
human figure sitting in the midst of them. The gloom has not
entered from without; it has brooded here all day, and now, taking
its own inevitable time, will possess itself of everything. The
Judge's face, indeed, rigid, and singularly white, refuses to melt
into this universal solvent. Fainter and fainter grows the light.
It is as if another double-handful! of darkness had been scattered
through the air. Now it is no longer gray, but sable. There is
still a faint appearance at the window; neither a glow, nor a
151Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 312.
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glimmer--any phrase of light would express something far brighter
than this doubtful perception, or sense, rather, that there is a
window there. Has it yet vanished? No!--yes!--not quite! 152
Moreover, just as the harmony of a piece of music may structure itself
around a dominant tone, Hawthorne's descriptive gaze orders its objects
around a variable level of lighting, which in itself always tends toward
the dominant "color" inherent in his oeuvre.

And this elemental

constancy within the world of Hawthorne's work, and which sustains the
very setting of that world, uniformly appears as black--the total absence
of color.

Thus, the twilight glooming upward in the room where Judge

Pyncheon motionlessly slumps ultimately obtains from this pre-dominant
darkness, and involucrately subsists within it.

Ontologically, of course,

this perceptual "dominant" constitutes nothing less than the horizon of
finite temporality, that double horizon of Being and nothingness which
threatens at any moment to annihilate our perceptual consciousness, and
all other forms of consciousness as well:
And there is still the swarthy whiteness--we shall venture to marry
these ill-agreeing words--the swarthy whiteness of Judge Pyncheon's
face. The features are all gone; there is only the paleness of
them left. And how looks it now? There is no window! There is no
face! An infinite, inscrutable blackness has annihilated sight!
Where is our universe? All crumbled away from us; and we, adrift
in chaos, may hearken to the gusts of homeless wind, that go
sighing and murmuring about, in quest of what was once a world!153
Hence, Hawthorne's lighting suggests an ontological significance far
beyond its descriptive surface, and subsequently points back to the
subjective nature of perception itself.

In the sense that lighting

corroborates the perceptual situation, spontaneously guiding the gaze
toward an object which can only become determinate to the extent that it
152The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 276.
153Ibid., pp. 276-77.
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comes into being amid a general setting whose structure unfolds or "surrounds" both subject and object, the subject-object dichotomy concurrently
coalesces to a dialectic of inside and out. 154

Just as the meteor and the

darkness are mutually impossible without each other, the perceptual subject can experience neither without the phenomenal lighting which allows
them to appear.

Hawthorne's descriptive gaze accommodates this "double"

space within the single image because it is willing to forfeit the visual
frame of perspective, which merely appropriates the object, in favor of
the ambiguous, though constant, experience of a subject.

The world itself

guarantees this constancy, for Being is always situated.
Furthermore, Hawthorne's darkness expressively situates us at an
interior "center," although that situated central "point" can never be
located geographically or geometrically, but rather phenomenally, for
"anywhere is the center of the world." 155

Unlike the detached observer,

such as Coverdale or Kenyon, whose preconceived perspective constitutes a
world uniformly illumined from without, Hawthorne's dark creates a
specific, situated point of view whereby the observer participates in the
perceptual enownment of the object; the surrounding blackness dissolves
the "objective" distance between spectator and world which the
spiritualized Paul Pry takes for granted,156 since it situates us toward
an intentional "where-we-are" and not the spatial "where" of scientific
objectification.

As the consummate master of a two-dimensional art,157

154cf. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, pp. 211-31.
155Neihardt, p. 43.
156cf. "Sights from a Steeple," IX, pp. 191-98.
157cf. Levin, pp. 66-67, who sees the narrator in similar terms as
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for example, the Virtuoso's collection of objects transfers the value of
pictorial perspective back upon the world; and he consequently dismisses
the narrator's deception by Parrhasius' trompe-l'oeil with the single
remark, "You need not blush." 158

In a previous and parallel scene, the

narrator had already rejected such an attitude by refusing the invitation
to Cornelius Agrippa's magic glass, another two-dimensional illusion:
"There are so many greater wonders in the world, to those who keep their
eyes open, and their sight undimmed by custom, that all the delusions of
the old sorcerers seem flat and stale."l59

With Parrhasius' painting, of

course, it is ironically the art work which deceives; for like the phenomenal space of perception, the space of the art work is similarly virtual,
and must be phenomenally "touched" in order to reveal its proper depth.
Conversely, an object can purely vanish "into thin air" only at the l,.evel
of theoretical objectification, for at the threshold of perception, it
must always go somewhere else, even though it is momentarily concealed.
Furthermore, while he rhetorically

cl~ims

a situated point of view based

solely in the present, the Virtuoso's view constitutes the flat projection
of a world-view grounded in infinity, for he is doomed to live forever.
Like the objects of his collection, he envisions the history of man in
terms of a trans.parent perspective which is simultaneously everywhere and
nowhere.

Inhabiting, or better, constituting a world grounded in illusion,

he thus betrays a repressed resentment160 for the concrete object itself,

"'

well. Levin's interpretation, however, is contradicted by the narrator's
own remarks.
158"A Virtuoso's Collection," X, p. 492.

159Ibid., p. 482.

160cf. Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William W. Holdheim
(New York: Schocken Books, 1972), pp. 55-56.
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the very thing his "collection" or view claims to appropriate with
finality.

Fearing the incarnate specificity of the thing itself, which

comminates at any moment to annihilate his comprehensive "picture," the
Virtuoso subsequently comes to hate all objects.

Analogous to the in-

authentic understanding of the technological perception, the Virtuoso has
likewise "learned to despise all things." 161

Indeed, Hawthorne may have

specifically had in mind here the Kantian category of the Understanding
when his narrator rejoins:

"'To despise all things!' repeated I.

at best, is the wisdom of the understanding.'"l62

'This,

Hawthorne's descriptive

technique, on the other hand, encourages the percipient to disrupt or
merge into the "content" of his gaze by virtue of the darkness which
surrounds him and which, at every moment, threatens to obliterate his
world, "like the archway of an enchanted palace, all of which has
vanished but the entrance into nothingness and empty space.rrl63

In order

to transcend or overcome the dark, this world must be continually
reconstituted by a perceiver who, in fact, must turn himself inside-out
with each successive image which appears.

Every new image of a world thus

guarantees a primordial coherence between subject and object, wherein the
percipient sensibly participates in the Being of that world, and thereby
loses his reflective identity.
Because visual experience naturally pushes objectification further
than the tactile, the scientific-technological world-view flatters itself
that it constitutes the world:

"it presents us with a spectacle spread

16l"A Virtusos's Collection," X, p. 485.
162Ibid.
163The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 133.
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out before us at a distance, and gives us the illusion of being immediately present everywhere and being situated nowhere."164

Tactile

experience, on the other hand, "adheres to the surface of our body; we
cannot unfold it before us, and it never quite becomes an object."165
is through the body itself that a subject opens onto the world.

It

By

internalizing a certain style as part of my motor potentiality, I thus
disclose a perceptual field which immediately brings me into contact with
phenomena, so that the world symbiotically invades me just as I respond to
and accept its advances.

Hawthorne implicitly understood this pre-

objective structure of perception, and descriptively endeavored to bring
us back in touch with our initial pre-reflective perception of the world
prior to its apophantical interpretation.

By reason of its indirect

lighting, Hawthorne's gaze suggests the object through delicate operations
which already begin to function cinematically.

In order to create the

perceptual "motion" of his pictures, however, Hawthorne was required to
establish, if only unconsciously, the constant setting by which the world
of his work would phenomenally cohere.

If his indirect lighting were to

articulate the objects of an emblematic gaze so that they virtually protrude to touch us, he would have to project a personal and concrete field
which interpenetrates every experience of his world, and concomitantly
allows for the inter-sensory unity of every "thing" in that world.
Through this setting, we come into the possession of the world of
Hawthorne's work.

In other words, Hawthorne's emblematic gaze required a

means at his disposal by which he could capture the reality of the world
of his vision, and his appropriation of the emblem partially accomplished
164Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 316.

165 Ibid.
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that task, for in the emblematic technique he discerned that indeterminate field which insinuates the object and perceptually enables it to
come to life.

Yet, the affective depth of his vision demanded something

more, and he unearthed that key in the diorama:
If Hawthorne continued after his illness was over to shut himself
away in order to look at things in the dark, if he displayed an
interest in magic lantern shows and fairground dioramas, he did so
in no dilettante spirit but with deliberate intent. It was upon a
foundation of shadow that he built up his technique of indirect
lighting. Light came for him, as it did for Van Gogh, through
darkness.166
This all-encompassing darkness which informs Hawthorne's vision,
and which Melville so brilliantly acknowledged at. the center of his art,
not only structures our experience of that vision, but also sustains the
general setting which circumscribes the perceptual situation as such.
Hawthorne's interest in the confessional further reinforces his
descriptive predilection for the dark.

Clearly, it was the visual as

well as the psychological phenomenon of the confessional that excited his
imagination, for it provided a darkness which could articulate both
"inside" and "outside" of a world.
nuance in a journal entry:

Already by 1842, he had observed this

"A Father-Confessor--his reflections on

character, and the contrast of the inward man with the outward, as he
looks round on his congregation--all whose secret sins are known to
him."167

Similarly, Hilda's confession in The Marble Faun enables her to

discard the personal burden of guilt, which she attaches to her own
identity, by welcoming the anonymity of the enclosing dark.

Only after-

166Normand, p. 308. By "diorama," we mean throughout, not only a
three-dimensional, translucent scene in miniature, but any such scene
produced with similar effects as well, including those displayed before
a collective audience--e.g., Daguerre's diorama~ double effet.
167The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 235.
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wards, in the determinate world of the cathedral, is she compelled to
discuss it face to face.168

Yet, however much the confessional may have

fired Hawthorne's imagination, it was the diorama which represented, for
him, the most expressively intense perceptual model of how we primor-

-

dially articulate the world.

What best characterizes the dioramic

experience is its ability to absorb a reflective identity via the
circumambient darkness constitutive of the precondition for

involvement~

Speaking of this effect in contemporary cinema, V. F. Perkins has
remarked:
In the(ideally) comforting, self-forgetting darkness of the moviehouse we attain faceless anonymity, a sort of public privacy,
which effectively distances the real world and our actual
circumstances. That the darkness is an essential insulator will
have been realized by any reader who has had to watch films in an
insufficiently darkened cinema. The deterioration of the image on
the screen matters far less than the absence of the 'shield' which
darkness customarily offers. The erection of the shield seems to
be the precondition of involvement.169
Just as silence constitutes the ground of all communication, darkness
makes it possible.

Darkness is immanence.170

Darkness recreates the

interior of Being, the way in which the world makes its first appearance;
for without a subject there could be no "world."
To speak in these terms, however, is not to place the subject
perceptually or ontologically prior to the "world," for Hawthorne's
dioramic darkness engages the spectator-reader by surrounding him, and
thus establishes the specific situatedness by which a percipient makes
168The Marble Faun, IV, pp. 357-58.
169Film as Film (London:
p. 134.

Penguin Books, Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1972),

170wladimir Jankelevitch, "Le Romantisme allemand," quoted in
Normand, p. 318.

244
the birth of Being posslble in the first place.

Reciprocally, because it

encloses the spectator within the immediacy of its own perceptual re-enactment, this dioramic darkness concurrently generates the creation of a
self-sufficient world. 171

In fact, the spectator-reader has already been

put into the situation by virtue of the presencing temporality of those
images which spontaneously appear amidst the ground of chaotic darkness,
and are already on the way toward a determinate order.
images are essentially cinematic.

Thus, Hawthorne's

Against the enclosing dark, the cine-

matic image "takes shape," and prematurely stands out against this
indeterminate field "like someone on the screen when the film is half over
and one has only just walked into the darkness of the cinema.

the

image, before one's eyes, is already in the present indicative."172
Hawthorne's description of the dead Judge, for example, intimately engages
the reader in this active, interior moment.

From the twilight glooming

upward, toward the swarthy whiteness of the Judge's face, and finally to
that inscrutable blackness which annihilates all traces of any world "out

•
there" beyond the window--Hawthorne's description paradoxically transforms
the transparency of an objective world "without" into the ambiguous
opacity of an interior space which ultimately locates the subject at the
center of a world that is, ironically, himself.

Like the cinematic vision

which Georges-Michel Bovay, in his essay "Poe'sie et rlalisme," defines as
.,

1

"la vision interieure d'un monde," 73 Hawthorne's diorama-like technique
171cf. Raymond Durgnat, Films and Feelings (London:
Faber Ltd., 1967), p. 99.

Faber and

172Jules Supervielle, "The Man Who Stole Children," trans. Alan
Pryce-Janes, in Selected Writings (New York: New Directions, 1967),
pp. 194-95.
173Cin~a: un oeil ouvert sur le monde, ed. Georges-Michel Bovay
(Lausanne: La Guilde du Livre, 1952), p. 95.
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eliminates the traditional or daguerrean frame and enables us to perceive
and complete the image in so far as we are situated; that is, engulfed by
the surrounding darkness.

Here, a commonplace event, the coming of night,

"is transformed into apocalyptic revelation through description that
conveys the internal vantage point of diorama--that conveys the sense of
immersion in a changing scene in which real time expands into dioramic
time, into dream time." 17 4

This perceptual, physical blackness which

pervades Hawthorne thus yields the key that unlocks not only the perceptual habit of Hawthorne the man, but also discloses the interior, selfsufficient world of his oeuvre.

'

As Lautreamont remarked:

"It is only by

admitting the night physically that one is able to admit it morally."175
Thus, through the interplay of light and shade, grounded in dioramic
darkness, Hawthorne was able to create "a total ambiguity that would
enable him to achieve the freest possible interplay of substances,
identities, and physical, moral, and psychological realities."176
At the interior of this ambiguous vision, Hawthorne created the
affective depth by which an expressive space superannuates the perspective distance of the daguerrean view.

Through his dioramic gaze, the

world no longer stands before the spectator as a representation, but
rather becomes visible in its interior immediacy.
anew.

The world is born

Because the daguerrean frame supports a view upon the outside in

174Benjamin Lease, "Diorama and Dream: Hawthorne's Cinematic
Vision," Journal of Popular Culture 5 (Fall 1971) : 321.
175comte de Lautrlamont, Le Chants de Maldoror, trans. Guy Wernham
(New York: New Directions, 1965), p. 306. Compare Goodman Brown, who
cannot bring himself to accept the moral darkness he discovers in the
forest. Is it, perhaps, because he cannot accept the physical darkness
of the night itself?
176Normand, p. 311.
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terms of its optical relation to the world, it always represents a
spectacle of something else--something outside of it.

As Hawthorne

observed on his journey up Green Mountain:
As we ascended the zig-zag road, we looked behind, at every opening
through the forest, and beheld a wide landscape of mountain-swells,
and vallies intermixt. . • . Over this wide scene, there was a
general gloom; but there was a continual vicissitude of bright
sunshine flitting over it; now resting for a brief space on
portions of the heights, now flooding the vallies with green
brightness • • • . But we, who stood so elevated above mortal
things, and saw so wide and far, could see the sunshine of
prosperity departing from one spot and rolling towards another; so
that we could not think it much matter which spot were sunny or
gloomy at any one moment.177
Indeed, from such a "godly" vantage point, nothing much matters; it is
all the same.

This abstracted perspective, divorced from the affective

details ("we could not think it much matter"), is simultaneously
indifferent to time as well ("at any one moment").

Whenever it is seen

in perspective, the external world is somehow always beyond time; for
ultimately, everything can and will be located in its proper place.
history arrays itself before us in its fastidious chronological
Thus, in the preface to

!

Wonder

~'

Even

order~

Hawthorne explains that he. felt no

reluctance to shape anew, "as his fancy dictated, the for:ms that have
been hallowed by an antiquity of two or three thousand year6."H8
Hawthorne's perceptual and reflective habits naturally gravitated toward
man's interior facticity rather than his external factuality.

Correspond-

ingly, in the preface to his Biographical Stories for Children, he
advances the personal and intimate approach to the history of a life:
"It is here attempted to give our little readers such impressions as they

•

177The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 129.
1 7Bvii , P . 3 •
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might have gained, had they themselves been the playmates of persons, who
have long since performed important and brilliant parts upon the stage of
life."l79

At the other end of daguerrean objectification, the diorama

initially investigates the spectacle for its own sake; it is first and
foremost autofigurative:

"The spectacle is first of all a spectacle of

itself before it is a spectacle of something outside of it."180

In

Hawthorne, the image is able to exist for its own sake because it spontaneously emerges from a primordial darkness which circumscribes the
percipient, and touches him with its animate becoming.

Hawthorne's

dioramic blackness engages us from a situated point of view whereby an
object becomes an object in its specific carnality before our very eyes
and, at the same time, engenders or suggests an affectively unified
world:

"Every new aspect of the mountains, or view from a different

position, creates a surprise in the mind." 18 1
observes:

Elsewhere Hawthorne

"The mountains look much larger and more majestic some times

than at others--partly because the mind may be variously situated so as
to comprehend them."182

Unlike Wordsworth's transparent and ubiquitous

perspective from the top of Mount Snowdon, Hawthorne's dioramic technique
guarantees the ambiguous contour of Being for, within the expressive
space of its interior, it makes the object determinate only to the extent
that it reverses the objective dimensions of "locality."

The spectator

thus assumes a spatial relation to the thing in terms of his restricted
1 7 9vr , p • 213 •

180Merleau-Ponty, Primacy, p. 181.
181The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 104.
182Ibid., p. 125.
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situation, and not the transparently ubiquitous position of optical
perspective, which merely treats the body as another object in external
space.

Hawthorne appreciated the individual and limited aspect of a

thing, and employed a descriptive technique that surprises us with every
new appearance of the image.

In a journal entry of 1 June 1842, he

expressed it thus:
The greater picturesqueness and reality of back-yards, and everything appertaining to the rear of a house; as compared with the
front, which is fitted up for the public eye. There is much to be
learnt, always, by getting a glimpse at rears. When the direction
of a road has been altered, so as to pass the rear of farm-houses,
instead of the front, a very noticeable aspect is presented.l83
By definition, a situated point of view can only see one aspect at a time;
in such a light, the object is ultimately destined to remain partially
unknown.

The perceptual aspect of a thing, in turn, substantiates the

limited ability of the gaze at all times; it constitutes the Rubicon
which can never be crossed perceptually.

Thus, aspectiviti always puts

"solidity" on the hither side of the distinction between affective and
rational space in so far as it dynamically animates the primordial depth
of the visible.

Hawthorne knew what Cezanne was to discc;>ver, and what

cubism would repeat:

"that the external form, the envelope, is secondary

1

and derived, that it is not that which causes a thing to take form, that
this shell of space must be shattered." 184

At the same time, pure forms,

possessing an apparent solidity internally determined, can never disclose
the interstitial aspect of depth.

During his middle period, Cezanne

experimented in this direction, "and came to find that inside this space,
183rbid., p. 239. Eight years later, Hawthorne indulged in just
such a sketch; see pp. 496-97.
184Merleau-Ponty, P~imacx, p. 180.
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a box or container too large for them, the things began to move, color
against color; they began to modulate in instability.
space and its content as together."l85

Thus we must seek

Only between the double horizon

of physical and expressive space, then, does an object begin to secure
its perceptual and ontological dimensions.

"Aspectivity" thus confirms

the reciprocity between subject and object in a world common to both, and
disparagingly makes nonsense of each apart from the other.

Within the

interior of its expressive space, Hawthorne's dioramic gaze confers upon
perception a facticity which daguerrean objectification merely relegates
to the sun-drenched status of the factual.

Indeed, once the world of

factual objects is abolished, perception gravitates toward a world
entirely devoid of any objects whatsoever.

This approximates, in fact,

the dioramic or cinematic world prior to the appearance of its first
image.

It impersonates the night, that pure and simple being-in-the-dark.

Analogously, it is the night which brings me back in touch with my
contingency:
Night is not an object before me; ~t enwraps me and infiltrates
through all my senses, stifling my. recollections and almost
destroying my personal identity. I am no longer withdrawn into. my
perceptual look-out from which I watch the outlines of objects
moving by at a distance. Night has no outlines; it is itself in
contact with me and its unity is the mystical unity of the ~·
Even shouts or a distant light people it only vaguely, and then it
comes to life in its entirety; it is pure d·epth without foreground
or background, without surfaces and without any distance
separating it from me.l86
If the reflective attitude sustains its space by thinking the illuminated
relation of its parts, the pre-reflective interior of dioramic darkness,
on the other hand, unites me to an affective space precisely because it
185Ibid.
186Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 283.
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intimately merges with the surface of my body, and threatens to absorb
the very reflective identity which can always disperse it by "turning on
the lights."

Because it constitutes a dimension in which I am entirely

enveloped, darkness thus recreates the depth of an interior space wherein
I am perceptually situated at all times.

Without anchor in externally

objective co-ordinates, Hawthorne's dioramic darkness grounds the world
of his work in the ambiguous affectivity of a subject, that zone of notbeing-in-front-of whereby things are primordially able to come to light,
and, on the descriptive level, provides the very darkness necessary in
the cinema in order to show up the performance.l87
However, if dioramic space can be distinguished from the daguerrean
view in so far as it essentially envelops us rather than spreading i.ts
content out before us, and therefore outside of us, it also distinguishes
itself on another equiprimordially meaningful level.

Like the scientific-

technological world picture, the daguerrean view fixes the content of its
frame in order to secure the object with finality.

The scientific-

technological posture thus impetuously appropriated the daguerreotype,
for in so doing it felt it had at last discovered the absolute means of
making a "lasting impression," in fact, a permanent one--one, moreover,
which would be true for all times, places, and Dasein.

Grounded in its

steadfastly frozen genuflection to infinity, this world-view naturally
despises that which it attempts to control with absolute mastery; that
is, situated time and space.

Thus, to guarantee its continuous

domination of "nature," which uncompromisingly gets the better of it
because nature always holds the upper hand, it professes salvation in
187Ibid., pp. 100-101.
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the heavenly beatitude of a repressed, omnipotent goal, and consciously
takes the form:

"If only we could eliminate the awkward discomfort of

time and place once and for all • . • • "

Yet the other side of "angel"

is always "devil," and one demands the other--in fact, calls it into
being; for on the hither side of Being, where both reside, they are one
and the same.

Hawthorne knew it better than anyone.

Within the techno-

logical frame of his age, he detected the survival of an ancient
witchcraft, whose roots "lay in the very lowest of human instincts"--instincts which were bound "to people the world with monstrous shapes."188
Hawthorne alone was first to discern the monster gnawing at man's heart,
obscuring his vision, isolating him from his own world in the name of
objectivity.

Beneath the Janus-faced exterior of scientific optimism,

Hawthorne espied the demon loosed upon the world in the name of
it haunted the recesses of his imagination as severely as it
the freedom of his vision.

pro~ress;

threaten~4

,

That monster was, of course, the machine. , It

represented the plunderous extent to which man had been dispossessed

of

his world by the scientific promise of salvation and its insidiously
concomitant evils.

Amidst the beauty of the pre-technological garden,

Hawthorne perceived the fiendish whistle of the locomotive; its
devastating potential leveled his perceptual and aesthetic sensitivity
as it would Faulkner a century later.

In the steam engine, he anticipated

the twentieth-century horrors inevitable in the race for technological
supremacy, the battle between opposing world-views which endangers the
very life of the planet today.

The referential surface of the technolog-

ical world picture could no longer assuage the subsequently frightening
188Normand, p. 182.
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disjunction of its own applied content.

While describing a passenger

waiting in the station for a train, Hawthorne elicits his fundamental
disorientation as the train approaches:
and comes down upon you like fate, swift and inevitable. In a
moment, it dashes along in front of the Station-house and comes to
a pause . . . • A moment passes, while the baggage men are putting
on the trunks and packages; then the bell strikes a few times, and
away goes the train again; quickly out of sight of those who remain
behind, while a solitude of hours again broods over the Station
House, which, for an instant, has thus been put in communication
with far-off cities, and then has only itself . • .
Meantime, the passenger, stepping from the solitary station-house
into the train, finds himself in the midst of a new world, all in a
moment; he rushes out of the solitude into a village; thence
through woods and hills; into a large inland town • • • • 189
Grounded in alchemy and with the help of technology, Science was now able,
via the machine, "to r:ealize certain of the ancient magicians' dreams,
such as that of abolishing distance:

in the flight of the two 'suspects,'

the two 'owls,' the railroad becomes a substitute for the witch.' s

'k!

broom. u190

Even Hawthorne could not foresee the extent to whi,ch his own

~t

monsters were anticipations of history:

"He saw himself, and his work as

well, excluded from the world of the machine.

He had no idea that men

would return to his own 'chimaeras' in order to explain some very real
monstrosities to come."l91

Moreover, like the train which it describes,

the new perceptual moment in Hawthorne ironically and most significantly
obtains from motion.
III

If Hawthorne discovered, in the diorama, the circumscriptive black
in which the shape of his images could make their first appearance, he
189rhe American Notebooks, VIII, p. 488.
19~ormand, p. 182.

19lrbid., pp. 75-76.
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also detected an interior "motion" by which they unfold before us and come
to life.

By Hawthorne's time the "moving picture" had already undergone

several revolutionary advances.

Originally the invention of Philippe de

Loutherbourg, this new art first appeared in London in 1781 under the
name of Eidophusikon.

De Loutherbourg's invention, however, was in no way

comparable to the later panoramic productions, amounting to a kind of
panoramic moving peep show. 192

Shortly thereafter, Robert Barker's

"cyclorama" appeared, "the picture that encircled its spectators with
actual objects carrying the painted detail out beyond the foreground."l93
When word reached Charles Willson Peale in Philadelphia, 1784, he was
immediately captivated by the prospect of pictures "that lived and moved,
changed color, a magic release from the static character of all art
hitherto."194

By the autumn of 1784, Peale was already adding a sky-

lighted room to the end of his long gallery in order to house the equipment, while the pictures were to be viewed from the seats in the gallery
itself.195

The Pennsylvania Packet advertized the exhibit in the

following terms:

"Mr. Peale, respectfully informs the public, that with

great labour and expence, he hath prepared a number of eerspective views,
with changeable effects, imitating nature in vari()us movements."l96
Historically, Peale's moving pictures represent the first appearance in
America of the startling progress in pictorialism which began in England
during the 1780's, most notable the inventions of De Loutherbourg and
192John Francis McDermott, The Lost Panoramas of the Mississippi
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 175.
193charles Coleman Sellers, Charles Willson Peale (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 211.
194rbid., p. 204.

195rbid., p. 2os.

196rbid.

r
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Barker.

Some years later, Rubens Peale would display colored magic-

lantern projections in motion.

Yet, it was not until the 1820's that the

moving picture received its major impetus, where its development closely
paralleled that of photography.

Investigations into the persistence of

vision led Roget to publish his paper, "Persistence of Vision with regard
to Moving Objects," in 1824.
Optical toys based on this principle began to appear shortly afterwards. The first, manufactured in 1826, was a flat disc with a
picture on each side; spinning the disc made the pictures seem to
merge. This simple toy was described by i·ts makers as a
'Thaumatropical Amusement. To illustrate the seeming paradox of
Seeing an Object which is Out of Sight and to demonstra~e the
faculty of the Retina of the eye to retain the impression of an
object after its disappearance'. In 1832 there appeared a new toy,
the Phenakistascope, which made more sophisticated use of the
principles formulated by Roget; a series of drawings, depicting
separate stages in an action, was printed on a cardboard disc.
Rotated, and viewed in a mirror through slots in its circumference,
the Phenakistascope disc provided the first genuine moving
pictures.197
Along similar lines, Daguerre too was working toward the production of
pictorial illusions.

Widely known in France and England as a scene

designer and operator of supremely persuasive dioramic presentations long
before the invention of photography, Daguerre's three-dimensional views
"of a storm in the Alps or of a midnight mass in a great cathedral were
so effective that visitors from the provinces threw coins onstage to test
the apparent spatial depth they thought they saw."198

In 1822, Daguerre

and Bouton exploited panoramic effects in their first diorama by using
the rotonde "as an auditorium that turned on a pivot before huge
stationary pictures."199

Of even greater significance, however, were the

dioramas'a double effet which Daguerre began showing toward the commence197Perkins, p. 41.

198Rudisill, p. 37.

19~cDermott, Lost Panoramas, p. 6.
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ment of 1831:
A typical example was his Midnight Mass at Saint-Etienne-du-Mont.
The first view of this picture, daylight, showed an empty church.
Gradually day gave way to twilight and then to night. The
sanctuary lighted up and the church was seen crowded with people.
All this was done within one frame and on one piece of canvas. The
effects were achieved by painting the clearer picture on the right
side of the canvas and the second on the back, and by careful
manipulation of the lighting. Effects of sky and distance, and
sometimes of fire and of moonlight, could be obtained also by
another device: the use of two or more transparent surfaces on
separate frames placed a short distance apart. Sometimes part of
these surfaces might be cut away to create highlights.200
In its dioramic effects of lighting, Daguerre's Midnight Mass strikingly
resembles Hawthorne's description of the dead Judge, where twilight
gradually fades to night; and it is even more startling when we consider
that Hawthorne was most probably nescient of these technical developments
which preceded his mature works.

Yet, one final step was necessary for

the dioramic effects utilized by the massive panoramas of the 1840's, and
with which Hawthorne was undoubtedly familiar:

designing the machinery

by which they could move.
200rbid. For further discussion of these effects, cf. W. Williams,
Transparency Painting on Linen. London: Winson and Newton, n.d.
McDermott quotes the following from the above mentioned work:
The sky and distance being seen through two transparent surfaces
have their tints modified and softened, insomuch, that a surprising .
aerial effect is obtained. The objects also, on the second surface, being
seen through the first, maintain their tone of middle distance, and the
boldness of the foreground objects on the front surface, secures for the
combined subject a powerful and truthful appearance. • • • By such
arrangements, very successful effects of moonlight, of winter scenery,
and of fire, are obtainable. In some instances, portions of the middle
and back surfaces are cut away, in such forms as will admit of light
being thrown on particular spots on the front surface, in order to secure
at those places the highest points of light. Thus, in employing two
surfaces, we may, by cutting from one, or both surfaces, the quantity
corresponding with the extent of the light, throw a bright light upon
foreground figures, buildings, or other near objects, and communicate to
them a striking reality of relief and brilliancy. Moonlight scenes, with
reflection on water, sharp bright lights on the trees, and the ruined
tower, all enhanced by the contrast of an expanse of sombre tone and
shade, are subjects well adapted for this treatment(pp. l75-76).
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In its earliest form, the panorama consisted of nothing more than a
circular painting, arranged so that the spectator, placed in the center
of the room, saw only the subject portrayed:

"The frame around an

ordinary landscape or historical scene constantly reminded one that he
was after all looking at a picture.

The panorama, inclosing him, made him

feel that he was in the midst of the scene about him.

He was not standing

before a work of art but in the very 'presence of nature.'
existed but the picture and the spectator."201

Nothing

In order to achieve this

effect, the exhibitor required a circular hall with a conical roof.
In the center of such a room there was provided a platform on which
the spectator was placed in order that he might be kept at an even
distance from the painting. An opening in the lower part of the
roof permitted the light to fall from above and behind on the
painting, while a shelter over the head of the spectator allowed
him to see the full picture but nothing above it. To accustom him
to the change from the outside world the spectator was taken
through a dark passage so that the reality of the picture might be
doubly effective.202
As early as 1829, a moving panorama was exhibited in London, the movement
simply achieved by unrolling the canvas from one upright roller and
winding it back on another.

Thus, by 1840 technical advances were more

than adequately able to accommodate the huge panoramic canvases which
characterized the decade.

For example, during the 1840's the St. Louis

newspapers mention five panoramas of the Mississipi River which
measured anywhere from four hundred and forty yards up to twelve hundred
and fifty in length by four in height, and were exhibited as moving
newsreels or travelogues. 20 3
201Ibid., p. 5.

Hence, even the newsreel or travelogue is

202Ibid., pp. 5-6.

203lbid., p. vii. In one way or another, all these artists had
career connections with St. Louis, two of the panoramas having been
painted there, and three of them exhibited in the home town (pp. vii-viii).
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no invention of the twentieth century, as many would like to think, for
by the 1840's it had already attained an aristocratic demeanor:

"It had

grown to a length that required an audience to sit for two or three hours
while hundred of yards of colorful canvas were slowly unwound from one
cylinder and wound onto another."204

And though it did not talk, it

provided an elaborate program in which a commentator offered all
necessary explanation while "a handsome young lady rendered appropriate
accompaniment on the pianoforte." 205

Ironically, by a lamentable quirk

of history, Henry Lewis' vast panorama of the Mississippi showed late in
the summer of 1850 at Salem.

Unfortunately, by April of that very same

year, Hawthorne had already left Salem, never to return.

What marvelous

literary chef d'oeuvre might have obtained from such an encounter we shall
never know •. Nevertheless, by the 1850's the panorama had reached
prodigious popularity, and its production was now implemented by the
daguerreotype itself.

John Wesley Jones' Pantoscope of California was

painted not only from artist's sketches, but also from some fifteen
hundred daguerreotypes taken by himself; and after showing at Hope Chapel,
New York, in November, it was still doing business the following March.206
Finally, in 1861, three years before Hawthorne's death, Peale's grandson,
Coleman Sellers, Jr., first showed photography in motion by means of his
"Kinematescope."207

Thus, daguerreotype and diorama mutually conditioned

the advancement of each other, though each was to retain its own
distinctive characteristics throughout its development.
204rbid., p. 7.

Meanwhile, other

205rbid.

20~cDermott, "Gold Rush Movies," California Historical Society

Quarterly 33 (March 1954) : 30.
207sellers, p. 461.

........
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inventions, using the same basic method as the "Phenakistascope," were to
direct the diorama toward both its logical and technological termination
in the modern cinema:

the "Heliocinegraphe" (1850), the "Zoetrope"

(1860), and finally Reynaud's "Praxinoscope Theatre" (1877).

According to

Perkins, "Reynaud, the inventor of the Praxinoscope, devised a machine to
combine his toy with the magic lantern.

Using drawings printed on a long

roll of paper instead of the usual short and repetitious strip, Reynaud's

'Tht~tre Optique' presented a moving picture show to a large audience.
This, the earliest form of cinema, was quite independent of photography."208

Thus, the refinement and development of the diorama, with its

numerous variations, represents a history in Europe and America which
both occasioned the application of photography while it culminated in the
"motion picture" as we know it today.

Through its manifold effect of

lighting, the diorama initiated this inherent movement which emminently
characterizes the modern cinema of the twentieth century.
Hawthorne's dioramic lighting, his perception of light in dark,
creates an affective depth at its interior, a depth which expresses the
very motion characteristic of the perceptual act itself.

The images

which engage us during the showman's exhibit in ''Main-Street," and which
animate a past, bringing it to life before our very eyes, simultaneously
refute the daguerrean attitude of the critic in the audience, who would
always make it a point "to see things precisely as they are."209
In my daily walks along the principal street of my native town, it
has often occurred to me, that, if its growth from infancy upward,
and the vicissitude of characteristic scenes that have passed along
208Perkins, pp. 41-42.
209"Main-Street," XI, p. 52.
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this thoroughfare, during the more than two centuries of its
existence, could be presented to the eye in a shifting panorama,
it would be an exceedingly effective method of illustrating the
march of time. Acting on this idea, I have contrived a certain
pictorial exhibition . • . by means of which I propose to call up
the multiform and many-colored Past before the spectator, and show
him the ghosts of his forefathers, amid a succession of historic
incidents, with no greater trouble than the turning of a crank. Be
pleased, therefore, my indulgent patrons, to walk into the showroom, and take your seats before yonder mysterious curtain . • . •
the lamps are trimmed, and shall brighten into noontide sunshine,
or fade away in moonlight, or muffle their brilliancy in a
November cloud, as the nature of the scene may require; and in
short, the exhibition is just ready to commence.2IO
In typically ironic fashion, these images which shift, fade, and come
into variously sharpened focus with no more effort than the turning of a
crank, represent the pre-reflective way by which we take them up in
perception.

Like the dwellings of Balch, Norman, and Woodbury--"such is

the ingenious contrivance of this piece of pictorial mechanism," that
these images "seem to have arisen, at various points of the scene, even
while we have been looking at it." 2 11

Indeed, with Endicott's arrival,

"We seam to hear it with our own ears; so perfectly is the action
represented in this life-like, this almost magic picture.n212

Hawthorne's

images depend upon their internal visual composition, and the interrelation of each to the other, to such an extent that they pre-figure the
visual aesthetic of the silent movie some fifty years before its
inception.

The critic of the showman's exhibit, however, refuses to

assume a situated point of view whereby "the proper light and shadow will
transform the spectacle into quite another thing," 213 even as the Puritan
meeting-house fades, before his very eyes, into another image where
carpenters are busy in constructing a new one.
210Ibid., pp. 49-50.
212rbid., p. 56.

2llrbid., p. 54.

213Ibid., p. 57.

What Hawthorne is
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concerned with, here, is nothing less than the modern cinematic technique
of montage or, more precisely, superimposition.

The image of the

carpenters is literally "supered" over the image of the meeting-house, as
it fades into the altered image which succeeds it.

Such a radical

technique demands a new level of perceptual awareness in order to be
apprehended, a level toward which the critic of the exhibit refuses to
respond, just as the innovative techniques of D. W. Griffith demanded a
revolutionary perceptual level in order to be incorporated into the
twentieth-century film aesthetic.

In fact, by Hawthorne's time, dioramic

effects of lighting were already able to
cinematic effects as the "dissolve."

prod~ce

such contemporary

For example, an ad iri the St. Louis

Missouri Republican for 13 September 1849, commented on Leon romarede's
panorama of the Mississippi that it would conclude "with a beautiful
dissolving view of the Great Fire at St. Louis, on the night of 17th May,.
representing that awful and terrific conflagration in all its fury •
Gradually the devouring element subsides, and daylight appears, like.a
messenger from God, to stay the wreck of destruction." 21 4

Similarly,

Hawthorne's lighting characteristically exhibits such dioramic effects; as
with the death of Judge Pyncheon, the showman in "Main-Street" displays
admirable mastery of the dissolve.

From the gray light of early morning,

"slowly diffusing itself over the scene,"215 the image effortlessly
shifts to dusk, then night, in the twinkling of an eye.
It will be hardly worth our while to wait two, or it may be three,
turnings of the hour-glass, for the conclusion of the lecture.
Therefore, by my control over light and darkness, I cause the dusk,
214quoted in McDermott, Lost Panoramas, p. 145.
215"Main-Street," XI, p. 65.
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and then the starless night, to brood over the street; and summon
forth again the bellman, with his lantern casting a gleam about his
footsteps, to pace wearily from corner to corner, and shout
drowsily the hour to drowsy or dreaming ears.216
If on an elementary level the diorama initiated the vast repertoire of
"shots" peculiar to modern cinema, it is Hawthorne's cinematic imagina-

-

tion itself, nonetheless, which securely places him among the twentiethcentury masters of light and shade such as Griffith, Eisenstein, Renoir,
Cocteau, Bergman, and Bunuel.

His use of indirect lighting creates the

interiority of cinematic depth, like the landscape by Claude in The House

t:
'

of the Seven Gables, "where a shadowy and sun-streaked vista penetrated

~

so remotely into an ancient wood, that it would have been no wonder

~·

i f . . . fancy had lost itself in the picture's bewildering depths." 2 17

t{.

Hawthorne's klieg-like beams of light glimmer in transfigured shapes

~

i
i·

which entrap us amidst their evanescent mutability, like the Pyncheon
garden whose aspect becomes incarnate in the movement of the lighting
which animates it, bringing it to life.

At night, this daytime "green

play-place of flickering light" transmutes into "a great, wet mass of
tangled and broad-leaved shadow."218

Equally, the Letter illuminates a

world, disclosing the objects of a perceptual consciousness by reason of
the transfigurative and ambiguous lighting which emanates from it, and
which simultaneously projects its own shape onto the blank screen of the
darkened night-sky.

Hawthorne's dioramic technique fosters.the "interior

shot," anticipating Bergman especially in its use of darkened, oscillatory
areas within the composition of the image.

Typically, Hawthorne

manipulates the blackened silhouette against an even more obscurely
216Ibid., p. 67.

217rr, p. 203.

218rbid., pp. 145 and 246, respectively.
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darkened background:

the figures of Hepzibah, Dimmesdale, Goodman Brown,

Chillingworth, Judge Pyncheon, Clifford, Ethan Brand--all appear before
us, at one time or another, within the ambiguous and opaque lighting of
the diorama, as in a dream.

Reciprocally, this obscurity reflects an

interior light which radiates from the center out, as the dark countenance of Reverend Burroughs emanates an inward light that "glorifies his
figure, in spite of the soil and haggardness of long imprisonment,--in
spite of the heavy shadow that must fall on him, while Death is walking
by his side." 21 9 More abruptly, Hawthorne's lighting disrupts this
abstruse world with a dazzling brilliance which blinds us, as when the
black sky is invaded by the flaming Letter, "dilating like a luminous eye
upon a screen,"220 or when Pearl's reflection in the armor resplendently
beguiles us like t~e multi-faceted Madeira glass 221 through whose
brilliant medium we behold the simultaneously-faceted images of a compound
arthropod eye, as in a Kandinsky painting.
More often, however, Hawthorne resorts to less obvious effects; such
is his use of the "soft focus," whereby an image appears within the
toned-down atmosphere or "neutral territory" of a more difftlsed.or "gre1y
medium," as in the blurred cinematic portrait of Hepzibah whose features .
disappear "behind the warm and misty glow."222

As Normand remarks,

Hawthorne's technique, here, "not only renders the faces indistinct,
evasive, but also means that we do not see them until after they have
219"Main-Street," XI, p. 76.
220Normand, p. 311.
221"Fancy's Show Box," IX, p. 221; cf. also, Schubert, p. 25.
222The House of the Seven Gables, II, pp. 117 and 106, respectively.
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passed across the screen:

it filters out the details, the features, and

then allows them to settle gradually into their final forms."223

Thus,

like the portrait of her ancestor upon which Hepzibah gazes:
In one sense, this picture had almost faded into the canvas, and
hidden itself behind the duskiness of age; in another, she could
not but fancy that it had been growing more prominent, and strikingly expressive, ever since her earliest familiarity with it, as
a child. For, while the physical outline and substance were darkening away from the beholder's eye, the bold, hard, and, at the
same time, indirect character of the man seemed to be brought out
in a kind of spiritual relie£.224
As with the pre-reflective gaze prior to the perception of color as such,
these "inward traits" insinuate themselves "into the essence of the
picture," and are seen only "after the superficial coloring has been
rubbed off by time.n225

In conjunction with the above technique,

Hawthorne deftly employed the "dissolve," as when, for example, the showman in "Main-Street" executes a temporal transition without abrupt spatial
displacement:

"Under cover of a mist that has settled over the scene, a

few years flit by, and escape our notice.

As the atmosphere becomes

transparent, we perceive a decrepit grandsire, hobbling along the
street."226

Conversely, with the dissolve, Hawthorne has simultaneously

mastered the "fade:"
Behold here a change, wrought in the twinkling of an eye, like an
incident in a tale of magic, even while your observation has been
fixed upon the scene. The Main-street has vanished out of sight.
In its stead appears a wintry waste of snow, with the sun just
peeping over it, cold and bright, and tinging the white expanse with
the faintest and most ethereal rose-color. This is the Great Snow
of 1717, famous for the mountain-drifts in which it buried the
whole country.227
223Normand, p. 312.
224The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 58.
225Ibid., p. 59.

226xi, p. 79.

227Ibid., p.

so.
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In "The Wives of the Dead," the indistinct and bulky silhouette of Mary,
hovering over the slumbering Margaret, temporarily merges with the massive
shadows reflected on the lantern-lit wall, before fading into the darkness
of the night.228
"cross-fade:"

Moreover, with the fade, Hawthorne also discovered the

chapter III of The Scarlet Letter fades out as Hester is

returned to the prison.

"With the same hard demeanour, she was led back

to prison, and vanished from the public gaze within its iron-clamped
portal.

It was whispered, by those who peered after her, that the scarlet

letter threw a lurid gleam along the dark passage-way of the interior.n229
Her image immediately returns at the commencement of chapter IV in sharp
focus:

"After her return to the prison, Hester Prynne was found to be in

a state of nervous excitement that demanded constant watchfulness."230
And shortly thereafter, as the Physician is admitted to her cell,
Hawthorne zooms in for a more arresting close-up:

feeling her pulse,

Chillingworth gazed into Hester's eyes with a calm and intent scrutiny,
"a gaze that made her heart shrink and shudder, because so familiar, and
yet so strange and.cold.n231

Elsewhere, Hawthorne employs the cross-fade

to incorporate chapters XI and XII, as Dimmesdale disappears into the
night ("he stole softly down the staircase, undid the door, and issued
forth"), only to return beside the pillory the very next instant
("Walking in the shadow of a dream, as it were, and perhaps actually under
the influence of a species of somnambulism
2 2 Bxi, p. 199.

229The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 69.
230Ibid., p. 70.
231tbid.' p. 72.

Mr. Dimmesdale reached the

r

'
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spot, where, now so long since, Hester Prynne had lived through her first
hour of public ignominy"), 232

And again, Hawthorne integrates the

conclusion of chapter XIV with the opening segment of chapter XV as
Chillingworth, with a wave of his hand, recedes from Hester to gather
herbs, and then returns in sharp focus, decrepitly bent, nearly crawling
along the ground.233
Even then, Hawthorne's repertoire of cinematic shots is by no means
exhausted.

The "traveling shot" which follows Robin through the labyrin-

thian streets of the town234 also attends Kenyon through the serpentine
streets of Rome at Carnival time. 235

Hawthorne's traveling shots

naturally capture the visual frenzy of one of his favorite themes, the
.procession, although he reciprocally employs a stationary camera placed
above the scene in order to apprehend the larger, more general pattern of
a processional image.

Placed in a window, for example, the stationary

downward shot permits the camera eye to seize the motion of those objects
which frenetically pass it by:

from the "arched window," Clifford views

the microscopic activity of the town as part of the larger macrocosm of a
world--a vision which tempts him toward a greater involvement with
humanity by virtue of its homogeneous constitution:
As a mere object of sight, nothing is more deficient in picturesque
features than a procession, seen in its passage through narrow
streets. The spectator feels it to be fool's play, when he can
distinguish the tedious common-place of each man's visage • • • •
In order to become majestic, it should be viewed from some vantage232Ibid., pp. 146 and 147, respectively.
233Ibid., pp. 174-75; see also, Normand, p. 325.
234"My Kinsman, Major Molineaux," XI, pp. 209-12, 215-16, 219.
235The Marble Faun, IV, pp. 444-54.
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point, as it rolls its slow and long array through the centre of a
wide plain, or the stateliest public square of a city; for then, by
its remoteness, it melts all the petty personalities, of which it
is made up, into one broad mass of existence.236
Similarly, from his window, Giovanni espies the lovely Beatrice and
conspires to join her in the garden;237 from the steeple, the narrator
distinguishes various processions converging at right angles from two
different streets, and likewise discerns the ironic situation of a lover,
an old man, and his daughters; 2 38 from the balcony, Hilda discovers
Kenyon as the crowd of revelers repetitiously flows beneath her.239

At

other times, Hawthorne reverses this precipitous angle of the camera,
preferring to shoot upward, as when the camera assumes Kenyon's point of
view, gazing toward the balcony on which Hilda appears,240 or the monkey's
point of view, turning his wrinkled visage toward the arched window from
whence Phoebe and Clifford watch the organ-grinder's performance, a point
of view or attitude, moreover, that mimics the organ-grinder's previous
pecuniary observation ("With his quick professional eye, he took note of
the two faces watching him from the arched window, and, opening his
instrument, began to scatter its melodies abroad 11 ).241
The "long shot" enables Hawthorne to alter dramatic distance and
involvement by forcing the spectator to gaze even more intensely:
236the House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 165.
237"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, pp. 96-97.
238"Sights from a Steeple," IX, pp. 194-97.
239The Marble Faun, IV, p. 453.
240Ibid., pp. 450-52.
241the House of the Seven Gables, II, pp. 164 and 162,
respectively.

toward
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the middle ground, Sir Richard Saltonstall greets Governor Winthrop in
the street; the image blurs and, toward the background, further down the
same street, the camera focuses on Emanuel Downing and his son; then even
further back it glimpses the eccentric mannerisms of Nathaniel Ward.242
In like fashion, the entire square recedes from the close-up of its own
image reflected off the breastplate of John Endicott, just as Endicott
himself not only integrates a spatial long shot of the square as its
central object, but also determines the vanishing point of a temporal
retrospect historically leading to the Revolutionary "foreground;"243
Hester emerges from the prison gloom into the crowd of Puritans at a
"respectable" distance which not only amplifies her isolation from
humanity, but also encourages us to ascertain a closer look; 244

Donatello

regresses toward the gleam and shadow of the forest paths within the
Villa Borghese while awaiting his tryst with Miriam, just as the personified figure of Death invisibly anticipates the unsuspected wanderer during
the full heat of summer at the end of a dim vista; 24 5 the Gray Champion
suddenly appears at the end of a deep perspective, "a paved solitude,
between lofty edifices," before advancing toward the Governor and his
party.246

At the other extreme, Hawthorne's cinematic vision selects a

close-up or "tight shot" whenever the dramatic action dictates an altered
level of consciousness:

following the Gray Champion's advance, the

242"Main-Street," XI, pp. 61-62.
243"Endicott and the Red Cross," IX, pp. 434, 436, and 441,
respectively.
244The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 52.
245The Marble Faun, IV, pp. 74 and 73, respectively.
246 11 The Gray Champion," IX, p. 14.
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Governor and his party hastily bring their mounts forward, "as if they
would have pressed their snorting and affrighted horses right against the
hoary apparition;"247 the apprehensive faces of Leonard Doane and his
sister accost the narrator's inquisitive gaze before he leads the fated
pair to the newly made grave;248 the frozen figure at the entrance of a
cave repulses the glance of the farmer who uncovers the mystery of its
forbidding frown;249 the Reverend Lynn slowly issues from the obscure
forest into the sunlit street, gradually drawing nearer until

w~

virtually

overhear him memorizing his sermon out loud;250 the half-length image of
Ethan Brand touching his heart in a "medium shot," instantaneously
"zooms" to a single detail of the face as he breaks into scornful
laughter--a whale-sized mouth protrudes to devour us like Jonah; 25 1 the
meteor encroaches so palpably close upon the minister's field of vision,
"that it seemed still to remain painted on the darkness" long after it had
vanished, "with an effect as if the street and all things else were at
once annihilated.n252

Perhaps Hawthorne's most affective tight shot,

however, attends the death of Judge Pyncheon; it significantly concludes
that phantasmagoric scene, and composes the final image of the Judge
before returning to the street outside, at dawn:

"And there we see a

fly--one of your common house-flies, such as are always buzzing on the
247Ibid., p. 15.
248"Alice Doane's Appeal," XI, p. 275.
249"The Man of Adamant," XI, p. 168.
250"Main-Street," XI, p. 66.
251"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 87.
252The Scarlet Lette~, I, p. 156.
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window-pane--which has smelt out Governor Pyncheon, and alights now on
his forehead, now on his chin, and now, Heaven help us, is creeping over
the bridge of his nose, towards the would-be chief-magistrate's wide-open
eyes!"253

Hawthorne not only deploys his camera in imaginative space,

but utilizes the very syntatic nature of the written word as well; after
abruptly jumping from forehead to chin, and then to nose, Hawthorne's
syntactic "eye" intersperses three hyphenated words before landing on the
eyes--would-be:

chief-magistrate's:

wide-open:

eyes.

To the vacant

stare of the dead Judge, this focused speck of a fly no longer even
constitutes the terrifying shadow flitting about at the periphery of a
visual field.

The camera reciprocates this vacancy:

freeze frame--a

compound arthropod eye stares into nothingness!
Hawthorne often balances the internal composition of his image in
order to emphasize the significant relation of its parts:

"But the one

edifice, which gives the pledge of permanence to this bold enterprise, is
seen at the central point of the picture.

There stands the meeting-house,

a small structure, low-roofed, without a spire;"254 "Ever since sunrise,
Daniel Fairfield has been standing on the steps of the meeting-house,
with a halter about his neck • • • Dorothy Talby is chained to a post at
the corner of Prison Lane • • • while, through the bars of that great
wooden cage, in the centre of the scene, we discern either a human being
or a wild beast, or both in one, whom this public infamy causes to
roar;"255 "hemmed in by the dark wall of the forest, arose a rock, bearing
253The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 283.
254"Main-Street," XI, p. 57.
255Ibid., p. 66.
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some rude., natural resemblance either to an altar or a pulpit, and
surrounded by four blazing pines, their tops aflame, their stems
untouched, like candles at an evening meeting;"256 "Next, moving slowly,
with a confused clatter of hoofs on the pavement, rode a party of mounted
gentlemen, the central figure being Sir Edmund Andros;"257 "The central
object, in the mirrored picture, was an edifice of humble architecture,
with neither steeple nor bell to proclaim it,--what nevertheless it
was,--the house of prayer;"2S8 "And there stood the minister, with his
hand over his heart; and Hester Prynne, with the embroidered letter
glimmering on her bosom; and little Pearl, herself a symbol, and the
connecting link between those two.n259

By ordering and balancing his

imagery from within, Hawthorne subtly leads us from "representation" to
"composition;"260 the intensity of perception increases in direct
proportion to the augmented demands of the pattern.

Through the inter-

play of human experience, Hawthorne arrives at the structural elements
of a phenomenon, and correspondingly composes these elements into visuals
which most affectively structure the human emotions from which they
derive.

Furthermore, the structural composition of the image itself often

discloses not only the camera-narrator's attitude toward his audience as
well as himself, but also toward the art work.

For example, the triadic

image of Pearl upon the scaffold connects her to both Hester and
256"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 84.
257"The Gray Champion," IX, p. 12.
258"Endicott and the Red Cross," IX, p. 434.
259The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 154.
260cf. Eisenstein, The Film Sense, p. 192.
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Dimmesdale, not only as the "focal point" of their relationship, but also
~

r

as the expressive center of Hawthorne's tone throughout the work.

Specif-

~;

ically, it is through Pearl that we discover Hawthorne's attitude toward
the novel.

In this case, the history or "construction" of Pearl is

grounded in the very same law by which the art work itself is determined.
Thus, when Hawthorne raises the question whether she has any discoverable
principle of Being, it is, most simply, rhetorical.

The question has

already been answered; she is the Letter in another form, "the scarlet
letter endowed with life!"261

Moreover, as an art work Pearl is neither

subject nor object, but abides somewhere between the two:

she is both.

In lavishing her time and ingenuity upon the Letter, Hester succeeds in
creating "an analogy between the object of her affection, and the emblem
of her guilt and torture.

But, in truth, Pearl was the one, as well as

the other; and only in consequence of that identity had Hester contrived
so perfectly to represent the scarlet letter in her appearance."262

The

labor of art, the labor of childbirth, art work and child, both are
products of flesh, blood, and sweat.

Hence, against the Romantic notion

of inspiration, Hawthorne, through the "mask" of Pearl, blasphemously
remarks:

"I have no Heavenly Father!" 263

Both art work and child are

grounded in the finitude of masculine and feminine principles; that is,
Being.

Like Virginia Woolf's Orlando, the Haunted Mind is androgynous.

As with Pearl, the art work requires that its "unquiet elements" be
somehow "soothed away" or integrated into a larger structure before it
can accommodate a world.264

In such a way, each partakes of "depth, too,

261The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 102.
262Ibid.

263tbid., p. 98.

264rbid., pp. 94-95.
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as well as variety."265

In typically ironic fashion, Hawthorne thus

declares Pearl to be "the richest heiress of her day, in the New World." 266
Indeed, she truly is the first great novel to be crafted on North American
shores; it remained for another to refine and send her to foreign shores.
When we read in the concluding pages that Pearl grew up an heiress and
traveled abroad, "we realize that we can pursue her further adventures
through the novels of Henry James."267
If, however, Hawthorne's internal composition affectively
structures the image and subsequently determines the tone of the entire
work, it is his manner of accommodating the relationship between images
which most significantly constitutes the revolutionary aspect of his
oeuvre.

In the juxtaposition or, more properly speaking, the "transpo-

sition" of his images, we find Hawthorne's brilliant cinematic vision
most pronounced.

If his internal composition shapes the significant

content of the image, it simultaneously forms those images which precede
and succeed it, for the sequence of his imagery is predicated on the prereflective motion of perception, that motion in the visual field which
"makes sense" of the objects it discovers.

As Goethe remarked:

"In

nature we never see anything isolated, but everything in connection with
something else which is before it, beside it, under it, and over it."268
Hawthorne's cinematic "shots" constantly alter in proportion to the extent
of their discovery, ·for they continuously suit or accommodate the transfigurative motion of perception, the discernment of variously changing
265Ibid., p. 90.

266rbid., p. 261.

26hevin, p. 78.

f68conversations with Eckermann, 1825, quoted in Eisenstein, Film
Form, trans. Jay Leyda (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
Harvest Book, 1949), p. 45.
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figures against an indeterminate field or background.

Thus, the

"recognition" which initiates chapter III of The Scarlet Letter succinctly
and compendiously describes the significant distinction between being
conscious, which always partially includes the "self" as object, and the
concomitant shift to perceptual consciousness, which necessarily excludes
the "self" in absolute surrender to the object being discovered.

At the

beginning of chapter III, Hawthorne completely reverses the dominant point
of view in chapter II; from being an object of consciousness and observation in her own right, Hester becomes a subject of perception, a camera
eye which opens onto the surrounding scene in order to articulate it
situatedly:

"From this intense consciousness of being the object of

severe and universal observation, the wearer of the scarlet letter was at
length relieved by discerning, on the outskirts of the crowd, a figure
which irresistibly took possession of her thoughts." 26 9

This "double-

exposure" which concludes one ch?pter and, at the same time, opens the
next, universally characterizes the transpositional nature of Hawthorne's
imagery and its subsequent motion.

Like the modern art work, the

succession of Hawthorne's images defies the daguerrean or allegorical
framing of life, both perceptually and ontologically, by making the
spectator a participant in the creation of a world.

By super-imposing

specific and individually situated points of view, Hawthorne's work, like
that of the cubists, transcends the isolated, daguerrean frame and enters
onto the world itself.
In the diorama, Hawthorne had already discovered montage.
Hawthorne's mind, of course, had always delighted in the juxtaposition of
269The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 60.
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two apparently unrelated things to produce a new third thing.

In a

journey to Shelburne Falls, 31 August 1838, which necessitated transversing Green Mountain, he remarked:

"It was chill and bleak on the

mountain-top, and a fire was burning in the bar-room."270

His specific

use of the conjunction "and" reveals his facility to accommodate
disparately concurrent images.

Coincidentally or not, the passage

immediately follows his description of the old Dutchman, who travels the
country with his diorama, in a wagon:

"We looked through the glass

orifices of his machine, while he exhibited a succession of the very
worst scratchings and daubings that can be imagined.n271

And Hawthorne

concludes the passage with an image that rivals Griffith's first
cinematic close-up of a huge "severed" head smiling c:tt the public for the
first time, which caused such panic in the theatre:272

"When the last

picture had been exhibited, he caused a country boor, who stood gaping
beside the machine, to put his head within it, and thrust his tongue out.
The head becoming gigantic, a singular effect was produced." 273
where, speaking of pigs, Hawthorne once observed:

Else-

"I suppose it is the

knowledge that these four grunters are doomed to die within two or three
weeks, that gives them a sort of awfulness in my conception; it makes me
contrast their present gross substance of fleshly life with the nothingness speedily to come."274

The superimposition of temporal frames within

•
270The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 131.
271Ibid., p. 130.
272Blla Bal;zs, Theory of the Film, trans. Edith Bone (London:
Dennis Dobson, 1952), p. 35; see also, Perkins, pp. 72-73.
273The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 130.
274Ibid., p. 204.
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the mind's conception only serves to reaffirm the ek-static present in
which perception is grounded.

Hawthorne's dioramic gaze naturally

bolstered this kind of contrast visually as well.

In a passage

strikingly reminiscent of Eisenstein's example of montage taken from
Ambrose Bierce's "The Inconsolable Widow," Hawthorne relates an incident
in which his son, Julian, arrives at a similar kind of conclusion from the
juxtaposition of two separate images.

Eisenstein quotes the following

passage from Bierce, previously noted in chapter II:
A Woman in widow's weeds was weeping upon a grave.
"Console yourself, madam," said a Sympathetic Stranger.
"Heaven's mercies are infinite. There is another man somewhere,
besides your husband, with whom you can still be happy."
11
There was," she sobbed-- 11 there was, but this is his grave."275
Hawthorne notes the following remark, made by his son while looking through
a series of drawings and engravings:

"'What's that crying for his

father?,' asks he, looking at a picture of a widow and her son. 11 276

Both

examples suggest a new image from the juxtaposition of two previous ones.
Speaking of Julian, Hawthorne continues:

11

He brings me Flaxman's drawings.·

of Juno and Minerva going to assist the Greeks, in a car, drawn through
the celestial regions by two horses; and calls it 'Horses running so hard
to get to the barn.'" 2 77

Julian's

11

interpretation" of these images

suggests conclusions similar to those which Eisenstein proposes in his
275quoted in Eisenstein, The Film Sense, p. 5.
276The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 416.
2 77Ibid.; cf. also: "Little Julian
now sits with a slate and
pencil, drawing as he says a bird--and next, a chair--both objects being
represented by a similar scratch"(p. 409): "Children always seem to like
a very wide scope for imagination, as respects their babies, or indeed any
playthings; this cushion, or a rolling-pin, or a nine-pin, or any casual
thing, seems to answer the purpose of a doll, better than the nicest
little wax figure that the art of man can contrive"(p. 410). Similarly,
compare Hawthorne's description of Pearl: 11 The unlikeliest materials, a
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works on film.

In so far as the new image is qualitatively distinguish-

able from each component element viewed separately, it reduces "actuality"
to "suggestion." 2 78

The new image is in ~o way fixed, or ready-made, but

arises from the process itself; thus, montage transforms the representa-

-

tiona! into the presentational, obliging the spectator to create the new
image himself. 279

Because it transcends or transforms the individually

framed images which produce it, montage creates the illusion of motion--a
cinematic phenomenon which exists "on the higher levels of film structure
as well as on the very threshold of film illusion, for 'persistence of
vision' from frame to frame of the film strip is what creates the
illusion of film movement."280

Hawthorne employed the literary equivalent

of montage in order to create a similar kind of motion in the mind's eye.
Hawthorne's images constantly manipulate the affective

distanc~

between spectator and scene not only as a function of space, but also in
time.

In addition to his various cinematic shots which, as we have seen,

include such superimpositional techniques as the fade and cross-fade, he
also regulates and modifies the tempo by which they appear.

In a passage

remarkably similar to Merleau-Ponty's discussion of pure transition,
Hawthorne once observed of a bird in flight:

"Then the shadow of a bird

flitted across a sunny spot; there is a peculiar impressiveness in this
mode of being made acquainted with the flight of a bird; it affects the
stick, a bunch of rags, a flower, were the puppets of Pearl's witchcraft,
and, without undergoing any outward change, became spiritually adapted to
whatever drama occupied the stage of her inner world"(Th~ Scarlet Letter,
I, p. 95).
278Eisenstein, The Film Sense, pp. 8 and 24, respectively.
279Ibid., pp. 30-31.
280Ibid. , p. 80.
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mind more than i f the eye had actually seen it."281

Speaking of the

tbematization of movement and its subsequent negation of a pure
transition, Merleau-Ponty explains:
The something in transit which we have recognized as necessary to
the constitution of a change is to be defined only in terms of the
particular manner of its 'passing'. For example, the bird which
flies across my garden is, during the time that it is moving,
merely a greyish power of flight and, generally speaking, we shall
see that things are defined primarily in terms of their 'behaviour'
and not in terms of their static 1 properties•.282
Perhaps the most analogous visual example of cinematic motion in the
ordinary world obtained, for Hawthorne, from seeing an obscure image flit
across a doorway or window.

Such images, projected in motion against

their functional "screen," frequently appear in the notebooks:

watching

the window of a house, Hawthorne observes, "occasionally, a lady's
figure, either seated, or appearing with a flitting grace, or dimly
manifest farther within the obscurity of the room;" and elsewhere he
remarks, "In the interior region of the stable, everything is dim and
undefined; half traceable outlines of stalls; sometimes the shadowy aspect
of a horse, with a man in a white frock, and therefore more distinguishable, leading him along." 28 3

Such attention to transition securely

influenced Hawthorne's editorial technique of "cutting" and "splicing"
the tempo of his narration.

Sylph Etherege gazes at the superimposition

of her own features with those of her lover (animus and anima) in the
miniature portrait which she holds in her hand.

Suddenly the focus blurs,

the features change to bold, acrimonious strokes betraying a charcoal
281The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 247.
282Phenomenology, p. 275.
283rhe American Noteboo~~. VIII, pp. 497 and 504, respectively.
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sketch of her lover's secret face; 2 84

disillusioned by this revelation,

she resolves to seek the true image that she loves elsewhere, in death:
the eye of the camera stares out into infinity.285

Hawthorne's camera-

eye penetrates the interior texture of a world whose objects disclose the
various "rhythms" of perceptual consciousness by virtue of their metamorphic displacement in space.

The camera recreates perceptual

consciousness in its endeavor to complete a situated and intentional
"gestalt" via a series of temporally displaced figures which articulate
a composite, yet indeterminate, field.

Amidst a sequence of moving shots

which firmly establish a particular setting, for example, Hawthorne's
dioramic gaze will often come to a complete halt, permitting various
"figures" to enter its "field:"

after surveying the crowd which surrounds

the prison, the camera freezes on the jail itself, as Hester emerges into
the open air with Pearl;286

>

following its investigation of the darkened

parlor, where the dead Judge slumps in his ancestral arm-chair while
Hepzibah stares around the room from its threshold, the camera pauses as
Clifford appears before her, obliquely emerging from within the room's
interior, reflecting in his pale countenance the dark secret at its
center;287 from the human commotion surrounding him along the road where
he sleeps, David Swan remains the single, stationary figure of the
solitary scene he so forcefully disrupts at the beginning.288
Hawthorne's images continually increase or decrease in tempo,
284"sylph Etherege," XI, p. 116.

Cf. also, Normand, p. 317.

285Normand, p. 317.
286The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 52.
287The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 249.
288"David Swan," IX, p. 184.

279
displaying the pre-reflectively supple time and space of cinematic
consciousness; his method of composition thus recreates perceptual
consciousness itself.

As Eisenstein has said of compositional embodi-

ment in film, it asserts :its own unique affect upon its perceivers, "not
only because it is raised to the level of natural phenomena, but also
because the laws of its construction are simultaneously the laws
governing those who percei;re the work." 289

In "The Haunted Mind,"

Hawthorne's camera presents a stepped-up sequence of "supered" shots
which create the depths of reverie from whence they derive; 290 likewise,
the supered images which revolve around the static image of Hester on the
pillory, consolidate a rapid series of tableaux which reconstructs the
associative process of memory, 29 1 just as the story itself moves through
"a series of tableaux in which everything seems to stand still;" 292 the
swift succession of cross-cuts shifting from room to house, house to
street, and then back again, in "The Wives of the Dead," solidifies the
hectic activity of the night, pre-figuring the final "freeze-frame" in
close-up of a tear trickling down a cheek;293 the hasty progression of
images instantaneously fabricated by Fancy, Memory, and Conscience in
Mr. Smith's mind, convey the ineffable complexity and ambiguity of
life,294 "almost as if a modern psychologist were putting us through one
289Film Form, p. 161.
290Ix, PP· 306-07.
291The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 58.
292Mark Van Doren, Nathaniel Hawthorne (New York: The Viking Press,
1949; reprinted., Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972), p. 164.
293xi, p. 199.
2 94"Fancy's Show Box," IX, pp. 224-25.
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of his tests in thematic apperception." 2 95

More often, however,

Hawthorne's visual effects do not demand fast cutting.

Indeed, in many

instances fast cutting would ruin the desired effect, for the movement is
frequently located within the image and virtually demands a fixed,
consistent camera-viewpoint. 2 96

For example, with the escape of Clifford

and Hepzibah on the train, Hawthorne more properly creates his affective
visual tension by a sequence of long takes, rather than a series of brief,
sporadic cuts which the locomotion superficially seems to demand.

While

Clifford's eyes take in the rapidly passing scenes that beseige him,
Hepzibah's mind's eye returns to the iron fetters of the House, that
ubiquitously fixed idea from which she cannot escape.
With miles and miles of varied scenery between, there was no scene
for her, save the seven old gable-peaks, with their moss, and the
tuft of weeds in one of the angles, and the shop-window, and a
customer shaking the door, and compelling the little bell to jingle
fiercely, but without disturbing Judge Pyncheon! This one old
house was everywhere! It transported its great, lumbering bulk,
with more than railroad speed, and set itself phlegmatically down
on whatever spot she glanced at.297
Moreover, as the world races past these "two owls" ("Everything was
unfixed from its age-long rest, and moving at whirlwind speed in a
direction opposite to their own"), Hawthorne juxtaposes the interior life
of the railroad car, wherein decelerated long shots of passengers
engaged by such everyday past-times as reading, penny-papers, and ball
off-set the accelerated montage of images which beleaguer them from
without.298

Immediately thereafter, Hawthorne abridges both interior and

295Levin, p. 44.
296cf. Durgnat, p. 35.
297The House of the Seven Gables, II, p. 258.
298Ibid., pp. 256 and 257, respectively.
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exterior motion to a stand-still, as Clifford attracts the conversation
of a passenger.

Then, just as suddenly, the image once again shifts; we

cut to a long shot outside the car, as the train comes to a stop and
Clifford and Hepzibah terminate their giddy flight for a more stable
perch on solid ground.

Instantly, from the center of the track, a

stable camera hypnotically gazes toward a vast infinity, and theoretically swallows the incompatibly perpendicular lines which threaten to
explode the transparent perspective of a single horizon.

The train, with

all of its interior life, gradually recedes toward this external
distance, rapidly lessening to a point which, in another moment, vanishes
altogether.299
by the House.

Clifford and Hepzibah re-enter a static prospectus framed
The two owls become eagles.

Hawthorne's strong, eloquent arrangements between successive
images, and within the single image (mise-en-s~ne),300 subsequently
invites a further stylistic comparison with Eisenstein, especially his
later style in Ivan the Terrible, where he had already evolved away from
a rapid "cutting" style to a slow, elaborate pictorialism, stylistically
nearer to Dreyer and Sternberg.301

What Durgnat says of Eisenstein seems

equally true of Hawthorne; both tend to think of each screen picture "as
a little composition of its own, so deliberate and strong that one
becomes aware of each image, organized as a whole, following and replacing its predecessor, with a little impact.

The pictures are joined by

their 'collision', which sets a kind of solid, hard-edged mood, much as
brushstrokes set mood in painting." 302
299Ibid., p. 266.
301Ibid., p. 36.

Like the later Eisenstein,

300cf. Durgnat, p. 35.
302rbid., p. 48.
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Hawthorne's predominant tempo is slow; slow motion, delayed and
deliberate cutting, these most suitably accommodate his preferred theme
of the processional.

Indeed, the more a work benefits from rapid change

of image, the less it can draw on the equally expressive possibilities
of change within the image.303

Hawthorne's proclivity toward slower

tempos reflects not only his individual style, but the significance of
his vision as well.

By controlling the pace of his work, by constructing

a coherent emphasis, Hawthorne simultaneously shapes his theme.

The

more closely he adjusts the relationship among the parts, the more
intimate and personal the work becomes.

Yet, in so far as Hawthorne's

personal style reflects a way of seeing, it similarly encompasses a way
of showing; it not only embodies his relationship to characters and
objects, but also defines his relationship to us.

If point of view

determines the correlation between foreground and background, it is more
readily understandable why Hawthorne prefers a slower movement between
successive images, rather than a rapid cutting style, for it gives him
more time to create an ambience, to animate the scene, to linger, to
suggest--the speed, in short, which allows the most extensive interchange
between his foreground figures and background objects.

Through a series

of reflected ricochets, the figures of Pearl, Endicott, Goodman Brown,
and Ethan Brand variously reciprocate the armor, the breastplate, the
fire, the lime-kiln, as these objects, in turn, define the figures they
illumine.
To the extent that Hawthorne's dioramic darkness creates a center
around which a world coheres, it simultaneously discloses the motion of
303Perkins, p. 115.
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pre-reflective intentionality at the very heart of the perceptual act
which allows a subject to be "missing" from himself in order to
primordially dwell within the fabric of the world.

I am always absent

from myself at the center of Being, for if it were otherwise I could
never inhabit a world as such; the interior of Being osmotically engages
both subject and object in a single, "consubstantial" involvement.

In a

journal entry for 9 October 1841, Hawthorne descriptively implied this
kind of perceptual engagement between a subject and his world:
every tree seems to define and embody the sunshine.

"Now,

And yet, the

spectator can diffuse himself throughout the scene, and receive one
impression from all this painted glory." 304

In so far as "seeing" is an

act of the body, and not the mind, vision is always conjoined to movement, and prefigured in it.

"What would vision be without eye movement?

And how could the movement of the eyes bring things together if the
movement were blind?"305

The inauthentic technological perception would

have it precisely this way, for it conceives of perception as a function
of thought which sets before the mind a representational picture of the
world.

Consequently, its only retreat is towards the invisible, where it

finds safety and salvation from an incarnate world whose ambiguity it
cannot tolerate.

Authentic perception, on the other hand, opens itself

onto a world whenever it is genuinely "looking," and thereby holds things
around itself from an interior depth which is never merely a transparently
measureable displacement in external space.

When Hawthorne measures the

Letter, its mathematical length reveals nothing.
304The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 213.
305Merleau-Ponty, Prima~, p. 162.

"Certainly, there was
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some deep meaning in it, most worthy of interpretation, and which, as it
were, streamed forth from the mystic symbol, subtly communicating itself
to my sensibilities, but evading the analysis of my mind."306

Within

this expressive, heteroclitical space, the space of the heart, the
dialectic of inside and out congeals to an ambiguous locality wherein
"the mind has lost its geometrical homeland and the spirit is drifting."307
Amidst the world of Hawthorne's work, this interior and visible motion
transpires within and between the images themselves, and designates the
way in which they come to articulate the perceptual constancy of that
world.

Hawthorne's shadow and light, grounded in the finitude of an

inclusive darkness, interpenetrate one another to such an extent that
they autonomously express this double space of Being as it is realized in
the double-horizoned structure of the perceptual act itself.

The space

of Hawthorne's imagery always constitutes both an interior concavity and
an exterior convexity; the cave and mirror reflect the outside world
"like an eye that has become, in its turn, a projector and is able to
people the entire universe with its images in the manner of a magic
lantern."308

Hawthorne's imagery is thus clearly cinematic; its interior

motion reflects an intentional subjectivity beneath perception which not
only accounts for the birth of a world, but also sustains the reality of
that world.

He anticipated the modern cinema by more than half a

century, and in that process he prefigured the articulation of an
affective spatial depth wherein perception primordially transpires.
306The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 31.
307Bachelard, Poetics_ of Space_, p. 218.
308Normand, p. 154.

285
Thus Hawthorne's dioramic gaze displaces daguerrean representation
with cinematic composition, pattern in motion.309

His descriptive

technique transcends the representational nature of allegory, exemplifying Clive Bell's statement that "The representative element in a work of
art may or may not be harmful; always it is irrelevant."310

As a result,

Hawthorne's use of montage creates an expressive space whereby individual
figures and objects come to life by virtue of the motion which
articulates them.
and Film Acting:

As V.I. Pudovkin has remarked in his Film Technique
"every object, taken from a given viewpoint and shown

on the screen to spectators, is a dead object, even though it has moved
before the camera • • . •

Only if the object be placed together among a

number of separate objects, only if it be presented as part of a synthesis
of different separate visual images, is it endowed with filmic life."311
Hawthorne's dioramic gaze pierces the prejudiced and conventional
barriers of the technological world-view, for in its exploration of
physical reality it exposes a world never seen before.
Kracauer suggests:

As Siegfried

"physical nature has been persistently veiled by

ideologies relating its manifestations to some total aspect of the
universe •

The truly decisive reason for the elusiveness of

physical reality is the habit of abstract thinking we have acquired under
the reign of science and technology."312

Hawthorne's cinematic vision

309cf. Vachel Lindsay, The Art of the Moving Picture, rev. ed.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922.
310Art (London:
311London:

Chatto and Windus, 1923), p. 25.

Vision Press, 1958, p. 25.

312Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 299-300.
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consistently proclaims reality to be more inclusive than any single view,
for it must always remain primordially ambiguous in its opacity.

Just as

any dialogue is grounded in silence, and punctuates that ground with its
meaning or significance, so Hawthorne's dioramic gaze is grounded in
darkness, and intermittently pierces that dark with its ambiguously
groping disclosures.

Image and object become one in the pre-reflective

gaze which articulates them.
Hawthorne's cinematic vision recreates the pure transition of the
visual field in order to explore reality face to face against the world.
Because it negotiates a world close-up, and not in terms of a uniformly
fixed perspective, it mutually and proportionately conceals whatever it
reveals.

Hawthorne's dioramic gaze thus frees the image from its frame

and, like the modern art work, matriculates it onto the world.

Unlike

the technological loco-motion of the train, which merely represents a
transference in geographical space, this dioramic gaze reconstructs the
intentional motion of a percipient and thereby accommodates a space both
physical and virtual in which object

~nd

that ambiguous reality called "world."

subject inclusively constitute
With Hawthorne, therefore, it is

never a question of "objective" space, but rather its subjectively
heteroclitical equivalent which continuously refutes a homologously framed
geometric-mathematic transparency devoid of Being.

Light and shadow,

external and internal world inosculate each other and simultaneously
ratify an ambiguous dialectic of "without" and "within."

Hawthorne's

pre-objective gaze explodes the absolute, projected space of the
daguerrean view, in favor of a space concurrently projected and interior,
that double-horizoned space where object and image abide as one.
Hawthorne prefigured on the screen of the mind's eye what Renoir would
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project on the modern cinematic screen nearly a century later, prophetically liberating vision from its erroneous analogies with both perspective, and painting in general.

As Andr/Bazin said of Renoir:

In visual terms the screen is habitually equated with a pictureframe and, dramatically, with the proscenium. These parallels
result in an organization of visual material whereby the image is
composed in relation to the sides of the rectangle • . . • But
Renoir saw clearly that the screen was simply the counterpart of
the camera's viewfinder and therefore not a frame • • • but its
opposite: a mask whose function is as much to exclude reality as to
reveal it • . . ; what it shows draws it value from what it
conceals.313
As an originating consciousness, prior to objective knowledge as such,
Hawthorne's dioramic gaze articulates a lived-through world of experience
in which an object is never merely represented or identified, but
contingently lingers as opaque and ambiguous; for being-in-the-world is
primordially pre-objective, pre-apophantical, and decidedly personal.
This is not, however, to place the burden of the world upon a subjective,
"noetic" analysis, but rather to remain faithfully within the object
itself, as Husserl defined his "noematic" reflection, in order to
discover the world prior to any falling back upon ourselves:

"it is the

ambition to make reflection emulate the unreflective life of
consciousness."314

To the extent that Hawthorne's oeuvre reproduces this

pre-reflective life of perceptual consciousness, disrupting the
apophantical authority of the scientific-technological world-view, he is
unequivocally "modern."
Finally, Hawthorne's revolutionary use of montage implicitly
affirms the ontological priority of time itself.

Cinematic "cutting"

313cahiers du Cintma, 1952, quoted in Perkins, p. 38.
314Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. xvi.
aim of Husserl's eidetic reduction.

This is, of course, the
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ignores objective space; as such, its simultaneous spatial transposition
of images reciprocally neglects the temporal displacement as well.

The

expressive space of cinematic montage confirms the possibility of pure
transition, since it no longer "measures" time as a function of
space--that is, how long it takes to get from one place to another.
so far as it is virtual,

In

it obliterates the spatial priority of the

world-view as a primordial function of time.

Thus, like cinema,

Hawthorne's spatial relationships become metaphors for human relationships.

The virtual space of Hawthorne's dioramic gaze reduplicates the

interior subjectivity of an intentional, perceptual motion, that motion
grounded in the double horizon between both objective and affective space.
Like the perceptual space of the visual field, cinematic space comes and
goes.

Thus, its most distinctive characteristic:

present, an order of direct apparition.

"it creates a virtual

That is the mode of dream."3lS

If the style of Hawthorne's gaze asserts the perceptual constancy of the
thing as a completed function of time, it nevertheless continues to
sustain the ontological ambiguity of a world.

As the "measure" of Being,

time underpins the lived-through experience of Hawthorne's fictional
world.

Yet, by definition, a world accommodates not only "objects," but

"subjects" as well.

In its subjective constitution, the vague phantasms

which inhabit the world of Hawthorne's work are no less "real" than its
perceptions.

Because it is an individual which embraces every "thing,"

and not a collection of objects linked by causal relations, the world is
always destined to remain the ambiguous theatre of all experiences.316
315Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 412.
316Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 343.
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Hawthorne's fictional world exploits this antepredicative tolerance, "and
our bewildering proximity to the whole of being in syncretic experience."317

At its interior, Hawthorne's world appropriates this

ontological proximity to Being in so far as it accommodates the
expressive subjectivity of dream_, which dwells at the very heart of its
vision.

To the extent that Hawthorne's dioramic gaze visually dislocates

"reality," it adhibits the hypnagogic image--those images, as
F. 0. Matthiessen observed, "subsisting on the borderland of the unconscious which surrealism has seized for its peculiar dornain." 318

Like the

cinematic consciousness itself, the dream mode is able to draw the
spectator into a creative act "in which his individuality is not
subordinated to the author's individuality, but is opened up throughout
the process of fusion with the author's intention."319

Rather than close

itself off within the self-evident certitude of a uniformly framed view,
Hawthorne's dioramic gaze expressively affirms the equivocal nature of a
world anterior to rational investigation.

If anything, the superimposed

questioning voice at the center of Hawthorne's narration constitutes the
rhetorical negation of all certitude whatsoever.

For example, the

"supered" interrogative voice attending Hawthorne's description of the
dead Judge ("Has it yet vanished?

No!--yes!--not quite!"), reflects the

universal epistemological ambiguity of his entire oeuvre.

It is the

disembodied voice of the dream, the secret witness whose vision we
317rbid.
318Arnerican Renaissance (New York:
p. 232.

Oxford University Press, 1941),

319Eisenstein, The Film Sense, p. 33. Cf. also, Ernest Lindgren,
The Art of the Film (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 92: It is the
spectator:-'s own mind that moves.
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share.320

Thus, what made dioramic effects particularly significant to

the implementation of Hawthorne's descriptive gaze was their singular
appropriateness to the world he characteristically evoked--"a dream
world halfway between reality and fantasy in which truth is
simultaneously, maddeningly, graspable and evanescent." 321

As with

Montaigne, the world of Hawthorne's work confines itself to an
interrogation which is never even formulated, for any such formulation
would implicitly demand a determinate reply.322

Conversely, Hawthorne's

fictional world substantiates the lived-through identity of both Being
and appearance, the ambiguous opacity of existence; in both cases, we
have the same silence and the same void.323

It is toward the silence

and the void of this world that we must now turn.

320Lease, p. 321.
321rbid.
322cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, p. 295.
323rbid.

CHAPTER IV
HAWTHORNE'S ONTOLOGICAL ABODE:

THE INTERIORITY OF BEING

If Hawthorne's dioramic gaze enabled him to reveal an indeterminate
world no longer constituted by the daguerrean frame or world-view, it simultaneously structured a consciousness which was itself ambiguously
circumvoluted.

Because cinematic consciousness projects a space which

comes and goes, it subsequently creates an iconology whose jagged edges
split and tear the image rather than seal it off.l

In so far as these

images which shift and fade occupy an haptic foreground, emerging to
touch the cutaneous surface of our gaze, they articulate a concernfully
situated posture rather than the objectively detached view of daguerrean
representation.

In other words, they are expressive.

Vision in high

definition always discourages empathy, 2 whereas Hawthorne's fragmented
vision encourages participation by virtue of the indefinite edges of its
"field," a field which affectively enters onto the expressive space of
the world.

At the interior of this disconnected, unenclosed vision,

Hawthorne heuristically interrogates the meaning or significance of those
apparitions which inhabit the world of his work.

Left to its own

devices, the visual sense always seeks to outrage the ambiguous opacity
of appearances by seeking "reality" elsewhere; indeed, the rift between
appearance and reality is already built into that kind of seeing which
lMcLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 2.
2Ibid., p. 77.
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pictures the world as a view.

The seventeenth-century portrait, for

example, which stares back at us in full view, evidences the correctness
of itself--that is, the artist's view--in opposition to the ambiguous
way it is drawn by the light.

It similarly frames the spectator by

placing him in the center of its own objectively correct space.
portrait becomes a baby-sitter.

The

Beyond the ambiguous boundary of Being,

man thus forfeits his right to live the world in any way other than as a
detached observer.

Reality subsequently becomes the representation of

an isolated moment in time, a three-dimensional perspective of the mind,
a concept.

Man goes blind.

The world of Hawthorne's work, on the other

hand, previews the purely apparitional space of cinema and its irreverent
disregard for objectivity by re-incorporating appearance and reality.

In

order to escape the rationalism of the visual frame which had dominated
Western civilization for centuries, Hawthorne's oeuvre recovers an
iconography whose interior vision once again involves the spectator as a
participant in the world.

Amidst a mosaic of appearances, Hawthorne's

world refuses the spectator the possibility of escaping those questions
which it raises.

He can deny them, but he must address them first.

Hawthorne's cinematic vision expresses this immediacy, the immediacy of
its apparitions.

Grounded in facticity, Hawthorne's world is thus

formal only in so far as it is phenomenal; because it has no framework
fixed in a physical or pictorial space, but merely structures the mobile
reticulation of intention, it thus asserts, as its primary formal
characteristic, a virtual present.3

It is in the mode of dream.

Hawthorne's fiction characteristically evokes a dream mode, a mode
3cf. Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 412.
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which like all of modern art brings its elements equally into the foreground.

As Susanne Langer has remarked:

The most noteworthy formal characteristic of dream is that the
dreamer is always at the center of it. Places shift, persons act
and speak, or change or fade--facts emerge, situations grow, objects
come into view with strange importance, ordinary things infinitely
valuable or horrible, and they may be superseded by others that are
related to them essentially by feeling, not by natural proximity.
But the dreamer is always "there," his relation is, so to speak,
equidistant from all events. Things may occur around him or unroll
before his eyes; he may act or want to act, or suffer or contemplate; but the immediacy of everything in a dream is the same for
him.4
The dream is thus essentially iconic, and not pictorial; the psychiatrist
merely forms the story line.5

Like the dioramic gaze, Hawthorne's

cinematic or dream consciousness is pervasively present; the dreamed
reality "can move forward or backward because it is really an eternal and
ubiquitous virtual present."6

The dream provided Hawthorne with a

diastolic counterbalance to the ponderous systole of rationalism and its
synchronic historical perspective.

From a Freudian point of view, the

dream project is disclosable (Darstellbarkeit) precisely to the degree
that it is "over-determinate;" and this is what frustrates the rational
attitude the most.

As Freud observed, the principles of "over-determina-

tion" and "condensation" allow the dream mode to expressively transpose
disparate and discontinuous elements or moments in time.

Hawthorne

implicitly understood this dynamic, and explicitly reconstructed the
logic of dream consciousness in order to undermine the arrogant and
manipulative certitude of the daguerrean view, thus undercutting the
4Ibid., p. 413.
5McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 137.
6Langer, Feeling and Form, p. 415.
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subject-object dichotomy itself.
remarks:

As the narrator in "P. 's Correspondence"

"More and more I recognize that we dwell in a world of shadows;

and, for my part, I hold it hardly worth the trouble to attempt a
distinction between shadows in the mind, and shadows out of it.

If

there be any difference, the former are rather the more substantial."7
Again, in The American Notebooks, Hawthorne said it another way:
"students out to be day-dreamers, all of them--when cloud-land is one and
the same thing with the substantial earth." 8

Hawthorne typically adopted

the stance of conscious dreamer9 so that the world of his work
consistently remains opaque throughout.

Against the transparency of

scientific certitude, Hawthorne's fiction asserts the ambiguous
concealedness of truth and its corresponding epistemological appropriation by a factical subjectivity which must call it into Being.

And

though his use of the "doppelganger" technique in such stories as
"Monsieur du Mirroir" and "Graves and Goblins" represents a superficial
attempt to get outside the "self," his most effective efforts addressing
the problem of knowledge paradoxically derive from quite the opposite
point of view.

For it is only when Hawthorne delves to the very interior

of consciousness that he ironically achieves his most poignantly
perceptive angle of vision on the truth of the world.
By re-establishing the primacy of the phenomenon, Hawthorne's
dream-like vision returns to the immediate order of apparitions as they
make their first appearance in consciousness, and by which the world, in
7x, p. 367.

Bviii, PP· 122-23.
9cf. Joseph C. Pattison, "Point of View in Hawthorne," PMLA, 82
(October 1967) : 365-66.
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turn, originally announces itself.

The dream enabled Hawthorne to

structure a vision of the world primordially grounded in appearance, a
vision indistinguishable from the "reality" it is presumed to re-present.
Over and against the scientific-technological objectification of the
world and its attendant manipulation of Being, Hawthorne's cinematic
dream-consciousness concernfully enowns the facticity of things within
the openness of Being.

It encourages the thing to rest within itself, 10

and likewise rescues truth from its invisibly transparent fixation in the
mind.

Reality becomes the oblique transformation of appearances, a

lived-through structure whereby man's facticity announces itself anew.
As Heidegger observed:

"What is lasting in the presence of objective

things is not their self-subsistence within the world that is their
own."ll

Hawthorne implicitly recognized that the "worldly" character of

truth implies the whole of Being:

"Truth often finds its way to the mind

close-muffled in robes of sleep, and then speaks with uncompromising
directness of matters in regard to which we practice an unconscious selfdeception, during our waking moments."12

In opposition to the Platonic

tendencies inherent in romanticism, transcendentalism, and the
scientific-technological world-view, Hawthorne's fiction proclaims the
phenomenal nature of "form," and thereby re-confirms the factical wholeness of Being itself.

Since neither truth nor beauty subsist

"objectively" within the whole of Being, they must be sought on the
hither side of an artificial distinction between subject and object.
lOcf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 130.
llibid.
12"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 40.
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Both physical and metaphysical inquiry willfully ignore their own
interrogative relation to the "nature" they so obdurately seek to disclose by virtue of the theoretical frame which they employ, and which
subsequently places the "content" of their investigation outside of the
inquirer himself.

Because it divorces itself from the very inquiry it

undertakes, an "objective" posture is always forced to judge the truth of
its discoveries in terms of an absolute, impersonal "One" (das Man).

For

example, Kant's position from the outset is tantamount to "One
knows

II

Thus, the transcendental unity of apperception is no

one's in particular.

In so far as both rationalism and idealism demand

the same "objective" point of view, then, they demand in fact no point of
view at all--that is, Leibniz's perspectiveless posture.

In other words,

"one knows" in the same way "one sees," by virtue of a ubiquitous and
uniform rational space, the uniform space of perspective.

It is this

very dynamic, or lack of it, which makes the body-less point of view
inauthentic; it lacks a "self."

It constitutes the care-less voice of

the "they" (das Man), as when we explain what is "correct," for example,
with the exclamation:

"one does this" or "one does that."

Only in this

way can the perspectiveless posture accommodate a contradiction it
denies to "reality" itself:
unnatural.
natural

the distinction between natural and

Pascal knew better:

"The nature of man is wholly

There is nothing he may not make natural; there is

nothing natural he may not lose." 13

To the extent that Being is always

"at home" with itself, it autonomously relegates the "unnatural" to the
13Blaise Pascal, Pens/es, in "Pensles" -and "The
Provincial _;_:_..;;....o.~..:..
Letters"
--- -~--=-=trans. W. F. Trotter and Thomas M'Crie (New York: The Modern Library,
1941) , p. 3 7.
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realm of the absurd.

Man can do things to nature, for nature, against

nature; but they are never unnatural, for the formal possibilities of a
world are already alongside each other in so far as a world is
structured by whatever can be.

Hawthorne expressed it thus:

comes amiss to Nature--all is fish that comes to her net.

"Nothing

If there be a

living form of perfect beauty instinct with soul--why, it is all very
well, and suits Nature well enough.

But she would just as lief have

that same beautiful, soul-illumined body, to make worm's meat of, and to
manure the earth with."l4

For Hawthorne, the dream mode cancelled out

the abstracted and theoretical logic of second-order consciousness; the
truth of the world no longer obtains from its non-contradictory agreement
within a fixed and sterile mental perspective of correct and true ideas.
Indeed, dream even distorts the "probable," that quantitative securityblanket by which the masses live their lives mathematically.
has remarked:

As Pascal

"Take away probability, and you can no longer please the

world; give probability, and you can no longer displease it."l5
Hawthorne's interior world of dream translates the dioramic gaze
into the "subjective" realm of metaphysics as an analogous model of
logic.

In contrast to the mediate, reflective consciousness of the

rational attitude, this new interior consciousness reveals a logic
immediately in touch with Being.

In so far as he "occupies" a finite

middle between two infinite extremes, man must learn to seek repose
within the center of Being itself, a sphere whose circumference is
nowhere.

"For in fact what is man in nature?

14The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 272.

15Pens~s, p. 318.
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with the Infinite, an All in comparison with the Nothing, a mean between
nothing and everything.

Since he is infinitely removed from comprehending

the extremes, the end of things and their beginning are hopelessly hidden
from him in an impenetrable secret. 11 16

Thus, Owen Warland, whose butter-

fly becomes a heap of glittering fragments, at last enowns the object of
his life-long labors only when it ceases to be objective:

"the symbol by

which he made it perceptible to mortal senses became of little value in
his eyes, while his spirit possessed itself in the enjoyment of the
Reality."17

Only outside Being does man objectify the object; within

the concernfully solicitous sphere of his existence, the object is
objective only in so far as it "objects."

Hawthorne's ontological turn

toward the interior of Being discloses a logic which converts the
immanent abjectness of consciousness into the heart's innermost region. 18
Within this intimate space, the heart takes up the things of the world as
}

they proximally express the nearness of Being.

The drama which trans-

pires amidst the world of Hawthorne's work articulates an affective
"locale" wherein the object virtually comes to life; this Ovidian
universe announces itself to the degree that it becomes animate.

The

Letter, the House, the statue, the ribbon, the pipe, the oaken lady, the
mountain, the lime-kiln19 __ these objects touch us with their own reality
only to the extent that they kindle an affective life within.

The

16Ibid., p. 23.
17"The Artist of the Beautiful," X, p. 475.
18cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 131.
19The Scarlet Letter, I; The House of the Seven Gables, II; The
Marble Faun, IV; "Young Goodman Brown," x;"Feathertop," X; "Drowne's
Wooden Image," X; "The Great Stone Face," XI; "Ethan Brand," XI.
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controlling consciousness at the center of Hawthorne's vision is thus
discovered in the heart's inner space; the logic of the heart brings
things into the fullness of Being where a restructured consciousness
accommodates the very nearness of Being itself:

"Bringing near in this

way, nearness conceals its own self and remains, in its own way, nearest
of all."20
That the remoteness of Being, which the perspective of the scientific-technological attitude takes for granted, represents the most
pressing dilemma of a visual culture is already indicated in the growing
sense of division between appearance and reality; thus, in conjunction
with its aforementioned evils, the perspective of a world view also introduced an obsession with the problem of hyprocisy:

witness Moli~re's

Tartufe, Tourneur's Revenger's Tragedy, and Fielding's Tom Jones. 2 1
Rather than reflect the Baroque quest for depth through duality,2 2
Hawthorne's oeuvre, like the mirrors which populate it, seeks to direct
or turn consciousness away from itself, and back to a single-minded
injunction long forgotten since Socrates.

And it is now remembered in

the same way that we recall a friend who was once dear to us.

Because

this single-minded injunction constitutes the forgetting of itself in a
particularly personal way, it is now recalled with an affective ardor
that surprises us with the immediacy of its truth--an immediacy which
forms a revolutionary directive for the future.

At the same time, this

injunction evokes a "general image" 2 3 which initially hovers before the
20Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 178.
21McLuhan, Vanishing Point, p. 99.

22rbid., p. 101.

23cf. Eisenstein, The Film Sense, p. 31.
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world of Hawthorne's work, and which completes the work itself.

And

though Hawthorne's metonymic iconology manipulates its "space" so that it
freely moves about, his interior consciousness and its corresponding
logic of the heart's inner space nevertheless creates an intimate and
unified bearing toward the world of his work, a bearing spiritedly at
odds with the continuous and fixed attitude of the world-view.

It is this

intimate and unified bearing which recalls the single-minded injunction
long since forgotten:

"to thine own self be true!"

This imperative so

immediately undercuts the hypocritical duality of the world-view that its
recognition at once illuminates the deceitful disposition of the technological attitude and its attendant evils.

As Pascal remarked of his own

age, which was already on the way toward the technological era:

"I set

it down as a fact that if all men knew what each said of the other, there
would not be four friends in the world." 2 4

For Pascal, as for Hawthorne,

man can only transcend the hypocritical tendencies of the rational
attitude by beginning with the "self."

Like Hawthorne's single-minded

injunction, Pascal asserts the factical beginning of Being:
know oneself.

"One must

If this does not serve to discover truth, it at least

serves as a rule of life, and there is nothing better."25

By being true

to himself, man can at last learn to accept the reciprocal "reality" of
appearance and its formal relation to the structure of the world.
Hawthorne's oeuvre attests this fact, and solicits the truth of Being
within the ambiguous openness at the interior of the heart's inner space.
Hawthorne's work accomplishes this venture by transforming the technological dominion of purposeful self-assertion in the objective into the
24Pensles, p. 41.

25Ibid., p. 20.
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saying of an inner recall; and

~t

the single-minded injunction.

Once Being has been dared this way, it now

lies in the balance.

inaugurates this transformation with

As Heidegger expressed it:

"The hard thing consists

not only in the difficulty of forming the work of language, but in the
difficulty of going over from the saying work of the still covetous
vision of things, from the work of the eyes, to the 'work of the
heart. '" 26

The venture thus begins in going over from objective repre-

sentation to the logic of the heart,27 where Being lies in the balance.
The world of Hawthorne's work safely negotiates this balance once it
executes the saying of the inner recall.

In going over from the

calculating will to the interior of the heart, the world's inner space,
the conversion is therein complete, whereby consciousness secures Being
for itself.

Thus, the conversion of consciousness at the interior of

Hawthorne's world appropriates a "physics of the exception"28 rather than
the rule; it care-fully takes man beyond the protective rule of uniformity
toward that interior space which bears the personal and unique stamp of
Being.

Hawthorne's oeuvre arrives out of the future; the future is

present in it:

"The greater the concealment with which what is to come

maintains its reserve in the foretelling saying, the purer is the
arrival."29
thus:

In "The Hall of Fantasy," the narrator's guide explains it

"If a man be in advance of his age, he must be content to make

his abode in this hall, until the lingering generations of his fellow26cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 138.
27Ibid., p. 133.
28cf. Gaston Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire, trans. Alan
C. M. Ross (Boston: Beacon Press, A Beacon Paperback, 1968), p. 82.
29Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 142.
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men come up with him.

He can find no other shelter in the universe.

But

the fantasies of one day are the deepest realities of a future one."30
It was only the destitution of his own age which, unaware of what it was
doing, prevented Hawthorne's work from becoming timely.31

The world of

Hawthorne's work is present to us now.

I

More often than not, Hawthorne considered life itself a dream.

He

did so with the implicit recognition that those passing apparitions which
beseige the interior life of consciousness, especially those which assail
the "haunted mind" somewhere between waking and slumber, bespeak of a
reality at odds with the noonday certitude of everyday experience, and
yet constitute a unified aspect of that experience.

Like the narrator of

"The Celestial Rail-Road," it is easy to dismiss the ambiguous interior
of consciousness with the facile cliche', "it was only a dream."32

For

Hawthorne, however, this clichl represents the ultimate, pathetic gesture
in escape from self-knowledge. 33

It is always those characters who

reject the dream that are most foolish.

Assuming of course, that only

one who is intelligent can be foolish, 34 Hawthorne's work attests the
bankruptcy of that intelligence which denies its own apparitions.

At

30X, p. 17 9 •
31Heidegger says the same of Holderlin's poetry; cf. Poetry,
Language, Thought, p. 142.
32x, p. 206.
33Joseph C. Pattison, "'The Celestial Rail-Road' as Dream-Tale,"
American Quarterly, 20 (Summer 1968) : 236.
34cf. Max Scheler, Man'~ Place in Nature, trans. Hans Meyerhoff
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, The Noonday Press, 1961), p. 29.
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Blithedale, Coverdale's ultimate failure is already prefigured on one of
his first nights in the community by his dismissal of a dream:

"Had I

made a record of that night's half-waking dreams, it is my belief that it
would have anticipated several of the chief incidents of this narrative,
including a dim shadow of its catastrophe."35

In the preface, Hawthorne

had observed that his own experience at Brook Farm was "essentially a
day-dream, and yet a fact . . . offering an available foothold between
fiction and reality."36

Hawthorne's fiction addresses a perceptive

audience whose sensibility, as he said of his daughter Una, "is more
readily awakened by fiction than reality." 37

Similarly, with the

Pyncheons, "rejection of dream at cost to their humanity is
characteristic .

Haughtily as the Pyncheons bear themselves in the

noonday streets, however, they are 'no better than bondservants to these
plebian Maules, on entering the topsy-turvy commonwealth of sleep'."38
As with the world-view, those who reject dream inevitably find themselves
cut off from their own humanity and the world which they inhabit--witness
Goodman Brown:

"A stern, a sad, a darkly meditative, a distrustful, if

not a desparate man, did he become, from the night of that fearful
dream."39

Throughout his life, everything predisposed Hawthorne to day-

dreaming, toward unfocused diversions of the mind and senses;40
35The Blithedale Romance, III, p. 38; cf. also, Pattison, "'The
Celestial Rail-Road' as Dream-Tale," p. 227.
36Ibid., p. 2.
37The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 415.
38Pattison, "'The Celestial Rail-Road' as Dream-Tale," p. 227.
39"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 89.
40Normand, p. 107.
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single-mindedly, his work accomplished this oneiric transformation of
reality, articulating a world constituted by images both from without and
within.

In a journal entry, 1842, he expressed it thus:

"To write a

dream, which shall resemble the real course of a dream, with all its
inconsistency, its strange transformations, which are all taken as a
matter of course, its eccentricities and aimlessness--with nevertheless a
leading idea running through the whole. Up to this.old age of the world,
no such thing ever has been written."41
As the spectator of his own dreams, Hawthorne's cinematic
consciousness reclaims the Ovidian universe as man's primordial homeland:
We find ourselves on the borders of the region of primitive
romance, of the supernatural, of dreams. We are entering a land of
chimeras where everything is possible, where everything is capable
of metamorphosis: houses transformed into vegetables, human trees,
wooden figureheads with faces of flesh--we stand once again in the
province of magic--in which objects and beings are simultaneously
themselves and other than themselves, change their faces, their
forms, their colors, appear and disappear • • • the country in
which things become animate, in which living beings suddenly become
statues, in which the dead move, in which man is on the same scale
as nature • • • • 42
Against the scientific-technological world-view, which always makes man
"larger than" nature as the "measure" or subjectum, Hawthorne's
convoluted dream mode not only gives man back to nature, and nature to
man, but also places him within the circular sphere of Being.

Indeed,

because it puts him on the same scale as nature, it re-places man within
the ambiguous texture of the existent.

Through the dream mode,

Hawthorne's iconic imagery recreates the expressive labyrinth of a world
whose ownmost image is itself to be discovered at the interior of the
41The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 240.
42Normand, p. 294.
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heart's inner space.

Each work being a sphere, the interwoven texture of

the world finds its reciprocal convexity and concavity enclosed by
mutually opposing mirrors which constantly reflect the ambiguous image of
Being back upon itself:43

the echoes which ricochet from the hills are

exclusively supported by the hollow, perpetually drawing them back to its
center;44 the images of the past which circle around Hester are
inclusively maintained within the frozen silence of the pillory;45 the
images which evolve inside the showman's box are ultimately grounded by
its finite, temporal center;46 the interior labyrinth which Goodman Brown
discovers in the forest paradoxically encloses that which it reveals, as
the forest itself reciprocally revolves about him.47

The dream-like

contour of Hawthorne's convoluted sinuosities actively provokes the
antagonism of the straight line, and the acute aggressive angle.48
Antipodal to the transparent perspective of the daguerrean view, and its
explicit sanctification of the straight line and acute angle, the dream
process opposes all reflective distance by which we "know" the objects of
a world.

As with the equidistant images which revolve around Hester on

the pillory, dream puts us directly in touch with the objects of a
consciousness immediately our own.

It thus articulates a world

independent of a priori, rational or mental constructs; it is the
43cf. Ibid., p. 298.
44"The Hollow of the Three Hills," IX, p. 201.
45The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 58-59.
46"Main-Street," XI, pp. 49-50.
47"Young Goodman Brown," X, pp. 83-84.
48Normand, p. 300.
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incarnate reality of immediate appearance.

As Werner Wolff points out:

"Most investigators of the dream knowledge that the dream is a
reflection of waking experiences, but none has stated that our waking
experiences are also reflections of our dreams;" and though in dream man
searches for the fulfillment of reality, the opposite is equally true as
well:

"in reality, man searches for the figures of his dream."49

Similarly, Hawthorne's narrator often questions the "reality" of events;
he merely states a "fact" and then casts doubt upon it.
narrator achieves a kind of dream logic in the "telling."

Thus, the
The ambiguous

references to illusion and reality accommodate Hawthorne's opaque
technique without precisely having to define the nature of the experience--for example, whether it is "actual" or "imaginary."
In dream, objects of the conceptual mind become but dim shadows to
the "eye;" the image returns to the incarnate setting of a world.
Haunted Mind" defines the oneiric urgency of this moment:

"The

"Passion and

Feeling assume bodily shape, and the things of the mind become dim
spectres to the eye."50

As with Keats' "negative capability," the

haunted mind relinquishes its will to will in favor of a sensibility more
or less entirely passive, a sensibility, moreover, which invites the
world to it in order to appear.

"In an hour like this, when the mind has

a passive sensibility, but no active strength; when the imagination is a
mirror, imparting vividness to all ideas, without the power of selecting
or controlling them; then pray that your griefs may

slt~ber,

and the

49The Dream: Mirror of Conscience (New York: Grune and Stratton,
1952), pp:-299-300. Cf. also, Erich Fromm, The Forgotten Language.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951.
50 IX, p. 306.
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brotherhood of remorse not break their chain."51

For centuries, the

ontical world of science had contented itself with "observation," a
procedure which Hawthon1e found at best superfluous.

In so far as

scientific observation merely notices or "takes note of" the conspicuous,
it is redundant.

For this kind of "seeing," the world, as merely the

sum of all those individual entities that we encounter in it, becomes
significant only as a concept in the mind.

That this theoretical frame-

work became the sole model for dis-covering the world is still evidenced
today in the expression, "do you see what I mean!"

For Hawthorne,

however, "to see" is to perceive the inconspicuous, to discover something
in a way which is peculiarly original.
uniquely singular activity.
once observed:

In this sense, seeing is always a

At the old Manse, for example, Hawthorne

"The trees have a singular appearance in the midst of

waters; the curtailment of their trunks quite destroys the proportions of
the whole tree; and we become conscious of a regularity and propriety in
the forms of Nature, by the effect of this abbreviation." 52

As with the

diorama, Hawthorne employed the analogous pre-reflective consciousness of
dream in order to disclose the world anew.
Unlike the objective analytic of the scientific-technological
world-view, which "subjects" the world to a determinate number of
discrete entities or "categories," dream expresses the existential
unitary structure of the world itself.

As Freud observed:

"Dreams are

particularly fond of reducing antitheses to uniformity, or representing
them as one and the same thing."53
51 Ibid.

Ambiguity is thus central to the dream

52The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 381.

53sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. A. A. Brill
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 304.
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logic.

By ambiguity, for example, the Letter comes to mean things

opposite to the Puritan conception of sin.54

Dream both reveals and yet

conceals that which can never be seen by the willful and arrogant "view."
It is, in other words, that mode which best lends itself to "burrowing . . . into the depths of our common nature," which Hawthorne found
most suitable to the purposes of "psychological romance;" and whosoever
pursues his researches in such a dusky region must necessarily do so as
much "by the tact of sympathy as by the light of observation."55

More-

over, while dream often reveals that which most affectively "lies"
closest to us, it always does so in disguise.

In fact, the hypnagogic

image discloses that which is most "closed off" from the reflective
"self," including its attitudes about itself.

Coverdale's central dream

refutes the abstract, reflective logic of his waking moments, that logic
which gets articulated through his narration, while it expressively confirms the logic of his heart, the truest and most profound feeling which
the narration itself denies.

Although he constantly refers to himself

as a minor figure in the drama of Blithedale, his intermediate position
between Zenobia and Hollingsworth, as they stand on either side of the
bed reaching across to exchange a kiss, amidst the torment of his dream,
reveals in fact that he considers himself central to both their lives;
indeed, as he beholds this passionate exchange between the two, the image
of Priscilla entirely fades away so that the dream itself discloses what
even his final confession conceals:
Priscilla.56

he was in love with Zenobia and not

Similarly, if Goodman Brown's experience in the forest was

54Pattison, "Point of View in Hawthorne," p. 369.
55Preface to The Snow-Image, XI, p. 4.
56rhe Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 153 and 247, respectively.
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only a dream, "alas! it was a dream of evil omen;"57 for in denying the
evil in himself, he henceforth severed himself from both his wife and the
remainder of humanity as well.
Furthermore, in its deployment of images, the dream mode always
functions cinematically.

Consequently, even those works which do not

explicitly concern themselves with dream nevertheless appropriate its
technique, for it is a rare work of Hawthorne's which avoids the immediate mode of "appearance," and usually one of significantly lesser
artistic quality.

"Hawthorne was simply consciously exploiting the

cinematic resources of the soul.

He was one of the first to discover,

and to demonstrate in dazzling fashion, that the cinema had always
existed potentially in our imagination, and that it is part of our mental
activity." 58

Conversely, because the moving photograph satisfies our

sense of reality, it subsequently became an ideal medium for making
fantasy seem real.59

The interior landscape of "Young Goodman Brown"

engages us as urgently as if we were "actually" there.

Through the

cinematic play of light and shade, this ambiguous nightmare arrests our
attention at the very surface of its dramatic "screen:"
center.

It is entirely private.

up front and

In a similar way, the action of

'~y

Kinsman, Major Molineux" refutes a public space and time, but rather
"rearranges" its materials by means of montage as in a dream:

"Indeed,

in the sense of the rapid succession of images that the story gives us
Claire Sprague, "Dream and Disguise in The Blithedale Romance," PMLA, 84
(May 1969) : 596-97.
57"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 89.
58Normand, p. 329.
59Durgnat, p. 31.
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and in the definite effect of condensation and acceleration involved
we almost seem--as though we were Robin--to dream rather than read the
story." 60

The focus of Robin's gaze alters in proportion to its

discoveries, and with an alacrity which iimnediately reflects the dramatic
situation itself:

rooftops become walls, walls become mansions, mansions

become balconies, balconies become pillars, pillars become a gothic
window.61

This montage, however, disappears abruptly at the end.

The

procession fades out first, leaving the scene by itself; the sense of
location goes last as the procession moves on, bequeathing a silent
street behind--and out of this silence, there comes the break in the
fabric of the dream.62

Hawthorne's sharp focus at the conclusion of the

story merely punctuates the solitary privacy of his vision, and
re-situates us toward the public space and time outside the labyrinthian
interior from which Robin has emerged.

And in a final ambiguous gesture,

the gentleman refuses Robin's request:

"'Will you show me the way to the

ferry?'

'No, my good friend Robin, not to-night, at least,' said the

gentleman.

'Some few days hence, if you continue to wish it, I will

speed you on your journey.

Or, if you prefer to remain with us, perhaps,

as you are a shrewd youth, you may rise in the world, without the help of
your kinsman, Major Molineaux.'" 63

Obviously, Robin's perception of his

kinsman at the conclusion of this illusively shattering experience is
diametrically opposed to that which he had before when his kinsman
60Franklin B. Newman, "'My Kinsman, Major Molineux': An
Interpretation," University of Kansas City Review, 21 (March 1955)
61"My Kinsman, Major Molineux," XI, p. 221.
62Newman, p. 209.
63"My Kinsman, Major }lolineaux," XI, p. 231.
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visited him in the country, the

very~

him when he first entered the town.

priori conception he brought with

Yet, everyman may have two faces.

So Robin's laughter at the end, as loudest of all, supplants even that
of the double-visaged figure, suggesting that his momentary perception
of the world as ambiguous and often contradictory reinforces the underlying irony of all things, and further implies a new and different kind
of wisdom as the modern image of the conventional jester.
In addition to nightmare and dream, however, the haunted mind
accommodates reverie as well; indeed, "it contains the entire cinema of
consciousness, with its methods, its technique, its screen, its
camera."64

Properly speaking, Hawthorne's haunted mind more closely

approximates what, today, contemporary psychology calls the "theta
state."

"You sink down in a flowery spot, on the borders of sleep and

wakefulness, while your thoughts rise before you in pictures, all disconnected, yet all assimilated by a pervading gladsomeness and beauty;"
or, to vary the metaphor, "you find yourself, for a single instant, wide
awake in that realm of illusions, whither sleep has been the passport,
and behold its ghostly inhabitants and wondrous scenery, with a
perception,of their strangeness, such as you never attain while the
dream is undisturbed." 65

Like reverie, a world of fragmented images

arises before the haunted mind within "the space of a summer night;" 66
images which reveal the depths of the heart; it is the present moment of
a time thoroughly detached from all biographical perspective, a time
64Normand, p. 329.
65"The Haunted Mind," IX, pp. 308 and 304, respectively.
66Ibid., p. 305.
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without past or future.

"Yesterday has already vanished among the

shadows of the past; to-morrow has not yet emerged from the future.

You

have found an intermediate space, where the business of life does not
intrude; where the passing moment lingers, and becomes truly the present;
a spot where Father Time, when he thinks nobody is watching him, sits
down by the way side to take breath." 67
sleep." 68

It is the time of "conscious

Like the images which engage us when we are seated before a

fire, each lingers in the mind's eye long after darkness has swallowed
the reality.69

Around the principle of the haunted mind, Hawthorne thus

structures his most effective tales; through reverie-like associations,
he transcends the everyday world of conventional consciousness.
Harassed by the phantasms which arise before him, Goodman Brown struggles
forward through the gloom of the forest;7° plagued by the panorama of her
past, Hester momentarily displaces the anguish of the pillory with that
of another;71 compelled by his curious sense of unreality, the adventurer
of the "Night Sketches" hastens through the black of the night, guided
only by an occasional flicker of light--a reverie of street-lamps rather
than fire.72

And so the consciousness of reverie articulates a parallel

between human life and itself:

"In both you emerge from mystery, pass

through a vicissitude that you can but imperfectly control, and are borne
onward to another mystery." 73
67Ibid.

68Ibid. , p. 307.

69Ibid., p. 308.

70"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 81.
71rhe Scarlet Letter, I, p. 58.
72Ix, pp. 428 and 431, respectively.
73"The Haunted Mind," IX, p. 309.

313

Beside the blaze of the fire, Ethan Brand struggles against those
images that beseige him, recalling the smoldering panorama of his life
within a single instant.
As Bachelard observes:

More than anything else, fire invites reverie.
"If fire, which, after all, is quite an

exceptional and rare phenomenon, was taken to be a constituent element of
the Universe, is it not because it is an element of human thought, the
prime element of reverie?"74

Hawthorne's own life reveals a marked

fascination, if not obsession, with this phenomenon--as does his oeuvre.
In Salem, as a child, he often went to watch the fires that broke out;
and if one occurred late at night, he used to send his sister to investigate, reporting back to him whether it was worth getting out of bed to
see.75

Both the notebooks as well as the fiction abound with references

to the fireside.

Distinct from the attention of observation and

contemplation, reverie before a fire expresses the unitary structure of a
total phenomenon.

Thus, Ethan Brand "sat listening to the crackling of

the kindled wood, and looking at the little spirts
through the chinks of the door.

of fire that issued

These trifles, however, once so

familiar, had but the slightest hold of his attention; while deep within
his mind, he was reviewing the gradual, but marvellous change, that had
been wrought upon him by the search to which he had devoted himself.n76
The fire itself reflects this sudden change, the withering of a heart
having "ceased to partake of the universal throb." 77
74The Psychoanalysis of Fire, p. 18.
75Normand, p. 21.
76"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 98.
77rbid., p. 99.

In a typically

314

astute psychological perception, Hawthorne thus conjoins this transformation to both the stunted life of the fire and the plenary life of the
lime-kiln, a world unto its own, as Ethan ascends the hill toward the top
of the structure.

In its own way, of course, the reverie has already

accomplished this task:
Fire is for the man who is contemplating it an example of a sudden
change or development and an example of a circumstantial development. Less monotonous and less abstract than flowing water • . .
fire suggests the desire to change, to speed up the passage of
time, to bring all of life to its conclusion, to its hereafter.
In these circumstances the reverie becomes truly fascinating and
dramatic; it magnifies human destiny; it links the small to the
great, the hearth to the volcano, the life of a log to the life of
a world. The fascinated individual hears the
the
- -call
- - -of- - funeral
~For him destruction is more than a change, it is a
renewal.78
Thus Ethan, through identification, surrenders the cold marble of his own
heart to the heart of the flames.

Unlike the mayfly, however, this

incomplete lesson in eternity leaves a trace--the shape of his heart
endures upon the surface of the lime. 79

Yet, once the lime-burner

crushes the remains, the lesson is complete:

Ethan paradoxically

reappropriates the warmth of humanity's common bond, the heart.
Ironically, death in the flames is the least lonely of deaths; through
it, Ethan attains the cosmic:
nothingness.BO

an entire world is reduced to

Only the dream remains:

"That night the sound of a

fearful peal of laughter rolled heavily through the sleep of the limeburner and his little son; dim shapes of horror and anguish haunted their
dreams, and seemed still present in the rude hovel when they opened their
78Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire, p. 16.
79cf. Ibid., p. 17.
BOcf. Ibid., p. 19.
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eyes to the daylight."81
In so far as it thus accommodates nightmare, dream, and reverie,
the haunted mind evades objective time and space; because it envelops
a personal consciousness, the haunted mind exemplifies the plenitude of
a world where intentional subjectivities primordially abide.

Within this

ambiguous and opaque abode, the transparent "cogito" gets thrown back
upon its equivocal, subjective adherence in pre-objective phenomena.
Like the gothic edifice in "The Hall of Fantasy," the haunted mind, as
with fantasy itself, admits the light of "heaven" or reason "only through
stained and pictured glass, thus filling with many-colored radiance, and
painting its marble floor with beautiful or grotesque designs; so that
its inmates breathe, as it were, a visionary atmosphere, and tread upon
the fantasies of poetic minds." 82

This edifice of poetic fantasy forever

remains man's true and lasting homeland, for though it superficially
gives "the impression of a dream, which might be dissipated and
shattered to fragments, by merely stamping the foot upon the pavement,"
yet, "with such modifications and repairs as successive ages demand, the
Hall of Fantasy is likely to endure longer than the most substantial
structure that ever cumbered the earth."83

Hence, the logic of the

haunted mind is nothing less than poetic; it articulates the interior
growth of consciousness, that unchartered region which we are so prone
to isolate from "reality," either to grant it an immaterial existence
apart or to deny its existence altogether.

Indeed, Hawthorne's world

converts the poetic consciousness into an organ, a thing of flesh and
81"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 100.
B2x, p. 112.

83Ibid., PP· 172-73.
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blood "whose substance may be tenuous but which can also become
extremely dense and weigh down with a great weight in the physical
world."84

Because the haunted mind identifies itself with the substance

of its images, the very identity between object and image, it is always
already alongside or, better, inherent in the reality it discloses:
"consciousness awake and consciousness asleep--consciousness questing or
fleeing, following its own arabesques, mingling with itself, fighting
against itself without cease." 85
have iron sinews. 86

For this reason, great poets should

Likewise, as with the Hall of Fantasy, "we see but

a small portion of the edifice," 87 for the poetic consciousness is
incarnate; it scorns the intellectual transparency of the world-view
whose schemes for "fixing the reflections of objects in a pool of water,
and thus taking the most life-like portraits imaginable," 88 must always
go awry.
Hawthorne's poetic consciousness, furthermore, reasserts the
primacy of time over and against the spatial objectivity of the worldview.

In its convulsive, Laocoon-like sinuosity, poetic consciousness

unequivocally rejects the infinite transparency of heaven for the finite
"apparency" of earth:
just like this." 89

"I fear that no other world can show us anything

Grounded in time, the poetic consciousness of the

haunted mind appropriates the appearance as a significant part of the
reality it discloses.

As Lessing observed:

84Normand, p. 350.

85rbid.

86"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 375.
87"The Hall of Fantasy," X, p .. 173.
88rbid., p. 178.

89rbid., p. 184.
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not only in space, but also in time.

They continue, and, at any moment

of their continuance, may assume a different appearance and stand in
different relations." 90

Moreover, in so far as he inhabits the Hall of

Fantasy daily, "the poet knows his whereabout, and therefore is less
likely to make a fool of himself in real life." 91

He thus ironically

occupies the solid ground of earth more often than the dream-tower to
which the scientific attitude always assigns him:

"the root of human

nature strikes down deep into this earthly soil; and it is but reluctantly
that we submit to be transplanted, even for a higher cultivation in
Heaven.

I query whether the destruction of the earth would gratify any

one individual; except, perhaps,. some embarrassed man of business, whose
notes fall due a day after the day of doom."9 2

Rather than analyze its

constituent elements, the poet invites the earth to his bosom endearingly,
and for the sake of her own apparent beauty, and not her abstracted
schematization in the mind.

To be sure, the multitude generally desires

that the earth continues to endure as well; yet its reasons are invariably
selfish:

"In short, nobody seemed satisfied that this mortal scene of

things should have its close just now.

Yet, it must be confessed, the

motives of the crowd for desiring its continuance were mostly so absurd,
that, unless Infinite Wisdom had been aware of much better reasons, the
solid Earth must have melted away at once."93

The poet, on the other

hand, accepts the solicitous call to Being:
90Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon: An Essay Upon the Limits of
Painting and Poetry, trans. Ellen Frothingham (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, The Noonday Press, 1969), p. 91.
91"The Hall of Fantasy," X, p. 177.
92Ibid., pp. 182-83.

93Ibid., p. 183.
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For my own part, not to speak of a few private and personal ends,
I really desired our old Mother's prolonged existence, for her own
dear sake.
"The poor old Earth!" I repeated. "What I should chiefly regret
in her destruction would be that very earthliness, which no other
sphere or state of existence can renew or compensate. The
fragrance of flowers, and of new-mown hay; the genial warmth of
sunshine, and the beauty of a sunset among clouds; the comfort and
cheerful glow of the fireside . • . even the fast-falling snow,
and the gray atmosphere through which it descends--all these, and
innumerable enjoyable things of earth, must perish with her."94
This new poetic consciousness in Hawthorne embraces the finite as its very
ground and, in so doing, subsequently hands back the truth of Being to the
illusive and ambiguous sphere of "beauty" from whence the truth of Being
primordially makes its first appearance.

Indeed, appearance is beauty.

Hence, the beautiful does not occur alongside and apart from this truth,
but "belongs to the advent of truth, truth's taking of its place."95
Poetic consciousness thus penetrates the dream-like opacity of the
haunted mind only in so far as it articulates those interior voids or
subjectivities which dwell within the fold of Being, those impenetrable
gaps in the texture of the existent which both disclose and conceal the
universal veil of Being itself.

As P. remarks:

"The reality--that which

I know to be such--hangs like remnants of tattered scenery over the
intolerably prominent illusion.

Let us think of it no more."96

Like his

"irrational" correspondence, the dream-like consciousness of the haunted
mind disrupts the synchronic standpoint of the world-view and its
distanced chronological perspective, in favor of an ek-static present
which diachronically appropriates the past with Care (Sorge).
94Ibid., PP· 183-84.
95Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 81.
96"p. 's Correspondence," X, p. 371.
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correspondent explains:
My unfortunate friend P. has lost the thread of his life, by the
interposition of long intervals or partially disordered reason.
The past and present are jumbled together in his mind, in a manner
often productive of curious results . . . . The poor fellow • • •
meets, in his wanderings, a variety of personages who have long
ceased to be visible to any eye save his own. In my opinion, all
this is not so much a delusion, as a partly wilful and partly
involuntary sport of the imagination . . . . 97
In having lost the "thread" of his life, P. disrupts the synchronically
detached standpoint itself.

Against the dis-interested standpoint of

rational observation, his interested "repetition" or recollection forward
dialogically engages him with the whole of Being.

Reality ceases to be

prior and becomes, in turn, ontologically grounded in the Being of
Dasein, for reality is dependent upon Care.98

Because it thus refers the

metaphysical "reality" of the idea (eidos) back to the phenomenon of Care,
the unitary structure of Dasein, the unorthodox logic of P.'s "irrational"
mind simultaneously returns the idea itself back to the ambiguous,
incarnate texture of Being from whence it makes its initial appearance.
Similarly, this unorthodox logic spontaneously consolidates itself "into
almost as material an entity as mankind's strongest architecture.

It

~s

sometimes a serious question with me, whether ideas be not really vis.ible
and tangible, and endowed with all the other qualities of matter." 99
Like the recollected figure of Keats in P.'s own haunted mind, who has
"thrown his poem forward into an indefinitely remote future,"lOO P.'s
poetic consciousness likewise recollects the past forward, in intere.sted

97 Ibid., p. 3 6 1.
98Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 255.
99"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 362.
lOOib:i,d., p. 375.
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repetition, in order to dialogically recall the most primordial question
of Being, a question which the metaphysical tradition of Western civilization had forgotten since Parmenides--the ontological question of Being,
and not the pseudo-problematic of those ontical "beings" constitutive of
a world.

In so far as "appearance" itself--that is, the phenomenon--pri-

mordially discloses the truth of the world, it simultaneously reveals to
what extent reality is ontologically grounded in a factical subjectivity
which makes the birth of Being possible, and to whom the question of
Being can become an issue in the first place.

Open to its ownmost

possibilities, P.'s haunted mind recreates the visionary moment of
anticipatory resolution, that authentically historical temporality which
"deprives the 'today' of its character as present." 101

Like the Proustian

consciousness, those figures which populate P.'s past persistently haunt
his present as well by virtue of an interested recollection forward, and
by which they have become incarnate:

"Were it only possible to find out

who are alive, and who dead, it would contribute infinitely to my peace
of mind.

Every day of my life, somebody comes and stares me in the face,

whom I had quietly blotted out of the tablet of living men, and trusted
never more to be pestered with the sight or sound of him." 10 2
has said it another way:

Heidegger

"When, however, one's existence is

inauthentically historical, it is loaded down with a legacy of a 'past'
which has become unrecognizable, and it seeks the modern.

But when

historicality is authentic, it understands history as the 'recurrence'
of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if
101Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 444.
102"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 377.
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existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision, in resolute
repetition." 103

Similarly, "the fantasies of one day are the deepest

realities of a future one."l04
The poetic consciousness thus assures the appearance of its
reciprocal place in reality.

Through its dream-like vision, the world of

Hawthorne's work opens a phenomenal ingress to the question of Being,
without which the poetic consciousness would leave that very world behind.
Hence, dream provides the necessary link between both subject and object
which indivisibly cohere within the unitary structure of a world.

As

Merleau-Ponty has remarked:
In the same way, though it is indeed from the dreamer that I was
last night that I require an account of the dream, the dreamer
himself offers no account, and the person who does so is awake.
Bereft of the waking state, dreams would be no more than
instantaneous modulations, and so would not even exist for us.
During the dream itself, we do not leave the world behind: the
dream space is segregated from the space of clear thinking, but it
uses all the latter's articulations; the world obsesses us even
during sleep, and it is about the world that we dream.l05
Because the haunted mind recreates a consciousness whose fluid interior
unceasingly equivocates the transparent picture that scientific consciousness demands, it expresses the very situated structure of Being itself,
a structure wherein free and multiple consciousnesses articulate the
hidden reality of a world beyond the edges of an objective frame.
a strange, incongruous dream is the life of man!" 106

"What

Hawthorne's fiction

resuscitates the psychic vitality and validity of dream in order to secure
103Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 444.
104"The Hall of Fantasy," X, p. 179.
105Phenomenology, p. 293.
106"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 373.
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the world's inner space, the space of the heart.

The dream can never

"lie;" its truth is inherently there, though often in disguise.

By

reason of its own logic, dream discloses those aspects of the "self," and
its relation to the world, which intellectual observation would deny.
"Ordinary people have the power of not thinking of that about which they
do not wish to think." 107

Similarly, the heart has reasons of which

reason itself knows nothing. 108

Hawthorne's world expresses the

bankruptcy of an objective view grounded in the intellect, for only the
reality of the heart can touch man in his whole nature, allowing him to
openly hold his world around him in wonder and awe.
know us not!"l09

"How many kingdoms

The logic of the heart is thus extraordinary in so far

as it takes man beyond the protective and self-defensive bounds of
objectification, the self-assertive domination of Being.
openness of man's own heart is he secure.
works, P. expresses it thus:

Only within the

Speaking of Shelley's later

"They are warmer with hwnan love, which has

served as an interpreter between his mind and the multitude.

The author

has learned to dip his pen oftener into his heart, and has thereby
avoided the faults into which a too exclusive use of fancy and intellect
was wont to betray him."llO
psychology well.

Long before Freud, Hawthorne knew his

Within the logical structure of the dream, Hawthorne

discovered an analogous logic of the heart--the interior logic of the
world's inner space which both expresses the poetic consciousness itself
107Pascal, Pensles, p. 91.
108rbid., p. 95.
109rbid., p. 75.
llO"P.'s Correspondence," X, p. 373.
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and, at the same time, recalls the single-minded injunction long forgotten
since Socrates:

"Be true!

Be true!

Be true!

Show freely to the world,

if not your worst, yet some trait whereby the worst can be inferred!"l11
In an age when men's minds were still oriented toward moral analysis,
Hawthorne's fiction brought about a psychological revolution in American
literature, "a revolution that in no way prefigured the introduction into
the average American's everyday life of a psychoanalysis imbued with a
superstitious regard for the social norm, but, on the contrary, that
upheld both the rights of the outstanding individual and the rights of
the poet."112

As Dimmesdale's life attests:

It is the unspeakable misery of a life so false as his, that it
steals the pith and substance out of whatever realities there are
around us, and which were meant by Heaven to be the spirit's joy
and nutriment. To the untrue man, the whole universe is false,--it
is impalpable,--it shrinks to nothing within his grasp. And he
himself, in so far as he shows himself in a false light, becomes a
shadow, or, indeed, ceases to exist.113
II
Because it abnegates the distanceless remoteness of the world-view,
Hawthorne's oeuvre turns the transient and therefore preliminary
character of object-things away from the invisible region of the
producing consciousness and toward the true interior of the heart's
space:

"Only what we thus retain in our heart (par coeur), only that do

we truly know by heart." 1 14

Those objects which populate the interior

space of Hawthorne's world synecdochically express the whole of Being at
111 The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 260.
112Normand, p. 236.
l13The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 146.
114Heidegger,

Poetr~,

Language, Thought, p. 130.
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its most primordially affective depth, a depth whose meaning obtains from
an opposing "ob-," that factical subjectivity which initially calls the
ob-ject into Being. 115

Thus, Hawthorne's superficial observance of

historical objectivity often merely constitutes an ironic posture; like
Goethe and Tieck, he delighted in destroying this "objectivity" every
chance he got.

Indeed, Hawthorne's irony frequently satirizes the past

as a value in itself.

Whereas only one glass of whiskey suffices to

produce the rather doubtful "Edward Randolph's Portrait," for example,
the story of Lady Eleanor represents the product of three glasses of
madeira.116

Hawthorne's ambiguously ironic pose persistently refutes the

object as objective, redeeming its synoicous essence while simultaneously
returning it to the incarnate setting of a world.

Against the scientific-

technological objectification of the world, which distances the thing by
virtue of its frame or view, Hawthorne's interior logic of the heart
reappropriates the thing for man, and man for the thing.

Being is near

whenever it stays the object in its presence, just as man appropriates
the nearness of Being whenever he allows it to come up to itself and
back into the nature of its truth.ll7

The dichotomy between "head" and

"heart" which pervasively characterizes Hawthorne's work, and which the
critics have so often discussed, subsequently structures the "nearness"
and "farness" of Being within a larger metaphysical picture, a picture
whose referential surface Hawthorne's oeuvre sets out to destruct or
de-structure.

Because the scientific or "intellectual" attitude, that of

ll5Ibid., p. 177.
116Alfred H. Marks, "German Romantic Irony in Hawthorne's Tales,"
Symposium, 7 (November 1953) : 278.
117Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 131.
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the head, sets man at odds with nature, and thus with himself, it simultaneously sets him apart from the world he seeks to "picture" or know.
Such is the case with all of Hawthorne's villains.

Chillingworth manip-

ulates Dimmesdale with the detached perspective of a behavioral
psychologist observing the reactions of his guinea pigs;118 Westervelt
controls both Zenobia and Priscilla with an intensity equalled only by
his monomaniacal attachment to his own dark schemes;119 Aylmer tinkers
with an insignificant imperfection in his wife only to discover that in
curing the "disease" he has killed the patient; 12 0 Rappaccini
experiments on his daughter with no more affection than he displays
toward the noxious plants within the encapsulated garden, a garden which
not only isolates them from the world, but from each other as well--that
is, he treats her ob-noxiously;l21 even Hollingsworth, whose philanthropy
has turned inward and back upon itself to the point of madness,
obsessively envisions mankind as one vast body in desparate need of
reform. 122
Hawthorne's villains unanimously deny the supplications of the
heart; at best, the heart becomes an object of investigation.

Because

they intellectually separate themselves from whatever object their
investigation undertakes, both the scientist and reformer sever their
"self" from its affective relation to the world.

The nature and purpose

118The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 129-38.
11 9The Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 158-59 and 201-02.
120"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 56.
12l"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 114.
122The Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 70-71.
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of their investigation has already determined this.

In so far as they

must "undertake" the object of their investigation in order to discover
it objectively, they have already placed themselves outside the solicitous
sphere of Being.

Indeed, the infinite remoteness necessary for holding

the object at bay precludes their ownmost freedom to "take it up"
affectively.

Since they cannot take the object to themselves--that is,

bring themselves to it--Hawthorne's villains "undertake" the world in the
very same way we undertake a disagreeable chore.

The world henceforth

becomes a necessary evil, an evil whose existence must be tolerated in
order to theoretically transfer it to the mind where its material
resistance ceases to be an ob-stacle entirely.

A theory thus becomes

the world, and the world becomes "becoming" to the subjectum.

At the

same time, however, because this "space" has receded toward the purely
human, indifferent to the intentional space of "others," it has already
gone insane.

"It is remarkable, that persons who speculate the most

boldly often conform with the most perfect quietude to the external
regulations of society.

The thought suffices them, without investing

itself in the flesh and blood of action." 123
from this inclination:

Even Hester is not exempt

"Much of the marble coldness of Hester's

impression was to be attributed to the circumstance that her life had
turned, in a great measure, from passion and feeling, to thought;"
standing alone in the world, "she cast away the fragments of a broken
chain.

The world's law was no law for her rnind." 12 4

Hester's love and

concern for Dimmesdale, however, secures her from the total isolation
123The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 164.
124 rbid.
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experienced by Hawthorne's villains, who "by an iron framework of
reasoning"125 obdurately seek to verify their own stunted intellectual
convictions.

By im-posing their "space" on others, both scientist and

reformer religiously take upon themselves the burden of the world--that
is, the freedom and responsibility of others.
words, religious fanatics.

They become, in other

And as Pascal so forcefully points out:

"Men

never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from
religious conviction."126
Chillingworth deceptively begins his initial investigation "with
the severe and equal integrity of a judge, desirous only of truth, even
as if the question involved no more than the air-drawn lines and figures
of a geometrical problem, instead of human passions, and wrongs inflicted
on himself."127

Yet, such an over-simplified attitude is easily

distorted since it neglects its own facticity:

"But, as he proceeded, a

terrible fascination, a kind of fierce, though still calm, necessity
seized the old man within its gripe, and never set him free again, until
he had done all its bidding."128

At the same time, Dimmesdale's natural

bent exhibits similar tendencies, for his entire bearing toward the
world has been "etherealized" by extended years of weary toil among his
books; all he lacked "was the gift that descended upon the chosen
disciples, at Pentecost, in tongues of flame; symbolizing, it would seem,
not the power of speech in foreign and unknown languages, but that of
addressing the whole human brotherhood in the heart's native language."129
125rbid., p. 162.

126Pens~es, p. 314.

127The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 129.
I28Ibid.

129rbid., pp. 141-42.
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Like Hester, however, the burden of guilt and complicity with mankind
irrevocably stays his intellectual tendencies, ironically bestowing upon
him that very faculty the pentecostal flame ignites:

"But this very

burden it was, that gave him sympathies so intimate with the sinful
brotherhood of mankind; so that his heart vibrated in unison with theirs,
and received their pain into itself, and sent its own throb of pain
through a thousand other hearts, in gushes of sad, persuasive
eloquence."l30
rejects.

It is, of course, this brotherhood which Goodman Brown

Nevertheless, so long as Dinnnesdale remains untrue to himself,

this hidden complicity continues to gnaw at his heart, while even his
eyes reflect the deep secret at his interior; thus, "it was the
clergyman's peculiarity that he seldom, now-a-days, looked straightforth
at any object, whether human or inanimate." 1 3l

What subsequently

differentiates Dimmesdale, however, from the true villain, is that his
human complicity, though hidden, interpenetrates the solicitous sphere of
Being, whereas Goodman Brown, for example, deliberately chooses to stand
apart from the existent as a whole.
This self-imposed isolation characterizes all of Hawthorne's
villains.

They lack heart; "they would not make a friend of it." 132

Instead, they often seek to penetrate its secrets, to analyze its
operations, to rationalize its "reasons," to objectify its ambiguous and
evasive logic.

Hawthorne's villains are thus chronically deceived in

their obsessive endeavors, for though a disease of the heart may very
well affect, or infect, the body, it can never become transparent to an
130Ibid., p. 142.

131Ibid., p. 131.

132Pascal, Pensles, p. 73.
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intellectually comprehensive view.

Although the propositions of the

intellect are inferred, the principles of the heart are always intuited:
"it is as useless and absurd for reason to demand from the heart proof
of her first principles, before admitting them, as it would be for the
heart to demand from reason an intuition of all demonstrated
propositions before accepting them."133
Chillingworth:

As Dimmesdale remarks to

"There can be, if I forebode aright, no power, short of

the Divine mercy, to disclose, whether by uttered words, or by type or
emblem, the secrets that may be buried with a human heart.n134
Ironically, the secret buried within Dimmesdale's own heart discloses
itself emblematically; but even then, as a psychosomatic phenomenon,
this tell-tale emblem emblazoned on his bosom shows signs of a
disturbance in its purely symptomatic manifestation.

Even after the

physician discovers the burning emblem on Dimmesdale's breast, stealing
into the room while he sleeps, it only encourages Chillingworth's
curiosity the more.

His compulsion forces him to delve deeper and

deeper into an investigation which has no perceptible end in view.
the vanishing point of a perspective, it is infinitely remote.

Like

The

"reasons" of the heart can never array themselves before the intellect
within a single, unified picture; the heart, like the body itself,
evades such a transparent manipulation precisely because it is always
situated.

We can never have it before us, entirely in view.

Because it

equivocates the objectification to which Hawthorne's villains would
subject it, the heart throws the intellectual attitude back upon itself
1 33rbid., p. 96.
134rhe Scarlet Letter, I, p. 131.
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where it is now further frustrated by its insatiable attempt to know or
objectify not only the "other," but its "self" as well.
becomes his own most dangerous enemy.

The villain

Trusting no one, he can no longer

recognize the enemy when he actually appears.

By treating the "other" as

an object in an object-world, he subsequently loses his ownmost "self."
Having once created this affective void at the center of his being, the
villain, bereft of a world, must thereafter depend upon the object of his
investigation for his own existence.

He thus paradoxically becomes an

active agency only in so far as he expropriates the being of the "other."
He ceases to participate in the life of the existent as a whole.

Hence,

with Dimmesdale's death, Chillingworth is doomed as well:
All his strength and energy--all his vital and intellectual
force--seemed at once to desert him; insomuch that he positively
withered up, shrivelled away, and almost vanished from mortal
sight, like an uprooted weed that lies wilting in the sun. This
unhappy man had made the very principle of his life to consist tn
the pursuit and systematic exercise of revenge; and when, by its
completest triumph and consummation, that evil principle was left
with no further material to support it,--when, in short, the·re was
no more devil's work on earth for him to do, it only remained for
the unhumanized mortal to betake himself whither his Master would
find him tasks enough, and pay him his wages duly.l35
Similarly, all of Hawthorne's villains maniacally attach themselves
to the disembodied ubiquity of a transparent idea; and all are equally
destined to forfeit the object of their solitary pursuit:

governed by

the obsession to eliminate the crimson imperfection on Georgiana's cheek,
Aylmer employs his utmost energy only to lose her in the end;l36
encouraged by his feeble curiosity and the dispassionate desire to see
Beatrice transcend the sphere of ordinary women, Rappaccini rears his
135 rbid., p. 260.
136"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 56.
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only daughter amidst the poisonous experiments of his garden only to
behold her death at the hands of an ironically fatal antidote;137
haunted by the quest to discover the Unpardonable Sin, Ethan searches
throughout the world only to destroy himself in impotent surrender to the
blaze of the lime-kiln;138 driven by his will to power, Westervelt
deploys his hypnotic skills toward Zenobia and Priscilla only to forfeit
both. 139

Like Mr. Lindsey in "The Snow-Image," Hawthorne's villains

utilize an inflexible, systematic frame by which they negotiate the world
without exception.

In this sense, they are uniformly unexceptional.

Furthermore, the reformer is, in many ways, the most dangerous of all the
Hawthorne villains, for since his object of concern is always the "other,"
the sphere of his power is most often prone to run away from the very
reponsibility his view professes.

What Hawthorne concludes of

Mr. Lindsey holds equally true for all of his reformers; it would make
profitable reading today in a curriculum for social workers:

"it behoves

men, and especially men of benevolence, to consider well what they are
about, and, before acting on their philanthropic purposes, to be quite
sure that they comprehend the nature and all the relations of the
business in hand.

What has been established as an element of good to one

being, may prove absolute mischief to another." 140

Perhaps Hollings-

worth's character itself best describes that extreme to which the
"benevolent" attitude is most disposed:
137"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 128.
138"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 100.
139The Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 203 and 234, respectively.
Cf. also,"liihe Man of Adamant," XI, and "The Ambitious Guest," IX.
140"The Snow-Image," XI, p. 25.

332
admitting what is called Philanthropy, when adopted as a profession,
to be often useful by its energetic impulse to society at large, it
is perilous to the individual, whose ruling passion, in one
exclusive channel, it thus becomes. It ruins, or is fearfully apt
to ruin, the heart; the rich juices of which God never meant should
be pressed violently out, and distilled into alcoholic liquor, by
an unnatural process; but should render life sweet, bland, and
gently beneficient, and insensibly influence other hearts and other
lives to the same blessed end. I see in Hollingsworth an
exemplification of the most awful truth in Bunyan's book of such;-from the very gate of Heaven, there is a by-way to the pit!141
As the novels of Henry James so aptly confirm, the unattainable ideal
makes monsters of us all.

Within the finite realm of Being, those who

would be God would be Satan as well, for the other side of Angel is
always Devil.

"Man, as man, has always measured himself with and

against something heavenly.

Lucifer, too, is descended from heaven."142

Pascal has said it another way:

"Man is neither angel nor brute, and the

unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the brute." 143
Hawthorne's reformers are not alone in this respect; for both the
scientist and the intellectual in general are precariously poised above
this egocentric "pit."

Since, by definition, the monomaniacal enterprise

undertakes its mission with its gaze fixed solely on an isolated
"objective" which constitutes the infinitely remote vanishing point of
its view, it ignores, like the inauthentic technological perception, that
which lies closest to its immediate "field."

In other words, it avoids,

at all costs, the responsibility for itself.

Because it has not

questioned its own raison d'ttre, it simultaneously denies itself the
possibility of self-reproach for whatever failure it encounters.
141The Blithedale Romance, III, p. 243.
142Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 221.
143Pensles, p. 118.
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ever, the lesson is learned too late.

Thus, Ethan's final, "involuntary

recognition of the infinite absurdity of seeking throughout the world for
what was the closest of all things to himself, and looking into every
heart, save his own, for what was hidden in no other breast,"l44
ironically terminates eighteen years of futile, blind volition.
else is left to will of any significance but his own death?

What

Similarly,

years after his experience at Blithedale, Hollingsworth has yet to reform
a single criminal; 145 after seven years of uninterrupted observation,
Chillingworth has yet to whole-heartedly entrap his prey;l46 after
complete surrender to an ideal quest, Owen Warland has yet to permanently
materialize the aim of his original intention; 14 7 after a twenty-year
leave of "absence" from his wife in order to observe her, Wakefield has
yet to discover that the final joke is on him.l48

And we may confidently

assume the same of Aylmer, Rappaccini, and Westervelt.

Even Dimmesdale,

who likewise learns his lesson too late, exhibits the egotistic tendencies
of Hawthorne's villains.

His perception of the Letter against the

darkened night sky is thus imputed solely to the disease of his own eye
and heart--"Not but the meteor may have shown itself at that point, burning duskily through a veil of cloud; but with no such shape as his guilty
imagination gave it; or, at least, with so little definiteness, that
another's guilt might have seen another symbol in it." 14 9

Hawthorne

144"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 87.
145The Blithedale Romanc~, III, p. 243.
146The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 256.
147"The Artist of the Beautiful," X, p. 475.
148"wakefield," IX, p. 140.

149The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 155.
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further comments:
But what shall we say, when an individual discovers a revelation,
addressed to himself alone • . . . In such a case, it could only
be the symptom of a highly disordered mental state, when a man,
rendered morbidly self-contemplative by long, intense, and secret
pain, had extended his egotism over the whole expanse of nature,
until the firmament itself should appear no more than a fitting
page for his soul's history and fate.l50
Paradoxically, then, the intellectual attitude inclines toward both
extremes of consciousness:

in its quest for the "objective" this

attitude implicitly places itself above all "others," while at the
opposite extreme it may turn in upon its "self" out of frustration so
that the "self" explicitly becomes its own "object."

In either case, the

"self" becomes divine.
The ruinous effects of egotism or the "bosom-serpent," however, are
nowhere more pronounced than in Roderick Elliston.

Tortured by the void

of his own heart, Roderick must socialize his "disease" in order to
maintain any sense of individuality--he must show himself to the world.
In his nothingness he henceforth becomes the supreme egotist, for he
cannot bear the emptiness of his heart alone.
All persons, chronically diseased, are egotists, whether the
disease be of the mind or body; whether it be sin, sorrow, or
merely the more tolerable calamity of some endless pain, or
mischief among the cords of mortal life. Such individuals are
made acutely conscious of a self, by the torture in which it
dwells. Self, therefore, grows to be so prominent an object with
them, that they cannot but present it to the face of every casual
passer-by • • . • for it is that cancer, or that crime, which
constitutes their respective individuality.l51
Thereafter, Roderick draws his misery around him like a cape, and looks
triumphantly down upon all whose interior nourishes no deadly
lSOibid.
15l"Egotism; or, The Bosom-Serpent," X, p. 273.

335
monster.152

Indeed, it is this very emptiness which operates as an anti-

dote against any who would attempt a cure, for nothing can come up to it;
it is incomparable.

Like a "black hole" in space, it blindly swallows

all "other" intentions in its own intentional void.

Its only remedy is

in forgetting that which it cannot forget, and in remembering that which
it has repressively forgotten--the "other:" "Could I, for one instant,
forget myself, the serpent might not abide within me.

It is my diseased

self-contemplation that has engendered and nourished him!" 153

As

Coverdale remarks at Blithedale:
It is not, I apprehend, a healthy kind of mental occupation, to
devote ourselves too exclusively to the study of individual men and
women. If the person under examination be one's self, the result
is pretty certain to be diseased action of the heart, almost before
we can snatch a second glance. Or, if we take the freedom to put a
friend under our microscope, we thereby insulate him from many of
his true relations, magnify his peculiarities, inevitably tear him
into parts, and, of course, patch him very clumsily together again.
What wonder, then, should we be frightened by the aspect of a
monster, which, after all--though we can point to every feature of
his deformity in the real personage--may be said to have been
created mainly by ourselves.154
Unlike most of Hawthorne's villains, however, Roderick learns his lesson
in time; with the appearance of his estranged wife, Rosina, the cure is
affected.

Roderick thus typifies the extremity of those two qualities

which Pascal universally ascribes to the "self:"

"it is unjust in itself

since it makes itself the centre of everything; it is inconvenient to
others since it would enslave them; for each Self is the enemy, and
would like to be the tyrant of all others."l55
Isolated from the world they seek to know, both Hawthorne's
152Ibid., p. 274.

153Ibid., pp. 282-83.

154The Blithedale Romance, III, p. 69.
155Pensles, p. 151.
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scientists and reformers are necessarily forced to turn back upon themselves as the ultimate object of their own consciousness, for in having
refuted a situated consciousness in favor of the absolute truth of a
ubiquitous vision, they paradoxically deny themselves the very objectivity they so obsessively wish to impose upon the world.
This is always true of those men who have surrendered themselves to
an over-ruling purpose. It does not so much impel them from without, nor even operate as a motive power within, but grows
incorporate with all that they think and feel, and finally converts
them into little else save that one principle. When such begins to
be the predicament, it is not cowardice, but wisdom, to avoid these
victims. They have no heart, no sympathy, no reason, no conscience.
They will keep no friend, unless he make himself the mirror of their
purpose; they will smite and slay you, and trample your dead corpse
under foot, all the more readily, if you take the first step with
them, and cannot take the second, and the third, and every other
step of their terribly straight path. They have an idol, to which
they consecrate themselves high-priest, and deem it holy work to
offer sacrifices of whatever is most precious, and never once seem
to suspect--so cunning has the Devil been with them--that this
false deity, in whose iron features, immitigable to all the rest of
mankind, they see only benignity and love, is but a spectrum of the
very priest himself, projected upon the surrounding darkness. And
the higher and purer the original object, and the more unselfishly
it may have been taken up, the slighter is the probability that
they can be led to recognize the process, by which godlike
benevolence has been debased into all-devouring egotism.156
In negating themselves the very objectivity they claim to acquire,
Hawthorne's villains reciprocally commit one of the two most allinclusive of human errors enumerated by Pascal:
literally.

2.

"1.

To take everything spiritually."157

To take everything
The first of these

intellectual over-simplifications applies to the scientist, the second
to the reformer.

Against the over-simplified intellectual attitude,

Hawthorne's oeuvre explores the "interior" of reality vis-'a-vis a
revolutionary conversion of consciousness.

By "translating" both

156The Blithedale Romance, III, pp. 70-71.
157Penstes, p. 217.
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the daguerrean and dioramic "postures" into their analogously respective
modes of logic, they subsequently become subjective, metaphysical
spheres of consciousness in their own right--Hawthorne's dichotomy
between "head" and "heart."

Thus determined, that mode of consciousness

proper to the daguerrean model corresponds to the logic of calculating
reason:

Descartes' consciousness of the ego cogito.

On the other hand,

that mode of consciousness proper to the dioramic model corresponds to
the world's inner space:

Pascal's logic of the heart,158

Consequently,

daguerrean logic, if we may speak of it thus, delineates what Heidegger
(via Rilke) calls "customary consciousness," whereas dioramic logic
articulates "uncustomary consciousness."

The interior conversion of

consciousness central to Hawthorne's world metaphysically subsists within
this opposition of consciousness, wherein the head remains directed outward while the heart turns toward its own interior, the interiority of
the world's space.

Hawthorne's oeuvre begins to negotiate this

conversion at the psychological level of psychosomatic disturbances.
That Hawthorne anticipated modern psychology is all the more
impressive when we consider his constant desire to make moral "diseases"
appear as corresponding physical diseases.

Throughout his life, Hawthorne

was incessantly concerned with the body's relation to both the world and
it's "self."

"What happened in the heart became manifest in the flesh;

and, conversely, one could arrive at inner truths by scrutinizing
appearances or by watching their reflections in a mirror." 1 59

A note-

book entry for 27 October 1841 already reveals Hawthorne's fascination
158cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 127-28.
159cowley, p. 562.
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with the psychosomatic problem:

"To symbolize moral or spiritual disease

by disease of the body;--thus, when a person committed any sin, it might
cause a sore to appear on the body;--this to be wrought out."160
again, on 1 June 1842:

And

"A physician for the cure of moral diseases." 16 1

The idea, of course, is exquisitely "wrought out" in The Scarlet Letter.
In his exhortation to Dimmesdale to deal with Hester, the Reverend Wilson
ironically betrays the very issue most central to Dimmesdale's own
conscience:

"Truly, as I sought to convince him, the shame lay in the

commission of the sin, and not in the showing of it forth."l62

From the

outset, Chillingworth detects some dark secret fatally lodged within the
intense sensibility of Dimmesdale's breast:

"Wherever there is a heart

and an intellect, the diseases of the physical frame are tinged with the
peculiarities of these.

In Arthur Dimmesdale, thought and imagination

were so active, and sensibility so intense, that the bodily infirmity
would be likely to have its groundwork there." 163

Thus, Chillingworth

early decides upon his plan of attack, delving to the most profound
interior of his patient's bosom:

"A man burdened with a secret should

especially avoid the intimacy of his physician." 16 4

The investigator

himself, however, is no more immune from the psychosomatic disease than
the patient, so that Chillingworth's own physical aspect undergoes a
reciprocal change.

Moreover, the crowd is readily disposed to perceive

this change only in so far as it "forms its judgment, as it usually does,
160The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 222.
16lrbid., p. 235.
162The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 65-66.
163rbid., p. 124.

164rbid.
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on the intuitions of its great and warm heart," whereas whenever it
"attempts to see with its eyes, it is exceedingly apt to be deceived."165
On the other hand, Dimmesdale too is able to perceive the change
transpiring both within himself, and without, and rightfully attributes
it to its first cause:

"so Mr. Dimmesdale, conscious that the poison of

one morbid spot was infecting his heart's entire substance, attributed
all his presentiments to no other cause." 166

Indeed, the heart not only

"colors" our perceptions, but also speaks its own language, a language
whose meaning may often contradict the spoken word itself.

Thus it is

with Dimmesdale's final sermon before the "revelation:"
But even when the minister's voice grew high and commanding
still, if the auditor listened intently, and for the purpose, he
could detect the same cry of pain. What was it? The complaint of
a human heart, sorrow-laden, perchance guilty, telling its secret,
whether of guilt or sorrow, to the great heart of mankind; beseeching its sympathy or forgiveness,--at every moment,--in each
accent,--and never in vain! It was this profound and continual
undertone that gave the clergyman his most appropriate power.167
In so far as it is ontologically prior, the heart always knows far in
advance of the head--indeed, amasses its reasons while reason itself
stumbles.

Hence even in his sermon, Dimmesdale is already alongside what

must inevitably follow by "reason" of a logic more swift and subtle than
any intellectual exercise could devise.

Articulating a context which

both logically and psychologically completes the central scaffold scene,
Dimmesdale approaches the pillory where Hester had encountered the world's
ignominious stare some seven years before:
little Pearl by the hand!
breast!" 1 68

"There stood Hester, holding

And there was the scarlet letter on her

After an anxious delay, Dimmesdale at last consummates the

165Ibid., p. 126.

166Ibid., p. 140.

167Ibid., pp. 243-44.

168rbid., p. 251.
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central image of the novel, and brings it full circle as he ascends the
scaffold, supported on the one hand by Hester's arm which twines about
him, while clasping the tiny hand of Pearl with the other.

Having dis-

placed Pearl as the central figure of the triad, he reveals the final
secret of a heart untrue to itself:
letter gleams.

imprinted on his flesh, the scarlet

Those best able to appreciate the minister's sensibility,

and the reciprocal operation of the heart upon the body, "whispered their
belief, that the awful symbol was the effect of the ever active tooth of
remorse, gnawing from the inmost heart outwardly." 169

In typically

ambiguous fashion, however, Hawthorne leaves the psychosomatic supposition
open to interpretation; for others, who professed never once to have
removed their eyes from Dimmesdale, "denied that there was any mark whatever on his breast, more than on a new-born infant's."l70
narrator even more ambiguously concludes:

And the

"Without disrupting a truth so

momentous, we must be allowed to consider this version of Mr. Dimmesdale's
story as only an instance of that stubborn fidelity with which a man's
friends--and especially a clergyman's--will sometimes uphold his
character; when proofs, clear as the mid-day sunshine on the scarlet
letter, establish him a false and sin-stained creature of the dust."l71
As Alfred Marks has said of this uncertain resolution:

"Clear as the

mid-day sunshine on the scarlet letter," however, to the twentieth-century
reader who notices what Hawthorne does with sunshine, on the one hand, and
the scarlet letter, on the other, means something equivalent to "clear as
mud."l72
169rbid., p. 258.
17 1 rbid.

17 0rbid., p. 259.

1 72p. 284.
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Nevertheless, Hawthorne's fascination with the psychosomatic
problematic is nowhere more in evidence than in its meticulously detailed
exploration and analysis in The Scarlet Letter.

Yet, other tales examine

a similar phenomenon from variously perceptive angles.

In her complexion,

for example, Beatrice betrays a marked similarity to the plants; she is
the semblance of but another flower, "the human sister of those vegetable
ones, as beautiful as they . . . but still to be touched only with a
glove, nor to be approached without a mask." 173

Even her voice betrays

an all too vivid bloom, "a voice as rich as a tropical sunset, and which
made Giovanni, though he knew not why, think of deep hues of purple or
crimson, and of perfumes heavily delectable." 1 74

Herkimer remarks that

Roderick's complexion "had a greenish tinge over its sickly white, reminding him of a species of marble out of which he had once wrought a head of
Envy, with her snaky locks." 1 75

And as with Dimmesdale, Roderick's

symptoms produce an endless perplexity and speculation among the crowd:
"They knew not whether ill health were robbing his spirits of elasticity;
or whether a canker of the mind was gradually eating, as such cankers do,
from his moral system into the physical frame, which is but the shadow
of the former." 1 76

Similarly, among the guests at "The Christmas

Banquet," there was a man whose misfortune it was "to cherish within his
bosom a diseased heart, which had become so wretchedly sore, that the
continual and unavoidable rubs with the world • . . made ulcers in
173"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 97.
174rbid., pp. 96-97.
175"Egotism; or, The Bosom-Serpent," X, p. 269.
176 Ibid., p. 271.
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it • . • . he found his chief employment in exhibiting these miserable
sores to any who would give themselves the pain of viewing them;" there
was a man of "nice conscience" as well, "who bore a blood-stain in his
heart;" then there was an aged lady, "who had lived from time immemorial
with a constant tremor quivering through her frame;" and then again, a
certain Mr. Smith, "afflicted with a physical disease of the heart, which
threatened instant death on the slightest cachinnatory indulgence, or
even that titillation of the bodily frame, produced by merry thoughts." 177
That Hawthorne is so often concerned with the psychosomatic phenomenon
reveals to what extent his fiction is grounded in the situation.

In so

far as the body equally links us to our "self" and the "world," it articulates both the psychological and physiological context of intentionality
which constitutes the single, unitary phenomenon,

being-in~the-world.

Hawthorne's understanding of this phenomenon has already put itself
ahead of the subject-object dichotomy, and its concomitant conceptual
schema:

form-content.

As a unitary structure, this phenomenon transpires

alongside two simultaneous, spatial horizons, two horizons moreover which
are neither parallel nor conjoined in infinity.

Grounded in a space

which is neither geometric-geographic (physical) nor affective
(intentional), but both, the phenomenon itself thus undercuts the entire
arsenal of machinery which representation has at its command.

Further-

more, because its content is entirely formal, its truth is discovered
solely in the appearance, in what remains hidden or concealed.
essential ambiguity which remains hidden is its truth:
this phenomenon is at once its own "object."

And this

the "subject" of

Correspondingly, so long as

177x, pp. 287-88, 294, and 295, respectively.
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it can never be a fact or proposition, it can never be "correct."

In

other words, rational (mind) and irrational (body) diachronically
constitute apparent manifestations of a single truth, the truth of
simultaneous horizons--that is, the ek-static structure of being human.
The psychosomatic phenomenon thus expresses man's existential facticity,
the situated structure of Being.

Hawthorne's treatment of this phenome-

non attests to what extent he implicitly understood its situated dynamic.
In protest to a one-sided "rationalism," Hawthorne's oeuvre ironically
asserts the very "irrationalism" of such a pro-position, for the heart
must have its say as well.

It can make its complaints "known," however,

through the only intermediary both head and heart address in the same
"language."

The void which Hawthorne's villain experiences at the center

of his being, and to which the body subsequently bears witness, is the
very emptiness of his heart.

The circle, moreover, is vicious.

a heart, he lacks a common bond with the "other."

Without

At the same time, in

severing his relation to the "other," he simultaneously severs his own
relationship to "self" in so far as the "other" is a constitutive element
of the "self"--that is, the unitary structure being-in-the-world.

The

self-assertive domination of the rational subjecturn and its objectification of Being places Hawthorne's villain outside all care, but only from
a theoretical point of view.

The body can never escape its situation,

and thus rebels against the reasonless pro-position of reason alone as
the only redeeming link between the "selfishness" of the head and the
"otherness" of the heart.

Metaphysically, as a subjective mode of

consciousness, the head can never have its "reason" without the heart;
and conversely, the heart too becomes a blind and wilful pro-position or
im-position, void of its own "reason," without the head.

Each, without
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the other, reduces itself to absurdity.
From an existential point of view, this distinction takes the form:
~

soi-pour soi.

Warland.

For the one, witness Ethan Brand; for the other, Owen

In the end, they are the same.

That is not to say they are

identical, but rather constitute two aspects of a single phenomenon.
Their dynamic is the same.

Hawthorne's oeuvre discloses the Pascalian

truth that we are always searching for what we have already found.

Thus,

Ethan Brand spends eighteen years in search of a truth he is at last to
discover, beside the blaze of the lime-kiln, within his own heart alone.
Against the deficiency disclosed in measuring the distance between himself
and his ideal, Hawthorne's villain deserts the very ground of Being.

By

seeking to be the equal of his ideal, he thus reduces Being to the dull
unity of mere uniformity.l78

That is to say, he has already measured

this distance mathematically or, better, geometrically.

Such is the

supreme reductio ad absurdum which the scientific-technological attitude
negotiates, the reduction of Being to quantitative measurement; and such
is the imperfection which troubles Aylmer.

As representative of the

scientific posture of his age, his experiment on his own wife reveals his
absolute faith in science and its ultimate ability to control nature:
"The higher intellect, the imagination, the spirit, and even the heart,
might all find their congenial aliment in pursuits which . . • would
ascend from one step of powerful intelligence to another, until the
philosopher should lay his hand on the secret of creative force, and
perhaps make new worlds for himself.nl79

His wife becomes the probability

178Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 219.
179"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 36.
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of this new "world," for he had devoted himself too unreservedly to
scientific studies, "ever to be weaned from them by any second passion"-which is to say, by any passion whatsoever; indeed, his "love for his
young wife might prove the stronger of the two; but it could only be by
intertwining itself with his love of science, and uniting the strength of
the latter to his own."l80

Though Aylmer seeks to make Georgiana more

than she is factually, he concurrently seeks to make himself more than he
is factically; and it is in this sense that he deserts the ground of
Being.

Indeed, to Aylmer, this minor imperfection represents the very

"visible mark of earthly imperfection."l8l

In striving to come up to

perfection, to become its equal as "creator," Aylmer has already measured
this dimension quantitatively.

The ideal of perfection is, by definition,

infinitely removed from man's own factical being, for only number as
quantity can negotiate the idea of infinity.
expressed it:

As Max Scheler has

"Man takes his own emptiness of heart for the 'infinite

emptiness' of space and time." 182

"Empty" means, to begin with, an

expectation that is not satisifed; man's original emptiness is, then, the
emptiness of his own heart.183
desire.

It is the emptiness or lack of what we

In order to take this emptiness to himself, man must measure

this dimension with his own intentional metric; 184 only thus does man
bring Being into its ground plan--that is, his own facticity.

Aylmer,

on the other hand, addresses an expectation which in itself is infinitely
180Ibid., pp. 36-37.

18 1Ibid., p. 37.

182Man's Place in Nature, p. 45.
183Ibid., p. 44.
184cf. Heidegger, Poetry, ~anguage, Thought, p. 221.
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remote.

As such, the original emptiness of his heart is inhuman from the

start, for its desire is already outside its own possibility.
Similarly, the void at the interior of Gervayse Hastings' being is
without ground:

"he is such a being as I could conceive you to carve out

of marble, and some yet unrealized perfection of human science to endow
with an exquisite mockery of intellect; but •

• the demands that spirit

makes upon spirit, are precisely those to which he cannot respond."l85
As Gervayse says of himself:

"It is a chillness--a want of. earnestness--

a feeling as if what should be my heart were a thing of vapor--a haunting
perception of unreality!

Thus, seeming to possess all that other men

have--all that men aim at--1 have really possessed nothing, neither joys
nor griefs." 186

Roderick's preface to the story of Gervayse hits on a

further truth; such a man most probably is never "conscious of the
deficiency." 187

Neither of course is Ethan Brand, whose marble heart

reflects the utter desolation and solitude of daguerrean consciousness.
Like all of Hawthorne's villains, Ethan "carelessly" expects to come up
to the ideal, to identify at some point in the future with the infinitely
remote.

He thus becomes a fiend; in fact, began to be so from the moment

that his heart had ceased to keep pace with his intellectual development,
a development which in its progress,
disturbed the counterpoise between his mind and heart. The Idea
that possessed his life had operated as a means of education; it
had gone on cultivating his powers to the highest point of which
they were susceptible; it had raised him from the level of an
unlettered laborer, to stand on a star-light eminence, whither the
philosophers of the earth, laden with the lore of universities,
might vainly strive to clamber with him. So much for the intellect!
185"The Chr1.· stmas Banque t , " X, p. 284 .
186rbid., p. 304.

187rbid., p. 285.
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But where was the heart? That, indeed, had withered--had
contracted--had hardened--had perished! It had ceased to partake
of the universal throb. He had lost his hold of the magnetic chain
of humanity. He was no longer a brother-man, opening the chambers
or the dungeons of our common nature by the key of holy sympathy,
which gave him a right to share in all its secrets; he was now a
cold observer, looking on mankind as the subject of his experiment,
and, at length, converting man and woman to be his puppets, and
pulling the wires that moved them to such degrees of crime as were
demanded for his study.188
In this respect, Ethan is typical of the unfettered disregard for the
being of others, which daguerrean consciousness merely posits as quanta
of calculation.1 8 9

To put the world "in order," it subsequently forces

the existent as a whole to conform to the uniformity of its own view; it
thereby levels down every ordo to that of the manipulatively "objective."
Because its end, in fact, is never in the view itself, but rather
invisibly lingers at the end of an infinitely remote, single horizon, the
daguerrean imposition reciprocally and unknowingly cuts off or prevents
any experience of itself; and for this reason alone it is never conscious
of its deficiency.

Therein subsists its greatest danger to Being:

unaware of itself.

Hence, the objectification of Being consists in

it is

nothing less than man's blind, purposeful self-assertion in
everything.190
involuntary:
heart.

Fittingly, Ethan's final recognition of the truth is
it comes in reverie, both out of the fire and back to his

His death is thus paradoxically possible only in so far as he has

learned to identify with the finitude of his own facticity.

In being

brought back to himself, he is simultaneously restored to the solicitous
sphere of Being.
188"Ethan Brand," XI, pp. 98-99.
189cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 129.
190rbid., p. 116.
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Neither at home with themselves nor with the world, Hawthorne's
villains are therefore doomed to isolation.

Like Goodman Brown, the

deceit which they practice upon themselves and the world inevitably comes
back to haunt them.

Caught up in the sanctimonious omnipotence of their

ideal, they have already turned their eyes away from the earth, the very
ground on which they stand and which alone can bring the figure of the
"self" into the fullness of Being--that is, make it "stand forth."
Unable to accept their own finitude, the slightest disagreement or
divergence from their rigid, systematic frame becomes intolerable.

As

Kierkegaard remarked of Hegel's own such inflexible system, there is no
room in it for a sneeze.l91

So it is with the lady at the Christmas

banquet, who had fallen short of absolute and perfect beauty "merely by
the trifling defect of a slight cast in her left eye.

But this blemish,

minute as it was, so shocked the pure ideal of her soul, rather than her
vanity, that she passed her life in solitude, and veiled her countenance
even from her own gaze."l92

The void or emptiness of heart that

initiates this general movement away from the world and into the solitude
of the "self" is thus already determined by wilfully appropriating the
19lcf. Martin C. D'Arcy, S. J., Dialogue With Myself (New York:
Simon and Schuster, A Touchstone Book, 1966), p. 32.
192"The Christmas Banquet," X, p. 289. At the other extreme, there
are those who share an equal isolation with the egotist, having forfeited
all ties to the world, although via a route somewhat circuitous to the
most prominent of Hawthorne's villains. Such is the gentleman at the
Christmas banquet who, ever since he was able to read a newspaper, "had
prided himself on his consistent adherence to one political party, but,
in the confusion of these latter days, had got bewildered, and knew not
whereabouts his party was. This wretched condition, so morally desolate
and disheartening to a man who has long accustomed himself to merge his
individuality in the mass of a great body, can only be conceived by such
as have experienced it."(Ibid., p.303) Nonetheless, Hawthorne's indictment of those who refuse to take up their own responsibility cannot be
taken too lightly.
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daguerrean consciousness, that logic of the head which cuts the subject
off from the world in its objectification of Being.

An authentic subject,

on the other hand, comes into the fullness of the existent by leaving the
"self" unprotected and open to Being.

An authentic subject is thus

taken to the world, taken toward the world; he is taken by the world as
its own.

He is taken by the world in the same way as he is taken by that

toward which he is enthralled--in wonder and awe.

In moving outside or

beyond himself, he enowns the world both concernfully and solicitously,
and thereby expresses the unitary structure of his own existence.
Though deceptively simple, Hawthorne's exquisite little piece
entitled "Feathertop" poignantly explores this phenomenon, and the
related question of authenticity.

Mother Rigby sets the tone in her

initial observation of the scarecrow:

"Why, I've danced with a worse

one, when partners happened to be scarce, at our witch meetings in the
forest!

What if I should let him take his chance among the other men of

straw and empty fellows, who go bustling about the world?"l93

Once

brought to life, however, Feathertop's existential situation becomes
immediately apparent:
Step forth!

"Why lurkest thou in the corner, lazy one?

Thou hast the world before thee!"194

With the world "before

him," Feathertop must thence decide in what way he will negotiate it, how
he will "enter it."

The question of Being--that is, his existence

(Existenz)--having thus been decided, there remains the twofold
problematic regarding his own facticity:

(being)-in-the-world and

being-(with)-others. Feathertop resolutely accepts his factically limited
situation, that "essential condition of his existence;" as Mother Rigby
I 9 3x , p . 2 2 7 .

I94Ibid., p. 229.
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exhorts:

"whatever may happen to thee, thou must stick to thy pipe.

Thy life is in it; and that, at least, thou knowest well, if thou
knowest naught besides."195

Thus the scarecrow enters the world, and in

its resolute demeanor, "strode manfully towards the town" in order to
play its part "in the great world," where "not one man in a hundred .
was gifted with more real substance than itself." 196

Ironically, amidst

the general admiration which befalls the scarecrow, the only two who
perceive a discrepancy beneath his appearance are a dog and a child.
Unaware, however, Feathertop is soon to learn the truth of himself; and
when at last he beholds his image in the mirror, "not the glittering
mockery of his outside show, but a picture of the sordid patchwork of
his real composition, stript of all witchcraft," Feathertop surrenders to
the truth:

"For perchance the only time, since this so often empty and

deceptive life of mortals began its course, an Illusion had seen and
fully recognized itself." 1 97

Having commenced the world in fear ("feeble

and torpid natures, being incapable of better inspiration, must be
stirred up by fear"), he terminates it in anxious responsibility to the
truth of himself, and similarly takes upon himself his own "death:"
"I've seen myself, mother!--I've seen myself for the wretched, ragged,
empty thing I am!

I'll exist no longer!"198

Snatching the pipe from

his mouth, "he flung it with all his might against the chimney, and, at
the same instant, sank upon the floor, a medly of straw and tattered
garments, with some sticks protruding from the heap; and a shrivelled
195Ibid., pp. 234 and 235, respectively.
196rbid., pp. 236 and 232, respectively.
197Ibid., p. 244.

198rbid., p. 245.
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pumpkin in the midst"--the very image in which the child perceived him as
he entered the town. 199

If it seems somewhat foolish to speak of the

"life and death" of a scarecrow as we have in the above context, consider
that Hawthorne's irony, throughout, continuously throws us back to what
the tale itself presents as its most exclusive issue, an issue which
addresses the conflict between the truth of oneself and the falsehood of
the world in general.
the conclusion:

Mother Rigby summarily characterizes this world at

"There are thousands upon thousands of coxcombs and

charlatans in the world, made up of just such a jumble of worn-out,
forgotten, and good-for-nothing trash, as he was!

And why should my poor

puppet be the only one to know himself, and perish for it?"200

Thus, the

central problem is not, in fact, that Feathertop was an illusion, for the
illusion turns out to be the only truth of the entire tale.

Reality, on

the other hand, or what is taken to be the reality in our average everyday life, turns out to be a single and continuous lie.
top "dies" precisely because he was true to himself.

Indeed, FeatherFrom the outset,

Hawthorne had already rehearsed the logic of the conclusion in the ironic
rejoinder Feathertop gives to Mother Rigby:
honest man and a gentleman may!" 201
Rigby sums it up:

"I will thrive, if an

The conclusion:

he may not.

Mother

"Poor Feathertop • • . I could easily give him

another chance, and send him forth again to-morrow.
ings are too tender; his sensibilities too deep.

But, no!

his feel-

He seems to have too

much heart to bustle for his own advantage, in such an empty and heartless world."202

Clearly, then, the central issue at stake is that of

199rbid., pp. 245 and 239, respectively.
200rbid., p. 245.

20lrbid., p. 235.

202rbid., p. 246.

352
authenticity.

In his final moment of anticipatory resolution Feathertop

forsakes the inauthenticity of the "they" (das Man), that condition of
man's average everydayness whose essential tendency it is to level down
the possibilities of Being, and in so doing he appropriates the fullness
of Being as his own.

In following the dictates of his heart, Feathertop

effects the interior conversion of consciousness, that movement away from
the self-assertion of daguerrean objectification which represents the
constant negation of death.20J

His "death," in turn, turns Being itself

into the open, renouncing the negative reading of death that the
daguerrean consciousness assigns to it.
This interior transformation within the space of the heart
constitutes the conversion of consciousness which Hawthorne's oeuvre
transacts.

When consciousness turns toward and thus proceeds from the

interior of the heart's inner space, it thereby secures for itself a
safety, a safety thereafter liberated from daguerrean manipulation and
its objectification of Being.204

What we have called dioramic conscious-

ness, in reference to the explication of Hawthorne's world hitherto
advanced, thus approximates the basic experience of being-open-to-Being.
Accordingly, dioramic consciousness neither merely applies knowledge,
nor decides beforehand.205

Furthermore, the resoluteness of those

characters who turn the conversion of consciousness in Hawthorne's
oeuvre does not constitute the deliberate action of a subject as such;
otherwise, this movement would merely represent the subjectum of
203cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 125.
204cf. Ibid., PP· 120-21.
205It is, in fact, the basic experience of "thinking" in
Heidegger's Being and Jime; cf. also, Poetry, Language, Thought_, p. 67.
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daguerrean consciousness itself.

Rather, anticipatory resoluteness

enables a subject to transcend the captivity of the actual by opening
onto the possibility of Being.

Through his resolute anticipation, for

example, Dimmesdale articulates the phenomenal structure of care (Sorge)
in so far as his comportment toward death reveals his ownmost possibility
for Being; and to that extent his existence becomes authentic--if only in
its dying.

In the distinctive possibility of being his own, he has

already wrenched himself away from the "they."

This is made possible, in

the end, when Dimmesdale's consciousness turns toward the interior of the
heart:

"It was a ghastly look with which he regarded them; but there was

something at once tender and strangely triumphant in it." 2 06

Appropri-

ately, he invites both woman and child to his side; "Yet he trembled, and
turned to Hester with an expression of doubt and anxiety in his eyes, not
the less evidently betrayed, that there was a feeble smile upon his
lips." 20 7

In delivering himself over from the quantitative uniformity of

daguerrean logic in the "they," Dimmesdale triumphantly reveals the
burning letter on his bosom, the very symbol "of what has seared his
inmost heart." 208

By turning toward the truth of the caustic

accusations of his heart, he qualitatively secures for himself a
distinctive safety at the interior of Being, a safety made possible in
the ineffable logic of the world's inner space. Dimmesdale has
decisively come home to himself, and thus to Being as well.
expressed it in a letter of 11 August 1924,
206The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 252.
2 07Ibid., p. 254.
208 Ibid.

As Rilke
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However vast the "outer space" may be, yet with all its sidereal
distances it hardly bears comparison with the dimensions, with the
depth dimensions of our inner being, which does not even need the
spaciousness of the universe to be within itself almost unfathomable. Thus, if the dead, if those who are to come, need an abode,
what refuge could be more agreeable and appointed for them than
this imaginary space?209
In this "imaginary space," as Rilke calls it, Dimmesdale is delivered
over to Being:

"and there was a sweet and gentle smile over his face, as

of a spirit sinking into deep repose."210

At the same time, Dimmesdale's

single gesture secures the possibility of Being for the "other:"
Pearl kissed his lips. A spell was broken. The great scene of
grief, in which the wild infant bore a part, had developed all her
sympathies; and as her tears fell upon her father's cheek, they
were the pledge that she would grow up amid human joy and sorrow,
nor forever do battle with the world, but be a woman in it.
Towards her mother, too, Pearl's errand as a messenger of anguish
was all fulfilled.211
In coming up to the finitude of his own existence, then, Dimmesdale is
touched from out of the widest orbit of Being:

the will is shaken by the

touch. 212
In the same way, Ethan Brand dares the venture "to be" in his ownmost possibility toward death.

Having once ventured a glance inward

toward the knowledge of his own heart, Ethan "was making himself at home
in his old place, after so long absence that the dead people, dead and
buried for years, would have had more right to be at home, in any
familiar spot, than he." 213

In returning to the heartfelt sphere of

Being he had so long neglected, Ethan now reclaims the precinct of Being
2 09quoted in Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 128.
210The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 256.

211Ibid.

212cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 125.
213"Ethan Brand," XI, pp. 88-89.
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as his own.

His quest for the Unpardonable Sin returns full circle to

its beginning:

"It is a sin that grew within my own breast . . . .

sin that grew nowhere else!

A

The sin of an intellect that triumphed over

the sense of brotherhood with man . . . and sacrificed everything to its
own mighty claims." 21 4
turned

If, as Bartram remarks, "The man's head is

. • he is a madman," 215 Ethan's final act at least restores

him to the integrity of "self."

In turning toward the interior of his

own heart, he thus returns himself to earth and so redeems the whole of
Being:

"Oh, Mother Earth . . • who art no more my Mother, and into whose

bosom this frame shall never be resolved!

Oh, mankind, whose brotherhood

I have cast off, and trampled thy great heart beneath my feet!

Oh, stars

of Heaven, that shone on me of old, as if to light me onward and
upward!--farewell all, and forever!" 216

The sunrise which follows

confirms that Ethan's death has transformed the calculating logic of the
head back into the interior of the heart's inner space, where bot;h reside
as one:

"Earth was so mingled with sky that it was a daydream to look at

it."217

The transmutation of Being thus comes back into the "stilled

repose of the balanced oneness of the two realms within the world's
inner space."218

In surpassing itself, the marble of Ethan's heart not

only comes up to its own "self," but back into the finite nature of its
truth as well:

"At any rate, it is burnt into what looks like special

good lime; and, taking all the bones together, my kiln is half a bushel
214Ibid., p. 90.

215Ibid.

216Ibid., p. 100.
217 Ibid., p. 101.
218Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 135.
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the richer for him." 219

If Ethan takes upon himself the responsibility

for his own death in anticipatory resoluteness, however, Beatrice's
death, on the other hand, merely articulates to what extent the calculating and manipulative reason of daguerrean consciousness plunders the
whole of Being without the conversion of its interior.

By treating the

"other" as an object, Rappaccini reveals the self-assertion of the
scientific-technological objectification of Being at its most unbridled
extreme.

Yet, in his flagitious disregard for his daughter, he is not

alone; even Giovanni, who professes to love her, carelessly imposes his
own demands upon Beatrice out of the vacant selfishness of his own heart,
and is therefore equally responsible for her death.

Her final words,

perforce, must fall upon ears long since deaf to the solicitous call of
Being.
I would fain have been loved, not feared • • • • But now it matters
not; I am going, father, where the evil, which thou hast striven to
mingle with my being, will pass away like a dream--like the
fragrance of these poisonous flowers, which will no longer taint my
breath among the flowers of Eden. Farewell, Giovanni! Thy words
of hatred are like lead within my heart--but they, too, will fall
away as I ascend. Oh, was there not, from the first, more poison
in thy nature than in mine?220
Although the solicitous call to Being characteristic of the
conversion of consciousness may sometimes end in death, it does not
always; the lesson, however, is always learned at great expense.

Thus,

Roderick Elliston ironically re-enters the common bond of humanity to
tell it a story, a story of a man very much like himself before
dislodging the serpentine egotism gnawing at his heart. 22 1
219"Ethan Brand," XI, p. 102.
220"Rappaccini's Daughter," X, p. 127.
221see, "The Christmas Banquet," X, pp. 284-85.
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Hawthorne's irony is rarely so playful.
bespeaks a sterner fate by far.

The tale of Reuben Bourne

"He regretted, deeply and bitterly, the

moral cowardice that had restrained his words, when he was about to disclose the truth to Dorcas; but pride, the fear of losing her affection,
the dread of universal scorn, forbade him to rectify this falsehood." 222
Having once concealed the truth out of intellectual pride, Reuben's
"one secret thought, became like a chain, binding down his spirit, and,
like a serpent, gnawing into his heart; and he was transformed into a sad
and downcast, yet irritable man." 22 3

Like Dimmesdale, however, the logic

of his heart unwittingly works itself out toward an irrevocable
resolution.

Indeed, the further Reuben strays from the deliberate

course he had originally set upon, the more immanently his retribution is
at hand:

"Unable to penetrate to the secret place of his soul, where his

motives lay hidden, he believed that a supernatural voice had called him
onward, and that a supernatural power had obstructed his retreat." 22 4
And he accepts the call to Being, the call for a daring which surrenders
to the dictates of the heart, hoping for an opportunity of expiating his
selfish and deceitful past.

Within the darkened interior at the "heart"

of the forest, Reuben, like Ethan Brand, returns full circle.

In opening

up himself to what has been so hermetically closed off for years, he
finally effects the transmutation of consciousness within the heart.
Even so, this interior logical design is incomplete without the ironic
killing of his son; for with the death of Cyrus, Reuben likewise negates
his most indulgent claim to "self."

The "self" enters onto the world:

222"Roger Malvin's Burial," X, p. 349.
223rbid., p. 350.

224Ibid., p. 356.
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"His sin was expiated, the curse was gone from him; and, in the hour,
when he had shed blood dearer to him than his own, a prayer, the first
for years, went up to Heaven from the lips of Reuben Bourne."225
lips now speak from the heart.

Those

And in the saying of the inner recall,

which converts the will to im-pose into the innermost region of the
heart's space, all being "other" than the heart turns inward and toward
it:

"Here everything is inward:

not only does it remain turned toward

this true interior of consciousness, but inside this interior, one thing
turns, free of all bounds, into the other.

The interiority of the

world's inner space unbars the Open for us."226
Only when Being is ventured thus, does man create a safety; only
thus is he secure; only then does man poetically dwell in the world with
both himself and others.
spacious.

Being secure at the interior makes Being

In opening onto the world, man opens the world for others; he

thereby brings Being into its fullness.

The conversion of consciousness

in and toward the interior of the heart's inner space, which Hawthorne's
oeuvre transacts, bespeaks the saying of the single-minded injunction, to
thine own self be true.

This simple axiom commences the world; it is the

ground of all solicitous being-with-others; it is the truth of love.
Through love, the truth of the heart sets itself to work in Hawthorne's
world.

Though it begins with "self," Being begins to be at home when it

opens onto others, for Being is always situated.
The word "heart" is for Hawthorne the supreme mirror-word, the
word enclosing all others: it is sphere, house, temple, prison,
cave, grave, lake, fountain, and furnace. The word "head," its
225 rbid., p. 360.
226Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 130,
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antithetical homologue, is, in comparison, lackluster, indigent,
barren. And both the attic and the aerie, images of the observing
and sovereign consciousness, refer us back yet again to the central
organ that symbolizes better than any other all man's hidden
inclinations. For Hawthorne, consciousness was not a brain but a
heart . . . . And poetic language is not a language of the brain
but of the heart.227
Hawthorne's work is thus decidely onto-logical.

Yet, both head and heart

must come together in the conversion of consciousness which Hawthorne's
world sets forth in so far as they metaphysically constitute subjective
modes of consciousness.

In this initial movement, the head remains

directed outward while the heart turns inward toward itself.

As Martin

D'Arcy has expressed it, "Intellect and love work together ina reciprocal relationship, love being a blind beggar and intellect a cripple
with good insight sitting

0n

the shoulders of love."2 2 8

In the tradition

of Augustine and Pascal, Hawthorne's world therefore articulates a metaphysic of consciousness wherein man abides in his wholeness and
integrity, within the fullness of Being.

As Pascal has said:

"Nature

has set us so well in the centre, that if we change one side of the
balance, we change the other also."229

Ontologically, however, the

conversion of consciousness most central to Hawthorne's oeuvre primordially transpires within the interior of the heart's own space, the inner
space of the world--and there alone.

In its ontological constitution,

then, love inclusively expresses, within the single interior of its
space, the dual metaphysical postures of head and heart.

It does so,

furthermore, at the level of situated Being, whereby man ek-statically
227Normand, p. 341.
228nialogue With Myself, p. 31.
229Pensles, p. 21.
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dwells within the double horizoned structure simultaneously constituted
by his love of "self" as well as the "other."

The world of Hawthorne's

work thus dwells in love; it abides in its poetic saying of the inner
recall.

The heart must have its voice, for only in the heart does man

transcend the metaphysical attitude itself, that referential surface of
the world-view which Hawthorne's work internally disrupts:

"And as for

ripeness--and as for progress--let mankind always do the highest,
kindest, noblest thing, that at any given period, it has attained to the
perception of; and surely that thing cannot be wrong, nor wrongly
timedt" 230

At the interior of Hawthorne's world, then, love brings

about the future, whereas daguerrean consciousness in and of itself can
only be within the delimited confines of the actual, its present moment.
In the end, the onto-logic of the head represents nothing more than a
photograph album with fixed instances--"never the future coming about
before us, the step from yesterday to today, the first prick of forgetfulness in the memory." 2 31

Hawthorne's world initiates that first prick

of forgetfulness in the memory; it displaces the inauthenticity of the
actual in favor of an authenticity grounded in the possibility of Being
itself, and simultaneously gives man back to the ek-static temporality
of his own existence.
Over and against the eternal present of daguerrean consciousness
and its hypnotic gaze toward infinity, Hawthorne's world effects a
present which holds a finite future in it, a present whose very
temporality is grounded in that future.

Reuben Bourne begins the possi-

230"Earth's Holocaust," X, p. 393.
231Julio Cortazar, Hopscotch, trans. Gregory Rabassa (New York:
New American Library, A Plume Book, 1966), p. 468.
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bility of a future only when the burden of his synchronic past has been
withdrawn;23 2 Roderick Elliston initiates a new life with Rosina only
when the eternal moment of his morbid egotism has been discarded; 2 33
Owen Warland inaugurates a new beginning for his art only when the superficial motivation of his past endeavors has been nullified;234 Matthew
and his bride embark upon a new life only when their impossible quest has
been forsaken; 2 35 Peter Goldthwaite launches a realistic future only when
the pretense of his "castle in the air" has been exposed;236 Robin discovers he is his own man only when his immature dependence upon his
kinsman has been displaced; 2 3 7 Pearl enters onto the world only when the
truth of her birth has been laid bare;238 the two "owls" ironically
disengage themselves from a stifling past only when the House has been
abandoned. 2 39

Hawthorne's world attests the bankruptcy of all who would

live a present either grounded in the sterile fixation of its past or the
impossibility of its future.

"In this world, we are the things of a

moment, and are made to pursue momentary things, with here and there a
thought that stretches mistily towards eternity, and perhaps may endure
as long.

All philosophy, that would abstract mankind from the present, is

232"Roger Malvin's Burial," X, p. 360.
233"Egotism; or, The Bosom-Serpent," X, p. 283.
234"The Artist of the Beautiful," X, p. 475.
235"The Great Carbuncle," IX, p. 165.
236"Peter Goldthwaite's Treasure," IX, pp. 383 and 406,
respectively.
237"My Kinsman, Major Molineaux," XI, p. 231.
238The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 256.
239The House of the Seve~ Gables, II, p. 318.
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no more than words." 2 40

Pascal has said it another way:

We do not rest satisfied with the present. We anticipate the future
as too slow in coming, as if in order to hasten its course; or we
recall the past, to stop its too rapid flight. So imprudent are we
that we wander in the times which are not ours, and do not think of
the only one which belongs to us; and so idle are we that we dream
of those times which are no more, and thoughtlessly overlook that
which alone exists. For the present . . • . is never our end. The
past and the present are our means; the future alone is our end.
So we never live, but we hope to live; and, as we are always preparing to be happy, it is inevitable we should never be so.241
Whereas the inauthentic existence of Hawthorne's villains appropriates an
either infinitely remote past or future, authentic existence on the other
hand appropriates the present as its own, a present which can be its own
only in so far as its future is finite.

"How sad a truth--if true it

were--that Man's age-long endeavor for perfection had served only to
render him the mockery of the Evil Principle, from the fatal circumstance
of an error at the very root of the matter!"242

Only within the heart,

that "little, yet boundless sphere," 243 does man hold both a past and a
future within the present.

"Purify that inner sphere; and the many

shapes of evil that haunt the outward, and which now seem almost our only
realities, will turn to shadowy phantoms, and vanish of their own accord.
But, if we go no deeper than the Intellect, and strive, with merely that
feeble instrument, to discern and rectify what is wrong, our whole
accomplishment will be a dream." 244

For Hawthorne, then, the present is

authentic only when it contains the finite possibility of its future, a
present moreover which has already taken up the possibility of its own
240"01d News," XI, p. 133.
241Pensles, pp. 60-61.
242"Earth's Holocaust," X, p. 403.
243Ibid.

244Ibid., p. 404.
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death in anticipatory resolution.

For death is man's final horizon,

forever beyond his understanding, the plenary horizon of nothingness in
which Being itself is grounded.

As the skeleton at the Christmas banquet

betokens:
And if, in their bewildered conjectures as to the purpose of earthly
existence, the banqueters should throw aside the veil, and cast an
inquiring glance at this figure of death, as seeking thence the
solution otherwise unattainable, the only reply would be a stare of
the vacant eye-caverns, and a grin of the skeleton-jaws. Such was
the response that the dead man had fancied himself to receive, when
he asked of Death to solve the riddle of his life; and it was his
desire to repeat it when the guests of his dismal hospitality should
find themselves perplexed with the same question.245
If Aylmer's life apparently contradicts the ek-static structure of
man's existence in Hawthorne's work, it does so only paradoxically:

"The

momentary circumstance was too strong for him; he failed to look beyond
the shadowy scope of Time, and living once for all in Eternity, to find
the perfect Future in the present."246

In looking "beyond the shadowy

scope of Time," authentic existence thus disrupts its synchronic,
historical continuum, and thereby "stands out" from itself in an ekstatic present animated by its own finite future.

Hawthorne's villains,

on the other hand, maniacally attach themselves to the infinite

omni~

potence of an idea, an idea grounded in the impossibility of a future in
so far as it is unattainable.

Forever closed off to possibility,

Hawthorne's villains live an eternally repetitive present in which
existence itself has already escaped their grasp.

"Dr. Heidegger's

Experiment" poignantly bears witness to this phenomenon, and .the
absurdity of its four "melancholy old creatures, who had been unfortunate
245"The Christmas Banquet," X, p. 287.
246"The Birth-Mark," X, p. 56.
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in life, and whose greatest misfortune it was, that they were not long
ago in their graves." 247
Being:

Dr. Heidegger alone accepts the finitude of

"But the doctor's four friends had taught no such lesson to them-

selves.

They resolved forthwith to make a pilgrimage to Florida, and

quaff at morning, noon, and night, from the Fountain of Youth." 2 48
Hawthorne knew better:

"Death .

is an idea that cannot easily be

dispensed with, in any condition between the primal innocence and that
other purity and perfection, which, perchance, we are destined to attain,
after travelling round the·full circle."249
Hawthorne's work is thus decidely existential.

In contrast to the

inauthentic lives of its villains, "which end like literary articles in
newspapers and magazines, so pompous on page one and ending up in a
skinny tail, back there on page thirty-two, among advertisements for
second-hand sales and tubes of toothpaste,"250
the free and daring venture of Being.

Hawthorne's world exhorts

Against the fear and ultimate

despair of its villains, indicative of "every human existence which
supposedly has become or merely wills to become infinite,"251

Hawthorne's

world sets forth a resolute anxiety characteristic of the conversion of
consciousness, and ontologically grounded in the interior space of Being,
Pascal's logic of the heart, Hegel's logic of quality.

At this most

inward interior, the space of the world becomes both the public and
247rx, p. 227.

248rbid., p. 238.

249"Earth's Holocaust," X, p. 393.
250cortazar, p. 409.
251Kierkegaard, "The Sickness Unto Death," in "Fear and Trembling"
and "The Sickness Unto Death," trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, Princeton Paperback Edition, 1968), p. 163.
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private expression of a single, unitary structure.
dialogue makes clear:
here."252

As Diderot's famous

"I'm down here in this world, and I'm staying

At home with both himself and the world, man thus creates a

safety for Being wherein he dwells primordially secure.

In his

solicitous being with others, he articulates an authentic "public" life,
a life hypothecated in openness and love.

Hawthorne's treatment of the

psychosomatic phenomenon illustrates, for example, the essential publicness of life, and prefigures its contemporary relation to the
psychiatrist's couch.

Accordingly, to make one's private "sins" public

can sometimes cure the disease:

witness Roderick Elliston.

Similarly,

Dimmesdale's interior conflict is finally assuaged when he reveals the
truth of himself on the pillory.

Even more persuasively, the entire

novel is structured by an explicit alternation between public and private
scenes, between the pillory and the pulpit on the one hand, and the
interior drama of the heart on the other.

In the same way, the

avowe~

brotherhood at Blithedale reflects the morally untenable nature of those
distinctions which separate man from man in society, just as the fact of
the relation between Zenobia and Priscilla mirrors an implicit sisterhood
decisively more significant than the playful masquerade Zenobia would
make of it.253

In this respect, Westervelt epitomizes to what extent the

daguerrean consciousness of the scientific-technological world-view
manipulatively devastates the solicitous sphere of Being.

As a phenom-

enon, Westervelt's control over both Zenobia and Priscilla constitutes
252nenis Diderot, "Rameau's Nephew," Selected Writings, trans.
Derek Coltman (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 140.
253A. N. Kaul, "The Blithedale Romance," in Hawthorne: A
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. N. Kaul (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 158.
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a peculiarly sinister variation of the technological im-position, which
makes a delusive show of "spirituality" while really imbued throughout
with a cold and dead materialism:

"it suggests the exploitative power

which technology was putting into the hands of men:

the power to bring

individuals into total bondage while leaving them outwardly free and
untouched.

against the brotherhood of voluntary love, which is

based upon the magnetic chain of human sympathy, Westervelt's mesmeric
union is enforced bondage, destructive of true individuality as well as
true community."254

In its power of "remote control," the technological

attitude thus typified by Westervelt reflects the equally remote infinity
of its far-sighted vision as conclusively as it prefigures the technological ambition of the twentieth century itself:
distances behind him in the shortest time.

"Man puts the longest

He puts the greatest distance

behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortest
range."255
nearness.

And yet, this frantic abolition of all distances brings no
"What is least remote from us in point of distance • . . can

remain far from us.

What is incalculably far from us in point of

distance can be near to us.

Short distance is not in itself nearness.

Nor is great distance remoteness." 256

Solicitously counterpoised

against the remoteness of the daguerrean view, Hawthorne's work appropriates a circumambient milieu which affectively brings man back into the
nearness of Being, the interior of the heart's inner space wherein
existence sustains him with its touch.
254rbid., p. 159.
255Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 165.
256rbid.
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Yet, in its existential constitution, the world of Hawthorne's work
not only negotiates man's being-with-others, but equiprimordially articulates the unaccommodated "self" as well.

Unlike the modern

philanthropist at the Christmas banquet, "who had become so deeply
sensible of the calamities of thousands and millions of his fellow
creatures, and the impracticableness of any general measures for their
relief, that he had no heart to do what little good lay immediately within his power, but contented himself with being miserable for sympathy,"25J
whosoever ventures the conversion of consciousness, like Dimmesdale,
finds peace within himself, and in the resolute anticipation of death.
Authentic existence enjoys its "self" within its ownmost factical mode as
"thrown possibility." 258

Hawthorne's own life bears the stamp of such an

authenticity; although he loved to find himself among a circle of guests
seated about a fire, and while he likewise enjoyed the physical intimacy
of a crowd, he equally required life's most refreshing moments of
solitude:

"What would a man do, if he were compelled to live always in

the sultry heat of society, and could never bathe himself in cool
solitude?"259

This solitude, however, is decidedly not the solitary

confinement Hawthorne's villains experience at the center of their Being,
but rather constitutes a genuine enownment of the "self" in face of man's
most existential problematic.

Though unaccommodated in certain respects,

man always comes up to himself and to the world whenever he obeys the
saying of the inner recall, and its forward recollection of the single257"The Christmas Banquet," X, p. 303.
258Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 243.
259The American Notebooks, VIII, p. 26.
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minded injunction:

to thine own self be true.

Nevertheless, existence

is hard work, and brings with it its own demands.
it:

As Heidegger expressed

"The hard thing is to accomplish existence."260

The difficulty is

in the conversion, in going over from the self-assertive domination of
the head to the work of the heart.

And in this most existential of all

man's acts, he is emphatically alone.

Above all else, perhaps,

Hawthorne's oeuvre expresses this radical solitude, man's indelible sense
of apartness with which authentic existence must come to terms over and
against the inauthentic, collective activity of the "they;" the world of
Hawthorne's work is thus discovered beneath "the superficial, reassuring,
consoling myths of an America on the road to prosperity and discount
happiness." 261

But neither America nor the world has ever thanked anyone

for disrupting its comic and conventional myths of the easy life, as
Apollinaire so thoroughly managed for the twentieth century, in favor of
the kind of tragic myths which "involve man in a wholly different way,
thus forcing him to look at himself, not as he appears from his conventional gestures or in retouched and idealized photographs, but upon the
screen of his own consciousness." 262

And so for the most part,

Hawthorne's age did the best it could; it ignored him.

Yet, Hawthorne's

work arrives out of the future; his world is present to us now, a world
which discredits the noisy talk and idle chatter of the "they," supplanting, in its stead, the solitude of silence wherein man abides uniquely
hushed, and listens--to the resolute call of Being.
260Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 138.
261 Normand, p. 332.
262rbid., pp. 332-33.
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III

The tripartite structure of The Scarlet Letter not only conceals a
deeper structure beneath it, but also reflects one which underpins the
entire oeuvre, and which functions on a level closely approaching that of
an obsession.

For throughout Hawthorne's work, a single theme persis-

tently surfaces to the top:

that of the journey and return.

Dimmesdale

returns to the spot from which he strayed seven years prior; Coverdale
enters the experiment at Blithedale only to return once again to the
"world;" Goodman Brown journeys forth from the clearing at dusk and
returns again at sunrise; the narrator of "The Celestial Rail-Road" reenters the space of his dream only to dismiss it at the end with the
"light" of reason fromwhence it originated; the narrator of "The
Procession of Life" comes back to his own situation, it is not time for
death; Feathertop commences the world only to return to the lifeless
heap from which he began; Roderick finds salvation in being restored to
the love of Rosina, the wife whom he had originally deserted so many years
past; the Christmas banquet returns to itself each year, terminated only
with the death of Gervayse Hastings; Drowne's art reverts to its dull
mechanical style after his brief interlude with the lady of the wooden
image; Roger Malvin's curse is lifted only by Reuben's return to the site
from whence it was incurred; the narrator of "A Virtuoso's Collection"
forsakes the illusive museum for the "real" world from whence he
entered; the Gray Champion disappears as suddenly as he appeared; the
revellers at the may-pole disperse once again to the gloomy world forced
upon them when driven from their classic groves of fable; cast aside by
his mother, the gentle boy is again reunited only to lose her in the end;
Ethan Brand returns to the place from whence his quest for the
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Unpardonable Sin began; Wakefield comes hom twenty years later to
discover that the final joke is on him; David Swan interrupts his journey
with a nap, only to return to the highway of life refreshed but unaware;
Dr. Heidegger's guests become the shriveled victims of their age prior to
the experiment; Robin returns from his labyrinthian sweep of the town to
the ferryman who brought him hence; Nurse Toothaker returns to the bedside of the dying man who had originally disclaimed her; the wanderer of
the "Night Sketches" returns to the fireside; the wives of the dead
return to their beds; the haunted mind returns to its sleep.
goes on.

The list

This obsession with circularity in Hawthorne, to. come round

again to the beginning, at once attests to both the roundness of his
oeuvre, and the inevitable end which it implies, for roundness ends
wherever it begins.

The circle is endless only to a geometrician

grounded in the "viciousness" of his infinity.
Being is round.

Life knows better.

Hawthorne's oeuvre was his life; and as his oeuvre,

Hawthorne's life was round.

Hawthorne's life came full circle, and by a

most uncanny, symmetrical route.

"My journey, as thou callest it, forth

and back again, must needs be done 'twixt now and sunrise." 263

It is a

curious fact, then, that Hawthorne's European travels were thus circular,
and nearly perfectly so.

For from the States (Wayside), Hawthorne

proceeded to England, France, and Italy; he returned from Italy, to France,
then to England, and finally back to the States (Wayside).

It is a more

curious fact that the very same ship captain, a Captain Leitch, who took
him over to England brought him back again.

It is a most curious fact

that Hawthorne's absence from home reflected the same amount of time that
263"Young Goodman Brown," X, p. 74.
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Dimmesdale avoided the pillory:

seven years.

Similarly, there is a

corresponding relation between Hawthorne's life and the emphasis on time
in his oeuvre; we discover thus:

the early works emphasize the past; the

ndddle period, the present; and his final period, especially the
unfinished manuscripts, the future.

Suffice it to say in general that

throughout his life, until those final desparate years, Hawthorne's most
pressing issue had been expressed most poignant.ly in his preface to the
Twice-Told Tales:

"They are not the talk of a secluded man with his own

mind and heart, (had it been so, they could hardly have failed to be more
deeply and permanently valuable,) but his attempts, and very imperfectly
successful ones, to open an intercourse with the world." 264
intercourse with the world:

To open an

Hawthorne's work was the very way out of his

own personal tendencies toward introspection, what Melville called his
"indoor cast of mind."
Where openness, expansion, and a hankering after infinitude are
characteristic of his contemporaries, Hawthorne sticks to his
secretiveness, and to the atmosphere of enclosure, the awareness of
things closing in. The journey ends in a house and within a locked
room, with the rediscovery of another self for whom it has all been
a dream; he has never left home. But this does not mean that he
has never adventured; for there can be cosmic adventure in
introspection, as much as in exploration.265
Torn between the androgynous poles of Being, between the "self" and
"other," Hawthorne's life affirms the deep-seated duality of his nature:
he was at once both proud and humble, cold and sensuous, sluggish and
active, conservative and liberal, realistic and romantic. 266

Corre-

spondingly, his life, like his work, reflects the struggle with the
single-minded injunction:

to thine own self be true.

Hawthorne's

struggle with himself articulates his resolutely anxious endeavor to come
264rx, P. 6.

265 Levin, p. 100.

266 cowley, p. 551.
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up to this imperative, an imperative he had imposed upon himself at a
very tender age--since the time he emerged from the accidental injury to
his foot--at the age of twelve.
How difficult it must have been, for example, for Hawthorne to underplay his gravitation toward Melville and the exotic world this nomad
offered his profound sensibilities, at the expense of himself and in the
interest of his wife, Sophia.

Since he often confided to his journals

those experiences which affected him most, the very absence of any
detailed commentary on Melville speaks for itself.

Hawthorne's silence,

on this point alone, bespeaks a world of critical supposition.

Yet,

Sophia's insistence upon reading everything he committed to paper
undoubtedly accounts, at least in part, for Hawthorne's reticence, and
simultaneously points to his solicitous regard for her.
keep many such secrets.

He was forced to

And so the journey ended for Hawthorne as it had

begun, within his indoor cast of mind.

His life-long struggle with time,

and the journey and its return, came home to haunt him.

As he expressed

it at the Wayside, 1863, less than a year before his death:
the Immediate, the Actual, has proved too potent for me." 2 67

"The Present,
In his

final years, he could no longer sustain the immediacy of that resolutely
forward recollection which grounded not only the world of his work, but
his very life--the recollection of the single-minded injunction.

As his

final fragmentary pieces confirm, the issue most at stake had become the
future.

The fragmented consciousness of Dr. Grimshawe's Secret and the

obsession with immortality, in both Septimius Felton and The Dolliver
Romance, testify to the dream-like consciousness with which Hawthorne
267"To a Friend," the dedication piece to Franklin Pierce, Our Old
Home, V, p. 4.
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quitted the earth.

The concerns of the haunted mind had become his only

ones; he grew especially weary of the feeling that he had been "here"
before--the deja vu of going through the same emotions meaninglessly:
as writers repeat their plots, thus man's life repeats itself, and at
length grows stale.268

Like the dream-scape of Dr. Grimshawe's Secret,

in the end everything was comparable to a dream for Hawthorne, an
unforgotten reality.269

The "flight of time" in Fanshawe which

characterizes Dr. Melmouth's study, that flight of time so "swift as the
wind, and noiseless as the snow-flake . . . a sure proof of real
happiness,"270 now weighed heavy on Hawthorne's troubled mind.
close to him, and he knew it.

Death was

Yet, it was no surprise; nor could he

suddenly fear what had informed the most persistent theme of his entire
oeuvre.

Believing, or pretending to believe, that a change of air was

his only hope for recovery, he determined upon a journey to the region of
lakes and hills that had been his true native land all his life.271
Having succumbed in those final barren years to the expectations and
demands he had set upon himself throughout life, half-way between waking
and dream, and unable to write, he summoned one last spurt of courage and
set off, on 12 May 1864, with his dearest friend in life, to die alone-far from the domestic complications of Sophia and his children to whom he
had unselfishly devoted his ownmost being.
Making their way up into the White Mountains, perhaps with the
expectation of reaching Crawford Notch, the two friends stopped off
at the little town of Plymouth. Hawthorne seemed to be having more
and more difficulty in walking and using his hands. Was it
paralysis or a heart attack? However, on the evening of May 18 he
268Levin, pp. 97-98.
270nr, p. 337.

269rbid. , p. 98.

271Normand, p. 77.
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went off to sleep peacefully enough. Between three and four
o'clock in the morning of the nineteenth, Pierce went into his
friend's room, and upon touching him discovered that he was already
cold. That was how Hawthorne died, at the age of sixty, in the
completest solitude, his last thoughts, his torments, his doubts,
and the mystery of his genius locked up forever in his heart.272
He returned home only in death.

At the gravesite, The Dolliver Romance

was most fittingly placed upon his breast.

His heart embraced in death

what he could not complete in life.
Being is round.

The world is round around the round Being.273

Being is around the world.

We come from nothing and go to nothing; from

the darkness of the womb, to the darkness of the grave.
there is only the void which waits to be filled.

In between,

The conversion of

consciousness, at the interior of the heart's inner space, takes the
void as its own and embraces this void with its fullness, the fullness of
temporality, the ripeness of its own time.

The ontological movement in

Hawthorne's oeuvre, both in and toward the heart's interior, creates a
safety for Being itself, a security without care, a care-free center
which turns toward the open draught of Being and into it.

In Hawthorne,

dioramic consciousness begins this movement, wherein man creates a safety
at the interior of himself, a secure re-pose outside the daguerrean
objectification of Being, and wherein man reposes in the logic of the
heart.

This unguardedness, outside the protective defenses of the head,

intimately secures the wholeness of Being around man himself.

Dimmesdale

secures a safety in the daring venture to be himself; his gesture lights
up the presence of Being and makes it present in its widest orbit, wider
272rbid., pp. 77-78.
273cf. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, pp. 234 and 240,
respectively.
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by far than that of the comet, which illumines the night sky and yet
conceals him.

And yet, to Chillingworth, Dimmesdale is now hidden more

than ever, for under rational analysis the gesture of the heart has
already taken flight.
more than once.

It is gone.

("Thou hast escaped me!"

"Thou hast escaped me!") 274

he repeated

Being thus shatters every
I

attempt to penetrate it; it turns the calculating im-position backjoward
its destruction.

Even in his dying, Chillingworth turns his back to

Being; his death becomes the altogether inconstant and null.275
Reciprocally, Dimmesdale acknowledges where Being touches him most; his
death becomes the constant and full.

His death sets Being on the way of

its orbit once again; the Letter goes abroad.
Being.

It too will die--even

And yet, while Being is, it can be only in so far as man enowns

it at the center of himself, the interior of his own heart.
The inner and invisible domain of the heart is not only more inward
than the interior that belongs to calculating representation, and
therefore more invisible; it also extends further than does the
realm of merely producible objects. Only in the invisible innermost of the heart is man inclined toward what there is for him to
love • . • • the interior of uncustomary consciousness remains the
inner space in which everything is for us beyond the arithmetic of
calculation, and free of such boundaries, can overflow into the
unbounded whole of the Open. This overflow beyond number arises,
in its presence, in the inner and invisible region of the
heart. • • • The widest orbit of beings becomes present in the
heart's inner space.276
Dimmesdale's conversion recalls the abjectness of objects back into the
space of the heart.
for Being.

It rescues the thing from abjectness and rescues it

Dimmesdale's conversion returns the Letter to the world.

makes things once again familiar, and man familiar to himself.
274The Scarlet Letter, I, p. 256.
275cf. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 125.
276Ibid., pp. 127-28.
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Dimmesdale's conversion gives both the thing and man back to Being, and
does so in such a passionate way that the fullness of Being comes up and
back to its own within the heart itself.

In being returned to its own

domain, Being, as "being-there" (Dasein), is secured.

But how?

In the saying of the inner recall, Dimmesdale dares Being.

The

round presence of Being is marked off in its being present in the word:
"Language is the precinct (templum), that is, the house of Being."277
Dimmesdale accomplishes the return from the realm of objects, and their
representation, back to the innermost region of the heart's space only in
this precinct, the temple of Being itself.

The Letter flees from its

abjectness to become language--that is, part of the world--only when
Dimmesdale accepts the dare to speak.

In the saying, the Letter becomes

its own:
People of New England! • • . I stand upon the spot where, seven
years since, I should have stood • • • • Lo, the scarlet letter
which Hester wears! Ye have all shuddered at it! Wherever her
walk hath been • . • it hath cast a lurid gleam of awe and horrible
repugnance roundabout her. But there stood one in the midst of
you, at whose brand of sin and infamy ye have not shuddered! • • •
But he hid it cunningly from men, and walked among you with the
mien of a spirit, mournful, because so pure in a sinful world!--and
sad, because he missed his heavenly kindred! Now, at the deathhour, he stands up before you! He bids you look again at Hester's
scarlet letter! He tells you, that, with all its mysterious horror,
it is but the shadow of what he bears on his own breast, and that
even this, his own red stigma, is no more than the type of what has
seared his inmost heart!278
Dimmesdale's saying punctuates the silence of the crowd more piercingly
than even the meteor punctuates the dark fissure of the night; it rends
the jagged edge of silence away from the void and back to the fullness of
the world, the fullness of the existent, the fullness of Being.
277Ibid., p. 132.
278The Scarlet Letter, I, pp. 254-55.
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makes Being full.

"The multitude, silent t:Ul then, broke out in a

strange, deep voice of awe and wonder, which could not as yet find
utterance, save in this murmur that rolled so heavily after the departed
spirit."279

In daring language, Dimmesdale restores Being to its full-

ness; he makes its presence present; and he does so in a saying which
accomplishes the oneness of the two realms, both head and heart, because
it has already been turned toward the interior of the heart's inner space.
"That oneness, as the integral globe of Being, encircles all pure forces
of what is, by circling through all beings, in-finitely unbounding
them." 280

Because the saying in-finitely unbounds all beings, it thus

finitely binds them to themselves, and to themselves alone.

Secure within

themselves, the Being of all beings has thereby been won over.
Dimmesdale's saying is a saying that recalls the temple of Being to
itself.

Language thence encircles in and through the crowd, bringing

every being immediately before its own facticity, and at the threshold of
the temple as well, but only at the threshold; at best, it can but murmur.
And yet, it is a beginning; it begins to form the work of language on its
own, the final saying that goes over from the vision of the head to the
saying of the heart.

Dimmesdale's articulate utterance, on the other

hand, has come round to the temple full circle, and back into it.

It has

already pronounced the round sound itself, and brought it to repose.
Being is round. 28l

Dimmesdale's pronunciation brings the Letter into its

279rbid., p. 257.
280Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 136.
28l"What calm there is in the word round. How peacefully it makes
one's mouth, lips and the being of breath become round."(Bachelard, The
Poetics of Space, p. 239.)
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own, into the fullness of words, into the saying of its discourse.
of the silence comes the sound.

The silence and the saying come together;

together they articulate the spoken.
no language, what is said. 282

Out

For what is spoken is never, and in

The "A" becomes Art, becomes alphabet,

becomes alpha, becomes beginning; and yet it is itself the end as well.
It is beginning and end.
itself.

It has already come round the full circle to

Dimmesdale's conversion occurs in the poetry of language.

therefore uncommon; it is exceptional.

It is

In turning toward the freedom and

openness of its finitude, it denies the customary im-position of the
"self" in its everyday, eternal imposture of the "they."
saying makes Being safe, secure; it makes it sound.

Dimmesdale's

It is a saying that

follows something to be said, a saying which is said solely in order to
say it.283

And in its very saying, it turns away from itself; it turns

itself toward man:

"The more venturesome are those who say in a greater

degree, in the manner of the singer.
all purposeful self-assertion.
desire.

Their singing is turned away from

It is not a willing in the sense of

Their song does not solicit anything to be produced.

In the

song, the world's inner space concedes space within itself."284

As Rilke

has expressed it in the third of his sonnets to Orpheus (1922):

"Gesang

ist Dasein."

Song is existence.285

singer; the singer makes space.

The more venturesome is thus the

He makes the round space for Being.

The

282Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 11.
2 8 3cf. Ibid., p. 137.

284 Ibid., p. 138.

285Rainer Maria Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus, trans. M. D. Herter
Norton (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., The Norton Library, 1962),
p. 20:
Gesang, wie du ibn lehrst, ist nicht Begehr,
Nicht Werbung um ein endlich noch Erreichtes;
Gesang ist Dasein.
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singer takes the first breath that makes the round space of Being there,
so that when Being is there, it is the singer (Da-sein).

Being and the

singer are one in the breath which dares to say; and "those who are more
daring by a breath dare the venture with language."286

And who is this

singer who ventures more than any other?
He is the poet, but only the poet "whose song turns our unprotected
being into the Open." 287

In the saying of the inner recall, Dimmesdale

takes up the song of the singer and dares to venture forth from the
everyday nature of man into the round realm of Being.

"The converting

inner recalling is the daring that dares to venture forth from the nature
of man, because man has language and is he who says." 288
thus the poet whose song sings the round Being itself.

Dimmesdale is
And yet, this

round Being is in no sense thereby handed over to the geometrician,
whose thinking is exterior to thinking. 289

For Being always comes into

its completion within the finitude of its own time, and so can never
enter onto the single, infinite horizon of the geometrician's eternally
vacant stare.

Rather, the simple song which Dimmesdale sings teaches a

profound lesson in both finitude and solitude, but only to those who
listen.

It is outside the noisy chatter of the "they," and 'therefore

"to the point."

Dimmesdale's song is near and to the point because it

echoes, amidst the interval of silence, the authentic interrogation,
Song, as you teach it, is not desire,
Not suing for something yet in the end attained,
Song is existence.
286Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 140.
287Ibid.

288rbid.

289cf. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, p. 233.
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"What does it mean to be!"

It echoes, however, only with another

question, for the answer is itself already contained in the question.
Dimmesdale's saying sings the song:

"What does it mean to die!"

It

sings the saying with such an immediate frankness that those who are
talking cannot hear.
"tout rond."290
question.

The saying is therefore like the singer himself:

The roundness of the poet is the roundness of his

The poet Dimmesdale thus sings the saying of the inner recall

long forgotten since Parmenides:

What is the meaning of Being!

The

question, like its meaning, comes round full circle in the solitude of
the poet who sings it.
us in his death.

And the roundness of the question comes back to

Death makes poets of us all.

Being is round.

The time of Hawthorne's oeuvre is now; it is

present to us in its future.

Those with ears may hearken to the

intimate silence of its void.

The silent void of Hawthorne's world

unnerves us with its strange and alien listening.

It is the silence of

the dark, the silence that echoes a saying, a saying out of a silence
which is, as night is to darkness, the disembodied shade of silence
itself.

As with Montaigne's essays, Hawthorne's work informs a single

question; it answers none.

It is silent.

which has long since been forgotten:

The question is the saying

what does it mean to be!

This

saying of the question has been forgotten because it is too near.
this reason, it has been forgotten on purpose.

For

Hawthorne's work disrupts

the talkative chit-chat of forgetfulness with a silence that remembers
290In English, the expression betrays to what extent the
hypocritical tendencies of the scientific-technological world-view
reflect its manipulatively pre-dominant and psychotically insecure (careless) mode of consciousness; for such an earnest openness is never
"round," but "square." (Cf. Ibid.)
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what has become remote, and which is near to us now because there is
nothing in the way.

Hawthorne's work takes in a single breath the

saying of the question what does it mean to be and, in an aspiration
singly full of sound, creates a world.
in the poetic saying of its language.

The world of Hawthorne's work is
The poetic saying of Hawthorne's

work speaks to us today, and does so within the silence of its
listening, a listening which echoes the saying of the inner recall to be.
The poetic saying of Hawthorne's oeuvre "gathers the brightness and
sound of the heavenly appearances into one with the darkness and silence
of what is alien.

By such sights the god surprises us.

strangeness he proclaims his unfaltering nearness." 291

In this
The poetic saying

of Hawthorne's work brings man back to earth and into the fullness of
Being.

Hawthorne's world is his work; it brings man into the fullness of

dwelling.

Poetically, Hawthorne's oeuvre abides.

291Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 226.

SUMMARY
THE GROUND.

The middle ages had conceived of a picture as an impene-

trable surface on which figures and things were depicted.

It was not

until about 1420 that Brunelleschi defined the painting as a plane cross
section through the pencil of rays connecting the eye of the spectator
with the objects seen, so that by around 1435 Alberti was able to formulate the picture as an imaginary windowpane through which we look out
into a section of space.

Because the Renaissance predicated its

radically new approach to the visible world upon this neoteric definition
of artistic construction and representation, the world itself became
uniformly spatial in so far as it could be geometrically articulated.
Indeed, this revolutionary technique for graphic representation created
the very possibility of an objective science; and it is fair to say that
the subsequent development of all the sciences during the Renaissance was
directly contingent upon it.

To the degree that the world had become

geometrically spatial, man became an observer--the dis-interested
spectator of his "view."

Similarly, to the extent that the new

representational technique of perspective delineated the space of an
"objective" world and created the basis for an "objective" science during
the Renaissance, it subsequently fostered the metaphysical world-picture
whereby the subjectum negotiates the world from an un-situated and
theoretically ubiquitous point of view--that is, outside of it.

Once the

world became transparent, it ceased to be that space where man comes up
"against" things, and became instead the luminous reflection of
consciousness.

Cartesian metaphysics solidified this position when it
382
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defined the existent as objectivity of representation, and truth as
certainty of representation; as such, the existent is only so long as it
is set before us as an object, as something calculable and manipulable.
Similarly, the world became determinate only in so far as man had it in
his view.

This anthropological analysis of the world attained exclusive

prominence at the end of the eighteenth century and is essentially
characterized by having a world-view (Weltanschauung).

For Newton the

existent became known as correct or true to the extent that it was
represented as a refractive condition of the eye; for Kant the existent
became known as correct or true in so far as it was represented either as
a determinate concept through the instrumentality of the

~

priori forms

of the categories of the understanding, or as an indeterminate concept of
an "aesthetic" object.

Thus, both the "scientific" and "intellectual"

attitudes came to be predicated on the analogous operation of
re-presentation.
Blake's disgust with the tradition of Newton and Cartesian dualism
constitutes a radical break with the eighteenth-century aesthetic and
metaphysical world-view.

He continuously inveighed against the

scientific-technological objectification of Being.
part, his age ignored him.

Yet, for the most

Similarly, the romanticism and transcenden-

talism of the nineteenth century merely transferred the transparency of
an isolated "cogito" onto the external world itself.

Thus, the subject-

object dichotomy remained inherent in any investigation of "reality."
Although romantic poets rhetorically rejected "rationalism" in favor of
"feeling," they continued to employ its perceptual bias in so far as they
appropriated perspective in order to isolate single, emotional states.
In looking back toward an historical subjectivity, romanticism
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synchronically framed a whole life in terms of sequential, emotional
pictures placed in a theoretical perspective.

In the same way, Emerson's

"transparent eyeball" ignored the opaque carnality of existence.

In his

essay "Nature," he invariably relied upon the traditional epistemological
metaphor of picture-thinking, and its correlative ground in perspective.
Like the scientific consciousness, Emerson's "reason" defines its scope
in terms of the infinite and eternal; because it fails to recognize the
very situatedness of Being, it dis-locates itself from the world it seeks
to perceive and, henceforth, ascribes to mind what was once the task of
the body.

Truth remains objective in the sense that it is there for all

to see, it is the object of the mind; and man can know the truth only as
a completed view already set before him.

This attitude represents a

logical extension of Cartesian metaphysics, wherein the existent as a
whole forfeits its opacity and becomes visibly transparent--that is,
invisible.

Thus, man gets a view on it, a picture of the whole thing.

In effect, Emerson no more wished to transact the truth of vision than
did Descartes, for Emerson's vision, like Descartes' Dioptric, merely
constructs the visible according to a model-in-thought.

Indeed, that

Emerson uses the word "picture" in his essay to such an excess suggests
that he recognizes the moment of vision as a fixed, organized image,
anticipating the daguerreotype by three years.
If in the history of modern science the advent of perspective
marked the beginning of a first period, the discovery of the photograph
culminated the attitude of an age.

More than any other invention of the

nineteenth century, the daguerreotype became the metaphor for technology
in the public consciousness.

In general, the daguerrean view supported

the publicly biased attachment to technology and its concomitant
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perceptual prejudice to the extent that it helped "locate" man in the
universe; it encouraged the fictive time and space which accompanies
having a world-view,

Once man had captured the existent scientifically,

and done so in a purely "objective" fashion divorced from the partial
subjectivity inherent in microscopic and telescopic instrumentation, the
existent was assumed to be "there-before-him" once and for all--that is,
in the sense we have defined as "rational. 11

In 1849, when Samuel Dwight

Humphrey sent one of his plates of a multiple exposure of the moon to
Jared Sparks, Sparks remarked that it revealed the actual motion of the
earth on its axis, distinctly measured for half a minute's time within
the space of one-tenth of an inch.

Once time and space have been set

before us as an entirely measurable function, as the kind of thing on
which we can formulate a perspective, both time and space are
demonstrated to be calculable and manipulable; they are, in fact, proven
to be exclusively objective, and to be so "really."

The daguerreotype's

ability to record a direct image of man's "location" with respect to the
moon and stars asserted man's presence in the universe, and pushed him
further into the forefront of that frame of reference by which the
existent as a whole would henceforth be envisioned, manipulated, and
constituted.

The daguerreotype terminated the emphasis which the age

placed on visual representation and its correlative ability to arrive at
the truth of nature, and reality in general.

Moreover, the dauerreotype

not only objectified the thing, but the subjectum as well; the
daguerrean portrait transformed people into things in so far as it
extended and multiplied the human image to the proportions of massproduced merchandise.

Nevertheless, whatever "object" it captures, the

photograph, like the world-view, sets its image before us as

~

view; the
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spectator simultaneously sets himself apart from the view to the extent
that it represents a privileged consciousness anterior to perception
itself.

In the sense that the photograph objectified the world, it

further evidenced the "correctness" of Cartesian metaphysics whereby the
subjectum knows the object as extended and separate from him in a
continuous and uniform space according to an a priori rationality or
fixed perspective.

Scientifically, of course, the photograph culminated

the age of mechanical industrialism.

Thus, perspective created the very

possibility of an objective science.

Telescope and microscope had

further magnified the scientific objectification of the world.

But with

the photograph, the scientific mission had entered a new era which would
extend the ubiquitous deceit of the camera-eye far into the twentieth
century itself.

Since it was able to capture the interior gestures of

both matter and mind, the photograph constituted the foundat.ion not only
for sub-atomic physics, but for the new worlds of endocrinology and
psychopathology as well.
When Gertrude Stein said of Picasso that with him pictures
commenced to want to leave their frames, she prefigured the most
elementary posture of twentieth-century art in general •. Although the
twentieth century divinizes the image of life framed by the world-view
because it remakes technology into the new godhead, its artists have
relentlessly declared that god is, once and for all, dead.

Very simply,

this means that we can no longer unquestioningly accept the all-embracing
grace of the ubiquitous vision of science.

Rather than envision the

world as god would see it, twentieth-century art liberates the world for
man and man for the world; it situates man within the limited point of
view, the freedom of his own "perspective," and rids him of the
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cystostic vision of a technology which would control him with the same
disrespect by which its controls its entire object-world.
what cubism explicitly proclaimed.

And this is

Because cubism appreciated the

spectacle of the world as a certain kinaesthetic situation, it redefined
the significance of correlative perspective in perception.

It thus

renounced the transparently ubiquitous point of view which always "sees"
the thing from an ideal perspective, as a mental construct or
idea--Leibniz's perspectiveless posture.

Cubism reformulated the

phenomenal space of the world, the non-geometrical space in which my
relation to the thing is constituted by the situation.

In so far as the

"realism" of the photograph is derivative, it tells us' nothing of our
primordial appropriation of a world.

If art were to escape its utter

subjection to the world-view, it had to rediscover that primary "reality,"
being-in-the-world.

Cubism pictorially articulated the primordial

situatedness of Being prior to its intussusception by a malignant
theoretical optics.
Euclidean space.

It reversed the traditional perspective of

Even before cubism, modern painting had definitively

disclaimed Euclidean space as an

~

priori.

The images of Seurat and

Rousseau transact the "interior" space of the world; as formal or
phenomenal spaces they are naive only to the extent that there is no
"room" for an impersonal object.

By manipulating its foreground as the

embolic function of an expressive depth, modern painting apprehended the
object in its phenomenal space, one which in-corporates the spectator,
takes him in, envelops him.

Because it does not set the perceiver apart,

as a viewer, its expressive space emancipates it from the frame.

Yet,

in their insubordination to the emmetropic delineation of reality, modern
painters were not alone.
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Just as in painting the composition commenced to leave its frame,
so it was with the musical composition as well; for with "atonality" or
"antitonality," as Stravinsky preferred to call it, the tonal function
of chords escaped the frame of the diatonic system.

Similarly, with

Apollinaire, Proust, and Ibsen, the poem, novel, and play abandoned the
narrative and temporal continuity which had informed the basic structure
of literary art since the Renaissance "rediscovered" Aristotle.

Thus,

by rejecting the lineality of a continuous and uniform perspectivespace, modern art exploded that most elemental bias which had plagued
Western civilization for more than four centuries.

In returning to the

expressive composition of the work, modern art abrogated the subjectobject dichotomy constituted and sustained by the principles of
resemblance, imitation, and representation.

By virtue of a trans-

position, either juxtaposition or superimposition, modern art escaped
the continuous and uniform perspective of "transition."

We no longer

observe the art work from a pre-determined distance, as a view, but touch
it by entering onto its space.

To the extent that modern art brings all

of its "elements" equally into the foreground so that something is "in
front" or "in back" of something else only in so far as the gaze of the
"perceiver" distinguishes it as such, the art work enters onto the world
as an incomplete "gestalt" which demands to be completed in order to be
experienced at all.

In its demand to be completed, modern art asserts

an ontological priority in time, not space, and appropriates this
significance in so far as the motion becomes identical with its
completion.

The transposition of modern art thus constitutes what today,

in effect, we call "montage."

For the twentieth century, as for the

Renaissance, it was art which once again preceded science and technology,
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and their most significant product since the daguerreotype--the "motion"
picture.

The motion in modern art prefigured cinematic montage and its

purely transitional nature--temporal juxtaposition.

Modern art not only

opened onto the revolutionary form of the film and its subsequent technological development, but once again laid the ground for all of the
seminal advances in the science and technology of the twentieth century.
It created, in fact, the very possibility of a "post-modern" physics
some fifty years ahead of its time.

For what, after all, is the space

of the electron, wherein it concurrently travels through two or more
different routes without traversing the space between them at all, if not
the pre-objective, "behavioral," situated space of being-in-the-world?
It is nothing less than the expressive space of modern art.

The post-

modern physicist is subsequently encouraged to talk about a theory in
terms of its "elegance," rather than its "truth."

And in so doing, he

has at last returned to a world of beauty, the very world of art from
whence he originally emerged during the Renaissance.

As it did when

Einstein introduced his theory of relativity and Heisenberg his
principle of indeterminacy, the world henceforth runs the risk of
continually being upset--indeed, reappropriates the very principle of
chaos as part of its ground.

The perceptually biased "defense

mechanisms" of optical perspective are, at last, de trop.

THE FIGURE.

For the nineteenth century, the daguerreotype appreciably

offset the temporal and spatial displacement caused by the latest
technology; for it securely located man within the perspective
co-ordinates of his world-view.

Yet, violent technical innovation

engenders alienation and the pain of isolation in any age.

Hawthorne's
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fiction definitively expresses the alienation and pain of isolation which
his own age experienced.

Hawthorne's fiction condemns the unconscious

bias of perception of his own culture, and thus opens the possiblity of
new perceptions with respect to the counter-environment or "world" of the
fiction itself.

Hawthorne's fiction speaks against the age.

What he

most generally disliked about his age was its attitude toward the visual
sense, an attitude which overwhelmingly reflected the major concern of
his day as it appeared vis-\-vis technology--specifically, the
"daguerrean" or world-view.

Grounded in finite temporality, Hawthorne's

descriptive gaze never gives us the whole picture any more than the mind
is able to grasp the meaning and value of Being within a single and
systematic mental equivalent.

Hawthorne's emphasis on feeling,

sensibility, and interiority reflects his reaction to the prevalent
"rationalism" of his day, and appropriates, in its place, the changing
appearance of each object with respect to the temporality of perception
itself.

The scientific frame of reference provided Hawthorne with

images which enabled him to interiorize the world afresh in order to
communicate with it, to rediscover its primordial texture and consistency
rather than describe its popularly accepted fixation in physical,
chemical, and biological laws.

Hawthorne's external objects

consistently defy their abstracted theoretical frame:

the Letter, the

House, the Faun, the serpent, the ribbon, the maypole, the veil, the
lime-kiln--all these objects signify, in fact, the interior enownment
of a world, partial elements of a spatial configuration, the personal
completion of a structural "gestalt" within a subject.

For Hawthorne,

an object is "objective" only to the extent that it perceptually informs
the partial aspect of a "field."

Indeed, in the most basic sense of the
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term, all of Hawthorne's symbols are, in fact, emblems.

They exist

within a spatial configuration, and appear as "figures 11 against an
ambiguously indeterminate "ground. 11
symbol, the scarlet letter.

Thus it is with Hawthorne's greatest

Hawthorne's fiction abrades the traditional

descriptive distance; we find ourselves in a revolutionarily unique
landscape where the immediate encroaches so entirely upon our perceptual
field that we can scarcely obtain a perspective at all.

Like the cubists,

Hawthorne's descriptive gaze transforms the object into a set of
synecdochic oscillations whose visual orientation strives toward maximum
determinateness.
it himself.

It obtains only in so far as the perceiver "completes"

This technique is clearly cinematic, and prefigures the

changing angle, variable perspective, and repertoire of variously focused
"shots" indicative of the highly sophisticated "motion" picture of the
twentieth century.
Hawthorne's changing light manifests this perceptual "distance" as
an expressive function of the gaze itself.

Our proximity to any given

figure in the field is solely predicated upon the descriptive intention
to "take it up."

Because description discloses the affective aspect of

an object, its perceptual appropriation primordially reflects an
intentional "motion" in the subject, and not the representational
determination of an object as such.

Thus, in Hawthorne, distance

invariably constitutes the expressive completion of a figure against a
background, and not the static and fixed pictorialism of photographic
perspective.

Hawthorne's variable lighting alters the discovery of its

objects according to the changing situatedness of the perceiver.

Unlike

daguerrean representation, which seeks to bring into sharp focus the
entire content of its frame, Hawthorne's emblematic field, grounded in
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darkness itself, merely suggests the incomplete outlines of its figures
as they are intermittently elucidated by the perceptual intention to take
them up.

For every object the gaze investigates, it simultaneously

forfeits its hold upon the other objects in its field; they, in turn,
slip away or fade back toward the obscure periphery from whence they
originated.

Like the modern art work, Hawthorne's descriptive gaze

brings the object out of its predetermined location and to the surface.
It explodes the predetermined objectification of a reality transparently
and uniformly illuminated by the scientific vision, which would impose
its own inflexibly rigid structure in order to manipulatively dominate
the delimited content of its fixed and sterile view.

The world of

Hawthorne's fiction passionately defrays the inordinate cost of an
objectively neutered universe and its bankrupt vision, in favor of a
polar and metamorphic reality situated in the personal glance of a
perceiver.

Amidst this sexually ambiguous world, Hawthorne's gaze enowns

the interiority of its objects as they in turn reconstruct the
subjective consciousness perceiving them.

Perceptually grounded in the

mutability of time, the object refuses the absolute determination
assigned to it by the formal and spatial priority of the world-view.

The

inter-play of light and shade, of reflected and refracted light against
an obscure backdrop of black, allowed Hawthorne to populate his universe
with objects interiorized by the opacity of human consciousness itself.
Hawthorne's Faustian gaze dared to see reality differently than his age
would have him view it; rather than intellectually codify the images of
experience, he ventured into its primordial chaos in order to resurrect
the very body of the world itself, a body whose physical and opaque
carnality had long since been discarded by the disembodied image of
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daguerrean perspective, the flat projection of the scientific and
technological world-view.
Yet, if Hawthorne's indirect lighting were to articulate the
objects of an emblematic gaze so that they virtually protrude to touch
us, he would have to project a personal and concrete field which interpenetrates every experience of his world, and concomitantly allows for
the inter-sensory unity of every "thing" in that world.

In other words,

Hawthorne's emblematic gaze required a means at his disposal by which he
could capture the reality of the world of his vision, and his
appropriation of the emblem itself partially accomplished that task, for
in the emblematic technique he discerned that indeterminate field whicQ
insinuates the object and perceptually enables it to come to life.

The

depth of Hawthorne's vision, however, demanded something more; and he
unearthed that key in the diorama.

For Hawthorne, the diorama

represented the most expressively intense perceptual model of how we
primordially articulate the world.

What best characterizes the dioramic

experience is its ability to absorb a reflective identity via the
circumambient darkness constitutive of the precondition for involvement.
Just as silence constitutes the ground of all communication, darkness
makes it possible.

Darkness is immanence; it recreates the interior of

Being, the way in which the world makes its first appearance.

Dioramic

darkness engages the spectator-reader by surrounding him, and thus
establishes the specific situatedness by which a percipient makes the
birth of Being possible in the first place.

Reciprocally, because it

encloses the spectator within the immediacy of its own perceptual
re-enactment, this dioramie darkness concurrently generates the creation
of a self-sufficient world.

In fact, the spectator-reader has already
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been put into the situation by virtue of the presencing temporality of
those images which spontaneously appear amidst the ground of chaotic
darkness, and are already on the way toward a determinate order.
Hawthorne's images are essentially cinematic.

Thus,

Against the enclosing

dark, the cinematic image "takes shape," and prematurely stands out
against this indeterminate field.

This perceptual, physical blackness

which pervades Hawthorne thus yields the key that unlocks not only the
perceptual habit of Hawthorne the man, but also discloses the interior,
self-sufficient world of his oeuvre.

If the reflective attitude sustains

its space by thinking the illuminated relation of its parts, the prereflective interior of dioramic darkness, on the other hand, unites me to
an affective space precisely because it intimately merges with the
surface of my body, and threatens to absorb the very reflective identity
which can always disperse it by "turning on the lights."

Because it

constitutes a dimension in which I am entirely enveloped, darkness thus
recreates the depth of an interior space wherein I am perceptually
situated at all times.

Without anchor in externally objective

co-ordinates, Hawthorne's dioramic darkness grounds the world of his work
in the ambiguous affectivity of a subject, that zone of not-being-in-frontof whereby things are primordially able to come to light, and, on the
descriptive level, provides the very darkness necessary in the cinema in
order to show up the performance.
However, if dioramic space can be distinguished from the daguerrean
view in so far as it essentially envelops us rather than spreading its
content out before us, and therefore outside of us, it also distinguishes
itself on another equiprimordially meaningful level.

If Hawthorne

discovered, in the diorama, the cirumspective black in which the shape of
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his images could make their first appearance, he also detected an
interior "motion" by which they unfold before us and come to life.

In

the juxtaposition or, more properly speaking, the "transposition" of his
images, we find Hawthorne's brilliant cinematic vision most pronounced.
While the internal composition shapes the significant content of
Hawthorne's image, it simultaneously determines those images which
precede and succeed it, for the sequence of his imagery is predicated
on the pre-reflective motion of perception, that motion in the visual
field which "makes sense" of the objects it discovers.

Hawthorne's

cinematic "shots" constantly alter in proportion to the extent of their
discovery, for they continuously suit or accommodate the transfigurative
motion of perception, the discernment of variously changing figures
against an indeterminate ground.
discovered montage.

In the diorama, Hawthorne had already

Because it transcends or trans-forms the individually

framed images which produce it, montage creates the illusion of motion.
Hawthorne employed the literary equivalent of montage in order to create
a similar kind of motion in the mind's eye.

His images continually

manipulate the affective distance between spectator and scene not only as
a function of space, but also in time.

Hawthorne's editorial technique

of "cutting" and "splicing" directly regulates and modifies the tempo in
which his images appear.
fast cutting.

Most often, his visual effects do not demand

Indeed, in many instances, fast cutting would ruin the

desired effect, for the movement is frequently located within the image
and virtually demands a fixed, consistent camera-viewpoint.

Thus,

Hawthorne's strong, eloquent arrangements between successive images and
within the single image (mise-en-sc~ne), invites stylistic comparison
with Eisenstein, especially his later style in Ivan the Terrible, where
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he had already evolved away from a rapid cutting style to a slow,
elaborate pic torialism.

Li.ke the later Eisenstein, Hawthorne's

predominant tempo is slow; slow motion, delayed and deliberate cutting,
these most suitably accommodate his preferred themes, especially that of
the processional.

If point of view determines the correlation between

foreground and background, it is more readily understandable why
Hawthorne prefers a slower movement between successive images, rather
than a rapid cutting style, for it gives him more time to create an
ambience, to animate the scene, to linger, to suggest--the speed, in
short, which allows the most extensive interchange between foreground
figures and background objects.

Hawthorne's imagery is thus clearly

cinematic; its interior motion reflects an intentional subjectivity
beneath perception which not only accounts for the birth of a world, but
also sustains the reality of that world.

He anticipated the modern

cinema by more than half a century, and in that process he prefigured the
articulation of an affective spatial depth wherein perception primordially
transpires.
Moreover, if Hawthorne's dioramic gaze enabled him to reveal an
indeterminate world no longer constituted by the daguerrean frame or
world-view, it simultaneously structured a consciousness which was itself
ambiguously circumvoluted.

Because cinematic consciousness projects a

space which comes and goes, it subsequently creates an iconology whose
jagged edges split and tear the image rather than seal it off.

At the

interior of this disconnected, unenclosed consciousness, Hawthorne
heuristically interrogates the meaning or significance of those
apparitions which inhabit the world of his work.

The world of Hawthorne's

work previews the purely apparitional space of cinema and its irreverent
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disregard for objectivity by re-incorporating appearance and reality.
The cinematic vision expresses the immediacy of its apparitions.

Grounded

in facticity, Hawthorne's world is thus formal only in so far as it is
phenomenal; because it has no framework fixed in a physical or pictorial
space, but merely structures the mobile reticulation of intention, it
thus asserts, as its primary formal characteristic, a virtual present.
It is in the mode of dream.

Hawthorne's fiction characteristically evokes

a dream mode, a mode which like all of modern art brings its elements
equally into the foreground.

The dream provided Hawthorne with a

diastolic counterbalance to the ponderous systole of rationalism and its
synchronic historical perspective.

Hawthorne explicitly reconstructed

the logic of dream consciousness in order to undermine the arrogant and
manipulative certitude of the daguerrean view, thus undercutting the
subject-object dichotomy itself.

Against the transparency of scientific

certitude, Hawthorne's fiction asserts the ambiguous concealedness of
truth and its corresponding epistemological appropriation by a factical
subjectivity which must call it into Being.

By re-establishing the

primacy of the phenomenon, Hawthorne's dream-like vision returns to the
immediate order of apparitions as they make their. first appearance in
consciousness, and by which the world in turn originally announces
itself.

The dream enabled Hawthorne to structure a vision of the world

primordially grounded in appearance, a vision indistinguishable from the
"reality" it is presumed to re-present.

Reality becomes the oblique

transformation of appearances, a lived-through structure whereby man's
facticity announces itself anew.

For Hawthorne, the dream mode thus

cancelled out the abstracted and theoretical logic of second-order
consciousness; the truth of the world no longer obtains from its non-
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contradictory agreement within a fixed and sterile mental perspective of
correct and true ideas.

Indeed, dream even distorts the "probable," that

quantitative security-blanket by which the masses live their lives
mathematically.
Hawthorne's interior world of dream translates the dioramic gaze
into the subjective realm of metaphysics as an analogous model of logic.
In contrast to the mediate, reflective consciousness of the rational
attitude, this new interior consciousness reveals a logic immediately in
touch with Being.

Only outside Being does man objectify the object;

within the concernfully solicitous sphere of his existence, the object is
objective only in so far as it "objects."

Hawthorne's ontological turn

toward the interior of Being discloses a logic which converts the
immanent objectness of consciousness into the heart's innermost region.
Within this intimate space, the heart takes up the things of the world
as they proximally express the nearness of Being.

That the remoteness of

Being, which the perspective of the scientific-technological world-view
takes for granted, represents the most pressing dilemma of a visual
culture is already indicated in the growing sense of division between
appearance and reality; thus, in conjunction with its afo.rementioned
evils, the perspective of a world-view also introduced an obsession with
the problem of hypocrisy.

Hawthorne's oeuvre, on the other hand, seeks

to direct or turn consciousness away from itself, and back to a singleminded injunction long forgotten since Socrates.

And it is now

remembered in the same way that we recall a friend who was once dear to
us.

At the same time, this injunction evokes a general image which

initially hovers before the world of Hawthorne's work, and which
completes the work itself.

And though Hawthorne's metonymic iconology
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manipulates its "space" so that it freely moves about, his interior
consciousness and its corresponding logic of the heart's inner space
nevertheless creates an intimate and unified bearing toward the world of
his work, a bearing spiritedly at odds with the continuous and fixed
attitude of the world-view.

It is this intimate and unified bearing

which recalls the single-minded injunction long since forgotten:
thine own self be true!"

"to

This imperative so innnediately undercuts the

hypocritical duality of the world-view that its recognition at once
illuminates the deceitful disposition of the technological attitude and
its attendant evils.

By being true to himself, man can at last learn to

accept the reciprocal "reality" of appearance and its formal relation to
the structure of the world.

Hawthorne's oeuvre attests this fact, and

solicits the truth of Being within the ambiguous openness at the interior
of the heart's inner space.

Hawthorne's work accomplishes this venture

by transforming the technological dominion of purposeful self-assertion
in the objective into the saying of an inner recall; and it inaugurates
this transformation with the single-minded injunction.
been dared this way, it now lies in the balance.

Once Being has

The world of Hawthorne's

work safely negotiates this balance once it executes the saying of the
inner recall.

In going over from the calculating will to the interior of

the heart, the world's inner space, the conversion of consciousness is
therein complete, whereby consciousness secures itself for Being.

Thus,

the conversion of consciousness at the interior of Hawthorne's world
appropriates a "physics of the exception" rather than the rule; it
care-fully takes man beyond the protective rule of uniformity toward
that interior space which bears the personal and unique stamp of Being.
Ultimately, Hawthorne's work accomplishes this conversion within the
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precinct or temple of Being itself, within the solicitous sphere of
language.

In the saying of the inner recall, Being is at last liberated

for man and for itself.

Grounded in the single-minded injunction,

Hawthorne's oeuvre speaks against the age.

It was only the destitution

of his own age which, unaware of what it was doing, prevented Hawthorne's
work from becoming timely.

Yet, Hawthorne's oeuvre arrives out of the

future; the future is present in it.
present to us now.

The world of Hawthorne's work is

It returns man to the solicitous sphere of Being in

which he most primordially dwells, the temple of language.
Hawthorne's work reposes in the poetry of its saying.
Hawthorne's oeuvre abides.

The world of

Poetically,
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